Matthew R. Limón was convicted of criminal sodomy, a severity level 3 person felony, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2). He was sentenced to 206 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release. Limón argued that K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2) was unconstitutional because it impermissibly discriminated between heterosexual and homosexual sodomy. Li*370mon maintained that the classification limiting the applicability of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 to “members of the opposite sex” violated his right to equal protection because it criminalized heterosexual sodomy less severely than homosexual sodomy.
Limón appealed to this court. Relying primarily upon Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), which refused to confer a fundamental right to engage in homosexual conduct, this court affirmed Limon’s conviction. State v. Limon, Case No. 85,898, unpublished opinion filed February 1, 2002 (Limon I).
Our Supreme Court denied Limon’s petition for review. See 274 Kan. 1116. Limón then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The Court deferred its ruling until the decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), was filed on June 26, 2003. The next day, the Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and “remanded to the Court of Appeals of Kansas for further consideration in light of Lawrence.” Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003).
Because the challenged classification has a rational basis, we affirm. In addition, as to Limon’s contention that K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 impermissibly discriminates on the basis of gender, we disagree and affirm.
Limón, an 18-year-old male adult, and M.A.R., a 14-year-old boy, both resided at a school for the developmentally disabled. M.A.R. told police that Limón had performed one instance of oral sex on him. M.A.R. further told the police that Limón performed oral sex on him until he asked Limón to stop.
Limón was later charged with criminal sodomy under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2). Limón moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that he should have been charged with unlawful voluntary sexual relations under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522. He further argued that because he could not be charged under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522, as it applied only to heterosexual sex, this statute violated his right to equal protection.
The trial court rejected Limon’s equal protection arguments. Limón was tried before the trial court based on stipulated facts. *371The trial court convicted Limón based on those stipulated facts. Because of Limon’s prior two adjudications for aggravated criminal sodomy, the trial court sentenced Limón to 206 months’ imprisonment.
Constitutionality and Construction of Statutes
It is a basic rule that eveiy reasonable construction must be applied to save a statute from unconstitutionality. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190, 114 L. Ed. 2d 233, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), and NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500, 59 L. Ed. 2d 533, 99 S. Ct. 1313 (1979). “When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the statute comes before the court cloaked in a presumption of constitutionality.” State v. Baker, 11 Kan. App. 2d 4, 6, 711 P.2d 759 (1985), rev. denied 238 Kan. 878 (1986) (citing State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 223 Kan. 610, 616, 576 P.2d 221 [1978]). “Before a statute may be stricken down, it must clearly appear the statute violates the Constitution. Moreover, it is the court’s duty to uphold the statute under attack, if possible, rather than defeat it, and, if there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done.” Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824, Syl. ¶ 1, 811 P.2d 1176 (1991).
Limón first contends that because gay teenagers are excluded from the protection of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522, the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although the Equal Protection Clause guarantees equality before the law, Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 423, 10 L. Ed. 2d 456, 83 S. Ct. 1366 (1963), it does not require the law to treat all persons exactly alike. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 84 L. Ed. 1124, 60 S. Ct. 879 (1940).
Statutes by necessity are directed to less than universal situations. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 472, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1485, 77 S. Ct. 1344 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled by New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 49 L. Ed. 2d 511, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976). If this were not so, statutes would be ineffective because they would fail to take into account factual differences. See Morey, 354 U.S. at 472 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As a result, a mere showing that different persons or classes are treated differently is *372not sufficient to establish an equal protection violation. Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 230, 12 L. Ed. 2d 256, 84 S. Ct. 1226 (1964).
Moreover, legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power in making a classification. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a unanimous Court in rejecting the claim that the exemptions in a Maryland law violated equal protection, stated: “State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. [Citations omitted.]” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 81 S. Ct. 1101 (1961).
