Dissenting.
¶28 I agree with the majority that the losses sustained by Porter’s victims in this case fall within the preventative scope of the contractor licensing statutes. However, in denying restitution to Porter’s victims, the-majority concludes that the losses suffered by Porter’s victims are not sufficiently causally connected to his criminal conduct to support an award. Because I disagree with the majority in this regard, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 29 Under our constitution, crime victims have a constitutional right to prompt restitution. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8). Thus, a court must order a defendant convicted of a criminal offense to pay restitution for the full amount of the economic losses suffered by the victim. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. *382Ann. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-603(C)(Supp.1999). In determining the amount of a restitution award, a court “shall consider all losses caused by the criminal offense or offenses for which the defendant has been convicted.” A.R.S. § 13-804(B)(Supp.1999). Although eligible losses do not include consequential damages, see A.R.S. § 13-105(14) (Supp.1999), the restitution statute “is quite broad, and we have allowed restitution for a wide variety of expenses caused by the conduct of persons convicted of crimes.” State v. Baltzell, 175 Ariz. 437, 439, 857 P.2d 1291, 1293 (App.1992). Therefore, a court must order restitution “for actual damages, that are the natural consequences of the defendant’s conduct or when the court determines that the losses were foreseeable, considering the nature and character of defendant’s criminal actions.” State v. Morris, 173 Ariz. 14, 18, 839 P.2d 434, 438 (App.1992).
¶ 30 The majority opines that this case is “far closer” than State ex. rel McDougall v. Superior Court, 186 Ariz. 218, 920 P.2d 784 (App.1996). See ante at ¶ 9. But, in fact, McDougall resembles this ease only in that the trial court denied restitution. See 186 Ariz. at 219, 920 P.2d at 785. In McDougall, as the majority here correctly points out, the defendant’s criminal conduct in leaving the scene of a vehicular accident did not cause or aggravate injuries suffered by the accident victims. See ante at ¶ 8; 186 Ariz. at 220, 920 P.2d at 786. Consequently, restitution was not proper because the defendant’s criminal conduct did not cause the losses for which restitution was sought. See id. However, the majority concedes that the losses to “Porter’s victims in this case, do fall within the intended preventive scope of the statute.” Ante at ¶9. Thus, in my view, McDougall simply does not apply here.
¶ 31 Nevertheless, the majority reaches the same conclusion as McDougall — that restitution is unavailable because, as they see it, Porter’s crime did not directly cause his victim’s losses. See ante at ¶ 11. The majority correctly explains that it was Porter’s un-workmanlike performance that actually caused his victims’ losses. See ante at ¶ 12. Had Porter performed competently, his victims would have no claim for restitution because they would have suffered no losses. See id. ‘Yet,” writes the majority, “unwork-manlike performance is not an element of the criminal conduct for which Porter was convicted.” Id. They go on to note that homeowners, on occasion, knowingly deal with unlicensed contractors in order to get a better price. The majority thus believes that some element of nondisclosure or misrepresentation as well as unworkmanlike performance must accompany the crime of contracting without a license before restitution can attach. See ante at ¶¶ 13-14.
¶ 32 I believe that my colleagues’ analysis is flawed. The statutes make it a class 1 misdemeanor to act “in the capacity of a contractor within the meaning of this chapter without a license.” A.R.S. § 32-1164(A)(2) (1996); see A.R.S. §§ 32-1101 (Supp.1999), 32-1151 (1996). Thus, in this case, Porter committed a crime when he contracted with his victims to perform residential remodeling for compensation and thus acted in the capacity of a contractor without a license. See A.R.S. § 32-1101(A)(7). Had Porter not acted in this capacity, there would have been no contract. Had there been no contract, there would have been no incompetent performance and no injury. Therefore, in my opinion, the victims’ losses flowed directly from Porter’s criminal actions. See State v. Lindsley, 191 Ariz. 195, 198, 953 P.2d 1248, 1251 (App.1997) (holding that “the proper focus [for determining restitution] is upon how directly the loss flows from the defendant’s acts”).
¶ 33 The majority makes too much of the fact that without Porter’s unworkmanlike performance his victims would have suffered no losses. They correctly state that an unlicensed contractor commits a crime when he acts in the capacity of a contractor regardless of the quality of his work. See ante at ¶ 12; A.R.S. § 32-1165. They also correctly state that, unless the quality of the work is such that the victim suffers a loss, there could be no restitution. But then they reach the unwarranted conclusion that, because un-workmanlike performance is not an element of the crime of contracting without a license, restitution is not available to a person who suffers a loss because of it.
*383¶34 Just because restitution may be unavailable when a criminal act does not cause a loss, it does not follow that restitution is not available when the same criminal act does cause a loss. For example, a burglar may enter a home without breaking a window, but that does not mean that a homeowner cannot claim restitution for window that is damaged during a burglary. Damaging a window is not an element of the crime of burglary, just as unworkmanlike performance is not an element of the crime of contracting without a license, but the victim is still entitled to restitution for the loss. In the same fashion, a victim is entitled to restitution for losses resulting from the crime of contracting without a license even though there may be situations in which the same crime causes no loss.
