I respectfully dissent. It is clear to me that under Civil Code section 846,1 the so-called recreational use immunity statute, the owner of an estate in real property is not liable for any injury suffered, as the result of the owner’s mere ordinary negligence, by one who is on the property, without payment or invitation, for recreational purposes. The owner’s statutory immunity for ordinary negligence under such circumstances applies not only to injuries caused by physical conditions on the property, but also to those caused by the owner’s uses of, and activities on, the property, such as the negligent driving at issue here. As I shall explain, this result is compelled by a fair reading of the statutory language and by the policies underlying the immunity, as we have previously described them.
At the outset, I share a natural sympathy for the injured plaintiff in this case. It certainly seems that a bicyclist injured in a traffic accident on a public highway should be able to recover from the employer of a negligent driver who struck him while engaged in the course and scope of the employment. Unfortunately, however, the accident at issue here involved a federal employee driving on federal land. For better or worse, Congress has cloaked the federal government in California with any tort immunity a private person, including a private landowner, would have under state law, such as the *88recreational use immunity conferred by section 846. (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).) Moreover, though the government actively promotes the free public recreational use of its national forest lands and roads, case law has consistently held that it does not thereby “expressly invite[]” members of the public onto its property, so as to come within an express statutory exception to immunity. (§ 846, 4th par.)2 These anomalous, and perhaps counterintuitive, circumstances should not influence our resolution of the issue the Ninth Circuit has asked us to decide here. We should resist the temptation to make bad law from bad facts.
Instead, we must focus on how section 846 properly applies to the millions of individual California property owners—agricultural, industrial, commercial, and residential—who face exposure to tort liability when persons who have entered private land for recreational purposes, often without the owners’ permission, come into contact with the owners’ normal activities on their property. For multiple reasons, the majority reaches the wrong interpretation of section 846 as applied to these owners.
The Legislature’s primary purpose in adopting section 846 was to encourage the owners of real property to allow recreational use of the property by others without fear that if an owner’s mere negligence on the premises injured such a user, the owner would face tort liability. As discussed below, nothing in the legislative history of section 846, or in our case law directly interpreting this statute, manifests an intent to immunize only static physical “conditions” on the property, while leaving the owner fully exposed if his or her normal activities on the property injure a person who has entered, without payment or invitation, for recreational purposes. Though the majority insists otherwise, there is no readily apparent reason why the Legislature would make such a distinction. Landowners do not simply maintain their property, they use it. If the law seeks to encourage such owners to allow nonpaying, uninvited strangers to enter and use their land for recreational purposes without fear of personal injury liability, both “conditions” and “use” immunity are equally justified.
Of course, as this court has indicated, the statute also reflects a policy that it is unfair to subject a landowner to tort liability when nonpaying, uninvited *89strangers enter against the landowner’s will for recreational purposes. This was a primary ground for our holding that section 846 applies even to land that is unsuitable for recreation, and even where the landowner seeks to prevent recreational entry and use by others. In reaching this conclusion, we stressed that section 846 sets forth only two requirements for immunity: “(1) the defendant must be the owner of an ‘estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory’; and (2) the plaintiff’s injury must result from the ‘entry or use [of the “premises”] for any recreational purpose.’ (§ 846.)” (Ornelas v. Randolph (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1100 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 847 P.2d 560], italics added (Ornelas).)
