with whom Agosti and Becker, II., agree, concurring:
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that Vanisi’s request to represent himself was improperly denied on the bases of the delay in asserting his request and the complexity of the case. I also agree that the district court’s denial of Vanisi’s motion for self-representation was proper because Vanisi exhibited a risk of disruption, but only because of this court’s deferential policy toward the findings of fact of the district court on this issue. The facts of this case should set the high-water mark for the denial of a defendant’s constitutional right of self-representation.
We have held that a defendant’s pretrial conduct is relevant ‘ ‘ ‘if it affords a strong indication that [he or she] will disrupt the proceedings in the courtroom.’”1 I question whether the district court’s findings provide a “strong indication” that Vanisi would be disruptive at trial. Many of the court’s findings are more indicative of inconvenience than disruption. A request for self-representation should not be denied solely ‘ ‘ ‘because of the inherent inconvenience often caused by pro se litigants.’ ”2
My review of the record reveals that, at least at the hearing on the motion for self-representation, Vanisi was generally articulate, respectful, and responsive during rigorous examination by the dis*346trict court. It does not appear that Vanisi actually disrupted earlier proceedings, although the court’s frustration with Vanisi has some factual basis. At one hearing, for instance, Vanisi continued to question the court after the court had indicated that Vanisi should address his counsel. At that time Vanisi’s own counsel complained, and the court responded: “Actually, I didn’t think he is any worse than you. But you can go on. I mean, you have interrupted me on many occasions. I mean, he is excitable but I would not call him manic.” The transcript of this hearing as a whole reveals that Vanisi was generally respectful to the court, rarely interrupted or continued speaking inappropriately, and complied when the court told him to refrain from such conduct. I note, however, that toward the end of the hearing the court had to instruct Vanisi to keep his voice down while others were speaking; the court stated: “You have to whisper. You are interfering.”
Assessments of Vanisi’s behavior by defense counsel and by the State also contradict the district court’s ultimate evaluation. At the canvass, defense counsel commented that Vanisi’s behavior had “been impeccable since this case first came into this courtroom” and that there was “absolutely nothing he has done in this courtroom over the past year-and-a-half which reflects that he’s going to delay or obstruct or in any way make himself a nuisance.” Counsel explained, “[h]e had five days when he was in trial. He minded his manners. He’s observed decorum. He’s paid respect and courtesy to this Court.” The State agreed that Vanisi had not been disruptive whenever the State was present. The prosecutor explained,
I would indicate to the Court that at least the times in court that the State has been present . . . Mr. Vanisi has been anything but disruptive. I think he responded very literally to the Court’s inquiry, was cognizant of the questions and the proceedings surrounding them, oriented to time and place, and satisfies that criteria across the board.
The prosecutor commented further that Vanisi had “significant” ability to read and process information and that he was “distinctly and cognitively more adept at defending himself than any defendant I have ever been involved with.” Finally, Vanisi himself represented to the court that he would behave properly within the court’s guidelines and that he did not intend to disrupt the proceedings.
The court also commented on two other factors relating to the potential for disruption that were independent of Vanisi’s courtroom conduct. First, the court cited Vanisi’s “history of aggressive and disruptive behavior while at the Nevada State Prison.” The relevance of Vanisi’s out-of-court behavior in this case is *347questionable to me, given his apparently non-violent and generally appropriate in-court behavior and the fact that some of his out-of-court behavior and prior conduct might have been due to an untreated bipolar disorder.3
Second, the court noted that Vanisi had indicated that he wanted less confinement in the courtroom and that it appeared that Vanisi expected that he would be permitted unrestricted movement if allowed to represent himself. The court commented that, if denied full movement, it appeared that Vanisi would complain on appeal that he did not have an equal opportunity to present his case and that this revealed “a ‘tactic’ intended to disrupt the judicial process.” I believe that there is little basis for the district court to rely on Vanisi’s apparent desire to have full movement in the courtroom as a reason to deny his constitutional right of self-representation. Vanisi did not condition his request for self-representation on full movement or indicate that he would not abide by the court’s rules. When the court asked if Vanisi understood that the court would not allow him more movement in the courtroom than had been allowed thus far, Vanisi indicated that he understood. He further stated, however, that the court should ‘ ‘put it on the record’ ’ that it wanted him ‘ ‘to conduct a fair trial standing [like] a statu[e],” but that it was “fine” so long as the court “put it on the record.”
From the record before this court, it is difficult to find “strong indications” that Vanisi would have been disruptive in future proceedings. A defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation should not be denied merely because of indications of future inconveniences or moderate disruptions. However, this court has stated that on this issue it “will not substitute its evaluation for that of the district court judge’s own personal observations and impressions.”4 On this basis alone, I concur in the affirmance of the district court’s denial of Vanisi’s request for self-representation.
Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001, 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Tanksley, 113 Nev. at 1001, 946 P.2d at 150 (quoting Lyons v. State, 106 Nev. 438, 444 n.1, 796 P.2d 210, 217 n.l (1990)).
Compare Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that shackling and gagging of defendant and consequent termination of right to self-representation (due to gagging) were constitutional, given defendant’s egregious in-court behavior as well as some prior out-of-court behavior).
Tanksley, 113 Nev. at 1002, 946 P.2d at 151.