dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the majority that midnight is 1:00 a.m. The majority agrees with petitioners that Nevada Constitution article 4, section 2’s use of “Pacific standard time” is meant to differentiate from “daylight saving time,” as the measure of when the Legislature must adjourn. Thus, under their conclusion, midnight is not really midnight; instead, midnight is 1:00 a.m. I am not convinced that logic and reason lead to midnight being 1:00 a.m.
The dictionary defines the term “standard time” as “the time of a region or country that is established by law or general usage as civil time.”1 This definition is consistent with the conclusion: standard time is the time reflected on the clock, the time generally used in a particular area. A reading of the pertinent federal statute leads to this same conclusion.
Under section 260a of the Uniform Time Act of 1966, commencing the first Sunday of April and ending the last Sunday of October each year, the standard time of each zone is advanced one hour. This advanced time becomes the standard time:
During the period commencing at 2 o’clock antemeridian on the first Sunday of April of each year and ending at 2 o’clock *546antemeridian on the last Sunday of October of each year, the standard time of each zone established by sections 261 to 264 of this title, as modified by section 265 of this title, shall be advanced one hour and such time as so advanced shall for purposes of such sections 261 to 264, as so modified, be the standard time of such zone during such period.2
Thus, within a particular zone, the advanced, “daylight saving time” becomes the standard time for that zone during the designated period from April to October.3 Under the provisions of section 260a, a state may by law exempt itself from the application of advanced time.4 Nevada, however, has not done so. In the absence of Nevada law establishing a standard of time for this state, the federal statute dictates the observance of federal standard time.5
The majority states that the term “Pacific standard time” is precise and specific. Moreover, the majority insists that they are not free to presume any other meaning than that given by the framers, and yet, that is precisely what the majority has done, by presuming that midnight is 1:00 a.m.
The entire phrase, “midnight Pacific standard time,” read together results in only one conclusion: midnight Pacific standard time is midnight on the Legislature’s clock in Carson City, Nevada. This state falls into the Pacific time zone and all of our citizens, as well as our state government, conduct their business and social affairs in accordance with the time on the clock. To conclude that the Legislature is free to follow a different clock than all of the people of this state is an absurd and unreasonable result.
The legislative history reveals that the Legislature previously had a tradition of literally covering the clock on the last day of the regular session to allow extra time in which to complete its business. Article 4, section 2 prevents the Legislature from “covering the clock” and continuing until “midnight” in some time zone west of Nevada. The phrase “Pacific standard time” is intended *547to specify the time in Carson City, not Hawaii-Aleutian standard time or Samoa standard time.
Further, in these petitions, the Legislature itself, which drafted this provision, has taken the position that midnight is midnight. The Legislature is entitled to deference in its interpretation of the provision’s terms.6 As an additional indication of the Legislature’s position, in 1999, after the 120-day limit was passed, the Nevada Legislature adopted a Joint Standing Rule 14.3 of the Senate and Assembly that set deadlines for bills and final actions on bills by standing committees in both houses. Those deadlines were used to create a deadline calendar for the 120-day session. The deadline calendar numbered the day of commencement as day one for the 120-day period. The Legislature finally adjourned by midnight on the 120th day.7
The legislative history leaves no doubt that article 4, section 2 is intended to limit regular legislative sessions to 120 total days and to give the Legislature a clear time, midnight Pacific standard time, to end business for the session. To suggest, as the majority does, that the Legislature may create additional time for itself, should the need arise, is contrary to the Legislature’s intent to limit the time in which it must conduct business to a total of 120 days.
In my view, “midnight Pacific standard time” means midnight by the clock. This interpretation is the only reasonable one: otherwise, midnight is not midnight, and the Legislature is on a clock that ticks differently than every other in Nevada.
For these reasons, I dissent.
Webster’s Tenth Collegiate Dictionary 1146 (1997 ed.).
15 U.S.C. § 260a (1994) (emphasis added).
Cf. Miracle Auto Ctr. v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587, 588-89 (1998) (construing analogous state statutes and concluding that “standard time” means the time then in effect, whether it is “Standard Pacific Time” or “Daylight Saving Time”).
15 U.S.C. § 260a(a) (providing that a state by law may exempt itself from observing advanced time applicable during the designated period from April through October).
See, e.g., State Election Board v. McClure, 189 N.E.2d 711, 714 (Ind. 1963); State v. Frye, 157 N.W.2d 830, 831-32 (N.D. 1968); see generally McFarlane v. Whitney, 134 S.W.2d 1047, 1051 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1940); Anderson v. Cook, 130 P.2d 278, 281-82 (Utah 1942).
See NRS 218.240(1) (establishing procedures for assistance of legislative counsel bureau in preparation of legislative measures); cf. State ex rel. Tax Comm’n v. Saveway, 99 Nev. 626, 630, 668 P.2d 291, 294 (1983) (stating that “]g]reat deference will be afforded to an administrative body’s interpretation when it is within the statutory language; moreover, the Legislature’s acquiescence in an agency’s reasonable interpretation indicates that the interpretation is consistent with legislative intent”).
State v. Howell, 26 Nev. 93, 104, 64 P. 466, 468 (1901) (noting that, while not binding upon this court, a contemporaneous construction placed upon a constitutional provision by the Legislature “should be given great weight”).