INTRODUCTION
{1 Defendant Cheryl Barlow asks this court to overturn the district court's order granting Barlow's former domestic partner, Keri Jones, visitation of Barlow's daughter. Because Jones has no biological or legal relationship with the child, she has no statutory standing to seek visitation. The district court, however, granted standing under the common law doctrine of in loco parentis. We must now decide whether Utah courts have *810recognized, or should adopt, a common law doctrine granting standing for domestic partners of fit legal parents1 to seek visitation of children for whom they had acted as parents.
T2 We hold that the doctrine of in loco parentis, as recognized by the courts of this state, does not independently grant standing to seek visitation after the in loco parentis relationship has ended. Although this court recognized the right of stepparents to seek visitation in Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), standing in that case arose out of an interpretation of statutory law granting such rights, not from an independent common law source. We decline to extend the common law doctrine of in loco parentis to create standing where it does not arise out of statute. We accordingly overturn the trial court's grant of visitation rights and hold that the common law doctrine of in loco parentis does not independently grant standing to seek visitation against the wishes of a fit legal parent.
BACKGROUND
T3 Cheryl Pike Barlow and Keri Lynne Jones began a romantic relationship, and in time, they moved in together. They ultimately traveled to Vermont, where they entered into a civil union.
T4 In November 2000, around the time they made their decision to enter into a civil union, Barlow and Jones decided to have a child together. They planned that Barlow would be artificially inseminated and bear the child and that Jones would be artificially inseminated and bear a second child at a later date. Jones and Barlow selected a sperm donor who shared both of their characteristics and began the artificial insemination process. Barlow conceived in February 2001. During the pregnancy, Jones participated in prenatal care with Barlow and her physician.
5 On October 4, 2001, Barlow gave birth to a baby girl (the "child"). The birth certificate listed the child's surname as "Jones Barlow." For the first two years of her life, both Barlow and Jones cared for the child. And in May 2002, the parties obtained an order from the Third District Court designating Jones and Barlow as co-guardians of the child.
T6 Jones and Barlow ended their relationship around October 20083, soon after the child's second birthday. Subsequently, Barlow and the child moved to a separate residence, and Barlow eventually ended all contact between Jones and the child. Barlow also petitioned the district court for an order removing Jones as the child's co-guardian. Jones objected, but the district court granted the petition.
17 In December 20083, Jones brought suit in district court seeking a "[djecree of custody and visitation," claiming that she had standing under the common law doctrine of in loco parentis The district court found that the doctrine of in loco parentis could confer standing and ordered that the proceedings be bifurcated. First, the parties would participate in an evidentiary hearing to assess whether Jones stood in loco paren-tis to the child. If the court found that Jones established the elements of in loco parentis, then the court would proceed with a best interests of the child analysis to determine visitation and custody.
18 At the conclusion of the first phase of trial, the district court held that Jones was in loco parentis to the child and thus had standing to argue that visitation was in the child's best interest. The district court limited the second phase of the trial to issues of visitation and child support after finding that Utah's adoption statutes precluded a consideration of custody. Following the conclusion of the second phase of trial, the district court found that continued contact with Jones would be in the child's best interest and ordered visitation. In addition, the court ordered Jones to provide financial support to the child.
T9 Barlow appeals the district court's decision.2 She presents five arguments: (1) the *811trial court lacks jurisdiction in this case because the in loco parentis doctrine does not grant Jones standing to seek visitation; (2) the trial court's application of the in loco parentis doctrine violates Barlow's constitutional rights; (8) the visitation order violates Barlow's right to privacy; (4) Jones was never truly in loco parentis to the child; and (5) Jones' claims are barred by res judicata. Because we hold that Jones lacks standing, we reverse the trial court's order and decline to reach the merits of the remaining arguments.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{10 In reviewing questions of common law standing, this court recognizes three possible standards of review. Determinations of the legal requirements for standing are reviewed for correctness. Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 53, ¶18, 82 P.3d 1125. However, we give deference to the district court on factual determinations that bear upon the question of standing. Id. (citing Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997)). Finally, we give minimal discretion to the district court in its application of the facts to the law. Id.
