This case involves the construction of a warranty deed executed on November 2, 1931, by C. A. Farrand and Jessie V. Farrand conveying 160 acres of land to their son, Corles N. Farrand, and his “blood heirs.” The plaintiffs in this case, Pauline Belva Farrand Gray and Earsil Basil Far-rand, are the “blood heirs” and the only children of Corles N. Farrand.
In this action to quiet title, plaintiffs contend that the words in the granting clause, together with other language in the deed, show an intention on the part of the grantors to name these plaintiffs as grantees of the fee simple title in remainder, following successive life estates created by the deed in favor of C. A. Farrand, Jessie V. Farrand and Corles N. Farrand.
Defendant, Beula G. Stillman, a daughter of C. A. Farrand and Jessie V. Farrand, contends that the deed in question conveyed a fee simple title to Corles N. Farrand. In deraigning her title, her evidence shows that C. A. Farrand died within a few days after executing the deed; that on December 17, 1931, Corles N. Farrand executed a warranty deed in favor of his mother, Jessie V. Farrand, for a valuable consideration, and that on March 16, 1940, Jessie V. Farrand conveyed the property to defendant. The evidence shows that Jessie V. Farrand died in 1947.
Defendant filed a cross-petition praying the court to quiet the fee simple title in said land in her. The trial court held that the deed in question conveyed a fee simple title in said'.land to Corles N. Farrand, subject to the successive life estates of C. A. Far-rand and Jessie V. Farrand, and quieted the fee simple title thereto in the defendant, from which judgment plaintiffs have appealed.
The decisive question presented is whether the deed from C. A. Farrand and Jessie V. Farrand conveyed a fee simple title to Corles N. Farrand, or only a life estate to Corles N. Farrand with the remainder in fee simple to plaintiffs, following the successive life estates of the grantors.
In order to give proper consideration to the question presented, it ⅛ necessary that wé quote the deed in full, omitting only the acknowledgments. We have emphasized those typewritten portions of the deed which we believe to be decisive. The deed provides:
“THIS INDENTURE, MADE THIS 2nd DAY OF NOV. A.D., 1931 BETWEEN C. A. Farrand AND JESSIE V. FARRAND, his wife OF Woodward COUNTY, IN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, OF THE FIRST PART, AND Corles N. Far-rand, a married man OF COUNTY IN THE STATE OF Louisiana, THE SECOND PART:
“WITNESSETH, THAT SAID PARTies OF THE FIRST PART, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SUM OF One Dollar and Love and Affections DOLLARS, THE RECEIPT OF WHICH IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED DO BY THESE PRESENTS, GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL AND CONVEY UNTO THE SAID PART— OF THE SECOND PART, blood HEIRS AND ASSIGNS ALL THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL ESTATE SITUATED IN Major County COUNTY AND STATE OF OKLAHOMA, TO-WIT:
“The North half of the southeast fourth (Nl/¿ SEJ4), and the south half of the southeast fourth (SVé SE¡4) of Section 10 Twp. 23, Range 16, consisting of 160 acres more or less.
"It is the wishes of the parties of the first part that the title of the above described land be kept in the name of Corles N. Farrand during his lifetime and thereafter the title shall be transferred to his blood son Earsil Basil Far-rand and to his blood daughter Pauline Belva Farrand-Grey.
“It is furthermore the wishes of the parties of the first part that C. A. Far-*371rand shall have charge of the managing and the leasing for farming, grazing or other purposes, and the collecting of rentals during his lifetime, and thereafter the wishes of the parties of the first part are that Jessie V. Farrand shall have charge of the collection of the rentals, less the taxes in each instance, and the remainder of the rentals are to he used by Jessie V. Farrand as she judiciously sees fit.
“It is furthermore the wishes of the parties of the first part that this deed be recorded and held in escrow during the lifetime of C. A. Farrand and Jessie V. Farrand, and will then be delivered to Corles N. Farrand or his blood heirs.
“It is intended that the annual taxes deducted from rentals shall be paid from the rentals.
“TO HAVE AND TO HOLD THE SAME TOGETHER WITH ALL AND SINGULAR THE TENEMENTS, HEREDITAMENTS, AND APPURTENANCES THEREUNTO BELONGING OR IN ANYWISE APPERTAINING FOREVER:
“AND SAID C. A. Farrand and Jessie V. Farrand FOR their HEIRS, SUCCESSORS, EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS, DO HEREBY COVENANT, PROMISE AND AGREE, TO AND WITH THE SAID PARTies OF THE SECOND PART, THAT AT THE DELIVERY OF THESE PRESENTS have LAWFULLY SEIZED IN their OWN RIGHT OF AN ABSOLUTE AND INDE-FEASABLE ESTATE OF INHERITANCE, IN FEE SIMPLE, OF AND IN ALL AND SINGULAR THE ABOVE GRANTED AND DESCRIBED PREMISES, WITH THE APPURTENANCES, THAT THE SAME ARE FREE, CLEAR, DISCHARGED AND UNINCUMBERED OF AND FROM ALL FORMER OR OTHER GRANTS, TITLES, CHARGES, ESTATES, JUDGMENTS, TAXES, ASSESSMENTS AND INCUMBRANCES OF WHAT NATURE OR KIND SOEVER. AND THAT they WILL WARRANT AND DEFEND THE SAME FOREVER UNTO SAID PARTies OF THE SECOND PART, his HEIRS, SUCCESSORS, AND ASSIGNS, AGAINST SAID PARTies OF THE FIRST PART HEIRS, AND ALL AND EVERY PERSON OR PERSONS WHOMSOEVER LAWFULLY CLAIMING OR TO CLAIM SAME.
“IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE SAID PARTies OF THE FIRST PART HAVE HEREUNTO SET their HANDS THE DAY AND YEAR FIRST ABOVE WRITTEN.
“C. A. FARRAND
“JESSIE V. FARRAND.”
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a deed should be interpreted and the intention of parties ascertained in the same manner as other written contracts. Rush v. Champlin Refining Co., Okl., 321 P.2d 697; Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 179 Okl. 561, 66 P.2d 1069. But such intention cannot be used as a basis for deducing a conveyance when there is no granting clause creating the estate which was intended.
As was said by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the case of Flynn v. Fike, 291 Ky. 316, 164 S.W.2d 470, 473:
"Our court is one of the strongholds of the rule that in the construction of deeds the intention of the parties should be ascertained and given effect, regardless of formalities, but we have never extended that rule to the point of holding that title to realty may be transferred without words Of conveyance or language indicating an intention to convey or transfer title.”
We are convinced and hold that the words “blood heirs” as used in the above deed are'words of limitation and not words of purchase; therefore, no estate of any sort was vested in the plaintiffs in error by reason of their use following the name of the *372grantee. We are confirmed in this conclusion by the subsequent actions of the interested parties.
The pertinent facts disclosed by the record are:
1. In the warranty deed from Cories to Jessie, who had been one of his grantors and was advised of the contents of her deed to him, there was no reference to a remainder interest in anyone else.
2. A valuable consideration was paid by Jessie which obviously represented more than the value of a life estate in Cories. If she had been purchasing his life estate, she would have but little more than she already had, for she had an estate for her life.
3. There was a mortgage on this property in the approximate amount of $3,206 which was retired by Jessie and defendant in error, a sum which would probably not have been paid if only a life estate had been purchased.
These and many other instances disclosed by the record reveal that the parties considered that Cories had a fee simple title.
If intention is considered the controlling factor, we think the above amply sustains the judgment of the trial court. But there is an additional consideration herein. The three paragraphs inserted in the deed following the description contained no words of conveyance. They merely expressed a wish as to the future disposition of the property.
In the case of Long v. Holden, 216 Ala. 81, 112 So. 444, 446, 52 A.L.R. 536, the deed in question contained the following insertion after the description and before the habendum:
“ * * * It is so understood that at my death this land is to go to my daughter, L. L. Holden.”
In commenting on the effect of this the court said:
“ * * * By the statute, the duty is imposed upon the courts to liberally construe the words employed in the conveyance as words of transfer, and give them effect and operation according to the intention of the grantor, to be collected from the entire instrument. There must, however, be some words intended as words of conveyance. They cannot be supplied by judicial interpolation.”
In the above case reference is made to the case of McGarrigle v. Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum of San Francisco, 145 Cal. 694, 79 P. 447, 1 L.R.A.,N.S., 315, in which case the property was conveyed to Mc-Garrigle expressly “during his lifetime.” Following the description of the property was this inserted paragraph:
“It is the purpose of the party of the first part by this deed, that after the death of the said party of the second part, the said described lands shall become and be the property of the Roman Catholic Girls’ Orphan Asylum of San Francisco, State of California.”
In interpreting this deed, the court said:
“ * * * the language of the clause itself is but an expression of the grant- or’s purpose in the future disposition of the property. It left in her a reversion after the life estate of Thomas McGarrigle, which required some future conveyance, or some testamentary disposition, to effectuate its transfer to the orphan asylum. But not only was there a failure of operative words to convey to the asylum, but no present interest can be said to pass under the language which was employed. It is fundamental that, while possession or enjoyment of an estate may be deferred, a deed, to be operative, must pass a present interest. * * * ”
As said by the court in the Long case, supra, there must be words of conveyance to create an estate. They cannot be supplied by judicial interpolation.
While it is a cardinal rule of construction that the intention of the grantor in a deed, gathered from the four corners of the instrument, and surrounding circumstances, must be given effect if possible, such intention cannot be controlling if there is *373an absence of a proper granting clause, conveying a present interest and creating the estate intended.
We are of the opinion and hold that the deed in question, as construed by the parties, and by its failure to convey a present interest, vested Cories Farrand with the fee title rather than a life estate.
Judgment affirmed.
BLACKBIRD, V. C. J., and DAVISON, HALLEY and BERRY, JJ., concur. WILLIAMS, C. J.,' and WELCH, JACKSON and IRWIN, JJ., dissent.