dissenting.
If I were to vote to affirm the Commission, it could not be on the basis of the *796majority opinion. Reviewing older cases from bygone farming days, that opinion moves on to our recent cases of Dwigans v. Olander, 98 Idaho 744, 572 P.2d 178 (1977), and Kuhn v. Box Canyon Livestock, Inc., 102 Idaho 658, 637 P.2d 1154 (1981), only to disdeign my attempt at reconciling the present with the past, and facilely falling back upon the language of the statute, “feeding, caring for, training and management of livestock .... ”
Although a feedlot operation is not known to entail the training or managing of livestock, it is, nevertheless, said that the statute applies because “the raising of crops for feeding to cattle is an activity normally done by farmers, and one normally thought of as agricultural pursuit.” Being somewhat of a person who fancies himself as capable of normally rationalizing upon such matters, I am not want to disagree with the postulate that crop raising is normally done by farmers — I do normally so regard it. In fact, I have always, normally or abnormally, regarded farmers as growers of crops, and conversely regarded growers of crops as farmers. At the same time, I have generally regarded cattle ranchers as people who own ranches and raise cattle, and I do not question that they fall into the realm of agriculture, as defined by the Workmen’s Compensation Law.
And then, too, there are crop-growing farmers who utilize some of their land and feed to raise a few cattle or other livestock, ordinarily for home consumption, but also for market and extra revenue. There is no problem in seeing this as within the agricultural exemption.
There is yet to be considered the would-be capitalist, perhaps much as myself, who, knowing little or, as with others maybe a lot, about the money to be made by feeding cattle, in simple terms recognize that feed goes in, weight goes up, and profit results. It can encompass buying cattle to feed at a lot, which is somewhat different than the farmer who utilizes existing pasture, and different from the cattle rancher who has pasture and range, and it also encompasses feeding for hire — at so much a head or so much per weight increase. I have no recollection of any feedlots in Idaho in its earlier days — but do not doubt their existence in the big cities. A stockyard at or near a railroad yard is a striking example of a feedlot, and there have always been stockyards. It is true that the duration of penning and feeding is shorter than at the feedlots of today. It is true, so I believe, that a stockyard probably would not classify as an agricultural pursuit.
But, the majority implies, as I read the portion quoted, that caring for and feeding livestock is by statutory definition an agricultural pursuit. And, apparently this is to be so no matter what the circumstances.
One cannot help but remember Little Boy Blue, the cowherd and shepherd, and Little Bo Peep, the girl shepherd. They took care of (tended) sheep and cattle, and would be clearly within the exemption. But, were they today found working at a feedlot, it is extremely doubtful that either would be considered as engaged in an agricultural pursuit. “Caring” for sheep, or cattle, as set forth in the statute clearly envisions today’s cattle ranch, and as easily envelopes taking care of livestock on a farm — but it is not so readily accepted that an industrially operated independent feedlot is within those categories. It is, in short, a close question, made so as I see it by keeping in mind that caring for livestock would ordinarily entail feeding the same. But that is not always so, as with the case of shepherding cattle and sheep, or having sheep graze or livestock at pasture. “Feeding” on the other hand may more often be taken in the concept of a hired man on a ranch who in winter gets the assignment of feeding the livestock who ordinarily would suffice by feeding themselves — yet such a person is required to give no “care” — largely because the animals are fenced in or simply aren’t going to stray from their source of daily delivered sustenance.
The parties recognize the case as close, and give us excellent briefs. Claimant in his opening brief concludes his argument thusly:
*797“Those cases cited by the Industrial Commission in their Conclusions of Law are not supportive of the determination reached. Lip service was paid to the ironclad dictum of this Court that doubtful cases are to be resolved in favor of compensation; that exemptions from coverage are to be narrowly construed; that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is to be given broad and liberal construction, and that the humane purposes of the law leave no room for narrow, technical construction in the interests of justice. These rules have been reiterated by this Court in decisions too numerous to name, and most recently in Kuhn v. Box Canyon Livestock, Inc., supra. Instead, the Commission labored under the singular preoccupation of the letter of the law with no regard or consideration to the intent of the law and precedent set by this Court.
“The Commission further erred when it stated, in Conclusion of Law II, R., p. 28, that ‘such operations have traditionally been classified in Idaho as agricultural labor.’ An operation such as the Employer’s, the feeding of cattle belonging to other people for pecuniary gain, has never been classified in Idaho at all. The case at bar is unique. For the first time, this Court is asked to determine if a custom cattle feeding business will be allowed to claim the shelter of the agricultural exemption.
“When the Employer decided there was money to be made in the isolated function of feeding cattle, he forsake his position as a rancher for that of a businessman. When he approached members of the cattle industry with his offer to fatten their cattle, he was offering a limited and specialized service. The protection of the agricultural exemption had been forfeited.
“Those elements necessary to qualify for the agricultural exemption have been applied to the Employer’s business, and that business fails to meet any test put to it:
“(1) The nature of the business as a whole (the limited and specialized service of custom cattle feeding, with no degree of ownership in the cattle fed, performed under a contractual agreement)
“(2) The question of ‘artificial’ v. ‘natural’ process (the confining of cattle to pens where they are fed special formulas of feed and supplements for the singular purpose of weight gain)
“(3) Specialization and commercialization (only one aspect of a total process is involved, and that one aspect is offered for an agreed upon price)
“(4) The dual business question (the production of feed; not necessary to the operation of the business, but an alternative chosen for convenience and profit) “(5) The nature of the Claimant’s duties (a working manager charged with the responsibility for all activities carried on for the Employer who was treated in a special manner)
“(6) Underlying policy considerations (no administrative difficulties exist, nor are there any problems with passing the cost of coverage on to the consumer) “The evidence of record establishes that the Employer operates a diversified and specialized business, of a limited nature, and for pecuniary gain. He is not entitled to the shelter of the agricultural exemption.”