1 11 Because we confine our review to the district court's interpretation of the doctrine of in loco parentis and do not address its findings of fact or application of those facts to the law, the appropriate standard of review is correctness. We therefore grant no discretion to the district court.
ANALYSIS
Y12 "[S)tanding is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied" before a court may entertain a controversy between two parties Wash County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶6 n. 2, 82 P.3d 1125; accord Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986) ("[Llack of standing is jurisdictional."); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) ("[The moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court."). Under the traditional test for standing, "the interests of the parties must be adverse" and "the parties seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the controversy." Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148. A party may assert an interest that is legally protectible under either statute or the common law. See Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶17, 82 P.3d 1125. Recognizing that no Utah statute confers a right to seek visitation of the child, Jones bases her claim of a legally protectible right on the common law doctrine of in loco paren-tis.
T 18 The doctrine of in loco parentis is applied when someone who is not a legal parent nevertheless assumes the role of a parent in a child's life. Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978) ("The term 'in loco parentis' means in the place of a parent. ..."); Black's Low Dictionary 808 (8th ed. 2004) ("Of, relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent."). An individual attains in loco parentis status by assuming the "status and obligations of a parent without formal adoption." Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66; accord Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457, 459 (1925). While an individual stands in loco parentis to a child, he or she has the "same rights, duties, and liabilities as a parent." Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 Utah 502, 5 P.2d 570, 571 (1931); accord Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66, McDonald v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 267 S.W. 1074, 1076 (Tex.App.1924) ("All such are said to stand in loco parentis, and, as long as the relation exists, the rights and duties with reference to the child are the same as those of the natural parent.").
T 14 The central question now presented to us is whether the in loco parentis doctrine contemplates perpetuating these parent-like rights and obligations after a legal parent has ended the in loco parentis relationship. *812Because at common law all rights and obligations end with the termination of the in loco parentis relationship, and because the doctrine in no way abrogates a parent's right to terminate such a relationship, we conclude that Jones lacks standing to seek visitation. And we decline to expand the in loco parentis doctrine to permanently diminish parental rights.
I. THE IN LOCO PARENTIS DOCTRINE DOES NOT CONFER STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION AFTER THE PARENT-LIKE RELATIONSHIP HAS ENDED
115 Unlike the relationship arising from adoption, the in loco parentis relationship is temporary in nature. 59 Am. Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 (2002); Babb v. Matlock, 340 Ark. 263, 9 SW.3d 508, 510 (2000). In Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925), we endorsed the common law principle that where an individual enters into an in loco parentis relationship with a child, "the reciprocal rights, duties, and obligations of parent and child continue as long as such relation continues." Id. at 459; accord 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 (2002) ("Onee the person alleged to be in loco parentis no longer discharges all the duties incident to the parental relationship, the person is no longer in loco parentis."). Thus, the termination of the in loco parentis relationship also terminates the corresponding parent-like rights and responsibilities. 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 (2002); State v. Randall S. (In re Interest of Destiny S.), 263 Neb.255, 639 N.W.2d 400, 406 (2002).
16 Because it is clear that Barlow effectively ended the in loco parentis relationship when she moved to another residence and refused to allow Jones to interact with the child, the only question that remains is whether such an act by a legal parent qualifies as a valid termination of an in loco parentis relationship under the common law. Stated differently, the question is whether a legal parent may terminate the in loco paren-tis status by removing the child from the relationship with the surrogate parent or whether the in loco parentis doctrine allows the surrogate parent to extend the relationship against the legal parent's will.
1 17 Before addressing the question of how an in loco parentis relationship may be terminated, we first correct a misstatement this court has made as to the status of the common law on this issue. It is universally recognized that, "[uJulike natural and adoptive parenthood, the status of being in loco parentis is temporary; it may be abrogated at will either by the surrogate parent or by the child." 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 9 (2002) (emphasis added). In Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), we misconstrued this principle when we asserted that "[the common law concerning termination of the [in] loco parentis status is that only the surrogate parent or the child is able to terminate the status at will." Id. at 67 (emphasis added). This assertion that the common law recognized disavowal by either the surrogate parent or the child as the exclusive method of dissolving an in loco parentis relationship was incorrect.