As we explained in Ornelas, the Legislature “could reasonably determine that a landowner—any landowner—should not in fairness be held liable for injuries sustained by a trespasser from the recreational use of the owner’s property.” (Ornelas, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1105, italics added.) Indeed, we noted, the Legislature could recognize the “evident” injustice of subjecting a landowner who seeks to prevent recreational entry to greater liability than one who permits such entry. (Id., at p. 1107.) In sum, we indicated, the statute’s purpose is to ensure that “[t]he landowner’s duty to the nonpaying, uninvited recreational user is, in essence, that owed a trespasser under the common law as it existed prior to Rowland v. Christian [(1968)] 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561]; i.e., absent willful or malicious misconduct the landowner is immune from liability [to a recreational user] for ordinary negligence. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 1100, italics added; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 333, subd. (b) [under traditional common law rule, possessor of land is not liable to trespassers for failure to exercise due care either to put the land in a reasonably safe condition or “to carry on his activities so as not to endanger them” (italics added)].)3
Land may be unsuitable for recreation, and the owner may attempt to prevent recreational trespassing, not only because of dangerous physical conditions of the land itself, but because the activities the owner is conducting on the property—whether industrial, agricultural, commercial, residential, or even recreational—simply make it incompatible with recreational use by outsiders. No reason appears why those activities, if not willful or malicious, should nonetheless expose the owner to tort liability when a trespasser who enters the land for recreational purposes is injured.
*90Despite all this, the majority concludes that section 846’s basic immunity extends only to the physical condition of the land itself, not to uses or activities on the land by the owner, such as the operation of a motor vehicle by the owner (or the owner’s employee). To support its conclusion, the majority first points to features of the statutory language. However, I respectfully submit that the majority’s parsing of the statute does not withstand scrutiny. To put my views in context, I briefly review the statutory terms.
For our purposes, the significant portions of section 846 are contained in the first, third, and fourth paragraphs. The first paragraph provides in pertinent part that one with a possessory interest in real property “owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose,” or to “give any warning [to such recreational entrants or users] of hazardous conditions, uses of structures, or activities on such premises.” (§ 846, italics added.)
The third paragraph says that a landowner who gives permission to another for recreational entry and use does not thereby (a) warrant “that the premises are safe for such purpose,” (b) accord the permitted person “the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed, or (c) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury . . . caused by any act of such person . . . .” (§ 846, italics added.)
Finally, the fourth paragraph states, inter alia, that section 846 “does not limit the liability which otherwise exists (a) for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.” (§ 846, italics added.)
When all is said and done, the majority relies almost exclusively on two aspects of the first paragraph. First, the majority focuses upon the phrase “keep the premises safe.” The majority insists this phrase conjures up the notion of “premises liability,” a term of art generally associated with a landowner’s “property-based” duty to maintain the land and buildings themselves in a reasonably safe condition. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 79, italics added.) The Legislature, the majority assumes, must have so understood when it chose the statutory language. This phrase, the majority insists, does not extend to the owner’s negligent day-to-day activity unrelated to property maintenance, such as careless operation of a vehicle, even though the negligent conduct occurs on his or her own property and causes injury to a recreational user.
I am not persuaded. In the first place, there is no hard-and-fast rule that “premises liability”—the liability exposure of a possessor of land to persons injured thereon—is limited to what the majority deems the “property-based *91duties” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 80-81) of physical care, maintenance, and repair. Generally, “ ‘[t]he proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land ... is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others ....’” (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149, 1156 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 448, 929 P.2d 1239], quoting Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 119.) Nothing in that formulation necessarily distinguishes between dangers arising from mere negligent property maintenance by the possessor, on the one hand, and dangers arising from activities the possessor or others are conducting on the property, on the other. (See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207] [duty of landlord to tenant or patron to protect against foreseeable criminal activity on the property]; Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225, 233 [282 P.2d 69] [possessor’s duty to warn contractor’s employees of danger posed by operation of crane near live power lines].)
In any event, the Legislature did not use the term of art “premises liability,” as it might easily have done. Instead, the statute employs the broader phrase “keep the premises safe.” This phrase reasonably encompasses all failures to exercise due care that render the “premises” unsafe for recreational use by uninvited, nonpaying outsiders. Such failures may as easily and commonly involve the owner’s active conduct on the property, and the day-to-day use the owner makes of it, as they do static physical conditions on the land. As indicated above, no logical reason appears why the phrase “keep the premises safe” should provide immunity only for one, and not for the others.
