dissenting.
Because I conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing, I dissent.
Plaintiffs are subject to the constitutional requirement for standing that an actual case or controversy must exist before the judicial power may be invoked. See Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317 (Colo.1989); see also Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Pub. Utils Comm'n, 829 P.2d 1303 (Colo.1992).
The majority correctly states that an allegation that a regulation merely threatens to cause injury to a plaintiff's present or imminent activities may be sufficient to establish an injury in fact. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc., 830 P.2d 1045 (Colo.1992).
However, the alleged injury must be "sufficiently direct and palpable to allow a court to say with fair assurance that there is an actual controversy proper for judicial resolution." O'Bryant v. Pub. Utils Comm'n, 778 P.2d 648, 653 (Colo.1989); see also Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs, Inc., supra, 830 P.2d at 1053 (plaintiff must demonstrate an "existing legal controversy that can be effectively resolved ... and not a mere possibility of a future legal dispute over some issue").
In my view, plaintiffs have not alleged any injury suffered by them that has occurred or may occur in the future because of the adoption of the amendment. Instead, they allege that the amendment causes an injury in fact because it (1) is "a denial of local government's statutory rights and rights established by case law to regulate the oil and gas industry"; (2) "infringes upon and restricts Plaintiffs' land use regulatory authority and thereby harms Plaintiffs"; and (8) creates the potential for possible multiple interpretations if future injuries occur.
With these assertions, plaintiffs merely allege general and hypothetical injuries caused by the adoption of the amendment to Rule 303(a). They fail to identify a particular injury that has arisen or may arise under the amended version of Rule 308(a), such as a conflict with a specific exercise or element of their governmental authority. While I note that action in contravention of a regulation is not required to establish an injury in fact, the nonspecific allegation of a general abrogation of authority here is not sufficiently particularized to establish standing. Without specific facts, any injury alleged here is merely hypothetical and is not sufficiently direct and palpable to create an actual case or controversy.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's order dismissing the complaint for lack of standing.