concurring.
I agree with my colleagues that, because of the unusual facts of this case, James's last post-conviction relief attorney could not simply notify the superior court of his conclusion that none of James's remaining claims had merit. Rather, the attorney was bound by the rule we announced in Griffin v. State, 18 P.3d 71 (Alaska App.2001)-that is, he was obliged to provide the superior court with a full explanation for his conclusion that James had no further colorable issues to raise. I am writing separately to clarify my factual and legal reasons for reaching this conclusion.
~ In Griffin, we augmented the literal wording of Alaska Criminal Rule 35.1(f)(2) to ensure an indigent defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. We held that when an attorney is appointed to represent an indigent petitioner for post-conviction relief, and when the attorney concludes that *1127the petitioner has no colorable claim for relief, the attorney is obliged to "provide the court with a full explanation of all the claims the attorney has considered and why the attorney has concluded that these claims are frivolous".1 This explanation is required so that the court can "fulfill its duty to make sure that indigent litigants do in fact receive zealous investigation and presentation of any colorable claims for post-conviction relief2
But what of situations where the attorney concludes that the petitioner has at least one claim that has arguable merit and should be pursued? In such cireumstances, does Grif fin require the attorney to explain why they are not pursuing other potential claims?
The answer is no. Griffin applies only when the attorney concludes that there are no colorable claims to be raised on the petitioner's behalf.
In Tucker v. State, 892 P.2d 882 (Alaska App.1995), we addressed an analogous issue-an attorney's obligation when representing an indigent defendant on direct appeal. The question in Tucker was whether an appellate attorney is obliged to raise every colorable issue that might be raised on appeal or whether, instead, the attorney could choose to pursue the most meritorious issues and abandon claims that, although arguable, stood a lesser chance of success,. We held that "[sluch strategie choices fall squarely within the sphere of competent representation.3
In support of this conclusion, we relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Barnes, 468 U.S. 745, 108 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1988). In Jones, the Court recognized that a crucial part of appellate advocacy is to winnow out weaker arguments. Thus, the Court held, an appellate attorney representing an indigent defendant is not required to raise every colorable claim.4
We now hold that this same rule applies to attorneys representing indigent defendants in post-conviction relief litigation. Part of the attorney's job is to investigate the case and then select which issues to pursue and which to forego. When the petitioner's at-tormney reviews the petitioner's potential claims for post-conviction relief and then actively litigates one or more of those claims, the concern that prompted our decision in Griffin is alleviated: that is, the court can justifiably presume that the petitioner is receiving zealous representation. Absent a later assertion that the attorney acted incompetently when selecting the claims to litigate, there is no need for the attorney to independently justify all the roads not taken. Grif fin applies only when the attorney declares that there are no claims to litigate.
At first glance, the present appeal seemingly presents a situation where Griffin does not apply. James and his attorneys (the law firm of Hemby and Keller) raised several potential claims between them, but Hemby and Keller selected one claim to actively litigate: the claim involving the witness's recantation. Once this claim was litigated to conclusion, there was apparently nothing more to do (except appeal the superior court's rejection of this claim).
But after the superior court decided the witness recantation claim against their client, Hemby and Keller announced that they had never actively investigated James's other claims. In effect, Hemby and Keller told the court that they had decided to litigate James's petition in piecemeal fashion, but had refrained from telling the court of their intention until the court issued its adverse ruling on the witness recantation claim.
Alaska Criminal Rule 85.1(f)-(g) appears to contemplate that, unless the court allows a different procedure, all of a petitioner's claims will be investigated and pleaded by *1128the time the court schedules a hearing on the petition. In James's case, however, the superior court effectively allowed Hemby and Keller to bifurcate the litigation of James's petition-by giving the lawyers more time to investigate and pursue additional claims after the court had already decided the witness recantation claim.
Shortly after they secured this bifurcation of the litigation, Hemby and Keller moved to withdraw from the case, alleging that they had a newly-arisen conflict of interest. The superior court granted this motion and appointed a new attorney to represent James. It was this new attorney who filed a statement under Criminal Rule 85.1(f)(2), declaring that James had no colorable claims to present.
Under these unusual facts, James never had an attorney (or a law firm) who reviewed all of his potential claims and then selected one or more of them to be actively litigated. Rather, Hemby and Keller (with the tacit approval of the superior court) selected one claim to litigate while, at the same time, they let James's other potential claims go unexamined. After the superior court heard and rejected their one selected claim (the witness recantation claim), Hemby and Keller withdrew from the case and the superior court was obliged to appoint another attorney to investigate James's remaining potential grounds for post-conviction relief.
Under these cireumstances, I agree with my colleagues that the Griffin rule governed this new attorney's obligations to James and to the court. The new attorney's assignment was to review all of James's potential remaining claims and decide which of them should be litigated. His decision was to litigate none of them. This is "not the type of tactical choice contemplated [by this court in Tucker and by the Supreme] Court in Jones "5 Rather, it is the type of decision governed by Griffin. The superior court had a duty to ensure that the new attorney provided zealous representation to James. Because the new attorney had had no hand in the prior litigation of the witness recantation issue, and because the new attorney was solely responsible for evaluating James's remaining potential claims, it was incumbent on this new attorney to explain to the court why he concluded that James had no further col-orable issues to raise.
. Id., 18 P.3d at 77.
. Id.
. Id. at 836.
. See id., 463 U.S. at 751-54, 103 S.Ct. at 3312-15. See also Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 848 P.2d 966, 978 (1993) (an attorney's informed decision on which issues to raise on appeal is presumed competent); Williamson v. State, 852 P.2d 167, 169 (Okla.Crim.App.1993) ("It is the role of appellate counsel to carefully select and develop the legal issues to be presented to the court[; counsel need] not raise every non-frivolous issue conceivable.").
. Hertz v. State, 755 P.2d 406, 410 (Alaska App.1988) (concurring opinion of Bryner, C.J.).