specially concurring.
¶ 17 This case illustrates the tension that can occur between the need for prompt resolution of juvenile cases, including a juvenile delinquent’s right “to receive a timely, final disposition,” and a victim’s right to seek and recover restitution for damage caused by juvenile offenders. Alton D., 196 Ariz. 195, ¶ 7, 994 P.2d at 404; see also Kevin A., 201 Ariz. 161, ¶ 11, 32 P.3d at 1090. I reluctantly join in this decision because I believe the law compels me to do so, but I write separately to express my concerns about the unfortunate and apparently recurring circumstances that produce a result such as this — where an innocent and diligent victim somehow gets lost in the shuffle, is unable to recover on a valid restitution claim and, therefore, ends up being the real loser despite the victim’s constitutional and statutory right to receive restitution. See Ariz. Const, art. II, § 2.1(A)(8); A.R.S. § 8-344(A).
¶ 18 Procedurally, if anyone was prejudi-cially disadvantaged here, it would appear to be the victim, not Michelle. At her change-of-plea hearing in February 2005, Michelle said she understood that she would “have to pay” for any property damage she had caused. She does not dispute that, apparently as early as November 2004, the victim’s restitution affidavit had been furnished not only to the prosecutor but also to her. For reasons that are not clear in the record, however, the state did not request restitution at the July 2005 disposition hearing, nor did the juvenile court address or order restitution at that hearing or in its disposition or*345der. The court told Michelle she could appeal from that order within fifteen days, but she neither did so nor suggested that the order was not yet final and appealable. Although the victim did not cause or contribute to the delay, his restitution claim was not addressed until the state finally requested an award on his behalf in September 2006, and the court, after a noticed hearing that Michelle failed to even attend, then ordered restitution in early 2007.
¶ 19 Unlike Alton D., this is not a case in which the juvenile court set a reasonable deadline, or for that matter any time limit, within which a restitution claim had to be submitted. See Alton D., 196 Ariz. 195, ¶¶ 2, 19, 994 P.2d at 403, 406-07. And, unlike the situation in Kevin A., in this ease the juvenile court never indicated that “ ‘restitution [would] be closed’ ” at a certain point in time. Kevin A., 201 Ariz. 161, ¶ 3, 32 P.3d at 1089; see also In re Richard B., 216 Ariz. 127, ¶ 17, 163 P.3d 1077, 1081 (App.2007). Nor did the victim fail to comply with any deadline or other order concerning restitution. Compare Alton D., 196 Ariz. 195, ¶ 19, 994 P.2d at 407 (holding that “when, in light of the circumstances of a particular case, the court sets a reasonable deadline by which victims must present their restitution claims and supporting evidence, any victim who fails to comply is barred from recovery”), and Kevin A., 201 Ariz. 161, ¶¶ 4, 8, 32 P.3d at 1089, 1090 (when court ordered restitution “closed” after date certain and “victim filed no timely statement” and provided no verified statement to prosecutor, subsequent restitution award invalid), with Richard B., 216 Ariz. 127, ¶ 18, 163 P.3d at 1081 (restitution award upheld when tardy claim caused no prejudice or undue delay to juvenile’s final disposition and when record “supported] the juvenile court’s finding of good cause to allow its restitution order”).
¶ 20 In short, any “falling through the cracks” or “dropping of the ball” in this case was solely attributable to the state’s nonfeasance and the juvenile court’s failure to fulfill its statutory mandate under A.R.S. § 8-344(A). As a result, the victim is left “holding the bag” on his restitution claim, and Michelle remains unaccountable for the damage she caused.6 Nonetheless, in Alton D. our supreme court clearly counseled against open-ended, indefinite time frames for presenting restitution claims. 196 Ariz. 195, ¶¶ 8-11, 994 P.2d at 404. Although distinguishable on its facts, that ease seemingly does not condone a juvenile court’s essentially re-opening an otherwise final disposition order many months or even years later for purposes of awarding or adjusting restitution, particularly without expressly finding good cause for the delay and no prejudice to the juvenile. For these reasons, although I cannot disagree with the principal opinion’s analysis or conclusion, the ultimate result strikes me as both unfortunate and unfair. Hopefully the state and the juvenile courts will take heed in the future by vigilantly and timely including victims’ restitution claims in the disposition process.
. The victim’s statutory right to recover damages for any "intentional, knowing or grossly negligent” governmental conduct appears rather illusory because conduct worse than mere negligence must be shown and because that same statute neither "alters [n]or abrogates any provision for immunity provided for under common law or statute.” A.R.S. § 8-416(B). In addition, any disenfranchised victim seeking relief under § 8-416(B) presumably would have to comply with the notice-of-claim filing requirements and time deadlines imposed by A.R.S. § 12-821.01.