Specially Concurring.
I write only to address a minor point that may appear as an anomaly in this case. It relates to the steps taken by Magnuson to bring its damage claim to the courts.
*171The purpose of the notice requirement under the ITCA is to give a governmental entity — here, the City of Coeur d’Alene — an opportunity to investigate a potential claim so the City could decide whether it is responsible for the debt and should pay the claim either in Ml or by some agreeable amount in settlement, or to reject the claim and let the claimant proceed with a legal action for collection. The letter from Magnuson’s agent, Shea, on May 10, 1996, served that purpose. If, after review, the City had paid or settled the claim, then this case would not have proceeded through the courts. Under I.C. § 6-909, the City had ninety days to notify the claimant in writing of its approval or denial of the claim. Pursuant to the statute, a claim shall be deemed denied if at the end of the ninety-day period the City has failed to approve or deny the claim. Here, the City denied the claim on August 13, 1996, some ninety-five days after May 10. The City’s reason for rejecting the claim is irrelevant. At that point, in my opinion, Magnuson was free to file an action to collect on the rejected claim. Magnuson did not need to later send in a second claim addressing the same dispute when that claim had already been denied by operation of the terms of the pertinent statute and by the City’s rejection in fact.
However, Magnuson chose not to rely on the May 10 letter as a notice of claim. Instead, Magnuson continued to pursue discussions with the City in an attempt to receive reimbursement for its project’s costs. When Magnuson’s attempts proved futile, Magnuson sent another demand notice in February 1997, and then filed suit when that demand was rejected. As it turned out, of course, the February 1997 notice of claim was held untimely by the district court upon the facts as presented and argued by the parties in this case.
The Court’s opinion in this case correctly notes that Magnuson did not contend in the district court that the May 10 letter had the effect of a notice of claim under the ITCA. Indeed, even at oral argument on this appeal when the subject was broached, Magnuson took the position that the May 10 letter did not serve as a notice to the City of Magnuson’s claim.
Because Magnuson decided to proceed under its own interpretation of the steps to be followed without suggesting to the courts the correct alternative route, this Court is not required to reconstruct the case and put it on the proper track. Accordingly, I concur with the approach expressed in the Court’s opinion concerning the role the May 10 letter legally played in this case.
EISMANN, J. concurs.