dissenting.
¶ 24 My colleagues in the majority create a new rule governing express easements reserved in federal land patents that changes the settled law. Because I believe the majority’s new rule misreads the actual language of the patent, misapplies existing law, fails to serve the purposes of the Small Tract Act, 43 U.S.C. § 682a (repealed 1976) (“STA” or “the Act”),4 and will work mischief with every tract of land that contains an STA reservation, I dissent.
¶ 25 The property at issue in this appeal is located on what is now East Skinner Drive in Cave Creek east of 56th Street between Dixileta Drive and Dynamite Boulevard. Pursuant to the Act, Brown’s property was patented by the federal government to Brown’s predecessors in interest in 1959. The patent included the following reservation:
This patent is subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 33 feet in width, for roadway and public utilities purposes, to be located along the east and south boundaries of said land.
In the parcel to the immediate south of Brown’s parcel, the federal government also reserved a similar right-of-way “not exceeding 33 feet” across the parcel’s northern boundary. Thus, the two patents together reserved a sixty-six foot right-of-way centered on Brown’s southern boundary line. This right-of-way reserved a roadway corridor sufficient to provide multiple lane access that was both sufficient for developing needs and fairly apportioned between the two lots.
*21¶26 At some point, Brown, on her own initiative, cleared and graded an east-west road that was located entirely on her neighbor’s right-of-way. This road and its continuation were eventually named Skinner Drive. At the location in question, Skinner Drive is twenty-five feet wide and provides access for vehicle travel to all properties along the roadway, including those of the Appellees.
¶27 Sometime after Brown placed the road on her neighbor’s property, Brown obtained a permit from Maricopa County and constructed a fence around the border of her property, which blocked access to the portion of the right-of-way that runs across her property. Her neighbors to the east then brought suit against Brown for impeding the extent of their right-of-way. Brown contends that her neighbors do not need to use the right-of-way that runs across her property due to the existence of Skinner Drive. Therefore, she claims, they have no legal right to use that right-of-way.
¶ 28 Nevertheless, the well-settled law specifies that if an easement created by express grant or reservation “is unambiguous and grants [a party] the right of ingress and egress over the entire ... width of the easement, the deed governs and considerations of what is reasonable and necessary for ingress and egress are not controlling.” Squaw Peak Cmty. Covenant Church of Phoenix v. Anozira Dev., Inc., 149 Ariz. 409, 413, 719 P.2d 295, 299 (App.1986). The rule further specifies that, “the owner of a right-of-way for ingress and egress has a right to use the full width of the area [of the easement] unhampered by obstructions placed thereon.” Id. at 412, 719 P.2d at 298; see also 28A C.J.S. Easements § 52 (1996) (“The fact that the easement is not necessary will not bar its creation.”).
¶29 The majority acknowledges that the reservation in the federal patent at issue is express. It also acknowledges that the scope of an express easement is generally not limited by notions of necessity or reasonableness. Nevertheless, the majority, with no legal precedent or authority whatsoever, ventures to hold the explicit reservation in the federal STA patent ambiguous. It then interprets that purported ambiguity in Brown’s favor and against the beneficiaries of the easement. But it does so, apparently, only when the beneficiary claiming use is a private, as opposed to a governmental, beneficiary.
¶30 In so doing, the majority makes at least three errors. First, in order to find ambiguity the majority ignores the plain meaning of the federal regulations governing the STA. Second, when the majority interprets the purported ambiguity in favor of the holder of the servient estate rather than the beneficiary, it ignores the settled Arizona law as it pertains to STA reservations. Third, in ignoring the settled law the majority not only potentially calls into question the scope of every easement in an STA land patent in Arizona, but it also makes a hopeless muddle of the right to use such an easement based not on the text of the express reservations, but on the identity of the beneficiary. This is not good public policy.