18 When we review the authorities cited by this court in Gribble, we find no support for the proposition that only the surrogate parent or the child may terminate the in loco parentis relationship. In support of that proposition, the Gribble court, 583 P.2d at 67 n. 13, cited two cases: the Washington Supreme Court decision of Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wash.2d 510, 364 P.2d 444 (1961), and the South Carolina decision of Chestnut v. Chestnut, 247 S.C. 332, 147 S.E.2d 269 (1966). Both of these cases involved attempts by men who stood in loco parentis to a child to avoid child support upon divorcee or separation from their wives. Taylor, 364 P.2d at 444-46; Chestnut, 147 S.E.2d at 270. In declaring that these men could avoid a support obligation, both courts directly quoted the following statement from the Iowa Supreme Court as representing the accepted common law:
One important qualification is that one merely standing in the place of a parent may abandon the burdens attendant upon such status at any time. In McDonald v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association it is said: "... the status of one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abro*813gated at will by either the person thus standing in loco parentis or by the child." To the same effect is this language from In re McCardle's Estate [95 Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850 (1934) ]: "It (loco parentis) is not, as argued, to be likened to that of adoption. The one is temporary in character, the other permanent and abiding."
State ex rel. Gilman v. Bacon, 249 Towa 1233, 91 N.W.2d 395, 399 (1958) (citations omitted), quoted in Taylor, 364 P.2d at 445-46; Chestnut, 147 S.E.2d at 270.
19 That the surrogate parent is in no way bound by the obligations of the in loco paren-tis relationship does not support the somewhat contrary conclusion that the doctrine entitles the surrogate parent to unilaterally extend the rights pertaining to such a relationship. In fact, there is nothing in the authorities we cited in Gribble justifying the conclusion that the in loco parentis status may be terminated by only the surrogate parent or the child.
20 Our research has failed to uncover a single instance where a court has endorsed the proposition that the inherent power of the surrogate parent or the child to terminate the relationship is exclusive in nature. Quite the opposite, cases recognizing that.the relationship may be abrogated at will by either party emphasize the transitory nature of the relationship, rather than the Gribble formulation of a relationship that is essentially permanent at the option of the surrogate parent. See Harmon v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 134 Wash.2d 523, 951 P.2d 770, 775 (1998) ("At common law the status of one standing in loco parentis is voluntary and temporary and may be abrogated at will by either the person standing in loco parentis or ... the child."); In re Agnes P., 110 NM. 768, 800 P.2d 202, 205 (N.M.Ct.App.1990) ("Furthermore, an in loco parentis status is temporary and may be abrogated at will by either the child or the surrogate parent."); McDonald v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 267 S.W. 1074, 1076 (Tex.App.1924) ("[Thhe relation existing between an adopting parent and the child is permanent, continuing, and cannot be abrogated by the parent; whilst the status of one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at will by either the person thus standing in loco parentis or by the child."). In fact, a New Mexico appellate court that cited this proposition found that nothing within the in loco parentis doctrine prohibited the state from terminating the relationship against the objection of the surrogate parents. Agnes P., 800 P.2d at 205. The court held that the surrogate parents were not entitled to termination hearings because they did not have the same due process rights as legal parents. Id.
§21 In short, the fact that the in loco parentis status could be terminated by the surrogate parent or by the child does not suggest any limitation or restriction on the rights of a fit legal parent to terminate a surrogate parent's relationship with his or her child. We thus conclude that our statement in Gribble regarding termination of the in loco parentis status, insofar as it restricted the authority to terminate the relationship to either the surrogate parent or the child, was incorrect as a statement of the historical common law rule.
122 Indeed, there is no principle within the in loco parentis doctrine that purports to abridge a fit legal parent's right to govern her children's associations. The in loco parentis status is "temporary by definition and ceases on withdrawal of consent by the legal parent." Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 168 n.7 (2005).3 In other words, a legal parent may freely terminate the in loco parentis status by removing her child from the relationship, thereby extinguishing all parent-like rights and responsibilities vested in the former surrogate parent.