¶ 35 Similarly, I believe that my colleagues have misunderstood the impact of Porter’s misrepresentation or nondisclosure of his unlicensed status. The majority observes that some people choose to deal with unlicensed contractors and, in doing so, give up the protection of the licensing statutes to get a better price. See ante at ¶ 13. From this, they conclude that an element of misrepresentation or nondisclosure must accompany the crime of contracting without a license before restitution can attach because, otherwise, the connection between the crime and any loss is too tenuous. See id. at ¶¶ 13-14.
¶36 The majority’s reasoning is flawed because a person who knowingly solicits or facilitates an unlicensed person to act in the capacity of a contractor does not lessen that person’s criminal responsibility for any resulting losses, but rather forfeits the right to receive restitution. It is unlawful for a person to knowingly solicit or facilitate the commission of a misdemeanor. See A.R.S. § 13-1002 (1989) (solicitation); A.R.S. § 13-1004 (Supp.1999) (facilitation). Thus, a person who knowingly contracts with an unlicensed contractor would be committing a crime. Such a person would not be entitled to restitution because any loss resulting from the unlicensed contractor’s work would flow directly from the crime of soliciting or facilitat-mg that work. See A.R.S. § 13-105(14) (“Economic loss does not include losses incurred by the convicted person”). Therefore, Porter’s deceptions matter in this case not because of any causation considerations, but because of their impact on his victims’ restitution rights.
¶ 37 The purposes underlying the contractor licensing statutes also support an award of restitution in this case. First, a person who contracts with a licensed contractor has reasonable assurances that the work will be completed in a competent manner. To obtain a license, a contractor must meet minimal competency requirements. See A.R.S. § 32-1122(F)(l), (2) (Supp.1999). In addition, a person who contracts with a licensed contractor can presume that all work will be done in a workmanlike manner and the work will meet building codes and other objective quality standards.1 See Ariz. Admin. Code R4-9-108 (Supp.98-1) (Arizona Registrar of Contractors workmanship standards). Thus, it is reasonably foreseeable that any work done by an unlicensed contractor would likely be done incompetently. Such foresight is not farfetched given our prior case law with respect to restitution orders. See, e.g., Lindsley, 191 Ariz. at 199, 953 P.2d at 1252 (upholding a restitution award for a victim’s wages lost by voluntary attendance at court proceedings); State v. Blanton, 173 Ariz. 517, 520, 844 P.2d 1167, 1170 (App.1992) (finding no abuse of discretion in awarding restitution to a homicide victim’s parents for the headstone, flowers, chapel music, minister’s honorarium, and chapel fee); State v. Brady, 169 Ariz. 447, 448, 819 P.2d 1033, 1034 (App.1991)(holding that the court may award moving costs as restitution to the victim of a sexual assault); see also Morris, 173 Ariz. at 18-19, 839 P.2d at 438-39 (citing State v. O’Brien, 459 N.W.2d 131 (Minn.App.1990), in which the court ordered restitution for wedding costs resulting from the defendant’s false swearing that a prior marriage had been annulled).
¶ 38 Second, a person who contracts with a licensed contractor is assured that the contractor is financially responsible. In the con*384text of this case involving residential contracting, a licensed contractor must provide a bond of between $5000 and $15,000 to protect both the property owner and suppliers. See A.R.S. §§ 32-1131(3), 32-1152(B)(5), (E) (Supp.1999). In addition, a licensed residential contractor must pay $600 into a recovery fund to compensate a homeowner for losses caused by any violation of the contracting statutes or rules. See A.R.S. § 32-1132 (1996).
¶ 39 These basic protections are lost when a person contracts with an unlicensed contractor. The loss of these protections flows directly from the criminal act of contracting without a license. As a result, it is reasonably foreseeable that economic losses such as occurred here are the natural consequences of contracting with an unlicensed contractor. Cf. Morris, 173 Ariz. at 18, 839 P.2d at 438. Thus, the nature and character of Porter’s criminal act reinforces my belief that there is a sufficient causal nexus between the victims’ losses and Porter’s contracting without a license to justify a restitution award.
¶ 40 Finally, the award of restitution here serves the purposes of restitution. “The objectives of mandatory restitution are both reparative and rehabilitative.” State v. Freeman, 174 Ariz. 303, 306, 848 P.2d 882, 885 (App.1993). The municipal court’s restitution order serves to make the victims whole and brings home to Porter the seriousness of his offense.2 To state that the victims have a remedy through a civil lawsuit as the majority does, see ante at ¶27, is to state the obvious and, in this case, points the victims to an empty remedy. Porter declared bankruptcy naming his victims as creditors. Consequently, the victims could not recover from Porter in a civil suit if his contractual debts to them were discharged. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (1994) (a bankruptcy discharge “voids any judgment at any time obtained to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged”). On the other hand, Porter’s bankruptcy would have no effect on a restitution award. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)(1994); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52-53, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986).
¶41 Therefore, I would grant relief and reinstate the municipal court’s restitution orders.
. Here, one victim learned that Porter had violated city zoning codes, and the other discovered that Porter had not obtained the necessary permits.
. I also believe that the majority’s opinion is flawed in concluding that allowing restitution in cases such as this would "saddle” the justice and municipal courts with complex restitution hearings. See ante at ¶ 25. The municipal court ably handled this hearing; in fact, Porter does not contest the court’s determination of the amount of restitution. Further, the majority’s rationale ignores the constitutional and statutory restitution provisions which make no distinctions on the basis of which court decides the case.