dissenting: In adopting K.S.A. 59-2114(a), the Kansas Legislature explicitly stated that the requisite consent from the natural parent (or parents) in adoption proceedings
“shall be in writing and shallbe acknowledged before a judge of a court of record or before an officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments. If consent is acknowledged before a judge of a court of record, it shall be the duty of the court to advise the consenting person of the consequences of the consent. A consent is final when executed, unless the consenting party, prior to final decree of adoption, alleges and proves by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was not freely and voluntarily given. The burden of proving the consent was not freely *879and voluntarily given shall rest with the consenting party.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 59-2114(a).
The majority opinion finds that the consent form in the current case was in substantial compliance with this statute, despite the mandatoiy language of the statute and despite the absolute lack of acknowledgment of the natural mother’s consent in this case. Because I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the actions in this case substantially comply with the statute, I respectfully dissent.
This court has consistently explained with regard to courts’ interpretation of statutes:
“ ‘It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. Stated another way, when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the appellate courts will not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read such a statute so as to add something not readily found in it.’ ” McIntosh v. Sedgwick County, 282 Kan. 636, 642,147 P.3d 869 (2006) (quoting State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 [2001]).
See In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998).
In his dissent in In re Adoption of Trent, 229 Kan. 224, 624 P.2d 433 (1981), Justice Fromme explained that in applying a substantial compliance standard where the statutes in question contained mandatoiy language like that used in K.S.A. 59-2114(a), “[t]he majority of this court have abandoned their judicial role of interpreting the law and have stepped into a legislative role of amending what heretofore were mandatoiy requirements of two different legislative enactments.” 229 Kan. at 232 (Fromme, J., dissenting). The effect of this form of statutoiy interpretation, according to Justice Fromme, was to “repealf] the statute by permitting a court to disregard the requirements of that statute. This is a legislative prerogative. Such a rule will create confusion and litigation over clear, concise and mandatory statutes.” 229 Kan. at 233 (Fromme, J., *880dissenting). The facts in the instant case realize Justice Fromme’s prediction.
Here, the natural mother did not sign the consent form in the presence of a judge, a notary public, or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments. Instead, she signed the form in the presence of several of the adoptive parents’ family. When the adoptive parents learned from their attorney that the statute required that the natural mother’s signature be acknowledged, the adoptive parents did not return to her with an appropriate public officer. Instead, they went to a personal acquaintance who was authorized to take acknowledgments and told her “all that happened.” This personal acquaintance then “acknowledged” the natural mother’s signature outside of her presence and having no personal knowledge of her. Not only was this a clear violation of the acknowledgment statutes, see K.S.A. 53-501 et seq., but also, as the Court of Appeals found in this case, the acknowledgment was “in all material respects, false and untrue.” In re Adoption of X.J.A., 36 Kan. App. 2d 621, 630, 142 P.3d 327 (2006). Nevertheless, the majority finds that these actions “substantially complied” with the requirements of K.S.A. 59-2114(a), which states that consent “shall be acknowledged before a judge of a court of record or before an officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments.”
This is not a “slight deviation,” as even Justice Fromme characterized the actions of the notary public in Trent, where the public officer crossed the state line into the Missouri portion of the Kansas City metropolitan area to witness a signature. 229 Kan. at 233 (Fromme, J., dissenting). In this case, no acknowledgment was taken of the natural mother’s signature, nor was any valid acknowledgment attempted. In other words, the specific requirements of K.S.A. 59-2114(a) were not followed. Instead, that statute was intentionally disregarded by both the adoptive parents and the notary public. The majority finds that despite the apparent disregard for the specific requirements of K.S.A. 59-2114(a), the consent in this case nevertheless satisfies the statutory purpose. I cannot agree.
Our case law has defined “substantial compliance” as “ ‘ “compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to assure every reasonable objective of the statute.” ’ ” Orr v. Heiman, 270 Kan. *881109, 113, 12 P.3d 387 (2000). K.S.A. 59-2114(a) states that the required consent for adoption proceedings “shall be in writing and shall be acknowledged before a judge of a court of record or before an officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments.”