*81411 23 Other courts have recognized that the temporary nature of the in loco parentis status militates against using the doctrine to grant continual parent-like rights after the legal parent has terminated the in loco par-entis relationship. When confronted with a situation where a former partner asserted in loco parentis standing to seek visitation of a child after the natural parent unilaterally removed the child from the relationship, the Texas Court of Appeals found that
[oJnee [the biological parent] and the child moved out, however, any possible claim [the surrogate parent] may have had for standing in loco parentis ended. The common law relationship is temporary and ends when the child is no longer under the care of the person in loco parentis.
Coons-Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630, 635-36 (Tex.App.2003). Indeed, the Texas court described "the very cornerstone of the doctrine" of in loco parentis as the "central common feature [that] the person deemed to be standing in loco parentis had actual care and custody of a child in a parent's absence." Id. at 636. Thus, the assignment of permanent rights is repugnant to one of the defining features of the in loco parentis doctrine-its temporary status.
1] 24 This temporary status is reinforced by the fact that the surrogate parent may arbitrarily cast the relationship aside at any time and thus terminate all parent-like obligations and rights. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 348 (2002); Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wash.2d 510, 364 P.2d 444, 445 (1961). It would be a perverse doctrine of law that left a legal parent unable to enforee support obligations against a surrogate parent's will because of the temporary status of the in loco parentis relationship but allowed a surrogate parent to extend her parent-like rights against the legal parent's objections for as long as she saw fit Under such a distorted legal regime, the parent-like rights and responsibilities are permanent and abiding for as long as the surrogate parent wants them to be, yet transitory and fleeting when the legal parent seeks to enforce a parental obligation against the surrogate parent.4 Such an inequitable result, which would prioritize the rights of the surrogate parent over the needs of the child, demonstrates that the in loco parentis doctrine does not contemplate a perpetual grant of rights and is, in fact, ill-suited to convey such rights.
1 25 Despite the common law principle that the in loco parentis doctrine is temporary and does not convey rights that survive the termination of the parent-like relationship, Jones asserts that Utah cases have conferred standing to seek visitation upon those who had stood in loco parentis to a child. A close examination of these cases, however, reveals that this court has never granted standing to seek visitation solely on the basis of this common law doctrine.
126 In Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66, this court based a stepparent's standing to seek visitation upon an interpretation of a Utah divorce statute, which states in part that "[vlisitation rights of parents, grandparents and other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the child." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 80-8-5(5)(a) (Supp.2006)). We read this phrase to "indicate[ ] the legislative intent to protect the relationships which affect the child whose parents are being divorced" and reasoned that an individual who "stand[s] in the relationship of parent, grandparent, or other relative" had standing under the statute to seek visitation. Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66. Although we used the in loco parentis doctrine as an interpretive tool to guide the inquiry as to who stands in one of these relationships, the ultimate source of standing was the statute itself-not the common law doctrine of in loco parentis.5 Id. at *81568 ("If appellant is in loco parentis, he should be considered a parent for purposes of See. 30-3-5."); State ex rel. J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 715 n. 5 (Utah 1990) (finding that the court in Gribble "was interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953)"). In this case, however, Jones does not rely upon any interpretation of statutory law. Rather, she relies solely upon the common law for standing. We therefore conclude that Gribble is inapplicable.
127 Equally unavailing to Jones is our holding in J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710. In that case, a wife left her husband and subsequent-Ty bore a child fathered by another man. Id. at 712. Soon after, both the natural father and mother abandoned the child, and the state of Utah eventually terminated their parental rights. Id. Although the husband was still technically married to the wife, he did not learn of the child's existence until the child was nine months old. Id. Upon learning that he had a stepson, the husband petitioned for custody. Id. In conferring standing to the stepfather to seek custody, this court relied upon two rationales. First, we reasoned that this court had granted to stepparents standing to be heard on matters of custody. Id. at 716. Second, because the Utah legislature had imposed a support obligation upon stepparents for the duration of the marriage to the legal parent, we reasoned that this support obligation was sufficient to confer standing. Id. Neither rationale applies to Jones.
