concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 52 While I concur in the outcome of this case, I vigorously dissent from that part of the lead opinion that in substance states that regardless of how clear and unambiguous the language of a contract may be, a party may still offer extrinsic evidence in an attempt to show ambiguity. This is contrary to well-established canons of contract law that in determining the intent of contracting parties, the court must first examine the plain wording of the document for intent, and looks to extrinsic evidence only if the wording is ambiguous or uncertain. As this court stated in Winegar v. Froerer Corp.:
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling. If the contract is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the agreement. A court may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain.
813 P.2d 104,108 (Utah 1991).
¶ 53 The lead opinion states clearly in its conclusion that “because the language of the stipulation in question clearly reflects that Yeargin and the Division agreed Yeargin was not a purchaser or owner of materials used in constructing the AP facility, the Commission’s determination that Yeargin was a real property contractor was clearly erroneous.” In spite of the clarity and unambiguity of the language of the stipulation in question, the lead opinion, strangely enough, states that the Commission was correct in considering extrinsic evidence based upon a test put forth in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass’n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995).1 We should take this opportunity to reverse that part of Ward which allows consideration of extrinsic evidence when a contract is clear and unambiguous because it is contrary to the well-established contract law in Utah and across the country.
¶ 54 The approach wherein a court may consider extrinsic evidence in determining ambiguity, which was adopted in Ward and is now further espoused by the lead opinion, “invites parties to create ambiguity in even the clearest contract provisions.” Ward, 907 P.2d at 270 (Russon, J., concurring). This approach fosters a lack of reliability in the written contract and encourages adjudication. See id.
¶ 55 Furthermore, as pointed out in Justice Zimmerman’s dissent, Ward completely ignored our doctrine of stare decisis. See id. at 271 (Zimmerman, C.J., dissenting). Under stare decisis, we must follow the established rule of Utah law unless “ ‘clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent.’” Id. (quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill. L.Rev. 367, 367 (1957)). Needless to say, stare decisis is a cornerstone of American jurisprudence and necessary for the “ ‘predictability of the law and the fairness of adjudication.’ ” State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)).2
¶56 In contradiction to our doctrine of stare decisis, Ward gave no legitimate reason for overruling long-established Utah precedence. Instead, Ward merely mentioned that while Utah case law espouses a stricter application of the rule, the “better-reasoned approach” is to consider extrinsic evidence in determining whether an ambiguity exists. *300Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (relying primarily on California law).
T57 In addition, Ward conveniently misconstrued our ruling in Winegar that states, "A court may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain." 813 P.2d at 108 (emphasis added). Overlooking the constrictive language, Ward placed a permissive interpretation on the statement and then applied a converse construction totally lacking in reasoning.
T58 Because Ward ignored and misconstrued Utah law, disregarded our doctrine of stare decisis, and contravened the canons of contract law adhered to by most jurisdictions in the United States, it should be overruled. The lead opinion's reliance on Ward is therefore misplaced.
59 In the instant case, the Tax Commission concluded that the stipulation was open to more than one interpretation and looked beyond the language of the stipulation by considering extrinsic evidence such as invoices and checks. Because the determination of ambiguity is a question of law, we review the Commission's decision for correctness.
1 60 We cannot speculate as to why parties stipulate to facts. There are innumerable motives as to why a party may stipulate as it did. Therefore, we look to the stipulation itself, If the terms or provisions are conclusive on their face, the intent of the parties is determined solely from the language of the stipulation. -
1 61 The language of the stipulation before us is clear and unambiguous. It states:
During the course of construction of the facility PPI and WECCO entered into an agreement with United Engineers and Constructors, Inc., and its affiliate, Year-gin, for the purpose of providing assistance in the engineering, design and procurement for the construction of the AP manufacturing facility. United Engineers [Yeargin] assisted WECCO in purchasing materials for use in the construction of the facility and located suppliers, obtained price quotations and arranged for WECCO to make purchases of materials. Title to all materials purchased for use at the WECCO facility passed directly to WEC-CO from the suppliers.
(Emphasis added.) The language of the stipulation states clearly and unambiguously that title for all materials for use at the WECCO facility passed directly to WECCO from the suppliers. The court of appeals erred in upholding the Tax Commission's decision. The stipulation should be enforced as written, and Yeargin does not qualify as a real property contractor. Therefore, I concur only in the result reached by the lead opinion.
. Justice Durham wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justice Stewart and Justice Howe. Then Chief Justice Zimmerman and Justice Rus-son dissented.
. While we are attempting to overturn Ward, which is the current precedent, and stare decisis still applies, a rule established by a case should not be adhered to when it was originally erroneous. See White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1378 n. 1 (Utah 1994) (Russon, J., dissenting). As noted by Justice Felix Frankfurter, " '[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable....’” Id. (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604 (1940)). In accordance with our doctrine of stare decisis, we have provided sound reasoning as to why Ward was clearly erroneous and why more good than harm will come by departing from Ward.