concurring:
I agree that this case should be remanded for certain factual determinations, but I disagree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion as to when a crime committed against a child in a secret manner is “discovered” for purposes of the statute of limitations.
I agree with the majority that NRS 171.095(l)(a) is ambiguous as to when a crime committed in a secret manner is “discovered,” and that we must, therefore, focus on the intent of the Legislature, which is discernible through an examination of the “the context *717and spirit of the statute in question, together with the subject matter and policy involved.”1
I also agree with the majority that our interpretation of the term “discovery” must balance the reality of the circumstances surrounding crimes against children against the important fairness interests of the defendant/accused which underlie criminal statutes of limitations. It is not fair to subject a person to criminal liability indefinitely with virtually no time limit. On the other hand, neither is it fair to impose upon an already traumatized and susceptible child the burden of reporting to authorities an embarrassing and traumatic event. This court recognized these principles in Walstrom v. State2 and Houtz v. State.3 But these cases did not resolve the question of when a crime committed against a child in a secret manner is deemed to be discovered.
The majority concludes that discovery of the crime occurred in this case when the child told her mother, unless her mother failed to report “out of fear induced by the wrongdoer.” I believe that this standard reflects neither the reality of the circumstances surrounding crimes against children, especially crimes of a sexual nature, nor the policies established by the Legislature.
One of the realities of crimes against children is that parents very often do not believe their children when they report crimes of a sexual nature committed against them. The parent often either chooses to believe the perpetrator or condones the perpetrator’s actions for a variety of reasons other than fear induced by the wrongdoer, such as economic, social or psychological dependence. This is particularly the case in situations such as this, where the alleged perpetrator is the spouse of the parent to whom the child reports.
In NRS 432B.220, the Legislature established the policy that certain responsible adults, not including parents, are required to report known or suspected child abuse or neglect to either a law enforcement agency or child protective services.4 I would hold that a secret crime against children is “discovered” when a person who is required under NRS 432B.220 to report the abuse to the authorities knows or has reasonable cause to believe that abuse has been committed, not when persons who have no legal duty to report the abuse have knowledge.5
*718The evidence in this case indicates that the child-victim reported the abuse to her mother on December 12, 1996, and on the same day the mother told her pastor. NRS 432B.220(3)(d) provides that a ‘ ‘clergyman, practitioner of Christian Science or religious healer, unless he has acquired the knowledge of the abuse or neglect from the offender during a confession” is required to report the abuse or neglect to law enforcement or child protective services. Thus, it appears that the pastor was a required reporter and the disclosure to him occurred more than two years before the criminal complaint was filed. However, since there was no finding by the trial court on the issue of when the pastor was told and whether the pastor actually falls within the statute as a required reporter, I would remand the case for this factual determination.
Gallagher v. City of Las Vegas, 114 Nev. 595, 599, 959 P.2d 519, 521 (1998).
104 Nev. 51, 752 P.2d 225 (1988).
111 Nev. 457, 893 P.2d 355 (1995).
Under NRS 432B.220, people who are required to report include, among others, medical professionals, hospital personnel, social workers, teachers, counselors and law enforcement personnel.
This is also the rule adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Hensley, 571 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio 1991).