1 28 We explicitly did not rely upon the in loco parentis doctrine in J.W.F. because no such relationship existed in that case. Id. at 715 n. 5. In a footnote, however, we opined that perhaps other types of relationships could give rise to standing: "[IIt is conceivable that persons who are not related by blood or marriage, although not presumptively entitled to standing, could show that they had a relationship with the child that would warrant a grant of standing. We have no such situation before us today." Id. at 715 n. 4. As confessed dicta, this musing on the potential outcome of a hypothetical situation is not binding upon this court. And perhaps this court would have been less inclined to entertain the notion of throwing open the gate to participation in a child's life if a fit legal parent had been involved, as in the present case.6
€29 In summary, traditional common law principles counsel that the in loco parentis status is of temporary duration and may be terminated "[ojnce the person alleged to be in loco parentis no longer discharges all duties incident to the parental relationship." Hamilton v. Foster, 260 Neb. 887, 620 NW.2d 103, 116 (2000). While Jones may have stood in loco parentis to the child during the time she was actually living with her and providing for her care, her in loco parentis status terminated when Barlow and the child moved out. According to common law principles, Jones does not have standing to extend the in loco parentis relationship against Barlow's wishes. Finally, Jones is not proceeding under the divorce statutes as did the stepparent in Gribble. We conclude that recognizing a legally pro-tectible right under the rubric of in loco parentis would be "an unwarranted expansion of an otherwise well-established common law doctrine," Coons-Andersen, 104 SW.3d at 636, and therefore decline to do so.
II. WE DECLINE TO JUDICIALLY CREATE VISITATION RIGHTS BY ADOPTING A "DE FACTO PARENT" OR "PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT" DOCTRINE
$30 What Jones essentially asks us to do is recognize a new judicial doctrine in Utah that creates in a third party the right to seek visitation with a child in contexts outside those recognized by this state's domestic relation laws. Whatever label is applied to such a doctrine, it is clear that the common law concept of in loco parentis does not reach so far. Were we to recognize such a right in this case, it would have to be under one of several judicially created doctrines that have been used recently in other jurisdictions to confer visitation rights upon *816someone other than a parent. Most prominent among these other doctrines are those labeled "psychological parent," or "de facto parent."7 E.g., Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 163 (2005); V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539 passim (2000); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (1999). Rather than creating temporary rights and obligations that last as long as a surrogate parent stands in the place of an actual parent, these doctrines create permanent and abiding rights similar to those of an actual parent. See L.B., 122 P.3d at 177 ("We thus hold that henceforth in Washington, a de facto parent stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent, whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise."); V.C., 748 A.2d at 552 ("[A] psychological parent-child relationship ... may not be unilaterally terminated after the relationship between the adults ends.").
{31 We decline to craft such a doctrine. First, adopting a de facto parent doctrine fails to provide an identifiable jurisdictional test that may be easily and uniformly applied in all cases. A de facto parent rule for standing, which rests upon ambiguous and fact-intensive inquiries into the surrogate parent's relationship with a child and the natural parent's intent in allowing or fostering such a relationship, does not fulfill the traditional gate-keeping function of rules of standing. Under such a doctrine, a party could try the merits of her case under the guise of an inquiry into standing, unduly burdening legal parents with litigation. We agree with the Supreme Court of Vermont that
jurisdiction should not rest upon a test that in effect would examine the merits of visitation or custody petitions on a case-by-case basis. In reality, such a fact-based test would not be a threshold jurisdictional test, but rather would require a full-blown evidentiary hearing in most cases. Thus, any such test would not prevent parents from having to defend themselves against the merits of petitions brought by a potentially wide range of third parties claiming a parent-like relationship with their child.
Titchenal v. Dexter, 166 Vt. 373, 693 A.2d 682, 687-88 (1997).
132 In addition to providing an unsure jurisdictional threshold, adopting a de facto parent doctrine would exceed the proper bounds of the judiciary. The essential questions presented to the court in this case are some of the most intimate and important that our society faces. In the abstract, we are asked to define perhaps the most influential and personal relationship ever experienced-that of parent and child. In particular, we are asked to determine the future upbringing of a child and Jones' continued participation in that process.
