I dissent. The majority opinion appears to me to be contrary to law. It fails to apply the uniform rule that a separate and several liability exists against each employer regardless of whether he is a coemployer or a member of a joint enterprise. The liability of joint adventurers is the same as that of partners. The finding that Freedman and Hasson were engaged in a joint enterprise is therefore immaterial and may be disregarded as surplusage. Even though the evidence may not support the finding of a joint adventure, it seems to me to be neither necessary nor proper to reverse the award.
*635The commission found that M. J. Freedman and Ed Hasson employed the workman, John Ross. It also rendered a several award against both employers. There is ample evidence to support that finding against Freedman. The findings and the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed for the benefit of an injured workman. (Lab. Code, § 3202; 24 Cal.Jur. 1007, §§ 229 and 230.) The finding that Freedman and Hasson employed Ross refutes the theory that Hasson was an independent contractor. He testified that he was not “the boss,” but that he was merely acting as “foreman. ’ ’ That is in accordance with the record as a whole which indicates that Hasson secured the workmen and acted as foreman as the agent of Freedman, and not otherwise. Hasson had no authority to fire the workmen, nor to fix their wages, nor to direct and control the enterprise of picking the crop of grapes. When the workmen asked for an increase of wages Hasson sent them to Freedman saying he was not the boss and that he had no authority to raise their pay. When Ross was injured Hasson told Freedman, “It [the responsibility] is up to you if you want to take him to a doctor.” Freedman assumed that liability by taking the injured man to a physician for treatment. The burden was on the petitioner, Freedman, to prove that Hasson was an independent contractor. He failed to do so. When the evidence adduced, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, indicate that the owner of a business has the right to discharge workmen, fix their wages and control and manage their operations, he may be deemed to be the employer regardless of the manner in which they are paid or the method of their selection. (Riskin v. Industrial Acc. Com., 23 Cal.2d 248 [144 P.2d 16].) Where there is a substantial conflict of evidence regarding the relationship of employer and employee, the findings of the commission may not be disturbed. (S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 17 Cal.2d 411 [110 P.2d 377].)
Since Freedman was found by the commission to be an employer of Ross, and a separate award was rendered against him, it is immaterial whether Freedman was the sole employer or merely a coemployer of the workman. In either event he would be liable for the full amount of the award. (Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 58 Cal.App.2d 262, 269 [136 P.2d 633]; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. In*636dustrial Acc. Com., 123 Cal.App. 443 [11 P.2d 401].) Even though a joint enterprise was contemplated by the employers, and it,failed for some reason, each member may nevertheless became severally liable for the full amount of the award. (1 Campbell on Workmen’s Compensation, p. 406, § 452; New York Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 126 Cal. App. 37, 41 [14 P.2d .160].) A joint and several award against coemployers, whether they are members of a joint enterprise or not may be binding on one employer, even though it is void as to the other party. (Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra.) In the case last cited it was held, on certiorari, that the petitioner was liable for the full amount of the award, notwithstanding the fact that the judgment against the other coemployer, the William Powell Company, may have been void because the commission lacked jurisdiction of the last named company for defect of substituted service of process.
It follows that since the commission found that both Freedman and Hasson were employers of Boss, and rendered a joint and several award against them, Freedman would be liable for the full amount of the award, even though the. award may be void as to Hasson. Hasson is not a petitioner in this proceeding. He failed to appeal.
For the foregoing reasons I am convinced the award against M. J. Freedman should be affirmed.
Bespondents' petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 22, 1945.