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 35-37.
The employer counters in his conclusion:
“The Industrial Commission’s determination here is supported by the spirit and the letter of the agricultural pursuit exemption. A contrary result can be arrived at only by ignoring the plain meaning of. the exemption and by engrafting words which easily could have been inserted by the Legislature but were not. We refer to Claimant’s implied qualifications (a) that the cattle must have been owned by the employer; (b) that the exemption does not apply to large scale agricultural activity; (c) that the exemption does not apply to feeding cattle in feedlots; (d) that the exemption does not apply to feeding cattle belonging to others in a feedlot; (e) that the exemption does not apply to the specialized agricul*798tural service that requires special technical skills and businesslike management; (f) etc., ad nauseum.
“The simple answer is that the Legislature used rather ordinary, easily understood words in its definition of ‘agricultural pursuits.’ The words should be interpreted in the light of their common, ordinary meaning rather than resorting to a strained interpretation.
“Claimant of course is entirely opposed to the very concept of the agricultural pursuit exemption. We respect that opinion. Many hold the same beliefs. The wisdom of the exemption is subject to honest controversy. All of .these things should be addressed to the Legislature, however, rather than to the Court. The question before the Court is not whether the agricultural exemption is ‘just’ or ‘fair’ or ‘wise’ but whether it applies to this situation. If it does not apply it would be unjust, unfair and unwise to hold that it does.
“Claimant has not demonstrated any persuasive authority for his position. The Idaho cases on which he places the most heavy reliance — Mundell v. Swedlund, Reedy v. Trummell, Manning v. Win Her Stables, Inc., Goodson v. L.W. Hult Produce Co., Dwigans v. Olander, and Kuhn v. Box Canyon Livestock, Inc. —are all distinguishable on the facts or the law or both. The statute has been amended since Mundell; Reedy supports the Employer’s position; and the facts in Manning, Goodson, Dwigans and Kuhn are all decisively different than the facts here.
“On the other hand, Cook v. Massey and Reedy v. Trummell clearly support the Employer’s position that an ‘agricultural pursuit’ (particularly as defined since 1961) is nonetheless so if the services are performed for others. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the Employer’s enterprise was carried on on a 540+ acre farm owned by him and his wife; that at the time of the incident in question Claimant, the ‘farm manager,’ was clearly engaged in activities incidental to irrigation farming common to southern Idaho and the arid West in general.
“The determination by the Commission was correct. Any other determination would have required the Commission to read into Idaho Code § 72-212(8) words and concepts not contained therein. That is a Legislative function, not a function of the Commission or the Court.” Respondent’s Brief, pp. 73-75.
To which the claimant’s reply responds, concluding:
“It stands undisputed in the record that the Employer in the case at hand operates a cattle feeding business. R, Conclusions of Law II, p. 28.
“The Employer does not dispute the fact that the purpose of this business is to produce the greatest amount of weight gain in the shortest amount of time. In order to accomplish this, the cattle are kept in small, structured enclosures and fed a scientific mixture of feed and supplements. Br.A., p. 20.
“It stands undisputed in the record that this Employer makes his living through a contractual agreement to feed cattle belonging to other people. R, Findings of Fact, pp. 21 & 22.
“In following the dictum of this Court that the nature of the Employer’s business must be considered as a whole, we have a commercial business enterprise, offering a limited and highly specialized service performing a single, isolated function, selling that isolated and specialized service under contract. We do not rely on any cases in particular as authority. However, we DO rely heavily upon the consistent position of this Court that the agricultural exemption is not extended to businessmen who provide a limited and specific service, which performs an isolated function, on a contract basis. See, e.g., Dwigans v. Olander, supra.”
Appellant’s Reply Brief, pp. 18-19.
At oral argument the employer told us the issue was not clear-cut, largely because of the history of the agricultural exemption, and pointed out how' easily the legisla*799ture could have narrowed the exemption language as it did in 1982 for the milk haulers. It was submitted that a comparison might be made in feeding cattle on the famous King Ranch as against feeding cattle on a rented ten acre tract; one is an agricultural exemption, one is not.
The claimant at oral argument maintained that if the issue is in doubt, the nod goes to the working man.. Such, of course, has long been the law and is unneedful of citation.
I opened this effort with the statement that if I were voting to affirm, it would not be on the basis of the- majority opinion. Rather, it would be on the basis of the employer’s contention that the legislature should do the necessary. That body, however, may not be or may not become conversant with the problem. Our decision in Kuhn v. Box Canyon Livestock, Inc., supra, was apparently brought to the attention of the legislature, and it acted. This is as it should be. If the Court today affirms the Commission, as seems to be the case, legislative attention will not likely ensue. But it might, and for that reason I have incorporated the summaries of the parties. Even though the employer may prevail today, the employer has candidly suggested the closeness of the issue and the need for refinement of the statute.
The issue being in doubt, I cast my vote as predecessors in this office have done, for the working man claimant.