concurring and dissenting:
¶ 55 I concur in the result but dissent from the reasoning of the lead opinion. While I agree with the lead opinion’s position on the first two Ledfors1 questions, in my view, the third Ledfors question should be answered differently.
¶ 56 The third Ledfors question requires the trial court to make the following inquiry to determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit: “If the blanket immunity has been waived, does the Act also contain an exception to that waiver which results in a retention of immunity against the particular claim asserted in this case?” 849 P.2d at 1164. I believe that the plain language of section 63-30-10(18)(c) of the Utah Code allows Jordan School District (“the District”) to retain immunity provided that the vented hydrogen sulfide qualified as hazardous material or hazardous waste. Because of disputed facts about the origin of the hydrogen sulfide vented from the District’s sewer line, I cannot conclude as a matter of law that the hydrogen sulfide constituted hazardous mate*718rial or hazardous waste, and, therefore, I would reverse.
I. PLAIN LANGUAGE ANALYSIS
¶ 57 As the lead opinion notes, section 63-30 — 10(18)(c) retains immunity for governmental entities that cause injury while “regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes.” However, the lead opinion limits this retention of immunity to “state agencies responsible for providing public services that specifically relate to those exceptions.” Thus, the lead opinion, in effect, amends the statute to read that immunity is retained for governmental entities that cause injury while “regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes, provided the agency is responsible for providing public semces that specifically relate to those exceptions.”
¶ 58 While this addition to the statutory language may well be good policy, it does not change the fact that such language is not in the statute.' In order to justify this qualification to the language of the statute, the lead opinion contains an exhaustive review of the statute’s legislative history. It is well established, however, that “[wjhen interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain language and go no further unless we find the language ambiguous.” Cook v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, 2002 UT 105, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 1084 (citation omitted). Here, the language of the statute is plain and needs no further explanation because there is no ambiguity:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: (18) the activities of ... (e) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes.
Utah Code Ann. § 63 — 30—10(18)(c) (Supp. 2002). The statute therefore grants immunity to all governmental entities if an injury arises out of a number of different activities, including “the activities of ... regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes.” Id. If the legislature had intended to limit immunity to only those governmental entities that are “responsible for providing public services that specifically relate to those exceptions,” it would not have used the word “all.” Because the plain language of the statute provides immunity to all governmental entities when the injury arises out of any of the enumerated exceptions, there is no need to look any further. The lead opinion does so, however, and is thereby led to unnecessarily read additional terms into the statute.
¶ 59 The lead opinion relies on two cases to justify its conclusion that the specific exceptions to the waiver of immunity apply only to governmental agencies authorized to provide such services. In Branam v. Provo School District, 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989), and Williams v. Carbon County Board of Education, 780 P.2d 816 (Utah 1989), this court determined that governmental entities did not retain immunity under section 63-30-3 of the Utah Code because they were not engaged in the management of flood waters. Part of our analysis in those cases turned on whether the governmental entities involved had “statutory responsibility” to conduct the actions for which they claimed immunity. Branam, 780 P.2d at 812-13; Williams, 780 P.2d at 818. This court adopted the statutory responsibility analysis because it determined that the language of section 63-30-3, which had recently been enacted, resulted from the legislature’s concern “about potential' liability from police power measures taken to protect public and private property from natural disasters such as the heavy flooding that occurred in many locations in Utah in 1983.” Branam, 780 P.2d at 812. However, I believe that the plain language of section 63-30-3 was unambiguous and the court should not have implied limiting language into that statute. Accordingly, I am unwilling to extend the logic of those cases to subsection 63 — 30—10(18)(e).2
*719¶ 60 Thus, in my view, the District is entitled to retain immunity from suit if it is a governmental entity that caused an injury while regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes. It is undisputed that the District is a governmental entity. Therefore, in order to determine whether immunity has been retained, I turn to the question of whether the vented hydrogen sulfide qualified as hazardous material or hazardous waste as a matter of law.
II. HYDROGEN SULFIDE AS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL OR HAZARDOUS WASTE
¶ 61 Both hazardous material and hazardous waste are defined in the Utah Code. Using the Utah Code definition, the trial court determined that hydrogen sulfide was a “hazardous material” as a matter of law. The summary judgment would be sustainable, however, if the vented hydrogen sulfide was, as a matter of law, either a hazardous material or a hazardous waste.
A. Utah’s Statutory Definition of “Hazardous Material”
¶ 62 Section 19-6-302(7) of the Utah Code defines “hazardous materials” to be “hazardous waste as defined in the Utah Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, PCBs, dioxin, asbestos, or a substance regulated under 42 U.S.C., Section 6991(2).” Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-302(7) (1998). The trial court and the parties focused their efforts on determining whether hydrogen sulfide was a “hazardous material” based on 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2).
1. “Hazardous Material” Includes Federally Regulated Substances
¶ 63 Substances regulated under 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2), include petroleum and “any substance defined in section 9601(14) of ... title [42] (but not including any substance regulated as a hazardous waste under subehapter III3 of this chapter).” Defining hazardous substance, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) states that “[t]he term ‘hazardous substance’ means ... (A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, ... [and] (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. § 7412].”
a. Hazardous Material Under the Water Pollution Control Act
¶ 64 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A), requires the development of
regulations designating as hazardous substances ... such elements and compounds which, when discharged in any quantity into or upon the navigable waters of the United States ..., present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches.