The following examples illustrate the artificiality of the distinction the majority proposes:
A salvage yard, surrounded by a fence posted with “customers only” and “no children” signs, is strewn with carelessly heaped piles of parts and scrap metal recovered from junked vehicles. Attracted by the piles, two neighborhood teenagers, X and Y, enter for purposes of amusing themselves. X scrambles onto one of the piles. His weight causes it to shift, and he is partially buried in debris, causing him injury. Meanwhile, Y’s attention is diverted to an auto crushing machine, which is operating nearby. Y accidentally places his hand in the path of the crushing mechanism. The operator fails to shut off the machine in time, and Y’s arm is seriously mangled. Under the majority’s proposed holding, the salvage yard owner is immune from liability to X, but is liable for the negligent injury caused to Y.
Similarly, a wheat farmer has fenced his fields and posted them with “no trespassing” signs. During the harvest season, three bored adolescents who *92live nearby come onto the property to see what recreational opportunities might present themselves. One of the adolescents, C, enters a rarely used bam, which the farmer has allowed to fall into disrepair. C climbs up into the hayloft and falls through the rotten structure, injuring himself. Meanwhile, C’s companions, D and E, play a form of “tag” in the farmer’s wheatfields, using the tall, ripe summer wheat as cover. While D is hiding, the farmer, harvesting his wheat with a combine, accidentally runs over D’s leg, causing serious injury. Under the majority’s analysis, the farmer is not liable to C, but is fully exposed to liability to D.
Finally, a landowner, A, has a mral home with substantial acreage. On a remote portion of his property, he has constructed, for his own recreational use, a dirt bike course that includes moguls, blind curves, and water hazards. The owner has fenced off his land to discourage entry by strangers. He is familiar with the challenges the course presents, and, because of his efforts to deter outsiders, he assumes he will encounter no other riders. Hence, to maximize his fun, A rides at the highest speed the course will accommodate. While he is doing so, two other dirt bikers, B and C, negotiate the fence, enter the property with their vehicles, and begin riding on the course. B rounds a blind curve, unaware of the hidden water hazard just beyond. He crashes into the water, and is injured. Moments later, C speeds through the same curve, only to see A bearing down on him. The bikes ridden by A and C collide, injuring C. Under the majority’s narrow construction of “keep the premises safe,” A is immune from liability for B’s injury, but is fully exposed to liability for the injury caused to C.
Section 846’s immunity for failure to “keep the premises safe” does not, by its terms, admit of such arbitrary distinctions. Nor are they justified in light of the clear public policy implemented by the statute.4
The majority next observes that the first paragraph of section 846 also states an immunity for failure “to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises.” (Italics added.) Confronted with the fact that this phrase specifically refers to active conduct as well as physical conditions, the majority reasons that the immunity for failure to warn is simply broader than the “premises safe” immunity. Because a broad *93construction of the “premises safe” immunity to include uses and activities would encompass failure-to-wam theories, the majority asserts, such a construction would render the separate immunity for failure to warn unnecessary and superfluous. Hence, the majority concludes, the “premises safe” immunity must apply only to physical conditions, while the broader failure-to-wam immunity extends to activities and uses as well.
For several reasons, this analysis is not convincing. In the first place, no reason appears why the Legislature would wish to immunize landowners, as against recreational users, for failing to warn about hazardous activities and uses, while holding them fully liable for the activities and uses themselves. A more logical approach would be just the opposite—immunity for hazardous activities and uses, so long as the landowner provided adequate warning to persons entering the land for recreational purposes.
Consider the following example: As all agree, the statute would immunize a farmer from negligence liability for failing to warn nonpaying, uninvited recreational entrants that he is about to spray his crops with toxic pesticides. Nonetheless, he does post prominent notices of the imminent spraying at numerous locations on the fence around his land. Notwithstanding these warnings, trespassers climb through the fence and enter the property to hunt pheasant. Satisfied that the warnings he provided would deter recreational entrants, the farmer negligently fails to notice the hunters’ presence, and he proceeds with the spraying operation. Several of the hunters suffer injurious reactions. Under the majority’s interpretation of section 846, the farmer’s act of spraying exposes him to liability, even though he provided clear warnings, and even though he would have been immune from liability for his negligent failure to do so. It is difficult to conclude, as a matter of common sense, that the Legislature intended such a result.