In implying that it is irrelevant whether the legislature could have enacted a better law under a rational basis review, the United States Supreme Court declared:
“[E]qual protection analysis ‘is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.’ FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). See also, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970). Nor does it authorize ‘the judiciary [to] sit as a superlegislature to judge dre wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.’ New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). For these reasons, a classification neidier involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity. [Citations omitted.] Such a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if diere is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992); Dukes, supra, at 303. Further, a legislature tiiat creates these categories need not ‘actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.’ [Citations omitted.] Instead, a classification ‘must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’ [Citations omitted.]” (Emphasis added.) Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-320, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
Similarly, our Supreme Court, in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in an equal protection claim, stated: “[I]t appears that the legislature’s purpose in creating the classification need not be established. The classification must, however, bear a rational relationship to a legitimate objective.” Stephenson v. Sugar *373Creek Packing, 250 Kan. 768, 774, 830 P.2d 41 (1992). As a result, the question to be answered is whether the challenged classification has a rational basis. If the answer is yes, our inquixy is over.
Lawrence v. Texas
Limón relies on the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508, in support of his equal protection claim. Nevertheless, Lawrence is factually and legally distinguishable from the present case. In explaining that homosexual acts, illegal under Texas law, are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, Justice Kennedy stated:
“The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.” 539 U.S. at 578.
From this language, the major premise that underlies the Lawrence holding is clearly apparent:
No state may prohibit adults from engaging in private consensual sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.
This major premise may be reconstructed to state:
All adults may legally engage in private consensual sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.
Reference is made to all adults in the above proposition; children are excluded from the proposition. As a result, all children are excluded from the class that “may legally engage in private consensual sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle,” and all persons who “may legally engage in private consensual sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle” are excluded from the class of children. Moreover, in declaring that the majority’s decision did not encompass children, Justice Kennedy stated:
“The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It *374does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.” 156 L. Ed. 2d at 525.
Because the present case involved a 14-year-old developmentally disabled child, it is factually distinguishable from Lawrence.
In addition, the present case is legally distinguishable from Lawrence. For example, the Lawrence majority overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, which refused to extend to homosexuals the privacy right to be free from the criminalization of homosexual sex. In so doing, the Lawrence Court declared that private consensual homosexual acts between adults are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Nevertheless, as pointed out by the State in its brief, Limón is not asserting a Lawrence-like due process challenge. Instead, Limón makes an equal protection challenge to K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522. As a result, the law and facts are distinguishable from Lawrence.
KS.A. 21-3505(a)(2) and KS.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3S22(a)(2)
Limón was convicted of criminal sodomy under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2). This subsection states: “Criminal sodomy is . . . sodomy with a child who is 14 or more years of age but less than 16 years of age.” This subsection prohibits sodomy with a child within the stated age limitations without regard to the age of the offender or to the sex of the participants. As a result, K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2) is gender neutral. A violation of K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2) is a severity level 3, person felony. K.S.A. 21-3505(c).
On the other hand, K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2) reads:
“(a) Unlawful voluntary sexual relations is engaging in voluntary: ... (2) sodomy . . . with a child who is 14 years of age but less than 16 years of age and the offender is less than 19 years of age and less than four years of age older than the child and child and the offender are the only parties involved and are members of the opposite sex.” (Emphasis added.)
In addition to the age restrictions placed on the parties and to the requirement that the parties’ age difference be less than 4 years, K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2) requires that the sodomy be consensual and that the parties be members of the opposite sex. Unlike K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2), K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2) is gender specific. Under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2), unlawful volun*375taiy sexual relations (involving sodomy) is a severity level 9, person felony. K.S.A. 2002 Sunp. 21-3522(b)(2).
Rational Basis
Limón contends that excluding gay teenagers from the protections of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 does not rationally advance any purpose that the statute could be expected to serve. In considering Limon’s challenge to the constitutionality of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522, we are reminded of a statement made by Justice Douglas: “It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all. [Citation omitted.]” Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110, 93 L. Ed. 533, 69 S. Ct. 463 (1949).