¶ 31 As the majority acknowledges, the STA was passed to authorize the transfer of property from the federal government to private users “for residence, recreation, business or community site purposes.” See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kennedy, 147 Ariz. 514, 516, 711 P.2d 653, 655 (App. 1985) (Kennedy II). It was necessary, in dividing up the federal land into separate parcels, to provide rights-of-way necessary to access the separately-patented parcels that had previously been held in a single parcel by the federal government. The rights-of-way were necessary to the users of such property whether or not a public entity decided to construct or maintain roads over the rights-of-way.
¶ 32 Patents under the Act thus reserved an easement sufficient to provide multiple lane access regardless of whether the size of the easement granted would be consistently used while the property developed. See City of Phoenix v. Kennedy, 138 Ariz. 406, 408, 675 P.2d 293, 295 (App.1983) (Kennedy I); see also Bernal v. Loeks, 196 Ariz. 363, 366, ¶ 10, 997 P.2d 1192, 1195 (App.2000) (“It is only when the parcels are used ... that the government is justified in expending the time and resources needed to build such roadways.”). Such roadways did not need to be *22public roadways to be authorized by the reserved easement:
Although utilities almost invariably are installed and maintained by public entities, this is obviously not true for roadways, especially those that are forged in rural newly developing areas. That the [regulations pertaining to STA easements] did not modify the phrase “street and road purposes” with the word “public,” therefore, evinces a clear intent that such roadways are not limited to those that are publicly built and maintained.
Bernal, 196 Ariz. at 365, ¶ 9, 997 P.2d at 1194.
¶33 Further, by providing for easements of some size the Act reduced “the heavy burden on local governments of subsequently having to acquire an easement” for roadways and utilities as the need for access to these properties expanded. Kennedy I, 138 Ariz. at 408, 675 P.2d at 295. Because the easements were express easements, the easements were neither extinguished nor limited merely because the entire extent of the easement reserved was not immediately necessary to grant effective access.
¶34 If, from the time the patent was granted, a property owner wanted to use the right-of-way on property otherwise belonging to her neighbor, the right-of-way gives the property owner an express, unlimited right to use the easement for a roadway within the scope of the easement. It does so whether or not a local government chooses to build a road over the property and whether or not the property owner “needs” all of the easement used.
¶ 35 Indeed, Brown herself exercised this right to use the easement on her neighbor’s property when she initially graded what became Skinner Drive on the right-of-way running over her neighbor’s property rather than her own. She hardly had a “need” to use her neighbor’s property in light of the easement running across her own. But her lack of need did not prevent her from doing so.
¶ 36 She was authorized to do so by the language in her neighbor’s patent, which is identical to the reservation in her own, and gives her neighbors similar rights across her property. The language in Brown’s patent reserving a right-of-way “not exceeding 33 feet” on the south and east boundaries of her property is plainly explained by the federal regulations implementing the STA. Those regulations specified that, unless otherwise explicitly stated, the right-of-way reservation under patents issued pursuant to the STA would be for fifty feet:
The classification order may provide for rights-of-way over each tract for street and road purposes and for public utilities. If the classification order does not so provide, the right-of-way will be 50 feet along the boundaries of the tract.
43 C.F.R. § 2731.6-2 (removed 1980). Thus, because the Secretary intended for the reservation from Brown’s property to be for less than fifty feet, he specified in the patent that the reservation would not exceed thirty-three feet. The only thing the Secretary did, by so doing, was limit the size of the easement to thirty-three feet rather than fifty feet. Otherwise, as we have concluded in similar cases, the above subsection from the federal regulations “allows for roadway use without qualification.” Bernal, 196 Ariz. at 365, ¶ 9, 997 P.2d at 1194.
