Seigle v. Richardson

WILLIAMS, Justice

(dissenting).

The majority opinion after setting out the major part of the affidavit or alleged affidavit for publication in case No. 6062, holds such alleged affidavit to be sufficient and valid and further holds that the judgment of the trial court in the instant case holding such service by publication to be void, is erroneous. Such holding is made in the face of the fact that such alleged affidavit, as set out in such opinion, shows on the face of it that it is not the affidavit of anyone. Such alleged affidavit commences as follows:

“Maurice Seigle, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:”

Such alleged affidavit is not signed by Maurice Seigle, however, the only signature appearing at the end thereof being that of “C. C. Wilkins”. The majority opinion states that because it has been learned from other sources that C. C. Wilkins was the attorney for the plaintiff in that case that the above instrument is thereby converted into a good and valid affidavit for publication. If such instrument be an affidavit, whose affidavit is it? The majority opinion does not say, and I am of the opinion that it is not an affidavit at all.

Even more important, however, is a fact of which the majority opinion takes no cognizance whatsoever. The alleged affidavit for publication is composed almost entirely of false allegations, admittedly known to be false by the party signing the same at the time thereof. In addition, a portion of such admittedly false allegations were repeated in the affidavit of mailing filed in said cause No. 6062. I cannot agree that a valid and binding service of process may be obtained in any such manner. The majority opinion states that plaintiff alleged in her petition and contends here “that the plaintiff in Cause No. 6062 did not use diligence”. This is as much recognition as the opinion gives to the complete and brazen fraud which is uncontradicted in the record and was specifically found by the trial court. In rendering judgment in the instant case, the trial court, on its own motion, and initiative, made and entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact and conclusions of law are in pertinent part as follows:

“The defendants in this case claim title by virtue of a purported tax deed and a judgment quieting title thereon. The court finds that Otis Garrett and his son, R. W. Garrett, together with Maurice Seigle, have for several years used the same offices in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and have been engaged in *772acquiring tax titles in the various counties of Oklahoma; that the treasurer’s deed relied upon was acquired in the name of Otis Garrett on the 7th day of August, 1945, and was based upon a notice of application for tax deed and upon an affidavit to obtain service by publication, and an affidavit in lieu of mailing a copy of notice by publication for tax deed, none of which was served upon the occupant of the land in question. Notice was not given to well known local individuals, and though the affidavit to obtain service by publication was made by Otis Garrett, who lives in Oklahoma City, he swore that he did not know R. A. Hefner, one time May- or of Oklahoma City.
“The Court further finds that Maude S. Richardson, the plaintiff herein, received no notice of application for tax deed,- though she has resided in the same town, Muldrow, Oklahoma, for twenty-two years; that she and her husband, M. J. Richardson, are well known to all the abstractors, lawyers and real estate dealers across Southern Oklahoma; that her name and address could have easily been found by checking the reception records of Love County, Oklahoma.
“And the court further finds that the defendant, Otis Garrett, conveyed the above described land by quit-claim deed to Maurice Seigle, and thereafter in Cause # 6062 in the district court of this county, Maurice Seigle, another of the defendants, brought a suit to quiet title against the plaintiff herein, together with others; that the affidavit for publication service in cause '# 6062 was introduced in evidence in this case, showing that Maurice Seigle made said affidavit for publication and service, but that said affidavit was signed by C. C. Wilkins, attorney for the defendant herein.
“The court further finds that the affidavit to obtain service by publication made the statement, under oath, that many well known local individuals, known both to the defendants herein and their attorney, were included in the affidavit, and the statement was made that the plaintiff was unable to ascertain whether they were living or dead, and was unable to ascertain their whereabouts so that notice of the service by publication could be made upon them; that included among those well-known individuals were L. S. Dolman and Ezra Dyer, attorneys at law of Ardmore, Oklahoma, R. L. Bowman, E. J. Hendon, and George R. Fish, all well known real estate dealers and lease brokers in Ardmore, Oklahoma.
“And the court further finds that said affidavit and the affidavit of mailing state that the plaintiff’s address is unknown, though her name and that of her husband, M. J. Richardson, are well known to all real estate dealers, lease brokers, lawyers, and abstractors in Southern Oklahoma; and reception records of Love County, Oklahoma, and her address could have been ascertained for the purpose of giving her notice of the pendency of the suit with very little effort.
“The court further finds that the plaintiff, Maude S. Richardson, had no notice of the pendency of the suit, Cause # 6062, or of the setting of the same for trial and the taking of judgment against her therein, on the 28 day of February, 1947.
“The court further finds that in 1950 the plaintiff discovered the judgment taken in 1947, and brought this suit to set the same aside; that various nations were argued, and pleadings filed from March 29th, the date of the filing of the petition in this suit, and nothing was ever revealed to the court about the fact that on the same day the suit was filed, March 29, 1950, the defendant, Maurice Seigle, had conveyed the record title to the property involved herein to R. W. Garrett, another of the defendants, and that this fact was in no *773manner called to the attention of the plaintiff or her attorney by either of the defendants or their attorney until the same was discovered on the 21st day of March, 1952; further, that the original two (2) defendants, Maurice Seigle and Otis Garrett, through their attorney, diligently contested this law suit from March 29, 1950, up to March 21, 1952, and argued motions herein without disclosing to the plaintiff or to the court the fact that neither of said original defendants held record title to the property.
“The court further finds that neither of said original defendants in this action had ever been in possession of the land involved herein up to the time of the filing of the petition in this lawsuit; but that the plaintiff, Maude S. Richardson, had been in possession of said lands for many years through her tenant, E. L. Taylor; that since the pend-ency of this suit, the said E. L. Taylor sold his land and moved away, and that the attorney for the defendants herein then leased the land involved in this litigation to Charles Starrett, and through said lease claim possession at this time.
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“The court further finds that the defendants, Otis Garrett, Maurice Seigle, and R. W. Garrett, have, since the acquisition of the certificate tax deed, conspire, schemed, and planned, as shown by their actions and testimony in this case, to commit a fraud upon the true owner of the land involved herein in the following respects :
“1. That they conspired to obtain a Treasurer’s Deed upon their original certificate deed without giving notice to the occupant of the land or to the owner, Maude S. Richardson, the plaintiff herein, though such notice could have been easily given.
“2. That they further conspired to obtain a judgment quieting title upon the land involved herein, as against the plaintiff, without proper notice to her or to her tenant. And, /;
“3. They have conspired against the plaintiff herein by withholding from the court for nearly two (2) years the holder of the purported record title to the land herein, though at all times through their attorney, appeared before this court and contested the lawsuit as if party in interest were a party.
“Conclusions of Law.
“The Court finds as a matter of law that the property involved herein belongs to Maude S. Richardson, the plaintiff herein, and that at the time this suit was filed she was in possession of said property; further that she had a right to institute this law suit either as an owner altogether, or as partial owner for herself and a co-tenant.
“And the Court further concludes that the Tax Deed appearing in book 40 of deed record book on page 248 in the office of the County Clerk of Love County, Oklahoma, is void and of no force and effect as against the plaintiff for the reason that the same was obtained by fraud practiced by the defendants, since no effort was made to serve plaintiff with notice of any application for tax deed, though the address and place of business of plaintiff and her tenant could have been easily ascertained by the defendants.
“And the Court concludes further as a matter of law, that purported judgment quieting title in case # 6062 in this court is null and void and was obtained by fraud practiced by the defendants against this plaintiff for the reason that the court never acquired jurisdiction of the plaintiff because of the false affidavits of mailing and affidavits to obtain service by publication upon the plaintiff, when the defendants well knew or could have easily ascertained the address of both the plaintiff and her tenant; further, that as a matter of law, the purported affidavit to obtain service by publication was in *774fact no affidavit of any person having been made in the name of Maurice Seigle, one of the defendants herein, and signed by C. C. Wilkins, attorney for the defendant.
“And the Court further concludes as a matter of law, that the purported deeds transferring the property involved herein back and forth between them and each of them are champertous and null and void as against the plaintiff herein.
“For all the foregoing reasons the Court finds generally for the plaintiff herein, that the tax deed and judgment quieting title thereon should be set aside, cancelled, and held for naught; and that the plaintiff be restored to the possession of the land involved herein which she had at the beginning of this lawsuit.”