Although such a list was created and does contain hydrogen sulfide, see 40 C.F.R. § 116.4 (2002), the list is only applicable to substances discharged into or upon navigable waters, see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1). Such is not the case here.
b. Hazardous Material Under the Clean Air Act
¶ 65 Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, which deals with hazardous air pollutants, is also inapplicable. In 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(3), the statute requires the creation of a list of hazardous air pollutants containing substances that “are known to cause or may reasonably be anticipated to cause death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or the environment.” Although the statute originally required “[t]he initial list [to] include ... hydrogen sulfide,” id., in 1991, Congress deleted “Hydrogen sulfide” from this Act’s list of hazardous air pollutants. Act of Dec. 4, 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-187, 105 Stat. 1285. Because hydrogen sulfide no longer meets the statutory definition of a hazardous air pollutant, the federal statute does not support a conclusion that it constitutes a “hazardous material.”
*7202. Utah’s Regulatory Definition of “Hazardous Material”
¶ 66 Having determined that hydrogen sulfide does not qualify as a hazardous material under section 19-6-302(7) by virtue of it being a substance regulated under 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2), I next turn to the question of whether hydrogen sulfide qualifies as a hazardous material under section 19-6-302(7) by virtue of it being a “hazardous waste as defined in the Utah Hazardous Waste Management Regulations.” Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-302(7). The Utah Hazardous Waste Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 26-37-1, was repealed in 1981,1981 Utah Laws 126, § 1, and was replaced by the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Act, Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-101 to -123 (1998 & Supp.2002). The hydrogen sulfide at issue here constitutes hazardous waste under section 19-6-302(7) if it falls within the Utah regulatory definition of hazardous waste.
¶ 67 The Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste regulations define hazardous waste to be “[a] solid waste as defined in section R315-2-2.” Utah Admin. Code R315-2-3(a) (2000). “Solid waste” is defined as “any discarded material that is not excluded by subsection R315-2-4(a).” Id. at R315-2-2(a)(1). Discarded material excluded by subsection R315-2-4(a) from the definition of solid waste includes “[domestic sewage or any mixture of domestic sewage and other wastes that passes through a sewer system to a publicly-owned treatment works for treatment. ‘Domestic sewage’ means untreated sanitary wastes that pass through a sewer system.” Id. at R315-2-4(a)(l). Although it is not defined in the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste regulations, “sanitary waste” is elsewhere defined in the Water Quality regulations as
liquid or solid wastes originating solely from humans and human activities, such as wastes collected from toilets, showers, wash basins, sinks used for cleaning domestic areas, sinks used for food preparation, clothes washing operations, and sinks or washing machines where food and beverage serving dishes, glasses, and utensils are cleaned. Sources of these wastes may include single or multiple residences, hotels and motels, restaurants, bunkhouses, schools, ranger stations, crew quarters, guard stations, campgrounds, picnic grounds, day-use recreation areas, other commercial facilities, and industrial facilities provided the waste is not mixed with industrial waste.
Id. at R317-7-2.44. If the hydrogen sulfide vented by the District was domestic sewage, then it was not a solid waste and is therefore excluded from the regulatory definition of hazardous waste. However, there is a dispute among the parties as to the origin of this hydrogen sulfide. Since the hydrogen sulfide vented by the District is not one of the substances regulated by 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2), and factual disputes prohibit a determination of whether it fits within Utah’s regulatory definition, I cannot conclude as a matter of law that hydrogen sulfide is a hazardous material.
B. Utah’s Statutory Definition of “Hazardous Waste”
¶ 68 The District may retain immunity, however, if the vented hydrogen sulfide was a hazardous waste as defined in the Utah Code. Section 19-6-102(9) of the Utah Code defines “hazardous waste” as
a solid waste or combination of solid wastes other than household waste which, because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness or may pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-102(9) (1998) (emphasis added). Section 19-6-102(17)(a) defines “solid waste” and specifically excludes “solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage.” The District concedes that its “analysis suggested that the hydrogen sulfide gas and the accompanying smell might [have been] caused by a back-up of gas in the sewage system.” The District maintained, however, that the hydrogen sulfide may have *721originated from other sources and that it did not fit within the definition of domestic sewage. The Lovendahls argue that it was plainly domestic sewage. Since the hydrogen sulfide vented by the District might have originated from one of a number of sources, there is a disputed material fact concerning the origin of the vented hydrogen sulfide. Because of this dispute, I also cannot conclude that the hydrogen sulfide vented from the elementary school was “hazardous waste.” Based on my examination of the statutory definition of both “hazardous material” and “hazardous waste,” I cannot conclude as a matter of law that the hydrogen sulfide at issue constituted hazardous material or hazardous waste. Therefore, I conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
¶ 69 In sum, under the plain language of subsection 63 — 30—10(18)(c), the District is entitled to immunity from the Lovendahls’ suit if the hydrogen sulfide constituted hazardous material or hazardous waste as a matter of law. However, summary judgment is inappropriate on the issue of immunity because there are disputed material facts concerning whether the hydrogen sulfide vented by the District qualifies as hazardous material or hazardous waste. For this reason, I would reverse the trial court’s decision granting the District’s motion for summary judgment on this issue.
¶ 70 Justice RUSSON and Justice WILKINS concur in Associate Chief Justice DURRANT’s concurring and dissenting opinion.. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993).
. In addition, Branam and Williams dealt with the language of a different statute. While those cases analyzed immunity under section 63-30-3, we must determine whether immunity is retained under section 63 — 30—10(18)(c), which applies, in *719accordance with its own plain language, to "all governmental entities."
. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939e, which governs materials defined as “hazardous waste."