¶ 37 Now, however, the majority imposes a qualification on the use of a private roadway. It does so by asserting that an express easement for “access” does not mean what it says, but, as it applies to private users, grants an easement over only that part of the easement necessary to obtain reasonable access. The majority then holds that because plaintiffs can achieve access purely by passing over that part of the easement that passes to the south of Brown’s property, they cannot use their express easement as it passes over Brown’s property. Such a holding is directly contrary to the law of easements as laid out in Squaw Peak, 149 Ariz. at 413, 719 P.2d at 299, and Hunt v. Richardson, 216 Ariz. 114, 123, ¶ 29, 163 P.3d 1064, 1073 (App.2007) (holding that as it applies to an express easement, “what is ‘necessary’ is merely ... what is ‘appropriate’ ”). Use of a roadway corridor for access is plainly an “appropriate” use of an easement reserved “for roadway [] purposes.” That the Act *23was intended to allow “effective” use of public lands does not mean that neighboring parties may enforce the entire right of way only if their lots would otherwise not be utilized effectively, and the majority produces nothing to suggest that the “access” envisioned by the Secretary was access circumscribed by “need.” Such a construction is unworkable and frustrates the broad purposes of the Act in providing rights-of-way in the first place.
¶ 38 The sole case on which the majority relies to impose some sort of an implied need requirement is from the appellate division of the New Jersey superior court. See Hyland v. Fonda, 44 N.J.Super. 180, 129 A.2d 899 (App.Div.1957). That case has nothing to do with the STA and does not involve similar language. Rather, it held that a reservation “along a strip 25 feet in width” was ambiguous because it was unclear whether the 25-foot strip referred to the easement itself or to the land on which the easement was located. Id. at 904. By contrast, there is no possible double-meaning here — the easement covers the thirty-three feet along the southern and eastern boundary lines. The majority thus errs when it limits the size of this express easement by determining that it is not necessary to provide access to the plaintiffs.
¶39 Even assuming that there was an ambiguity in the STA patent, our cases clearly hold that such an ambiguity is construed in favor of the beneficiaries of the easement rather than in favor of the holder of the servient estate. In Kennedy II, the owner of the servient estate, Kennedy, asserted that Mountain States had no right to lay telephone cable in the thirty-three feet along his northern boundary pursuant to a thirty-three foot reservation in the STA patent by which he held his property. 147 Ariz. at 515-16, 711 P.2d at 654-55. The language of the reservation in Kennedy’s patent was identical in many respects to the reservation here, but it also had some important distinctions. Id. at 515, 711 P.2d at 654. Instead of plainly specifying that the thirty-three foot easement would be along the east and south boundaries of the land as the easement does here, the reservation in Kennedy’s patent specified that a thirty-three foot easement would be “located across said land or as near as practicable to the exterior boundaries.” Id. Kennedy noted that pursuant to that single reservation, Phoenix had taken a thirty-three foot easement across his western boundary in 1974 and his southern boundary in 1979. Id. Mountain States had taken an easement across the northern boundary in 1976. Id. Kennedy argued that the reservation was ambiguous and thus insufficient to grant multiple rights of way across his entire property at three of the four exterior boundaries. Id. at 516, 711 P.2d at 655. We disagreed. See id.
¶ 40 In deciding in Mountain States’ favor, we noted that “where the language of a public land grant is subject to reasonable doubt such ambiguities are to be resolved strictly against the grantee and in favor of the government.” Id. After stating the policy behind such reasoning, we acknowledged that Mountain States was not the U.S. government, but was nevertheless the sort of beneficiary for which the U.S. government had reserved the right-of-way. Id. We thus held that the rule construing ambiguities strictly against the grantee also applies “when the federal government reserves an interest in land for entities not party to the grant.” Id. Applying that rule, we held the reservation was sufficient to reserve an easement along the northern as well as the western and southern boundaries of Kennedy’s property. Id. at 517, 711 P.2d at 656. We thus held that Mountain States’ “placement of telephone cable within the specified 33 feet of the boundary was lawful.” Id. If such a rule of construction gave Mountain States an entirely new thirty-three foot easement across the servient estate, then it is certainly sufficient to grant a thirty-three foot easement here, where the reservation is express.
