I dissent. In my view, the Court of Appeal reached the correct conclusion when it reversed the convictions of defendants George Marrón and Raymond Vallejo. I agree with the Court of Appeal that insufficient evidence supported those convictions based on the theory that the shooting of Ernie Barba by defendant Jose Jesus Medina was a natural and probable consequence of the assault on Barba in which Matron and Vallejo participated. The Court of Appeal did not reach this conclusion lightly. The court applied the deferential substantial evidence standard of review to its inquiry. It also recognized the grim reality that disputes between gang members are in a different category from disputes between civilians. “As gang violence has become more prevalent and innocent bystanders have become victims of the violence in ever increasing numbers, our courts have recognized that a dispute between two neighbors and one between two gang members can lead to different consequences.” Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal determined that even in the context of gang violence there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict as to Vallejo and Matron.
The Court of Appeal carefully compared decisions affirming convictions of gang members based on the natural and probable consequences theory with the facts of this case in light of the reasonable forseeability requirement. (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013] [natural and probable consequences doctrine “is based on the recognition that ‘aiders and abettors should be responsible for the criminal harms they have naturally, probably and foreseeably put in motion’ ”].) In each case it considered, the Court of Appeal observed that the evidence supporting the convictions of the nonperpetrator included one or more crucial facts that were absent from this case. “In evaluating the cited cases, several facts emerge *929which support the courts’ conclusions that each defendant was.liable for the committed crime under the natural and probable consequences theory: (1) the defendant had knowledge of the weapon that was used before or during his involvement in the target crime; (2) the committed crime took place while the target crime was being perpetrated; (3) weapons were introduced to the target crime shortly after it ensued; (4) the fight which led to the committed crime was planned; (5) the gangs were engaged in an ongoing rivalry involving past acts of violence; or (6) the defendant agreed to or aided the commission of the committed crime. In all of these cases, more than one of these facts were present.”1
By contrast, the court noted that there was no evidence that either Vallejo or Marrón had knowledge that Medina was in possession of a gun before or during the fistfight with Barba. “Indeed,” the court observed, “there was no evidence that anyone had a weapon of any kind prior to the shooting.” The shooting of Barba did not occur during the assault on him by Medina, Vallejo and Marrón. Rather, the testimony of the three percipient witnesses— Ordenes, Rodriguez, and Varela—was that the fight had broken up, Ordenes had walked Barba to his car and put him inside of it, and Barba had begun to drive away when Medina alone walked into the middle of the street and started firing. There was no evidence that the assault on Barba was planned by defendants, much less that it was a retaliatory act in the course of ongoing gang warfare between the “Lil Watts” and “Sanfer” gangs. In fact, the gang expert, Officer Port, testified that these gangs were not even rivals. Finally, there was no evidence that there was any prior agreement between defendants to go out looking for a “Sanfer” gang member to assault.
Contrary to the Attorney General’s contention, by making this comparison, the Court of Appeal was not establishing a standard of evidence that must be met before a conviction based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine will be affirmed in the context of gang violence. Rather, the court was attempting to determine the contours of that doctrine by reference to extant case law, and, particularly, to cast some practical light on the elusive concept of foreseeability, given that “no published case to date gives a clear definition of the terms ‘natural’ and ‘probable (Judicial Council of *930Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2008) Com. to CALCRIM No. 403, p. 173.) It was necessary for the Court of Appeal to examine precedent to determine the nature, quality and quantum of evidence found to be sufficient to sustain a conviction under that doctrine in order to determine whether the evidence was sufficient in this case.
What the Court of Appeal found was that the “only piece of evidence that might support an inference that someone other than Medina knew the shooting would take place was Varela’s testimony that she heard someone say, ‘Get the heat,’ just prior to the sound of gunfire.” To this, I would add the majority opinion’s assertion—echoed by the Attorney General at argument— that both Ordenes and Port, the gang expert, testified, in effect, that a homicide is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the challenge, “Where are you from?” I disagree with the majority’s characterization of this evidence.
The majority places enormous weight on the “Get the heat” testimony and goes to some lengths to establish, circumstantially, that the person who uttered this statement must have been either Vallejo or Marrón. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 924.) That analysis proceeds, however, from an ipse dixit assumption: “It was unlikely that Medina yelled ‘get the heat’ to himself.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 924.) Medina was the one person in this episode who knew there was a gun somewhere because he used it to kill the victim. It is not unlikely, therefore, that Medina yelled out, “Get the heat.” But this does not necessarily imply that his codefendants must have known Medina had a gun with him. It only establishes that Medina, who was evidently quite angry that the attack on Barba had been broken up, shouted for a gun, not that anyone knew what he was talking about. It is just as reasonable to conclude that he shouted this command and, when no one responded, he got the gun himself. Indeed, this conclusion is more consistent with the testimony of Rodriguez that, after everyone scattered, Medina stepped out into the street with the gun and fired it.
The other bit of evidence on which the majority relies is testimony regarding the consequences of the challenge, “Where are you from?” The majority asserts: “According to Ordenes, a gang member’s query ‘where are you from?’ means ‘what gang are you from?’ and is a verbal challenge, which (depending on the response) could lead to a physical altercation and even death. Officer Port affirmed that a gang member who asks ‘where are you from?’ could be armed and probably would be prepared to respond with violence, ranging from a fistfight to homicide. As a former gang member, Ordenes foresaw precisely that result. He feared that somebody might get *931killed after Vallejo verbally challenged Barba and, because of that fear, ordered defendants to ‘take that into the streets.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 922.)
