concurring in the result.
I do not believe that Rule 11(a)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the striking of the complaint in this ease. The purpose of that rule is to insure that a document filed in a case is signed either by an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho, or by the litigant if he or she is not represented by an attorney licensed to practice in Idaho, so that an appropriate sanction can be imposed if the document was signed in violation of the rule.
Rule 11 requires that the pleading be (1) well grounded in fact, (2) warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and (3) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increases in the costs of litigation.
Koehn v. Riggins, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021, 895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). If the attorney or litigant signs the document in violation of these requirements, then he or she is liable for sanctions under Rule 11(a)(1). In this case, there is nothing in the record indicating that the complaint was signed in violation of Rule 11(a)(1).
Rule 11(a)(1) also provides, “If a pleading, motion or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the . attention of the pleader or movant.” This provision provides a means of forcing a proper signature. I agree that a document that is not signed by either an attorney licensed to practice law in Idaho or the litigant, if he or she is unrepresented in the action, should be considered as being unsigned. The rule only provides, however, that the document can be stricken if it is not signed “promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant.” The phrase “called to the attention” indicates not knowledge on the part of the pleader or movant but someone else raising the issue. Here, the issue was raised when Ameritel filed its motion to strike, and a properly signed amended complaint was filed twenty-eight days later. In my opinion, that constituted promptly signing the complaint after the omission of a signature was called to the attention of the pleader.
The district court properly struck the complaint, however, because the filing of it constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Russell Jones, the appellants’ attorney, is not licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. He drafted the complaint, signed his clients’ names to it without them having reviewed it, and then had it filed with the clerk of the district court in Ada County, Idaho. Such conduct constituted the unauthorized practice of law. In re Depew, 98 Idaho 215, 560 P.2d 886 (1977); In re Brainard, 55 Idaho 153, 39 P.2d 769 (1934). Where the filing of the complaint constituted the unauthorized practice of law, the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking it. As we stated in Brainard, “The particular reason or necessity for having the legal work performed is not a justification to practice law without being admitted.” 55 Idaho at 156-57, 39 P. 2d at 771.