concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion, but would resolve the latent ambiguity identified with regard to NRS 414.110(1). In my view, NRS 414.110(1) does not bar appellants’ claims of gross negligence against the City of Sparks.
The State of Nevada has qualifiedly waived its sovereign immunity and that of its political subdivisions, including the City, in NRS Chapter 41. NRS 414.110(1) re-creates governmental immunity in connection with acts of negligence in the performance of emergency management. But, as we have said in other contexts, re*658strictions on the waiver of sovereign immunity under NRS Chapter 41 must be narrowly construed.1
With regard to emergency planning and measures taken in the form of an emergency response, NRS 414.110(1) provides that:
All functions under this chapter and all other activities relating to emergency management are hereby declared to be governmental functions. Neither the State nor any political subdivision thereof nor other agencies of the State or political subdivision thereof, nor except in cases of willful misconduct, gross negligence, or bad faith, any worker complying with or reasonably attempting to comply with this chapter, or any order or regulation adopted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, or pursuant to any ordinance relating to any necessary emergency procedures or other precautionary measures enacted by any political subdivision of the State, is liable for the death of or injury to persons, or for damage to property, as a result of any such activity.
The majority notes that NRS 414.110(1) may arguably create absolute immunity for the government itself, while retaining the exposure of government operatives/employees to liability in the undertaking of emergency management in the event of gross negligence, intentional misconduct, or bad faith. While this reading seems plausible, it runs counter to the fundamental precept that government, like corporate entities, has no ability to act except through its agents/employees. It makes no sense to me that a government entity, which can only be liable in tort based upon the acts of its agents, would be immune vicariously for the acts of its agents while the agents themselves are qualifiedly exposed.2
As stated, any limitations on Nevada’s waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. In my view, when read in the context of the government’s fundamental exposure to liability pursuant to the qualified waiver of sovereign immunity, i. e., through vicarious or imputed responsibility for acts of its agents, NRS 414.110(1) does not clearly or unambiguously restrict the general waiver of sovereign immunity of the state and its political subdivisions when it reserves liability to the only medium through which imputed liability may attach, its agents.
To explain, NRS 414.110(1) starts with the notion that all emergency management is a function of government and then stipulates that the government is immune in connection with such activity. Having done so, the measure anomalously reserves limited liability (for gross negligence, bad faith, and intentional misconduct) in connection with what the government actually is in its executive ca*659pacity, its operatives. Thus, as noted by the majority, an inherent ambiguity arises.
One might justify this immunity dichotomy on the basis that acts of bad faith and intentional misconduct in connection with emergency management might not, as a general matter, implicate vicarious imposition of liability upon a government principal. However, occasions can arise, as in the case of corporate entities, under which vicarious liability would lie; /.<?., based upon such notions as prior authorization, ratification, or actions by a principal government actor.3 And, certainly, acts of gross negligence committed within the course and scope of employment would, as a matter of law, be vicariously imputed to the principal, here the government entity.
In short, NRS 414.110(1) does not clearly immunize state and local governments from the excepted acts — gross negligence, bad faith, and intentional misconduct — because reservation of such liability to government actors, as a real matter, reserves liability against the government itself.
My views on this subject are underscored by NRS 41.0349, which provides that government employees, including employees of political subdivisions such as this respondent, must be indemnified by their government masters for wrongs committed in the course of their public employment:
Indemnification of present or former public officer, employee, immune contractor or Legislator. In any civil action brought against any present or former officer, employee, immune contractor, member of a board or commission of the State or a political subdivision or State Legislator, in which a judgment is entered against the defendant based on any act or omission relating to his public duty or employment, the State or political subdivision shall indemnify him unless:
1. The person failed to submit a timely request for defense;
2. The person failed to cooperate in good faith in the defense of the action;
3. The act or omission of the person was not within the scope of his public duty or employment; or
4. The act or omission of the person was wanton or malicious.
A reading of NRS 414.110(1) with NRS 41.0349 seriously undermines the conclusion that the City, but not its employees, is im*660mune from acts of gross negligence.4 Along with the fact that such negligence would ordinarily be vicariously imputed to the City, NRS 41.0349 absolutely requires that the City indemnify any employee for that negligence. It is incongruous to hold that the City is immune from acts of gross negligence of its employees,5 but that such immunity is neutralized by the simple procedural act of naming the employees in the suit and forcing them to seek indemnity under NRS 41.0349.
Accordingly, I would conclude that NRS 414.110(1) does not preclude appellants’ claim of gross negligence against the City on a various liability theory and would allow these appellants to proceed with their gross negligence claims against the City.
See State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 914, 478 P.2d 591, 593 (1970).
Subject to capped liability under NRS 41.035.
See Smith’s Food & Drug Cntrs. v. Bellegarde, 114 Nev. 602, 610-11, 958 P.2d 1208, 1214 (1998) (establishing the parameters of vicarious corporate liability); see also Nittinger v. Holman, 119 Nev. 192, 195-96, 69 P.3d 688, 690-91 (2003); Evans v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 598 Nev. 613-14, 5 P.3d 1043, 1052-53 (2000).
I note that the second amended complaint alleges gross negligence as to the City itself, not as to any particular employees.
The terms of the second amended complaint do not allege acts of bad faith or intentional tortious misconduct.