Moreover, contrary to the majority’s assertion, it is simply not true that if the “premises safe” immunity applies to uses and activities as well as physical conditions, the failure-to-wam immunity becomes superfluous. On the contrary, separate treatment of the two immunities, as applied to both static physical conditions and active conduct, is rational and logical, because the duties to which these immunities relate are themselves often separate. Situations may arise where due care could be satisfied either by directly reducing, avoiding, or eliminating dangers arising from conditions or activities on one’s property—i.e., “keeping] the premises safe”—or by giving adequate warning of the dangers. In some cases, where due care cannot make conditions or activities on the premises safe—such as those arising from inherently or unavoidably dangerous agricultural or industrial operations— due care, where such a duty is owed, may still require the landowner to warn potential entrants of these dangers.
*94Ample reason thus exists to absolve a landowner of negligence liability to an injured recreational user whether a duty would otherwise arise to eliminate dangerous conditions and activities, or simply to warn of them. In my view, section 846 does just that.
If there were any doubt on this point, the fourth paragraph of section 846 resolves it. As indicated above, this paragraph declares in pertinent part that the statute “does not limit the liability which otherwise exists ... for [a landowner’s] willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity . . . .” (Italics added.) Two aspects of this provision unambiguously refute the majority’s construction of the statutory immunity.
First, the paragraph evidences the Legislature’s intent to deal separately and equally with the respective duties to “warn against,” and to “guard . . . against,” dangers on the property, whether those dangers arise from “condition[s]” and “structured,” or from “activities]” and “use[s].” (§ 846, 4th par.) Insofar as the paragraph withdraws or withholds immunity for landowners’ “willful or malicious” acts or omissions that injure recreational users, it does so across the board, for failures both to “guard . . . against,” and to “warn against,” injury-causing dangers, stemming either from physical conditions, or from the owners’ uses or activities.
As so worded, the fourth paragraph thus clarifies the scope and extent of the first paragraph’s immunity. The fourth paragraph makes clear that there is no immunity if the failure to “guard . . . against,” or to “warn against,” dangerous “condition[s], use[s], structured or activities]” was “willful or malicious.” But the statute’s need to specify the broad range of circumstances in which immunity is not provided obviously arises because the statute does otherwise provide immunity under the same circumstances for merely negligent acts or omissions. The paragraph clearly implies that its exception from immunity for “willful or malicious” conduct is coextensive with the immunity for conduct that is merely negligent. Since the exception applies to a failure to “guard . . . against” dangerous “used” and “activities]” as well as hazardous physical conditions, so must the immunity. (§ 846, 4th par.)
Thus, the most natural way to read the statute is that, under the first paragraph, the immunity extends to conditions, activities, and uses, except, under the fourth paragraph, those that are “willful or malicious.” Under this construction, the first paragraph’s phrase “keep the premises safe” is simply an analog of the fourth paragraph’s phrase “guard . . . against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.”
*95The majority suggests the fourth paragraph’s withdrawal of immunity for “willful or malicious” failure to “guard . . . against” “use[s]” and “activities]” may properly be read as referring only to the third paragraph, which specifies that a landowner who gives permission to another person to enter for recreational purposes does not thereby “assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury . . . caused by any act of such person.” (§ 846, 3d par., italics added.) Because the only express immunity set forth in section 846 for “act[s]” is the third-paragraph immunity for the “act[s]” of a permitted user, this line of reasoning goes, the fourth paragraph must simply mean that if the landowner has acted in a “willful or malicious” fashion, his or her immunity for the “act” of a permitted recreational user will not apply.