By classifying same-sex persons as ineligible for prosecution under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522, the Kansas Legislature has made an implicit fact-finding that same-sex sex acts are different from heterosexual sex acts. Generally, sex acts, including sodomy, between a child and an adult are illegal, unless the child is married to the adult when the sex acts occurred. See K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3502(b) (rape); K.S.A. 21-3503(b) (indecent liberties with a child); K.S.A. 21-3504(b) (aggravated indecent liberties with a child); K.S.A. 21-3505(b) (criminal sodomy); K.S.A. 21-3506(b) (aggravated criminal sodomy). The question we must address is whether the legislature can punish those adults who engage in heterosexual sodomy with a child less severely than those adults who engage in homosexual sodomy with a child. The answer is yes. The legislature could have rationally determined that heterosexual sodomy between a child and an adult could be put in a class by itself and could be dealt with differently than homosexual sodomy between a child and an adult.
Protection of Children
The unequal position of children and their dependence, both physically and mentally, make them a proper subject for legislative protection. The United States Supreme Court, in addressing the issue of child pornography, declared:
“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’ Globe *376Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). ‘A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.’ Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights. In Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, the Court held that a statute prohibiting use of a child to distribute literature on the street was valid notwithstanding tire statute’s effect on a First Amendment activity. In Ginsberg v. New York, [390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968)], we sustained a New York law protecting children from exposure to nonobscene literature. Most recently, we held that the Government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’ justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting received by adults as well as children. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
Similarly, our Supreme Court has noted: “The State has a compelling interest in the well-being of its children and particularly in their protection from all forms of cruelty, neglect, degradation, and inhumanity. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Wilson, 267 Kan. 550, 559, 987 P.2d 1060 (1999); see also 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Infants § 36 (“It is the policy of the law to look after the interests of infants, who are considered incapable of looking after their own affairs, to protect them from their own folly and improvidence, and to prevent adults from talcing advantage of them.”)..
Protective legislation is permissible even though based on a classification which may seem unreasonable. For example, laws based on a sexual classification are normally considered inherently unreasonable. Sexual classifications, however, have been upheld where their purpose was to protect the morals of women. Shortly after the turn of the 20th century, laws made it illegal to sell liquor to women. See Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108, 114-15, 48 L. Ed. 365, 24 S. Ct. 219 (1904); Eskridge v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 30 N.J. Super. 472, 477-78, 105 A.2d 6 (1954); see also Randles v. State Liquor Control Bd., 33 Wash. 2d 688, 698-99, 206 P.2d 1209-(1949) (prohibiting the sale of liquor to women except under certain conditions). Likewise, state legislatures have used the same rationale in making it illegal to furnish alcoholic liquor, to sell tobacco products, and to provide pornographic material to a child. As in the case of selling liquor to women, these *377laws were designed to protect the morals of children. See Cronin, 192 U.S. at 115. Such statutes are valid even though they may turn on a classification which is generally considered unreasonable. As a result, a classification that would normally be deemed unreasonable may be allowed when the legislature acts to protect a class and a rational basis exists for the protection of that class.
In enacting K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522, the legislature could have reasonably determined that to prevent the gradual deterioration of the sexual morality approved by a majority of Kansans, it would encourage and preserve the traditional sexual mores of society. Moreover, traditional sexual mores have played a significant role in the sexual development of children. During early adolescence, children are in the process of trying to figure out who they are. A part of that process is learning and developing their sexual identity. As a result, the legislature could well have concluded that homosexual sodomy between children and young adults could disturb the traditional sexual development of children.
Although the record reveals that M.A.R., the victim, had only one same-sex encounter with Limón, Limón labels M.A.R. as either homosexual or bisexual in his brief. Labeling M.A.R. in this way is unfair. For instance, if M.A.R.5s sexual identity was not well defined before his homosexual encounter with Limón, M.A.R. might have become confused about his sexual identity. In this case, M.A.R. was a 14-year-old developmental^ disabled minor. Moreover, the record does not show that M.A.R. was either homosexual or bisexual.