This court has previously explained that “[t]he purpose and necessity of a written consent is to insure that the natural parent freely and voluntarily consents to the adoption.” Trent, 229 Kan. at 228. The majority relies upon this statement in its conclusion that the court’s determination in this case that the natural mother’s consent was freely and voluntarily given results in substantial compliance with the statute. Nevertheless, K.S.A. 59-2114(a) provides that the consent “shall be in writing and shall be acknowledged.” (Emphasis added.) It may be that the purpose of the acknowledgment requirement is identical to that of the written consent — to ensure the voluntariness of the act. However, this court has held on numerous occasions that “ ‘[tjhere is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation.’ ” Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 89, 106 P.3d 492 (2005). It can therefore be inferred from the fact that K.S.A. 59-2114 contains two specific requirements — that the consent be in writing and that it be acknowledged — that the acknowledgment requirement serves purposes in addition to those served by written consent alone.
This court considered a similar question in City of Lenexa v. City of Olathe, 233 Kan. 159, 660 P.2d 1368 (1983), which involved a determination of whether a municipality had substantially complied with the annexation statutes, K.S.A. 12-519 et seq. The municipality had followed all of the general procedural requirements of the statutes but had mistakenly publicized that it was to annex the wrong tract of land. 233 Kan. at 163-65. The City of Lenexa court held that the municipality had not substantially complied with the annexation statutes because the publication requirement served a different purpose from the general annexation procedures:
“The general purpose of the annexation statutes is to protect the rights of landowners against unilateral action by a city in annexing their land. [Citations omitted.] Because all the land involved here was land which the owners petitioned the *882city to annex, this general objective has been served. If that were the only objective the publication requirement in K.S.A. 12-523 would be redundant. However, the publication requirement is there. It can be assumed the legislature intended publication to he of some importance and not merely a useless or meaningless act when it passed K.S.A. 12-523. [Citation omitted.]” 233 Kan. at 164.
In the same way, the legislature’s specific inclusion of the acknowledgment requirement in K.S.A. 59-2114(a) indicates that the acknowledgment serves other purposes in addition to those served by the writing requirement. As the Colorado Supreme Court explained in a similar case:
“The evidence shows that the respondent [natural mother] signed the consent in tire presence of petitioners [adoptive parents], and that it was not subscribed and sworn to as required by the statute. It is argued that in this case the evidence shows that there was no duress or fraud at the time respondent signed the consent, and that the purpose of having such a consent subscribed and sworn to is to lessen the possibility of duress or fraud. Admitting that this could be one purpose of that procedure, we still cannot say that the legislature did not intend that every consent by the natural parent to an adoption of a child should not be subscribed and sworn to for the purpose of emphasizing the seriousness and solemnity of the step being taken. It also should be emphasized that the person authorized by law to administer oaths or affirmations is a public officer, which of itself . . . gives the transaction a more impressive setting and an atmosphere of finality.” (Emphasis added.) Foley v. Carnesi, 123 Colo. 533, 537, 232 P.2d 186 (1951).
In this case, not only do the facts raise significant doubts regarding the voluntary nature of the natural mother’s consent, but die total lack of acknowledgment fails to provide any of the other safeguards that the Foley court recognized as being provided by the acknowledgment requirement. According to the natural mother’s testimony, she was asked to sign the consent form as she was exiting a vehicle. According to the adoptive parents’ version of the events, the natural mother signed the consent form in the home of one of the adoptive parents’ relatives. In any event, it is uncontroverted that no public officer was present to “give[] the transaction a more impressive setting and an atmosphere of finality.” Foley, 123 Colo. at 537. Similarly, there is no indication that die environment in which the natural mother signed the consent form emphasized the “seriousness and solemnity of the step being taken” — namely, that she was signing away all parental rights re*883lating to her daughter. 123 Colo. at 537. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the natural mother s consent was given in “compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to assure every reasonable objective” ’ ” of K.S.A. 59-2114(a). Orr, 270 Kan. at 113.