But this unduly narrow construction of the fourth paragraph’s references to “use[s]” and “activit[ies]” finds no support in the statutory language. By its terms, the fourth paragraph’s withdrawal of immunity for “willful or malicious” conduct by the landowner broadly extends to all failures to “guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity.” (§ 846, 4th par.) Nothing in this phrase suggests it is limited to those particular “act[s]” of a third person to whom the landowner has given permission for recreational entry and use, though such a qualification could easily have been expressed. And, as indicated above, the broad phrasing of the fourth paragraph’s exception to immunity clearly implies that the immunity itself also extends not only to “condition[s]” of the land, but to “use[s]” and “activities]” thereon—including those of the landowner.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the scenario to which the majority confines the fourth paragraph’s withdrawal of immunity would ever occur. If I understand the majority’s position correctly, the withdrawal of immunity for “willful or malicious” failure to “guard . . . against” “use[s]” or “activities]” on the land that injured a recreational user would apply only in the almost inconceivable case where the landowner “willful[ly] or malicious[ly]” failed to prevent a recreational user, whom the landowner had permitted to enter, from injuring another person on the land. Such a circumstance is so unlikely in real life that it stretches credulity to believe the Legislature was focused on it.
Moreover, contrary to the majority’s analysis, the third paragraph of section 846 supports, rather than undermines, my reading of the statute. The third paragraph states, inter alia, that merely by giving permission to enter and use the property for recreational purposes, the landowner does not thereby grant “the person to whom permission has been granted the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed . . . .” (§ 846, 3d par., italics added.) The obvious purpose of this provision is to equate the statutory immunity against a permissive recreational user, who might otherwise be *96entitled to greater common law protection as “an invitee or licensee,” with that afforded in the case of a recreational trespasser. By using the broad, unqualified term “a duty of care” (ibid., italics added) to describe the extent of this immunity, the statutory language strongly suggests that a landowner simply owes no duty of care (other than to refrain from “willful or malicious” conduct) to prevent injury to uninvited, nonpaying persons, whether trespassers or “permittee[s],” who enter and use the land for recreational purposes (id., 4th par.).
The majority concedes that the legislative history of section 846 is sparse, and further acknowledges that the Legislative Counsel’s summary of the original 1963 bill (bill “provides that an owner of an estate in real property is not liable for injuries to people who enter upon his land for various recreational purposes”) (Legis. Counsel, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 639 (1963 Reg. Sess.) July 5, 1963) suggests an intent to create a blanket immunity for injuries arising from a landowner’s negligence. Nonetheless, the majority insists its narrower view of the intended immunity finds support in the legislative history of the 1980 amendment to section 846.
I do not agree. One example cited by the majority simply parrots the statutory phrase “keep the premises safe.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1966 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 11, 1980, p. 1.) As I have indicated above, this language does not necessarily track the narrower term of art “premises liability.” Moreover, at least some of the 1980 legislative documents, while reciting the statutory language, state interchangeably that the statute “exempts an owner of any estate in real property from liability to recreational users of his premises.” (E.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Bill Digest of Assem. Bill No. 1966 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 11, 1980, p. 2.) This broader language suggests a blanket immunity for all injuries negligently caused by a landowner to a nonpaying, uninvited person on the property for recreational purposes.
The majority suggests that if the Legislature meant to immunize a landowner against all injuries sustained by a nonpaying, uninvited recreational user of the property as the result of the landowner’s negligence, it could simply have stated that rule in so many words. But given the ample indicia that the Legislature did intend to immunize both conditions and activities, if not “willful or malicious,” its failure to set forth the rule with the grammatical exactitude the majority proposes cannot be dispositive.
The majority also speculates that by applying the immunity only to physical conditions, and not to “use[s]” and “activities],” the Legislature sought to strike a reasonable balance between landowners and recreational users of land. The premise of this theory is that if the statute absolved *97landowners of liability for their negligent conduct toward those on the property for recreational purposes, persons would be discouraged from using private lands for recreation, contrary to the purpose of section 846.