Because the penalty for heterosexual sodomy with a child under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 is less severe than the penalty for homosexual sodomy with a child under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2), K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 is designed to discourage voluntaiy sexual behavior between young adults and children which deviates from traditional sexual mores.
Obviously, K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 contains a classification component: “members of the opposite sex.” Nevertheless, the classification is proper because it is rationally related to the purpose of protecting and preserving the traditional sexual mores of society and the historical sexual development of children.
*378 Marriage and Procreation
In addition, traditional sexual mores concerning marriage and procreation have been important to the veiy survival of the human race. In rejecting the statutory right to sterilize a convicted felon, Justice Douglas declared: “Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the veiy existence and survival of the race.” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 86 L. Ed. 1655, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942). Throughout history, governments have extolled the virtues of procreation as a way to furnish new workers, soldiers, and other useful members of society. The survival of society requires a continuous replenishment of its members.
On the other hand, sexual acts between same-sex couples do not lead to procreation on their own. As the State correctly points out in its brief, “protecting and advancing the family has been a legitimate governmental aim” throughout written history. Moreover, the family is commonly recognized as the unit for the procreation and the rearing of children.
Parental Responsibility
Additionally, sexual contact between minors and young adults can lead to unwanted pregnancies. Rearing children is not an overnight occurrence. Parents have a common law, as well as a statutory, duty to furnish support to their minor child. This duty applies equally to parents of a child bom out of wedlock. State ex. rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 252 Kan. 646, 652, 847 P.2d 1273 (1993).
When a child is born from a relationship between a minor and a young adult, the minor is often unable to financially support the newborn child. In many cases, the minor is still a dependent. As a result, the financial burden to support the newborn child properly falls to the young adult. Obviously, the young adult cannot furnish adequate financial support for the newborn child while he or she is incarcerated. The legislature could well have concluded that incarcerating the young adult parent for a long period would be counterproductive to the requirement that a parent has a duty to provide support to his or her minor child. See State v. Crawford, 21 Kan. App. 2d 859, 861, 908 P.2d 638 (1995) (holding that defend*379ant’s obligation to raise her children along with several other factors justified a downward sentence departure).
On the other hand, same-sex relationships do not generally lead to unwanted pregnancies. As a result, the need to release the same-sex offender from incarceration is absent. Equal protection is satisfied because K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 is rationally related to tire State’s legitimate interest in getting a young adult parent involved in providing financial support for the newborn child.
Prevention of Sexually Transmitted Disease
The State has argued that lessening the penalty for heterosexual activity between adults and children as opposed to homosexual activity between adults and children may reduce the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. The legislature could well have considered that same-sex sexual acts between males might increase their risk of contracting certain infectious diseases. Medical literature is replete with articles suggesting that certain health risks are more generally associated with homosexual activity than with heterosexual activity. Accordingly, we determine that K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2) is rationally related to the State’s legitimate interest in public health.
Punishment
Next, Limón maintains that his punishment under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2) is significantly more severe than the punishment administered to individuals who commit unlawful voluntary heterosexual sex acts under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2). We agree. Nevertheless, “[wjhatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility, [citation omitted,] these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.” Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405, 78 S. Ct. 1280 (1958). Moreover, in stating that the authority to fix or to impose a particular penalty for a crime rests with the legislature, our Supreme Court has declared: “The power to prescribe the penalty to be imposed for the commission of a crime rests exclusively with the legislature, not the courts.” State v. Keeley, 236 Kan. 555, 560, 694 P.2d 422 (1985). Because we have previously determined that the line drawn by the Kansas Legisla*380ture has a rational basis, K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In addition, in a footnote, Limón maintains that his conviction and sentence violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by punishing him based on his status as a teenager having a same-sex sexual orientation. In support of his argument, Limon cites Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1962). Nevertheless, unlike Robinson, where the United States Supreme Court struck down a statute that made it an offense for a person to “be addicted to the use of narcotics,” same-sex sexual orientation has not been shown to be a condition or illness that would compel a young adult to engage in sodomy with a child. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 552-54, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1254, 88 S. Ct. 2145 (1968) (White, J., concurring). In Powell, tire defendant, a chronic alcoholic, was convicted of being drunk in public. In determining that the statute making public drunkenness an offense did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment, the Court concluded that the offense of public drunkenness consisted not of the condition of being a chronic alcoholic. Instead, the offense consisted of defendant’s conduct of being drunk while in public, a situation over which defendant had some control. 392 U.S. at 531-37.