Moreover, the case law cited by the majority provides no support for its conclusion that the parties in this case substantially complied with the statute. In Trent, the court was faced with a question of whether a Kansas notary public’s acknowledgment of a signature in Missouri voided the consent for purposes of the adoption statutes. In that case, the only discrepancy from the statutory requirements was one of venue. The natural mother signed her consent voluntarily in the presence of the notary public, which the notary acknowledged. 229 Kan. at 226. Thus, the consent was provided in accordance with all of the solemnities and seriousness of signing in the presence of a public officer. Trent presents a markedly different scenario than the one here, where no public officer was present to acknowledge the natural mother’s signing of the consent forms.
Similarly, the decision in In re Adoption of J. H. G., 254 Kan. 780, 869 P.2d 640 (1994), does not support the majority’s finding of substantial compliance in this case. In J.H.G., the adoptive parents failed to include certain information in the petition for adoption; however, the majority of this information was included in other paperwork filed with the petition. The required accounting, which was not filed with the petition, was filed with the district court before it entered its final decree of adoption. While information regarding the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, and the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) were never provided, it was undisputed that these acts did not apply. Thus, all of the required information was before the district court when it made its decision. 254 Kan. at 793-97.
Other than by its application of substantial compliance, the decision in J.H.G. has little to do with the current facts. There was no question in J.H.G. that the natural mother’s consent was given in the presence of a notary who was authorized to take acknowl*884edgments. 254 Kan. at 786-87. Moreover, given the fact that the natural mother failed to contest the voluntariness of her consent before the final adoption decree was entered, the mother was barred from raising such a request on appeal. 254 Kan. at 791-93. The issue of consent, which the court in J.H.G. recognized as “ ‘an essential requisite to jurisdiction on the part of the court to render a valid decree of adoption,’ ” was not a factor in that case. 254 Kan. at 791 (quoting In re Adoption of Trent, 229 Kan. at 228).
The two out-of-state cases cited by the majority are also distinguishable. In In re Adoption of Infant Child Baxter, 799 N.E.2d 1057 (2003), reh. denied (2004), the Indiana Supreme Court held that a consent given outside the presence of a public officer could be proved by extrinsic evidence. The applicable consent statute in that case stated: “ ‘The consent to adoption may be executed at any time after the birth of the child either in the presence of [any one of six specified entities].’ ” Baxter, 799 N.E.2d at 1062 (quoting Ind. Code § 31-19-9-2). Considering this language, the court found that “the intent of the statute, which is designed to provide an equitable adoption procedure by protecting the rights of the adoptive parents and the child as well as those of the biological parents, is best served by finding the consent voidable.” Baxter, 799 N.E.2d at 1061 (citing In re Adoption of H.M.G., 606 N.E.2d 874, 874 [Ind. App. 1993]). The Baxter court continued:
“[I]f the written consent is not executed in the presence of any one of the six specified entities, the validity of the consent may nevertheless be satisfied by evidence that the signatures are authentic and genuine in all respects and manifest a present intention to give the child up for adoption.” 799 N.E.2d at 1062.
Noticeably absent from the Baxter court’s analysis of the Indiana consent statute is any discussion of whether the given consent had substantially complied with the statute. Instead, the court considered how “the intent of the statute” would be “best served.” This is not the analysis undertaken by Kansas courts, which proceed under the assumption that the legislature “ ‘expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted’ ” and which “ ‘must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not *885be/ ” McIntosh, 282 Kan. at 642 (quoting Meneley, 271 Kan. at 378). See In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. at 42-43. Furthermore, the Baxter court, like the majority here, fails to consider whether the legislature intended the acknowledgment requirement to serve purposes in addition to providing “an equitable adoption procedure.” Baxter, 799 N.E.2d at 1061 (citing H.M.G., 606 N.E.2d at 874).