1 33 Faced with these questions, and without the benefit of binding applicable law, Jones asks us to craft a judicial doctrine with broad social implications that attempts to adjudicate between competing policy considerations. On the one hand, we recognize that mutual bonds of affection can be formed between a child and an adult who does not fit within the traditional definition of a parent and that such a relationship has the potential to enrich the lives of both the surrogate parent and the child. However, in carving out a permanent role in the child's life for a surrogate parent, this court would necessarily subtract from the legal parent's right to direct the upbringing of her child and expose the child to inevitable conflict between the surrogate and the natural parents. Such a doctrine raises concerns that a legal parent could be deprived of a portion of her parental rights on the basis of "elusive factual determinations" as to whether she intended to relinquish those rights to a third party.8 Van v. Zahorik, 227 Mich. App. 90, 575 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
*817134 Although principled arguments can be made for the adoption of a de facto parent doctrine, such arguments are ultimately based upon policy preferences, rather than established common law. In such situations, we find the Michigan Supreme Court to be persuasive when it stated:
As a general rule, making social policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts. This is especially true when the determination or resolution requires placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another: The responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as ours-of identifying priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between competing alternatives-is the Legislature's, not the judiciary's.
Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320, 597 N.W.2d 15, 18 (1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State ex rel. Skeen v. Ogden Rapid Transit Co., 38 Utah 242, 112 P. 120, 125 (1910) (holding that exceeding the judiciary's own authority results in an undue usurpation of legislative powers).
[ 35 Jones asks this court to exercise the wisdom of Solomon by adopting a de facto parent doctrine based upon our weighing of the competing policies at play. Although this court is routinely called upon to make difficult decisions as to what the law is, or even to fill the interstices of jurisprudence, in this case we are asked to create law from whole cloth where it currently does not exist. While the distinction between applying the law to unique situations and engaging in legislation is not always clear, by asking us to recognize a new class of parents, Jones invites this court to overstep its bounds and invade the purview of the legislature.
"[ 36 Courts are ill-suited for such ventures. Courts are unable to fully investigate the ramifications of social policies and cannot gauge or build the public consensus necessary to effectively implement them. Unlike the legislature, which may craft a comprehensive scheme for resolving future cases and then may repeal or amend it at any time should it prove unworkable, courts are not agile in developing social policy. If we miscalculate in legislating social policy, the harm may not be corrected until an appropriate case wends its way through the system and arrives before us onee again-a process that may take years or even decades. Moreover, our attempt to correct a prior misstep could then damage the legal system's reliance upon the principle of stare decisis.
11 37 In addition to our reticence to assume an essentially legislative role, the creation of a de facto parent rule absent any precedent in Utah law would be an unwarranted expansion of the common law. We agree with the dissent that the common law is a "dynamic and growing thing." 15A Am.Jur.2d Common Low § 2 (2000), see infro TU 60-61. However, "the common law decisionmaking process is inherently incremental in nature; the very 'genius of the common law is that it proceeds empirically and gradually, testing the ground at every step' ... [and] calls for devising a rule that does not stray too far from the existing regime." PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. W. Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting R. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers 8 (1989); accord McClure v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 84 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir.1996); Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc., 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (1961) ("The persistent movement of the common law towards satisfying the needs of the times is soundly marked by gradualness. Its step by step process affords the light of continual experience to guide its future course."). Creating a de facto parent doctrine for Utah would be a dramatic expansion of the common law thereby defying the principle of incremental development.
1838 Such a divergence from Utah's established common law is also inappropriate because there are no broadly accepted principles to guide us to a de facto parent doctrine. We agree that "our courts should avoid effecting change in the common law of this State when there is no substantial body of agreement that such change is necessary and when it is patent that such change can be better effected by legislative action." Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc.2d 1078, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696, 701 (Sup.Ct.1973). As we have noted, this case presents us with conflicting policies upon which there is no broad consensus. There are simply no bedrock principles upon *818which to construct a doctrine creating visitation rights for nonparents.
