dissenting.
[¶ 12] I disagree with the majority's reading of the applicable statutes and would affirm the conclusion of the Office of Administrative Hearings that Mr. Jenkins was covered by worker's compensation insurance because he was an officer of a corporation that had elected worker's compensation coverage for its officers as it was entitled to do pursuant to the plain language of the statute. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-108(k) (LexisNexis 2005) provides, "Any corporation or limited liability company employing individuals cou-ered pursuant to subsections (a) or (J) of this section may elect to obtain coverage under this act for its corporate officers ...." (emphasis added). It is undisputed the corporation employs Mr. Jenkins. So the only question becomes whether he was an individual "covered pursuant to subsections (a) or ()...." He is not covered by subsection (a); however, he is covered by subsection (J) because he is an employee whose employer has elected coverage under the act and made payments as required. Subsection (k) does not say that the company must employ individuals who are not corporate officers before it can make the statutory election for coverage of its officers. We do not read into statutes language which the legislature did not include. Stutzman v. Office of Wyoming State Eng'r, 2006 WY 30, ¶ 16, 130 P.3d 470, 475 (Wyo.2006); KP v. State, 2004 WY 165, ¶ 22, 102 P.8d 217, 224 (Wyo.2004).
[¶ 13] I would reverse the district court's decision and remand the matter for consideration of the second issue raised by the division, le. whether Mr. Jenkin's injury was work-related.