dissenting:
The Majority concludes that the Colorado Springs Zoning Code appropriately and clearly grants the Planning Commission the "authority to deny a permitted use on the grounds that the use is incompatible with the surrounding area." Maj. op. at 1253. I view the criteria of compatability with the neighborhood to be insufficient grounds for denial of a lawful use. Accordingly, I respectfully disagree.
I.
Courts sustain the denial of a zoning application "if there is a lack of evidence to show that certain of the required factors existed, *1254or if the evidence is in dispute as to one or more of these factors, and the city council determines the permit should be denied, then it would have to make specific findings of fact as to what factors were or were not established. Where a record supports the findings, a reviewing court must uphold the city council's action." Bauer v. City of Wheat Ridge, 182 Colo. 324, 327, 513 P.2d 203, 205 (1973).
Here, while opponents of the development plan -raised concerns about increased traffic, safety for children and the elderly, and crime as negative consequences of the proposed development in front of both the Planning Commission and City Council, neither zoning authority acknowledged those factors in denying the development plan. Instead, both authorities relied only upon the general provisions of the development plan review criteria including whether or not the development was compatible with the neighborhood.
The trial court in this case held that the decision to zone the land in question as Planned Business District necessarily meant that the permitted uses for that District were in the best interests of the public health, safety, and general welfare; and that the City could not "attempt to reserve to itself the discretion to decide which of the complying land uses will be permitted." Therefore, the trial court held that the City's denial of permitted uses because they were incompatible with the surrounding neighborhood was inherently arbitrary and capricious, and that the City did not have discretion to refuse an authorized use of the property absent a legal rezoning.
While courts should not interfere with the decisions of a zoning authority absent a clear abuse of discretion, see Board of County Comm'rs v. O'Dell, 920 P.2d 48, 50 (Colo.1996), neither should a court "stand idly by, and allow unrestricted exercise of authority by Boards, not granted by statute, or permit the arbitrary and unjustified exercise of discretion." Western Paving Constr. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 181 Colo. 77, 82, 506 P.2d 1230, 1232 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
Review of a governmental body's decision pursuant to Rule 106(a)(4) calls into question the decision of the body itself, not just the district court's determination regarding the governmental body's decision. See O'Dell, 920 P.2d at 50. When, as here, the zoning authority's findings supporting its denial of the permit were brief and "extremely vague as to any substantial reason for its action" a denial of the permit may only be sustained if the record supports the finding. Bauer, 182 Colo. at 327, 513 P.2d at 205. The trial court in this case found that the record did not support the decision of the Planning Commission and I agree.
IL
Land use regulation in general represents an uneasy compromise between private landowner rights and community interests. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Conder, 927 P.2d 1339, 1351 (Colo.1996) (Kourlis, J., dissenting). Zoning identifies the permissible and impermissible uses of specific parcels of property, and is accomplished through a formal process involving notice and opportunity for protest. See id. at 1345. While a landowner may not use the land in a manner conflicting with applicable zoning, the landowner must be entitled to make use of the land in a manner consistent with the zoning. See id. at 1352 (Kourlis, J., dissenting). If a permitted use becomes incompatible "either through an environmental concern or a change of cireumstances ... the proper procedure is to amend the zoning resolution." Western Paving, 181 Colo. at 81, 506 P.2d at 1232.
The requirement that a landowner submit a development plan for approval denotes a modern trend in municipal planning that attempts to provide for more compatible and flexible development patterns in a city. See Shermam v. City of Colorado Springs, 763 P.2d 292, 296 (Colo.1988) (Sherman ID. These plans necessarily vest discretion in a planning commission or city council. Such discretion must nonetheless be guided by sufficient standards. See id.