$89 To the extent that there are guiding principles within the common law, they militate against a common law right of visitation for nonparents. It is a fundamental tenet of our common law that "the only persons having any actually vested interest in the custody of a child cognizable by the law are the parents." Wilson v. Family Servs. Div., 554 P.2d 227, 229 (Utah 1976). Other relatives of a child merely have "some dormant or inchoate right or interest in the custody and welfare of children" that matures only upon the death or termination of the rights of the parents.9 Id. at 230-31. Finally, courts may not make a "best interests" inquiry into nonparent custody of a child absent a determination that the legal parents are unfit. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368-69 (Utah 1982); see also A.N. v. M.I.W. (In re Adoption of P.N.), 2006 UT 64, ¶15, 148 P.3d 927.10 Although our precedent in this area involves custody rather than visitation, the common law nevertheless evidences a strong presumption that parental rights shall not be disturbed absent a determination that the legal parents are unfit.11 This presumption is in direct contradiction to a de facto parent doctrine, which interferes with a parent's right to direct the upbringing of her child. Thus, adopting such a doctrine would not be a natural development of the common law, but rather a legislative act in derogation of recognized common law principles.
140 Finally, the de facto parent doctrine conflicts with Utah statutory law. The legislature has defined the manner in which a parent-child relationship is established. The mother-child relationship is established by
(a) the woman's having given birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in Part 8, Gestational Agreement;
(b) an adjudication of the woman's maternity;
(c) adoption of the child by the woman; or
(d) an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child born to a gestational mother if the agreement was valid *819under Part 8, Gestational Agreement, or is enforceable under other law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-201 (Supp.2006). The legislature has also designated which nonparents have standing to seek visitation of a child. Statutes grant standing to an immediate family member to seek visitation in the context of a divoree, id. § 80-8-5(4)(a), and to grandparents in certain cireum-stances, id. § 80-5-2.
1141 Because the legislature has spoken in this area, we are reluctant to adopt a common law doctrine that implicitly controverts this statutory scheme. The addition of a new class of de facto parents would conflict with the legislature's apparently exhaustive list of who is considered a mother under the law. Also, granting visitation rights to de facto parents contradicts the legislature's narrow grant of standing to certain immediate family members to petition for visitation. As the dissent notes, the legislature has not explicitly addressed the standing of a surrogate parent. See infro 146. The grant of standing to immediate family members under certain well-defined cireumstances, however, creates the negative implication that all other categories of nonparents are prohibited from seeking visitation rights. Otherwise, the standing requirement would not serve its function as a jurisdictional bar to litigation because every unmentioned class of nonpar-ent could attempt to establish visitation rights under the common law. We decline to expand the common law into an area occupied by statute so as to contradict the apparent legislative intent.
T 42 In sum, we decline to adopt a de facto parent doctrine because it would be an improper usurpation of legislative authority and would contradict both common law principles and Utah statutory law. Although we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of Jones' parental feelings for the child, we are unwilling to craft a doctrine which would abrogate a portion of Barlow's parental rights.
CONCLUSION
43 We hold that the district court erred in granting Jones standing to seek visitation. The common law doctrine of in loco parentis does not convey perpetual rights that survive the termination of the parent-like relationship. And we decline to create such perpetual rights by adopting a doctrine similar to that of "psychological parent" or "de facto parent." We therefore reverse the district court order granting visitation and requiring Jones to pay child support.
T 44 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISH's opinion.. Because biological and adoptive parents enjoy identical rights under the law, our use of the term "legal parent" throughout this opinion refers equally to both classes of parents.
. We note that the docket number for this case, 20040932, was originally assigned to a string of interlocutory appeals filed with the Utah Court of Appeals before the entry of final judgment by the *811district court. A second docket number, 20041031, was assigned after Barlow filed a direct appeal from the final judgment. On December 17, 2004, the court of appeals certified this consolidated case number to the Utah Supreme Court. Although this case number was originally assigned to the interlocutory appeals, we decide this case as an appeal from a final judgment and deem all unresolved interlocutory appeals moot under this decision.
