concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority that movant Robert W. Lueck lacks standing to pursue quo warranto in this matter. Likewise, I agree that the constitutional appointment-term issue raised by Lueck nonetheless warrants this court’s immediate attention. From the majority’s analysis thereof, however, I must dissent.
In reaching its conclusion that Article 6, Section 20(2) of the Nevada Constitution mandates the expiration of an appointed judge’s term after the general election most immediately following the appointment, the majority accurately describes the history of that ambiguous provision. But nowhere in that extensive history championing the people’s right to select constitutional officers exists any indication that the provision should be construed outside the context of this state’s election laws, so as to result not in the installation of a newly elected judge, but rather in another potentially months-long judicial selection and appointment process. The provision must be read reasonably. See Secretary of State v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 590, 188 P.3d 1112, 1120 (2008); State v. Wells, 8 Nev. 105, 109 (1872).
As the majority points out, historically, Nevada has adhered to a strong policy of electing its judges and other constitutional officers. See Nev. Const, art. 6, § 5; State v. Arrington, 18 Nev. 412, 417, 4 P. 735, 739 (1884). In that regard, the constitution has always called for vacancies to be filled by election as soon as practicable, while appointments, solely temporary in nature, ensure the smooth running of government until such election can be had. Ex. Rel. Penrose v. Greathouse, 48 Nev. 419, 422, 233 P. 527, 528 (1925). To further that goal, in carrying out its constitutional duty to accommodate elections, see Nev. Const, art. 4, § 27; NRS 293.127(1)(c), the Legislature has provided for the nomination and election of candidates for an office declared vacant after the normal filing deadlines have passed. See NRS 293.165; Penrose, 48 Nev. at 423, 233 P. at *687529. For instance, nonpartisan candidates, such as those for district judge office, must file a nominating petition by the fourth Tuesday in June. NRS 293.165(2). And in each of the cases discussed by the majority, the candidates had complied with the applicable nominating statute. Thus, in the 1925 case, Ex. Rel. Penrose v. Greathouse, 48 Nev. at 421-23, 233 P. at 528-29, this court ordered onto the general election ballot the name of a candidate who had complied with statutory laws regarding the election of officers to fill vacancies created midterm, and in the 1954 case, Brown v. Georgetta, 70 Nev. 500, 507-08, 275 P.2d 376, 379 (1954), this court decided similarly regarding a midterm vacancy governed by a different, but like, provision. Neither of those cases dealt with the situation here, in which compliance with the election laws was not possible.1
The majority decision necessarily ignores that fact, suggesting that the constitutional appointment term limit, as they comprehend it, applied regardless of the result. But the practical consequences of the majority’s conclusion means that, when a vacancy occurs after the second Tuesday in June, the office must again be declared vacant, as was done here, or the election deadlines must be viewed as optional. Neither result is acceptable.
Vacancies are disfavored and election deadlines should not be arbitrarily disturbed
The “law abhors a vacancy” in public office. State v. Triplett, 17 N.E.2d 729, 731 (Ohio 1938); see also State v. Lutz, 147 So. 429, 432 (Ala. 1933); Johnson v. Collins, 464 P.2d 647, 651 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970); State Ex Rel. Warder v. Gainer, 167 S.E.2d 290, 296 (W. Va. 1969); cf. Ex. Rel. Penrose v. Greathouse, 48 Nev. 419, 422, 233 P. 527, 528 (1925) (recognizing Nevada’s legislative policy “to fill the vacancy for the office of district judge by election as soon as practicable after the vacancy occurs”); State v. Wells, 8 Nev. 105, 109 (1872) (noting that a district attorney appointed to fill a va*688caney properly served “until the qualification of a successor ... because the presence of such an officer is necessary to the proper conduct of public business”). Thus, courts must strongly presume against any intent to draft a constitutional provision creating a condition in which a public office is left wholly vacant for any length of time. See Warder, 167 S.E.2d at 296; cf. Wells, 8 Nev. at 109. Mandating a second vacancy, caused by the expiration of an appointed judge’s term, does nothing to further the policy of avoiding vacancies, and even if no gap between appointments occurs, valuable resources will have been spent in securing the second appointment. Moreover, calling for a second vacancy does nothing to limit the executive branch’s appointment powers, as evidently was the concern held by the drafters; at best, it could merely shift those powers to a new governor.
The alternative consequence, ignoring the statutory election deadlines, is no better. “[A]n election is not an inherent right in the people and cannot be held in the absence of legislation clearly authorizing the same.” Grant and McNamee v. Payne, 60 Nev. 250, 256, 107 P.2d 307, 310 (1940) (citing Sawyer v. Haydon, 1 Nev. 75, 78-79 (1865)); see also Ex Rel. Bridges v. Jepsen, 48 Nev. 64, 70, 227 P. 588, 590 (1924) (recognizing that “[a]n election can be held only by virtue of some constitutional provision or legal enactment . . . authorizing that particular election”); Penrose, 48 Nev. at 424, 233 P. at 529 (recognizing that an election cannot be held in the absence of regulating laws and urging the Legislature to enact election laws so “as to permit a vacancy in a nonpartisan office occurring shortly prior to a general election to be filled, no matter how or when such vacancy occurs”). Therefore, Nevada election law establishing deadlines for declaring candidacy for vacancies that arise after the deadline for filing a declaration of candidacy, NRS 293.165, is not simply a dispensable inconvenience.2 As the majority does not take issue with the deadline established therein, it must be presumed reasonable, see Brown, supra note 1, and thus should not be ignored. To do so is to invite a host of issues for the executive and judicial branches to resolve, likely under exigent circumstances, shortly before an election.