The analysis of the Montana Supreme Court in Riley v. Byrne, 145 Mont. 138, 399 P.2d 980 (1965), also is irreconcilable with Kansas’ substantial compliance standard. While the natural parents’ consents in that case were not acknowledged by a public officer, the Riley court focused its analysis on “whether appellants’ [natural parents’] consents were obtained voluntarily.” 145 Mont. at 144. The court found that “[t]o deny the validity of a decree of adoption for lack of acknowledgement [sic] when the natural parents have fully exercised those rights which such acknowledgement [sic] was designed to protect would, we think, reach a result contrary to the spirit of our adoption statutes.” 145 Mont. at 145.
The opinion of the Montana court should not govern this court’s decision for two notable reasons. First, as I have pointed out previously, the purpose of the acknowledgment requirement in K.S.A. 59-2114(a) is not limited, as both the majority and the Montana court assume, to a prima facie showing of voluntariness. See slip op. at 22-24; Riley, 145 Mont. at 144. Rather, this requirement serves a number of other functions, such as emphasizing the seriousness of the consent and providing the presence of a public officer. These purposes are not served by ignoring the statutory requirement.
Second, like the Baxter opinion from Indiana, the Riley court makes no reference whatsoever to substantial compliance. Instead, Riley is motivated entirely by “the spirit of [Montana’s] adoption statutes.” 145 Mont. at 145. Nowhere does Riley cite to the applicable statute or provide the governing statutory language regarding the acknowledgment requirement in that state. In Kansas, the substantial compliance inquiry does not allow a court to disregard the language of the statute being interpreted. See City of Lenexa, 233 Kan. at 164. Our inquiry is motivated not by a detached consid*886eration of the “spirit” of a particular statute, but rather by a consideration of whether there has been “ ‘ “compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to assure every reasonable objective of the statute.” ’ ”' Orr, 270 Kan. at 113.
In addition to its failure to consider the applicability of the reasoning from the Baxter and Riley decisions to Kansas’ substantial compliance analysis, the majority’s conclusion in the present case does not reconcile its analysis with other persuasive authority relied upon by the Trent court. In particular, Trent cited a Colorado decision, Foley v. Carnesi, 123 Colo. 533, 232 P.2d 186 (1951). In Foley, the natural mother had signed a “relinquishment of rights and consent to adoption,” as well as a letter stating: “ ‘I do hereby agree to the adoption of [the child] by [the adoptive parents].’ ” 123 Colo. at 534. The forms and statement were signed in the home of the adoptive parents and had not been acknowledged by a notary public, as was required by the statute. Because the consent did not comply with the statutory requirements, the district court vacated the decree of adoption.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, finding that “[t]he point in this case is not whether the natural mother can now withdraw her consent, but whether her consent in the adoption proceedings of her child was ‘the requisite consent,’ in compliance with the statute.” 123 Colo. at 536. The court held that “this statutoiy, procedural step [requiring acknowledgment] could not be ignored.” 123 Colo. at 537. The court also found that the natural mother’s due process rights had been violated because, as a minor, she could not waive service of process requirements. 123 Colo. at 537-38.
The Trent court recognized that the reasons for putting aside the adoption in Foley — the faulty consent and the lack of notice— were “equally valid.” 229 Kan. at 229. Thus, this court recognized that the failure to sign a consent to adoption in the presence of a notary public or other public officer was a violation of the statute that supported the district court’s decision to vacate the adoption decree. In distinguishing Foley from the facts in Trent, this court emphasized that “[t]he letter of consent [in Foley] had not been acknowledged by a notary public and there had been no attempt to obtain any manner of official acknowledgment.” 229 Kan. at 229. *887In Trent, however, the natural mother’s consent was given in the presence of a public officer, although it was given in Missouri instead of Kansas. Nevertheless, by citing Foley, the Trent court implicitly recognized that there are some cases where actions will not substantially comply with the acknowledgment requirements— namely, where the consent is not signed in the presence of an officer authorized to take acknowledgments.
