148 (dissenting) — The majority denies Suzanne D. Karr her day in court to litigate an election contest, asserting it is barred by res judicata. I strongly disagree. The mere fact that Ms. Karr and the unrelated litigants in the unappealed trial court proceeding of Borders v. King County5 sought to contest the same election does not constitute a concurrence of cause of action or of persons or parties for the purposes of the doctrine. This ruling strikes at the heart of the fundamental right of every person to access the courts. I dissent.
Sanders, J.I. Analysis
¶49 Under well-established precedent, res judicata bars a subsequent action only if a prior judgment has concurrence of identity in “(1) subject matter; (2) cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made” with the subsequent action. Rains v. State, 100 Wn.2d 660, 663, 674 P.2d 165 (1983). Where the issues or the parties are not the same, the doctrine simply does not apply. Snyder v. Munro, 106 Wn.2d 380, 383, 721 P.2d 962 (1986) (citing Int’l Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers v. Delaney, 73 Wn.2d 956, 960, 442 P.2d 250 (1968)). As we have explained:
“Privity does not arise from the mere fact that persons as litigants are interested in the same question or in proving or disproving the same state of facts. Privity within the meaning of the doctrine of res judicata is privity as it exists in relation to the subject matter of the litigation, and the rule is construed strictly to mean parties claiming under the same title. It *504denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same right or property.”
Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wn.2d 564, 568, 354 P.2d 696 (1960) (quoting Sodak Distrib. Co. v. Wayne, 77 S.D. 496, 502, 93 N.W.2d 791, 795 (1958)).
¶50 Holding Ms. Karr and the litigants in Borders are identical parties for res judicata purposes, the majority purports to rely on Snyder and In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d 255, 961 P.2d 343 (1998). Majority at 501. Not so.
¶51 The plaintiffs in Snyder identified themselves as “members of a ‘political party or group’ ” discriminated against by the legislative redistricting at issue in that case. Snyder, 106 Wn.2d at 384. We found sufficient privity with parties in the prior judgment existed because “[t]he parties in the prior judgment were the acknowledged heads of the major political parties in Washington.” Id. However, no such relationship exists between Ms. Karr and the Borders litigants. Ms. Karr did not participate in the Wenatchee trial. The record is silent on her political affiliation, if any. Her affidavit of error or omission was filed on January 10, 2005, a mere three days after the Borders contest was filed and some five months before the ruling in that case. In short, nothing in the record suggests a “ ‘mutual or successive relationship’ ” between Ms. Karr and the parties in Borders. Owens, 56 Wn.2d at 568 (quoting Wayne, 77 S.D. at 502).
f 52 Pearsall-Stipek is similarly inapposite6 because, unlike the petitioner in that case, Ms. Karr has not confined her affidavit to merely “present [ing] the same charges based on the same facts.” Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d at 259. Furthermore, whereas the initial litigation in Pearsall-Stipek had exhausted all available appeals, the petitioners in Borders elected not to appeal an adverse ruling on several key legal issues. Absent some proven close connec*505tion between Ms. Karr and the contestants in Borders, the fact Ms. Karr is challenging the result of the same election, standing alone, is insufficient to establish the concurrence of the parties’ identity. See Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 768, 887 P.2d 898 (1995) (holding “[p]rivity is established in cases where the person exercises actual control or substantially participates in the litigation”).
¶53 The majority also holds Ms. Karr’s and the Borders’ election contests arise under the same cause of action. Majority at 501. I disagree. Ms. Karr has stated a claim under both RCW 29A.68.020(1), alleging “misconduct on the part of any member of any precinct election board involved [in the election],” and RCW 29A.68.020(5), alleging Governor Gregoire was issued a certificate of election “[o]n account of illegal votes.”7 By contrast, the Borders petitioners alleged violations of RCW 29A.68.020(5) and RCW 29A.68.011(4) and (5), but not RCW 29A.68.020(1). See Court’s Oral Decision, Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 6 (Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Chelan County Super. Ct., Wash. June 6, 2005)). By concluding the two contests arise under an identical cause of action, majority at 501, the majority effectively merges RCW 29A.68-.011(4), (5), and RCW 29A.68.020(1), impermissibly rendering the latter superfluous. See Davis v. Dep’t of Licensing, 137 Wn.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous). Therefore, Ms. Karr’s claim of “misconduct on the part of election officers and members of the precinct election board involved [in the election]”8 under RCW 29A-.68.020(1) cannot be barred by the doctrine of res judicata for the additional reason it was not raised by the petitioners in Borders.
¶54 The majority concludes its analysis by cautioning this court will invoke res judicata to bar future election *506contests if “parties to one election contest adequately represent the electorate.” Majority at 502 n.4. Put differently, the majority effectively conditions the citizens’ right to contest an election on our assessment of the efficacy of any previous contests. This novel approach represents a stark departure from the well-settled principle that res judicata bars a subsequent claim if and only if congruence of “(1) subject matter; (2) cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made” exists, Rains, 100 Wn.2d at 663, and threatens to undermine the doctrine in nonelection cases as well. Perhaps this language is sugar coating a poison pill — because I see no principled distinction between application of this newly invented doctrine to election contests and any other case.
f55 While it is true in the abstract that a party with a “significant stake in the outcome”9 of an election contest who “investís] significant resources in pursuing all viable grounds”10 may also share the four concurrences of identity discussed above with a subsequent petitioner, it is not automatic and has not been demonstrated in this case. The concerns regarding conflicting verdicts in multiple jurisdictions, uncertainty regarding outcomes, and inefficient use of judicial resources raised by the majority in support of its approach are by no means unique to election contests and do not justify diluting the strict requirements of a doctrine, which can, if misapplied, strike at the heart of a person’s right to access the judiciary.
¶56 Moreover the Borders petitioners waived their right to appeal, hardly evidencing vigorous pursuit of “all viable grounds.” Had they done so, we would likely have a published precedent from this State’s highest court which would either support or undermine Ms. Karr’s claims — a disincentive for further litigation on her part or anyone else’s, probably also avoiding some of the practical objections the majority posits.
*507II. Conclusion
¶57 Ms. Karr has the statutory right to contest this election in court. This election contest is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because she is not in privity with the parties in the Borders contest and has invoked a distinct statutory cause of action in her affidavit.
¶58 I dissent.
J.M. Johnson, J., concurs with Sanders, J.
Motions for reconsideration denied May 31, 2006.
Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Chelan County Super. Ct., Wash. June 24, 2005).
I found Pearsall-Stipek’s dicta on res judicata unconvincing as explained in my concurrence, a concurrence ironically joined by Chief Justice Alexander.
Suzanne D. Karr Aff. of Error or Omission at 1, 3; see also majority at 500.
Suzanne D. Karr Aff. of Error or Omission at 1.
Majority at 502 n.4.
Id.