A zoning authority that denies approval of a development plan on the basis of an ordinance without adequate standards exceeds its jurisdiction. See id. at 297. While zoning *1255ordinances are often upheld as valid exercises of the police power to regulate public health, safety, and welfare, see Zavala v. City and County of Denver, 759 P.2d 664, 669 (Colo.1988), the exercise of such power must be guided so that any action taken by a city "in response to a land use proposal will be rational and consistent." Beaver Meadows v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928, 936 (Colo.1985).
The Colorado Springs Zoning Code specifically allows the City to take into account the effect on the neighborhood. See § 4-6-602(C)(1) ("Will the project design be harmonious with surrounding land uses and neighborhood?") In my view, this standard is insufficient to provide "all users and potential users of land with notice of the particular standards and requirements" imposed by the City for plan approval. Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 790 P.2d 827, 832 (Colo.1990); see also Bauer, 182 Colo. at 327, 513 P.2d at 204 (holding a zoning authority acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denies a permit meeting the general zoning qualifications solely because of the type of building to be constructed); Kosinski v. Lawlor, 177 Conn. 420, 418 A.2d 66, 69 (1979) (rejecting a denial of site plan approval based on "poor use of the site"); East Lake Partners v. City of Dover Planning Comm'n, 655 A.2d 821, 825 (Del.Super.Ct.1994) (finding the planning commission had no power to reject a site plan because the residents did not want the land used for a project that is a permitted use under the applicable zoning classification); PRB Enters., Inc. v. South Brunswick Planning Bd., 105 N.J. 1, 518 A.2d 1099, 1102 (1987) (limiting a planning board's discretion by prohibiting denial of a permitted use).
IIL
We have addressed this issue before and I view the precedent of Western Paving as dispositive. In that case, the County Planning Commission reserved the right to impose conditions and safeguards on special permit applicants to ensure that the property use would "be in harmony with the character of the surrounding neighborhood ... and otherwise to promote the health, safety, and welfare" of the county. Western Paving, 181 Colo. at 80, 506 P.2d at 1231. We held that such power was not intended "to serve as grounds for denial of lawful use." Id. at 81, 506 P.2d at 1231. "Rather, it is intended to give the Board authority to tailor a proposed use to the conditions of the district so as to protect the health, safety and welfare." Id., 506 P.2d at 1231-32. Western Paving stands for the clear proposition that the designation of a permitted use in a particular zone affirmatively resolves the issue of whether the use is in harmony with the surrounding neighborhood. See id. at 82, 506 P.2d at 1232.
The Majority determines that the reasoning of Western Paving does not apply, because home rule cities operate by constitutional grant and need not comport with statutory limitations on zoning power. In my view, neither a home rule city nor a statutory city may engage in an impermissible denial of a right to use property consistent with zoning requirements. Neither may impose conditions that invite or allow arbitrary decision-making by the land use authority.
Sherman v. City of Colorado Springs, 680 P.2d 1302 (Colo.App.1983) (Sherman 1), aff'd, 763 P.2d 292 (Colo.1988), dealt with a home rule city - in fact, the same home rule city that is a party to the present controversy. In Sherman I, the court of appeals held that when a city establishes a zone where a use is permitted by right, the zoning body cannot then reserve to itself "the discretion to decide which of the complying land uses will be permitted." Id. at 1304. "To interpret this development plan ordinance as giving the city the power to deny a lawful use of property runs contrary to the requirement of adequate standards." Id. A court should not allow the denial of a development plan on the basis of extraneous considerations when the applicant, as here, meets the legal requirements of the zoning ordinances. See Sherman II, 763 P.2d at 297.
IV.
The City of Colorado Springs' rejection of Securcare's development plan based on its *1256incompatibility with the surrounding area clearly controverts applicable and valid precedent of this court and the court of appeals. The trial court properly concluded that the standards were insufficient and resulted in an arbitrary and capricious decision. In my view, compatability with neighborhood conditions is an issue that the land use authority should properly determine before the land use entity adopts zoning requirements for a particular area. Therefore, I would affirm the court of appeals and respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion.
I am authorized to state that Justice COATS joins in this dissent.