On a practical level, a review of the record in this case demonstrates that no effort was made to comply with the statutory requirements of K.S.A. 59-2114(a). Instead, when the adoptive parents were made aware of the statutory requirements, they sought out an acquaintance who also served as a notary public and told her “all that happened”; the notary then falsely acknowledged the natural mother’s signature. In short, not only was there no effort made to comply with the statutory requirements, but there also was a conscious disregard by the adoptive parents for those requirements and the purposes served by them. In such circumstances, one cannot say that the consent form substantially complied with the requirements of K.S.A. 59-2114(a).
The majority concludes, in my opinion erroneously, that the purpose of the acknowledgment requirement is to provide “ ‘prima facie proof oí the . . . validity of the consent, . . . [of] the identity of the signer[,] . . . [and] that the written consent was freely and voluntarily given.’ ” Slip op. at 22 (citing Trent, 229 Kan. at 228). The majority finds that in the absence of an acknowledgment at the time of signing, substantial compliance is nevertheless provided by holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether these purposes were met. The majority seeks to avoid the constitutional implications of such a hearing discussed by the Court of Appeals below, see 36 Kan. App. 2d at 628-31, by transferring the burden of proof at the hearing regarding the voluntariness of the consent from the natural mother to the adoptive parents. See slip op. at 22-24.
There are several problems with the majority’s conclusion that an evidentiary hearing on the question of voluntariness may lead to substantial compliance with K.S.A. 59-2114(a). First, the majority’s conclusion runs contrary to the clear language of the statute, *888which explicitly provides that when a natural parent is contesting the consent during an adoption proceeding, that parent must “allege!] and prove!] by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was not freely and voluntarily given.” The statute further provides that “[t]he burden of proving the consent was not freely and voluntarily given shall rest with the consenting party.” K.S.A. 59-2114(a). The burden shifting described by the majority is directly contrary to the plain statutory language.
In addition, the majority’s solution cannot reconcile itself with the wording of the acknowledgment requirement itself, which provides that consent “shall be in writing and shall be acknowledged” before a public officer authorized to take acknowledgments. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 59-2114(a). However, the majority decision in this case effectively does away with the need for an acknowledgment as long as the court holds an after-the-fact hearing to determine whether the consent was voluntary. The majority’s substantial compliance reasoning, therefore, may be summarized as follows: Despite the mandatory language in K.S.A. 59-2114(a), the statute’s acknowledgment requirement may be disregarded as long as an evidentiary hearing is held to determine whether the consent was voluntary. The burden of proof at this hearing will be on the adoptive parents, despite the statute’s clear statement that “[t]he burden of proving the consent was not freely and voluntarily given shall rest with the consenting party.” K.S.A. 59-2114(a). In my opinion, this analysis cannot constitute “substantial compliance” with the statute, as it specifically runs contrary to two clear mandates therein.
Finally, the majority’s evidentiary hearing solution fails to further the other purposes served by the acknowledgment requirement. An evidentiary hearing cannot retroactively provide the solemnity of the acknowledgment at the original signing of the consent that the legislature deemed appropriate. Similarly, the environment of the hearing cannot provide the appropriate seal of finality associated with signing the consent in the presence of a public officer. While the hearing does provide a public presence, the very nature of such a hearing indicates that the natural parent is contesting the consent at such a forum — not providing consent willingly. There*889fore, the evidentiary hearing envisioned by the majority cannot constitute “ ‘ “compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to assure every reasonable objective of the statute.” ’ ” Orr, 270 Kan. at 113.