These findings by the trial court were not attacked in the brief of plaintiff in error, and are in effect conceded as being correct. The majority opinion does not even take cognizance of such findings. After ignoring the trial court’s uncontroverted findings of fact, the majority opinion simply says that since the plaintiff had paid no taxes for a number of years and took no action to protect the property by payment of these delinquent taxes, that she knew or was charged with knowledge that the title to her land would be lost unless she took affirmative action to protect it against the outstanding tax certificates. This is in effect a holding that the statute requiring service of notice upon the owner and the occupant of land covered by an application for a certificate tax deed before such deed shall issue, and the statutes requiring service of summons upon defendants in civil actions in this state, only apply to persons who have paid their taxes and have no application to those persons who may have, for one reason or another, or for one period of time or another, failed to pay some of such taxes. I do not understand such to have ever been the law in this jurisdiction or to have ever been intended as the law in this jurisdiction, and I cannot agree with an opinion that so holds.

This majority opinion refers to the fact that on December 12, 1944, plaintiff’s husband, acting as her agent, wrote a letter to Otis Garrett, one of the defendants, with reference to redeeming the tax certificate held by Garrett, as evidence that plaintiff knew or should have known that the title to her land would be lost. It should also be borne in mind, however, that such letter is also conclusive proof that Garrett had been given personal knowledge that plaintiff was living and a resident of the State of Oklahoma and her exact post office address, and Garrett’s affidavit made less than four months later to obtain service by publication of notice of application for tax deed was not only false in stating that plaintiff was a non-resident of the State of Oklahoma, and not within the State and could not be served within the State of Oklahoma, but such false allegation was willfully and intentionally made. Such letter, therefore, actually supports plaintiff’s allegation and the trial court’s findings, rather than the majority opinion. Conceding that knowledge that a tax certificate was outstanding against her land was some knowledge of a possible loss of title to plaintiff’s land, still can it legally and logically be said that such knowledge was also notice that the certificate holder would deliberately refrain from complying with the statutes relative to notices and summons, and would secure a tax deed, and later a judgment quieting title to the land, without ever serving a notice or summons upon either plaintiff or her tenant in possession of the land, and without ever obtaining possession of said land, all in direct contravention of the applicable statutes? The majority opinion answers such question in the affirmative. I do not agree. I therefore respectfully dissent.