Finally, Limón argues that his sentence of 206 months is disproportionate to the crime of criminal sodomy under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2). Nevertheless, Limón fails to show that his sentence, due in large part to his prior adjudications for aggravated criminal sodomy, is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the offense of criminal sodomy, a severity level 3 person felony. Violation of K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2) constitutes a felony of the same severity level as a violation of K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(l) (sexual intercourse with a child of 14 or 15 years of age). See K.S.A. 21-3504(c). To insist that Limon’s sentence, based on his two prior adjudications for aggravated criminal sodomy, is cruel and unusual flies in the face of reason. Because Limon’s sentence does not come within the ban *381against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, Limon’s argument fails.
Gender
Limón further argues that had he been a female engaging in this illegal activity, the activity would have been covered under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522. As a result, Limon contends that because K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of gender, the statute should be subject to a heightened scrutiny. Limón relies on Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967), and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222, 85 S. Ct. 283 (1964). Nevertheless, Loving and McLaughlin do not bear the weight of reliance which Limón places on these cases.
When one contrasts the freedom to many someone of one’s own choosing with the right to engage in homosexual sodomy, a clear distinction is apparent. In Loving, the Court pointed out that “[tjhere can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to many solely because of racial classification violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.” 388 U.S. at 12. Later, the Loving Court stated that the Virginia miscegenation statutes deprived the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Loving Court declared that the Virginia law was “designed to maintain White Supremacy.” As a result, because the classification in Loving was based on race, a strict scrutiny review was applied. 388 U.S. at 11-12.
McLaughlin is also distinguishable from the present case. Like Loving, the statute in McLaughlin made a classification based on race. As a result, the McLaughlin Court determined that “rigid scrutiny” should apply. 379 U.S. at 195-96.
The classifications in both Loving and McLaughlin were based on race. Race is one of those characteristics over which an individual has no control. The mere fact of being of a certain race is constitutionally irrelevant. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85, 86 L. Ed. 119, 62 S. Ct. 164 (1941) (Jackson, J., concur*382ring). As a result, a classification based on race is generally considered to be inherently unreasonable and unjustifiable.
On the other hand, the Lawrence Court refused to hold that homosexuality was constitutionally irrelevant and deserving of a strict scrutiny review. Unlike the individuals in Loving and McLaughlin, wbo had no control over their race, the offense with which Limón was charged was not based on his sexual orientation or his gender, but was based on his conduct of engaging in sodomy with a child, conduct over which Limón had some control. To say otherwise, we would have to believe that an adult with an irresistible urge to engage in sodomy with a child should not be punished for such behavior. As a result, Loving and McLaughlin are clearly distinguishable from the present case.
Further, Limon’s “had he been a female” argument is flawed. There has been no evidence that limiting the applicability of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 to members of the opposite sex was motivated by a gender bias. Although K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 is gender specific, it creates no discernible difference between the sexes. For instance, K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 neither disadvantages nor advantages men or women. The statute places both men and women under the same restrictions and similarly excludes them from the statute’s applicability when they engage in same-sex sex acts. We determine that tire classification embodied in K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 is not quasi-suspect. As a result, Limon’s argument that K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 discriminates based on gender fails.