In light of the several purposes to be served by the acknowledgment requirement in K.S.A. 59-2114(a) and the case law, the five points put forth by the majority of this court in support of its opinion are either unfounded or inapplicable. First, the majority finds that Trent stands for the proposition that “a failed attempt at acknowledgment did not preclude substantial compliance with the acknowledgment requirement.” Slip op. at 17. However, the current facts do not demonstrate “a failed attempt at acknowledgment.” Instead, the facts illustrate that the adoptive parents, after being informed of the acknowledgment requirement, attempted to circumvent that requirement by going to an acquaintance and asking her to “acknowledge” the natural mother s signature in violation of the notary statutes. As I have previously explained, this behavior is not substantial compliance, or even compliance at all— this is knowing disregard of a statutory requirement.
The remainder of the five points assume that the facts in this case support a finding of substantial compliance. In its second point, the majority explains that “in Trent we held that a consent to adoption executed in substantial compliance with statutory requirements is valid under a consent statute in view of subsequent judicial proceedings.” Slip op. at 17. However, the consent in this case was not executed in substantial compliance with the statute, and a hearing on the subject of consent cannot cure the failure to follow the statutory procedure or provide substantial compliance with that statutory procedure.
Third, the majority finds that the mandatory language of K.S.A. 59-2114(a) (namely, the term “shall”) may be interpreted as allowing for substantial, not only strict, compliance with its requirements. Nevertheless, the majority’s interpretation of K.S.A. 59-2114(a) requires at least substantial compliance with the statute; such compliance is not evidenced here.
Fourth, the majority finds that the failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of K.S.A. 59-2114(a) “can be cured with *890information from other sources, so long as the statutory purpose is met.” Slip op. at 18. However, there are numerous purposes served by the acknowledgment requirement, including an indication that the consent was freely and voluntarily signed, as well as the symbol and ceremony provided by a public officer to emphasize the gravity of the proceedings. Even if one were to argue that the consent was signed voluntarily, a conclusion cast into serious doubt by the evidence in this case, the other purposes of this statutoiy requirement were not met. An after-the-fact hearing cannot cure a complete failure to comply with the procedural requirements of K.S.A. 59-2114(a).
Fifth, the majority states that “the determination of substantial compliance with a statutoiy requirement is a finding of fact by the district court which will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial competent evidence.” Slip op. at 18. Even considering the deference given to district courts in making such determinations, there can be no question that the adoptive parents failed to comply with the statutoiy requirements. K.S.A. 59-2114(a) states that a consent to adoption “shall be in writing and shall be acknowledged before a judge of a court of record or before an officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments.” Here, it is uncontroverted that the natural mother did not sign the consent in the presence of a notaiy public or other official authorized to give acknowledgments. There is simply no evidence to support the district court’s finding in this case that the purported acknowledgment substantially complied with the statutoiy requirements.
I recognize that my reasoning in this case would lead to the regrettable result of removing this child from the care of her adoptive parents, with whom she has lived her entire 2Vz years. However, as the Court of Appeals noted below, “[a]n appellate court should refrain from rewriting a plainly worded statute simply to reach a desired result. Result-oriented justice is directly contraiy to the concept of the rule of law.” X.J.A., 36 Kan. App. 2d 621, Syl. ¶ 7. Moreover, the adoptive parents could have avoided this result by simply complying with the statutory acknowledgment requirement after their attorney explained it to them. The majority’s opinion in this case — and the district court’s opinion below- — leads to *891the regrettable result of having a natural mother’s daughter removed from her care without satisfying the important safeguards established by the legislature that she voluntarily consents to the relinquishment of her parental rights and understands the seriousness of her actions.
In my opinion, the majority decision has the result of increasing litigation on the issue of consent in adoption cases, which is a result the legislature sought to eliminate by enacting K.S.A. 59-2114(a). In holding that the consent in this case substantially complied with the requirements of K.S.A. 59-2114(a), the majority effectively nullifies the explicit statutory requirement that a consent to adoption be acknowledged by a public officer and replaces it with an evidentiary hearing. As Justice Fromme noted in his dissent in Trent, this is a “legislative prerogative,” runs contrary to the plain language of the statute, and undermines the purposes the requirement was meant to serve. 229 Kan. at 233 (Fromme, J., dissenting). I would affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court.
Rosen, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.