¶41 Mountain States’ placement of the cable along the northern boundary was not strictly necessary when there was already an existing easement along the southern boundary. But noting that the purpose of the reserved STA easements was to enhance the value of the granted land for “residence, recreation, business or community site purposes,” we determined that “[t]he purpose of the rights-of-way could best be fulfilled by permitting access along all boundaries.” Id. *24at 516, 711 P.2d at 655. Nor, of course, did Mountain States need to use the entire thirty-three feet in which to place its cable. Nevertheless, we specified that cable placement anywhere within the thirty-three feet of the boundary of the easement was lawful. Id. at 517, 711 P.2d at 656. Thus, Kennedy II dispels any argument that necessity for an STA easement is a requirement for its existence.
¶ 42 The majority, and even the Appellant, also concedes that Bernal stands for the proposition that rights-of-way reserved in STA patents exist for the benefit of the private owners of neighboring property.5 In fact, the express patent here reserves an easement for “roadway and public utility purposes.” With the exception of utilities, there is nothing in the text of the reservation that suggests that the scope of the right to use the easement for a roadway is different as between public and private users. Bernal confirms as much. See 196 Ariz. at 365, ¶ 9, 997 P.2d at 1194 (holding that STA regulations clearly demonstrate that these easements also exist for the benefit of private roadways).
¶43 The majority’s holding also presents potentially serious public policy ramifications for any property subject to an STA patent reservation. The majority has just declared that every STA patent reserving an easement “not exceeding 33 feet” — language used in every reported case involving STA easements in this state — is ambiguous. Thus, despite the reasons for which the easement was reserved, it can be used, at least by private parties, only when that party can satisfy a court that it demonstrably needs to use the whole scope of the easement to achieve access. The majority offers nothing in the text of the patent reservation itself that would justify such a limitation. Nor does it offer any justification for treating the user of a private roadway different than the user of a public roadway. Nor does the majority consider how its approach might affect future use of and need for the easement on Brown’s property.
¶44 Finally, it is good public policy to avoid constant resort to the courts to determine what qualifies as necessary, and thus to what extent an easement may be used. That is presumably why express easements are not bound by a “need” limitation unless that limitation is explicitly written into the reservation or otherwise evident from its purposes. There is no such restrictive language or purpose here.
¶ 45 To the extent that the federal government reserved an easement for the government and private users, the majority has now unilaterally declared that reservation null and void, except in cases of “need.” Such a pronouncement is unwarranted and ill-advised. The superior court’s summary judgment was correct and should have been affirmed by this court. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
. By the time the Act was repealed approximately 450,000 acres in fourteen western states were classified for small tract purposes. See Bureau of Land Mgmt, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Instruction Mem. No. 80-540, The Small Tract Act (Act of June 1, as Amended): Guide Book for Managing Existing Small Tract Areas (1980), cited in Brief of Respondent at 3, New West Materials, LLC v. Interior Board of Land Appeals, No. 07-44 (U.S. Nov. 2007). Thus, the effect of the majority’s decision could be considerable.
. The majority limits Bernal, however, by asserting that Bernal’s property was "landlocked” and thus that Bernal needed the easement to gain access to his property. Supra ¶¶ 1, 14. With all due respect to the majority, Bernal did not "need” the easement to access his property. A road ran the entire length of Bernal’s eastern boundary, which, in the words of the court, "provided] access to his property.” Bernal, 196 Ariz. at 363, ¶2, 997 P.2d at 1192 (emphasis added). While an arroyo did pass through Bernal’s property, it was spanned by a footbridge and thus the entirety of the lot was accessible. Id. Bernal’s only claim approaching “need” was his assertion that “he would like to keep horses on the west section,” to which he did not "readily ” have access given the arroyo. Id. (emphasis added). While Bernal may not have had easy access to every part of his land for any potential purpose, that is far indeed from saying that Bernal was in "need” of the right-of-way.