concurring: I concur with most of Judge Marquardt’s thoughtful discussion of the issues in this case. Nevertheless, I also agree with Janis Waslesld Murphy and Mary Helen Moeller that Ethel’s estate claims are time-barred because of the heirs’ (Clark’s sons’) failure to timely assert their demand against Ethel’s estate under K.S.A. 59-2239. Although Ethel’s estate seeks a variety of remedies in this case, they are all based on Ethel’s alleged breach of the antenuptial agreement between her and Clark Draper. It is undisputed that Clark’s sons were the intended third-party beneficiaries of the antenuptial agreement. As a result, Clark’s sons had a claim against Ethel to the extent that she failed to fulfill her obligations under the antenuptial agreement.
In addition, it is well-established that a decedent no longer has the individual capacity to respond in damages to torts, to pay debts, to carry out contracts, or to administer his or her estate, and the estate must meet the decedent’s financial obligations. An individual who claims entitlement to all or to a part of a decedent’s estate, whether based upon a tort, an oral or written contract, the decedent’s will, or the statute of intestate succession, must recover, if at all, from the decedent’s estate. In re Estate of Reynolds, 266 Kan. 449, 456-57, 970 P.2d 537 (1998); see also Salvation Army v. Estate of Pryor, 1 Kan. App. 2d 592, 601, 570 P.2d 1380 (1977) (“ ‘[W]here a party seeks to enforce a contractual obligation to devise or bequeath a portion of a decedent’s estate, the proceeding constitutes a demand against the estate and not a will contest.’ ”). Thus, because Ethel had died and could no longer be sued, Clark’s sons’ claims based upon Ethel’s alleged breach of the antenuptial agreement should have been brought against Ethel’s estate.
*192Accordingly, I would also reverse based on Ethel’s estate claims being time-barred under K.S.A. 59-2239.