. The Washington Supreme Court has recognized that the in loco parentis doctrine is temporary in nature and does not extend permanent rights akin to those held by actual parents. L.B., 122 P.3d at 168 n. 7; Luby v. Da Silva (In re Custody of Brown), 153 Wash.2d 646, 105 P.3d 991, 994 (2005) ("[Nlo Washington case recognizes that nonparents are guaranteed the fundamental rights of parents under the doctrine of in loco parentis."). However, the court has chosen to "adapt [their] common law"" to recognize a "de facto parent" doctrine which does confer rights equal to that of a legal parent. L.B., 122 P.3d at 176-77.
. Although hypothetically the surrogate parent would be burdened by parental responsibilities for as long as he or she chose to extend parental rights, this does not change the fact that the power of choice remains entirely the prerogative of the surrogate parent. The legal parent would have no right to exclude the surrogate parent from the child's life, while neither the legal parent nor the child would have the right to enforce a support obligation once the surrogate parent has opted to cast the relationship aside.
. We make no determination whether the Gribble interpretation of the prior version of Utah Code section 30-3-5 applies to the slightly modified wording contained in the current version of the code. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a) (Supp.2006).
. We do not have before us, and we do not decide, whether a person who is or once stood in loco parentis to a child has standing to seek visitation or custody in the absence of a fit legal parent.
. For a more detailed description of these doctrines, see Chief Justice Durham's dissent. Infra at T1 63-90.
. Chief Justice Durham's dissent proposes the adoption of a modified version of the test to determine de facto parent status in which "a third party claiming de facto parent status [must] establish by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the legal parent intended to create a permanent parent-child relationship between the third party and the child, and (2) an actual parent-child relationship was formed." Infra 1 68.
. We note that the language quoted by the dissent from State ex rel. J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 714 (Utah 1990), that nonparents need not "stand as a total stranger to the child" makes sense in the context of these inchoate rights. See infra T51. Taken as a whole the passage reads:
It may be that no one has the same rights toward a child as his or her parents. See Wilson v. Family Services Div., Region Two, 554 P.2d 227, 230 (Utah 1976). However, the fact that a person is not a child's natural or legal parent does not mean that he or she must stand as a total stranger to the child where custody is concerned.
J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 714. Thus J.W.F. does not stand for the proposition that nonparenis may have common law standing to assert visitation rights against fit parents. In fact, this decision affirms that "no one has the same rights toward a child as his or her parents." Id. This passage merely confirms the proposition asserted in Wi/-son that other relatives may have standing to seek custody in the absence of a fit parent. This is born out by the facts of J.W.F., where a stepfather was granted standing to seek custody only when both of the biological parents had their parental rights terminated. Id. at 712, 716.
. In the case of P.N., the child's biological mother relinquished her parental rights and gave custody of the child to a couple seeking to adopt him. 2006 UT 64, ¶3, 148 P.3d 927. The district court later found the mother's relinquishment to be ineffective. The mother and biological father both opposed the adoption and sought custody of the child, who, at the time, was in the custody of the prospective adoptive parents. Id. 113-4, 5. The trial court found no basis for terminating the parental rights of either of the biological parents and therefore dismissed the petition for adoption. Id. 18. It then scheduled a "best interests trial" and awarded custody of the child to the prospective adoptive parents. Id. 19. We reversed, holding that it was error for the court to award custody of PN. to legal strangers in the absence of an order terminating the parental rights of his fit natural parents. Id. 115. We therefore remanded the case for a determination of custody as between the biological parents. Id. Although the case involved custody rather than visitation and was based upon an analysis of the statute governing adoption, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16 (Supp.2006), it is nevertheless illustrative of the proposition that a child's fit legal parent is presumed to act in his best interests. Therefore, absent a statutory basis for doing so, it is improper for a court to second-guess the decision of the fit legal parents by conducting a "best interests" analysis.
. We note that Utah Code sections 30-3-5(4)(a) and 30-5-2, discussed below, stand as statutorily created exceptions to this general rule because they grant standing to seek visitation rights even against the objections of fit parents.