(dissenting):
T17 I respectfully dissent from my colleagues' decision. Although the majority opinion makes a persuasive case for affirming the trial court's decision, I believe that to construe Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1) (1998) as the majority has done poses several problems. These problems arise as the result of a statutory scheme that is hardly a model of clarity and consistency.
When construing a statute, we look first to the plain meaning of the words used and their statutory context. The plain language rule also requires that we give effect to all the terms of a statute so that no one provision is construed in isolation. Furthermore, " 'if doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, the Court should analyze the act in its entirety and harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose." "
Kimball Condos. Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. of Equalization, 943 P.2d 642, 648 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). Further, "when two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the more general provision." Hall v. Department of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 958.
{ 18 When reading the statute as a whole, I would conclude the trial court erred by ruling that section 41-6-87 prohibits the use of a left-hand bicycle path. It is true that section 41-6-87(1) sets forth a general rule requiring bicyclists to "ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1). However, it seems clear to me that subsection (1) does not apply in cases where a roadway has an adjacent bicycle path, since it never mentions bicycle paths and since subsection (8) does.
119 Subsection (8) requires the use of a bicycle path when one exists. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(8). Thus, while subsection (1) certainly sets forth a rule of general application, it does not govern the specific situation where a bicycle path exists. Thus, "the provision more specific in application [subsection (8)] governs over the more general provision [subsection (1)]." Hall, 2001 UT 34 at ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 958.
T 20 To conclude otherwise, as the majority does, would pose at least three serious problems that would prevent us from harmonizing all portions of the statute. First, if we concluded that subsection (1) requires bicyclists to stay to the right side of the roadway even when a left-hand bicycle path exists, we would necessarily create an exception to subsection (8) that the legislature did not include. Specifically, subsection (8) provides that "[Ilf a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(8). It does not say "bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway, unless the path is on the left-hand side of the roadway." Subsection (8) requires the use of an existing bicycle path without limitation as to which direction the bicyclist must ride, and does not limit bicyclists to one side of the road.
*11881[ 21 Second, to construe section 41-6-87 as the majority does renders subsection (8) inoperable. If we concluded that subsection (1) required bicyclists to ride on the right side of the road and precluded them from riding in a left-hand bicycle path, then subsection (8) would be inoperable whether there is a bicycle path on either side or both sides. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1) (requiring bicyclist to stay to the far right of the "roadway"); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(89) (defining "roadway" as "that portion of highway ... ordinarily used for vehicular travel"). The bicyclist would then be required to ignore the specific mandate to ride in the designated bicycle path, whether adjacent to the right or the left of the roadway, and follow the more general rule by staying as far to the right of the roadway as possible.
122 Third, such a construction would render subsections (1) and (8) contradictory, thus subverting the rule that we must " © "harmonize its provisions." ' " Kimball, 9483 P.2d at 648 (citations omitted). If a bicyclist stays to the far right of the roadway where a left-hand, but no right-hand bicycle path exists, she would violate the mandate of subsection (8) to ride in the designated bicycle path. On the other hand, if she followed the mandate of subsection (8) by riding in the designated bicycle path, she would violate the general provisions of subsection (1) that require her to stay to the far right of the roadway.
1 23 In order to harmonize and give effect to all portions of section 41-6-87, I would conclude that subsection (1) sets forth a general rule that does not contemplate a roadway with designated bicycle paths. Instead, subsection (8) applies and requires the use of a bicycle path where one exists. Further, section 41-6-87 does not prohibit the use of a left-hand bicycle path, and I would hold a rider may use the left-hand bicycle path regardless of whether a right-hand path also exists.
«[ 24 Thus, I believe the trial court erred in concluding Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1) (1998) prohibits the use of a left-hand bicycle path. I believe the trial court further erred in concluding that, because Salt Lake City, Ut., Ordinances § 12.80.070(I) (1989) expressly permits the use of a left-hand bicycle path in contradiction to section 41-6-87, it is therefore invalid. Finally, I believe the trial court erred in ruling that "[t]he jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that [Hansen] was not justified by ordinance nor state law in traveling in the direction he was against traffic." Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court's denial of Hansen's summary judgment motion with respect to this issue and remand.