*689 An appointment should end when the vacancy may validly be filled by election
To recognize the election mandate is to recognize the inseparable obligation to allow a meaningful opportunity to vote. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 633 P.2d 227, 235 n.24 (Alaska 1981) (recognizing that “ ‘[provisions of statutes governing the conduct of elections which have the purpose of securing a complete and enlightened vote or preventing fraud, where failure to comply is capable of influencing the outcome of the election, are mandatory’ ” (quoting C. Dallas Sands and Norman J. Singer, 2B Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57:21 (4th ed. 1973))); Meyer v. Putnam, 526 P.2d 139, 140 (Colo. 1974) (recognizing Colorado’s constitutional requirement that its legislature pass laws to secure the purity of elections). Thus, in Nevada, the expiration of an appointed district judge’s term of office has never been understood apart from correspondingly filling the office through the general election in compliance with Nevada’s election laws. Indeed, until today’s decision, in Nevada, the term “next general election” has always referred to the first general election when the vacancy may be filled by valid election.
In fact, NRS 3.080, a statute substantially unchanged from its earliest codifications in 1866, see 1866 Nev. Stat., ch. 108, §§ 38 and 48, at 238-39, ties the expiration of appointed judges’ terms to simultaneously filling the office through the general election. Like the original Article 17, Section 22 of the Nevada Constitution, that statute provides that an appointed judge’s term of office does not expire until after “the next general election ... at which ... a district judge shall be chosen for the balance of the unexpired term.” The majority dismisses this language as merely inconsistent with and, thus, superseded by, Nevada’s Constitution. But principles of constitutional interpretation insist that the “ ‘contemporaneous construction by the legislature of a constitutional provision is a “safe guide to its proper interpretation” and creates “a strong presumption” that the interpretation was proper.’ ” Halverson v. Secretary of State, 124 Nev. 484, 488-89, 186 P.3d 893, 897 (2008) (quoting State ex rel. Udall v. Colonial Penn, 812 P.2d 777, 783 (N.M. 1991)). Thus, as the Legislature drafted the earliest codifications of NRS 3.080 contemporaneous with and pursuant to its understanding of Article 17, Section 22, it is strongly presumed that the term of office of an individual appointed to fill a vacancy does not expire until the office is filled through the next available general election. As the majority points out, that original intent did not change with the 1976 amendments to the constitution, and thus, the intent is carried through to our current constitution.
In like circumstances, the Iowa Supreme Court, in State v. Claussen, 250 N.W. 195, 200 (Iowa 1933), concluded that giving *690effect to a constitutional election mandate meant filling vacancies in compliance with election laws enacted in pursuance of that mandate. Similar to Nevada law, the clause at issue in Claussen provided the following: “[A]ll persons appointed to fill vacancies in office, shall hold until the next general election, and until their successors are elected and qualified.” 250 N.W. at 197 (internal quotations omitted). In Claussen, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed whether a state office filled by appointment within 30 days of a general election can then be filled at that election, when compliance with Iowa’s election laws was impossible. Id. After recognizing the importance of election laws in giving effect to constitutional election mandate, the majority determined that “[t]he [term] next general election means the next general election at which, in pursuance of law, a vacancy may legally be filled. . . . [T]his does not necessarily mean the next general election, but the election at which the vacancy can be legally filled.” Id. at 200 (citing Ex Rel. Bridges v. Jepsen, 48 Nev. 64, 227 P. 588 (1924)).
The same analysis is warranted here, as we have recognized. See, e.g., Bridges, 48 Nev. at 69, 227 P. at 590 (stating that “election to office be by the people, when it can conveniently be done, and that appointments to fill vacancies made to meet the requirements of public business, shall be effective only until the people may elect”); Ex Rel. Penrose v. Greathouse, 48 Nev. 419, 422, 233 P. 527, 528 (1925) (recognizing the legislative policy “to fill the vacancy for the office of district judge by election as soon as practicable after the vacancy occurs” (citing to former NRS 3.080, which provided that the Governor “shall fill [a vacancy in a district judge office] by granting a commission, which shall expire at the next general election ... at which election such officers shall be chosen for the balance of the unexpired term”)).
Because the majority overlooks the full import of Nevada law regarding vacancies and renders a decision contrary to the election priorities of this state, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s decision concluding that vacancy appointments necessarily terminate after the general election most immediately following the appointment.
Indeed, in Brown, 70 Nev. at 507-08, 275 P.2d at 379-80, relied on by the majority here, this court affirmed the importance of complying with election laws when filling late-arising vacancies at the general election:
Under our statutes providing for late nominations under certain conditions it is inevitable that circumstances will arise whereunder ballots containing the names of late nominees will not reach absent voters living in distant parts of the world. If the names of the nominees are otherwise lawfully placed upon the ballots personally voted at the polls, it could not reasonably be contended that the election for the particular office should be declared void.
(T|n fixing the time before election in which nominations may be made where a vacancy occurs ... the legislature must be presumed to have chosen these periods as reasonable ones to accomplish the purposes sought.
The primary election for the office in question was held on August 12, 2008. Judge Teuton was not appointed until August 22, 2008. The general election was November 4, 2008.
NRS 293.165(4) provides, in part, that “[n]o change may be made on the ballot for the general election after 5 p.m. on the first Tuesday after the primary election of the year in which the general election is held.” Therefore, the deadline for the general election ballot change was Tbesday, August 19, 2008, at 5 p.m., or three days before Judge Teuton was appointed by the Governor. The first primary and general elections for which petitions for candidacy may be filed will not take place until 2010.