dissenting in part and concurring in part:
¶ 134 I dissent as to part I of Chief Justice Durham’s opinion, concur as to part II.A, and concur as to part II.B but for a different reason.
¶ 135 In part I of her opinion, Chief Justice Durham addresses the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting Maestas from offering the testimony of an expert witness on the general infirmity and unreliability of eyewitness identification. I dissent from the Chief Justice’s opinion on this issue for two reasons: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the expert testimony, and (2) Chief Justice Durham’s holding goes too far in suggesting that defendants are “entitled” to offer expert testimony of this nature and that defendants cannot receive a fair trial without it.
¶ 136 In this court’s most recent pronouncement on the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d 953, we held: “ ‘Whether expert testimony on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness identification should be allowed is within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” Id. at ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ¶ 43, 27 P.3d 1133). In Hubbard, we reiterated that “whether to allow proffered expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification testimony is a matter best left to the trial court’s discretion because of the trial court’s superior position to judge the advisability of allowing such testimony.” Id. Under this standard of review, the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony will stand unless the ruling “exceeds the limits of reasonability.” State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ¶ 66, 44 P.3d 794 (citation omitted).
¶ 137 In the case at hand, nothing in the record indicates that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of Maestas’ expert. Chief Justice Durham’s opinion fails to explain or demonstrate how the trial court abused its discretion or how the trial court’s decision to exclude the expert’s testimony exceeded the limits of rea-sonability. The lead opinion simply restates our past observations on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness identification and merely asserts, without explanation, that “given all the factors in this case, expert testimony will only act to clarify eyewitness testimony.” Such conclusory statements and review of our previous case law are insufficient to reverse the trial court’s ruling under our settled standard of review.
¶ 138 While this court’s prior rulings’ and the lead opinion’s questioning of the reliability of eyewitness identification is valid, the admission of expert testimony is not necessary in every case to inform the jury of the deficiencies of such identifications. Defense *650counsel may always cross-examine eyewitnesses. The purpose of cross-examination of an eyewitness by defense counsel is to inform the jury as to the deficiencies, if any, of that witness’s perception and recollection of the defendant and the defendant’s alleged criminal conduct. In addition, defense counsel may request an appropriate jury instruction, such as the Long instruction,1 in order to enlighten the jury as to the inherent deficiency of eyewitness accounts generally.
¶ 139 The lead opinion essentially creates a per se rule of admissibility of expert testimony as to the deficiency of eyewitness identification when it holds that “defendants[ ] are entitled to the information experts on human memory can provide about its operation,” and when it “agree[s]” with Maestas that “he cannot receive a fair trial without presenting expert testimony on the credibility of eyewitness identification.” (Emphasis added.) We have refrained from adopting, either explicitly or implicitly, a per se rule of admissibility or inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification testimony. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45 at ¶ 14, 48 P.3d 953. To hold that a defendant is entitled to such expert testimony would result in such experts being called by both the defendant and the prosecutor in every case. The decision on the admissibility of expert testimony in such cases should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
¶ 140 In regard to the lead opinion’s treatment in part II.A of the admissibility of Maestas’ statements in his presentence report, I concur. As to part II.B of the lead opinion, addressing the admissibility of Maestas’ statements in his allocution, I concur but for a different reason. I agree with Chief Justice Durham’s discussion and analysis of the history and role of allocution in the common law and in Utah law as set forth in part II.B.l of the lead opinion. In that portion of the opinion, the Chief Justice notes that this court has “clearly and thoughtfully recognized a constitutionally guaranteed right to allocution [under the Utah Constitution].” The Chief Justice then correctly con-eludes that “[t]he right to allocution would be meaningless if a convicted person’s allocution statements could be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.”
¶ 141 Instead of simply grounding its holding in this constitutional foundation, the lead opinion abandons this reasoning in favor of its rule 24(d) analysis in part II.B.2. I would decide the issue of the admissibility of Maes-tas’ allocution statements on this constitutional ground and hold that the admission of his allocution statements in his subsequent trial would effectively infringe and render meaningless his state constitutional right to allocution. Such a holding would resolve the issue without the need to borrow from rule 24 beyond its usual interpretation and application.
¶ 142 Justice HOWE concurs in Justice RUSSON’s concurring and dissenting opinion.. In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), this court delineated guidelines for a proper cautionary jury instruction on the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness identification and suggested a model jury instruction on the subject.