Romerv. Evans
Limón maintains that Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), controls the disposition of his argument that K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 discriminates against gay teenagers. We disagree. In Romer, the United States Supreme Court determined that a Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting government action designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause. 517 U.S. at 631-36. Applying a rational basis standard of review, the Court invalidated the amendment. In invalidating the amendment, the Romer Court focused on the apparent animosity toward gay people *383in enacting the amendment. The Court stated that the amendment drew a classification “for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.” 517 U.S. at 633.
Unlike Romer, the instant case deals with two criminal statutes: K.S.A. 21-3505 and K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522. As stated earlier, Limón was charged with criminal sodomy under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2). This subsection of the statute does not disadvantage gay teenagers burdened by the law. K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2) is gender neutral. It prohibits sodomy with a child within the stated age limitations without regard to the age of the offender or to the sex of the participants. Lack of consent is not an element under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2). Moreover, if there is no consent, aggravated criminal sodomy can be charged. K.S.A. 21-3506(a)(3).
Kansas, like other states, prohibits sex offenses such as rape, sodomy, indecent liberties with a child, and sexual battery. The severity level of these offenses depends on the sexual act of the defendant and on the age of the victim, not on the status of the offender. As a result, K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2) is based on the conduct of engaging in sodomy with a child and not based on the offender’s sexual orientation or gender. On the other hand, in Romer, the challenged legislation concerned the sexual orientation of tire class, which is a significant difference between Romer and the present case.
Likewise, K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2) does not disadvantage gay teenagers burdened by the law. Sodomy with a child is punishable under both K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2) and K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2). Although sodomy is punished more harshly under K.S.A. 21-3505(a)(2) than under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522(a)(2), the legislature may enact laws punishing one class less severely than another class for the same crime. For instance, youthful offenders are not subject to the same penalties as adult offenders. In addition, first-time offenders are not subject to the same length of sentence as mature recidivists.
As discussed earlier, the courts have upheld classifications protecting children based on their physical and mental immaturity. Moreover, many of those classifications have been upheld by the courts based solely on protecting the morals of children. Because *384we have previously determined that a rational basis exists for placing adult heterosexual sex acts with children in a class by themselves and that these acts may be dealt with differently than adult homosexual sex acts with children, Limon’s reliance on Romer is misplaced.
Remedy
As a final point, Limón contends that the language “and are members of the opposite sex” should be eliminated from K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522 so that both same-sex and opposite-sex couples could be sentenced under this statute. Because we have already determined that the statute withstands rational basis review, it is unnecessary to address this issue any further. Nevertheless, we wish to make clear that even if the statute were declared unconstitutional, the proper remedy would be to strike down the entire statute.
In addressing the issue of whether a statute can stand after a portion of it has been declared unconstitutional, our Supreme Court has stated:
“Whether the court may sever an unconstitutional provision from a statute and leave the remainder in force and effect depends on the intent of the legislature. If from examination of a statute it can be said that tire act would have been passed without the objectional portion and if the statute would operate effectively to carry out the intention of the legislature with such portion stricken, the remainder of tire valid law will stand.” State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov. of Wyandotte Co./Kansas City, 264 Kan. 293, Syl. ¶ 16, 955 P.2d 1136 (1998).
Upon examination of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3522, we cannot say that the statute would have passed without the language “and are members of the opposite sex.” The history of the statute, coupled with its clear wording, reveals that the legislature intended to impose this penalty only on young couples of the opposite sex. The striking of the language “and are members of the opposite sex” would alter the statute from gender specific, which clearly was the intent of the legislature, to gender neutral. Moreover, the striking of the previously mentioned language would enlarge the statute beyond its obvious statutory limits or boundaries. As a result, the remedy suggested by Limón would require us to make a statutory *385revision that would replace the intent of the legislature, which we cannot do. See State v. Patterson, 25 Kan. App. 2d 245, 248, 963 P.2d 436, rev. denied 265 Kan. 888 (1998).
Affirmed.