But there are two responses to this line of reasoning. First, as the Legislature must have understood, the greater a landowner’s potential exposure to liability for injuries to nonpaying, uninvited recreational users, the greater is his or her incentive to discourage or prohibit such use. Second, as this court has previously made clear, section 846 also justly applies to landowners who do discourage recreational entry and use of their unsuitable property. As indicated, that unsuitability may arise as much from the owner’s activities on the property that are incompatible with recreation, as from physical conditions thereon.
The majority also posits that the Legislature may have sought to place a landowner and a recreational user of the land on an equal footing, such that each owes a similar duty of care to refrain from injurious conduct when they are jointly engaged in activities on the property. The majority offers no evidence for this equal-footing theory. Moreover, as previously indicated, it flies in the face of the policies we have said underlie section 846. First, the statute seeks to encourage a landowner to permit outsiders to enter and use the land for recreational purposes, even though (1) the recreational users have no right to enter for this purpose, and (2) the owner has the absolute right to exclude them. Second, the statute seeks to protect a landowner who does exercise his or her absolute right to discourage recreational entry—perhaps because the owner’s own use of the land is incompatible with safe recreation by outsiders—from unjust exposure to tort liability when an outsider nonetheless enters for purposes of recreation and is injured while on the property.
Neither of these objectives is served by placing a landowner and a recreational user who enters the land without right or permission on an equal footing with respect to their respective activities on the land. Instead, as the Legislature undoubtedly concluded, the landowner is entitled to protection for his or her own uses and activities when, as a result of the owner’s mere negligence, a nonpaying, uninvited person who has entered the property for recreational purposes suffers injury.
For all these reasons, I am strongly persuaded that section 846 provides immunity both for negligent property maintenance by a landowner, and for negligent active conduct by the owner on the property, when a resulting danger causes injury to a nonpaying, uninvited person who is present for recreational purposes. I believe the majority’s contrary holding seriously misconceives the legislative purpose and undermines the public policy reflected in section 846.
*98Accordingly, I would respond to the Ninth Circuit’s request for clarification of California law by concluding that Civil Code section 846 does shield a landowner from liability to a nonpaying, uninvited recreational user for personal injury resulting from the negligent driving of the landowner’s employee acting in the course and scope of employment.
Chin, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Civil Code.
See, e.g., Mattice v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1992) 969 F.2d 818, 820-821 (§ 846 applied to paved secondary access road in national park); Termini v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 1264, 1265-1266 (§ 846 applied to Forest Service road in Angeles National Forest); Phillips v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1979) 590 F.2d 297, 299-300 (Forest Service promotional literature was not “express invitation” to enter national forest); see also Ravell v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1994) 22 F.3d 960, 962-963 (invitation to general public to attend air show on military base was not “expressQ invit[ation]” to injured spectator); Johnson v. Unocal Corp. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 310, 317 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 148] (exemption from § 846 immunity requires “direct, personal” invitation to injured person).
The majority insists that, in expressing this principle, our Ornelas opinion provided an “inaccurate or at least incomplete” description of pre-Rowland California law. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 86.) This law, the majority asserts, had developed nuances that acknowledged a landowner’s duty to exercise due care in “ ‘active conduct’ ” toward a trespasser whose presence was, or reasonably should have been, known. (Ibid.; see also Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 336.) The point is of little moment. The simple fact is that, in Ornelas, we discerned a legislative intent, by the adoption of section 846, to absolve a landowner of any duty to avoid negligent “conduct” toward a recreational trespasser.
The majority provides its own hypothetical example in an attempt to show that section 846 might operate arbitrarily in certain circumstances if interpreted to absolve a landowner of due care toward a nonpaying, uninvited recreational user with respect to the owner’s uses and activities on the property as well as physical conditions thereon. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 84.) Of course, any statutory policy choice may produce arbitrary results in isolated instances. But the majority fails to persuade that the policies reflected in section 846—to encourage the availability of suitable private land for recreation while protecting the owners of unsuitable land from liability for mere negligence to recreational trespassers—are best served by its pinched construction of the statute.