An examination of the reporter’s transcript belies the majority’s characterization of this evidence. What the transcript discloses is that both Ordenes and Port—and the former with considerable prodding from the prosecutor— were, at most, describing possible—not probable—consequences. For example, what Ordenes actually said, based on his experience as a gang member, was that the question, “Where are you from?” “would go on to a fight or whatever, [f] [Q-] Or what? [jQ [A.] Or whatever else would happen. [][] [Q.] What other things could happen from that? [][] [A.] Well, death, [f] [Q.] Death as by how? [f] [A.] Whatever. Whatever you can use. [f] [Q.] Okay. So if you have a weapon—[f] [A.] You would use it.” (Italics added.)
Thus, in my view, Ordenes’s testimony describes a possible event, not a probable one, that might occur if weapons were present (but Ordenes did not testify that he knew or even suspected any of the defendants in this case were armed). The gang expert’s testimony was equally attenuated. The expert testified that if the question “Where are you from?” was answered unsatisfactorily, “it’s some form of misunderstanding that can go into some physical altercation. They can go from a fistfight to disrespecting each other . . . verbally and all the way as far [as] homicide.” (Italics added.)
Like Ordenes, then, the expert did no more than describe a range of possible results from a fistfight to verbal insults and, perhaps somewhere down the line, a killing, although how far down the line was not elucidated. Moreover, when the expert was asked, “when a gang member usually asks that question to someone else, in your experience are they usually armed?” the expert replied, “They can be. It’s my opinion that if you’re going to ask that question, that you’re probably prepared to be in some form of altercation following the answer.” (Italics added.) “Some form of altercation,” of course, is exactly what happened in this case—a fistfight. It does not necessarily encompass a homicide.2
Nor do I agree that Ordenes’s testimony about his concern when he told defendants and Barba to take their dispute outside the house was because he *932foresaw a probable homicide. It was the prosecutor who raised this specter: “[Q.] Okay. And when you heard somebody say, ‘Where are you from,’ did that start to concern you a little bit? [][] [A.] Yes, it did. [f] [Q.] Okay. And is that for the reasons you just stated right now, that you knew that somebody was going to get killed? [][] [A.] For the reason that I didn’t want no problems to my house and also that reason too. [j[] [Q.] Okay. So what happened after you heard the words, ‘Where are you from?’ [f] [A.] I said, ‘Take that into the streets, go outside, don’t disrespect the house.’ ” (Italics added.)
Again, despite the prosecutor’s prodding, Ordenes’s testimony is not evidence that he reasonably foresaw a homicide as a consequence of the challenge. Instead, his testimony evinced a concern that he did not want a fight—a fistfight or some other physical altercation—inside his house where there were women and children. That this domestic concern, rather than fear of a probable homicide, was behind his command for the men to leave his house is reflected in his wife’s testimony. Rodriguez also told the men to leave the house because, as she testified, “they were kind of getting loud, so I told—they had my front door open and it was cold, so I told them to take that outside because my kids are in back asleep, and then I closed the door.”
Moreover, Ordenes’s conduct after ordering the men out is not consistent with the majority’s interpretation of his testimony. Had he suspected a killing was in the offing, one would think he would have done something to protect himself from getting caught in the crossfire, but he did not. Rather, he followed the men outside, broke up their fight and walked Barba to his car, telling him, “ ‘Just get in the car, just leave, I’ll take care of it.’ ” These are not the acts or the words of someone who is fearful that a killing is imminent. They are the acts and words of someone who is prepared for a low-level altercation that can be smoothed over eventually once the participants have been separated. Thus, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of Ordenes’s testimony as reflecting a fear “that somebody might get killed after Vallejo verbally challenged Barba . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 922.)
Stripped to its essence, what the majority holds is that the challenge “Where are you from?” is so provocative in the context of gang culture that any response up to and inducting murder is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of that utterance, so as to justify a murder conviction not only of the actual perpetrator but also of any other gang members involved in the target offense, whatever the surrounding circumstances. I cannot subscribe to such an expansive interpretation of the natural and probable consequences doctrine even in the context of gang violence, which no one doubts is a plague upon some of our state’s most vulnerable communities.
*933I must agree with the Court of Appeal: “Notwithstanding the violence which most gang confrontations spawn, on our facts, viewed objectively, we cannot conclude that an unplanned fight between unarmed combatants in front of a residence was reasonably likely to lead to a shooting resulting in death. In essence, the Attorney General is asking us to create a new theory of liability. An aider and abettor would be responsible for any crime that was a natural and possible consequence of the target crime. That, we cannot do.”
Neither can I.
Kennard, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.
The majority faults the Court of Appeal for “focusing on the facts that were missing, rather than on the actual evidence presented.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 921.) I disagree with this characterization. The Court of Appeal did not give short shrift to the evidence potentially supporting the convictions—indeed, the majority feels compelled elsewhere in its opinion to contest the Court of Appeal’s discussion of some of that evidence. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 922-924.) By definition, however, a finding that evidence is insufficient to support a judgment must be based on evidentiary deficiencies, and so, necessarily, a reviewing court would emphasize such deficiencies.
The majority highlights Port’s general testimony that the “Lil Watts” gang participated in crimes involving firearms, and concludes: “[Bjecause Lil Watts members had challenged a rival gang member, the jury could reasonably infer that, in backing up that challenge, a Lil Watts member either would have been armed or would have or should have known a fellow gang member was or might be armed.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 923.) I disagree with the conclusion that it can be reasonably inferred from Port’s testimony that, because some gang members participated on some occasions in gun-related crimes, these particular defendants must have known Medina was armed in the specific circumstances of this case—where members from two gangs, which were not rivals, met at a party house in neutral territory.