OPINION
FRANCHINI, Justice.{1} Plaintiffs-Respondents (“Plaintiffs”) brought an environmental action in Santa Fe County against a number of oil and gas companies. The complaint stated various claims stemming from Defendants-Petitioners’ (“Defendants”) alleged contamination of Plaintiffs’ property. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that venue was proper in Santa Fe County against some, but not all Defendants. Cooper v. Amerada Hess Corp., 2000-NMCA-100, ¶ 36, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68. We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals erred in: (1) determining that this lawsuit did not involve an interest in land; (2) allowing venue against some of the foreign corporation Defendants in Santa Fe County; and (3) concluding that improper venue as to some of the Defendants did not require dismissal of all Defendants. We affirm in part and reverse in part. We hold: (1) this lawsuit did not involve an interest in land; (2) venue was proper in Santa Fe County against the Defendants who maintained statutory agents in Santa Fe County; and (3) because venue was proper in Santa Fe County as to some of the Defendants, it was proper as to all Defendants who are parties to this appeal.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
{2} Plaintiffs own and reside on the Monument Springs Ranch in Lea County, New Mexico. Defendants, along with a number of other companies, lease the rights to conduct oil and gas operations on the property. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have released hazardous substances into surface and subsurface soils, strata and groundwater. Plaintiffs further allege that this contamination has caused property damage to the ranch and personal injuries to themselves.
{3} Plaintiffs filed suit in Santa Fe County, asserting claims for negligence, trespass, nuisance, unjust enrichment, and infliction of emotional distress against: (a) foreign corporations with statutory agents in Santa Fe County (Amerada Hess Corp.; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.; Dynegy Corp.; Concho Resources, Inc.; Arch Petroleum, Inc.; and Rice Engineering, Inc.); (b) a foreign corporation (Rhombus Energy Co.) and a foreign partnership (Rhombus Operating Co., Ltd.) who share a statutory agent in Chaves County; and (c) a domestic corporation (Primero Operating Co., Ltd.). The District Court ruled that the complaint “affect[ed] an interest in lands” and therefore dismissed the claims against all Defendants on the grounds that Santa Fe County was an improper venue.
{4} The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s determination that this lawsuit involved an interest in land. Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶¶ 23-25, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68. Accordingly, NMSA 1978, § 38-3-RD) (1988), which controls venue for causes of action that have land or an interest in land as their object, did not apply. Id. ¶26. With regard to the Defendants with statutory agents in Santa Fe County, the Court held that venue was proper in any New Mexico county, including Santa Fe County, pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 38-3~l(F) (1988). Id. ¶ 31. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in dismissing the action against these Defendants. Id. With regard to the other Defendants, however, the Court held that venue was not proper in Santa Fe County, and therefore affirmed the trial court’s dismissal as to these Defendants. We granted certiorari in order to review the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether venue is proper in Santa Fe County.
{5} The motion to dismiss for improper venue raises a question of law which we review de novo. Williams v. Bd. of County Commits, 1998-NMCA-090, ¶28, 125 N.M. 445, 963 P.2d 522. In the present case, we review de novo whether venue is proper in Santa Fe County. Whether a civil action may be filed in a particular county depends on a series of considerations enumerated by NMSA 1978, § 38-3-1 (1988). Among other provisions, Section 38-3-KD) mandates that if the object of an action is land or an interest in land, then the action must be commenced in the county where the land is situated. In contrast, proper venue for a transitory action depends on the residence of the defendant. If the defendant is a New Mexico resident, then Section 38-3-1(A) requires that the lawsuit be filed in any county in which a party resides, where the contract or cause of action originated, or in any county where the defendant may be found within the judicial district where the defendant resides.
{6} If the defendant to a transitory action is a foreign corporation, then under Section 38-3-l(F) one final distinction applies. If the foreign corporation defendant does not have a registered statutory agent in New Mexico, then venue is proper in any New Mexico county. However, if the foreign corporation defendant “maintain[s] a statutory agent in this state upon whom service of process may be had” then venue is proper only in the county where a plaintiff resides, in the county where a contract at issue was made or is to be performed, in the county where the cause of action originated or indebtedness was incurred, or lastly, in the county where the statutory agent designated by the foreign corporation resides. See § 38-3-KF).
B. Whether the object of this action is “lands or an interest in lands” under Section 38-3-l(D).
{7} Under Section 38-3-l(D)(l), “[wjhen lands or any interest in lands are the object of any suit in whole or in part, the suit shall be brought in the county where the land or any portion of the land is situate.” Thus, if the object of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is lands or an interest in lands, then venue will only be proper in Lea County. If, on the other hand, the action is transitory, then Plaintiffs are free to choose venue in accordance with the remaining provisions of Section 38-3-1.
{8} Claims for damages do not have lands or interest in lands as their object. Accordingly, a lawsuit comprised exclusively of claims for damages need not be brought in the county where the land is situated. Team Bank v. Meridian Oil Inc., 118 N.M. 147, 149, 879 P.2d 779, 781 (1994); Jemez Land Co. v. Garcia, 15 N.M. 316, 321, 107 P. 683, 685 (1910), overruled on other grounds by Kalosha v. Novick, 84 N.M. 502, 504, 505 P.2d 845, 847 (1973). In the present case, the Court of Appeals determined that Plaintiffs were requesting injunctive relief as well as damages. Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶ 2, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68 (“Plaintiffs also requested injunctive relief, apparently to restrain Defendants from further tortious acts.”). Accordingly, the Court questioned whether Plaintiffs’ “request for injunctive relief converts this case into an action involving an interest in land.” Id. ¶23. The Court reasoned that Jemez Land Co. created a dichotomy between actions to redress tortious injury to real property and actions to adjudicate title to real property. Id. Because the present action fell into the former category, the Court of Appeals concluded the object of the lawsuit was not lands or interest in lands within the meaning of Section 38-3-1(D)(1). Id.
{9} We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that Plaintiffs made a request for injunctive relief. The conclusion of Plaintiffs’ complaint requests that the trial court grant judgment against Defendants “for the injunctive relief set forth above.” However, careful review of the complaint reveals that Plaintiffs never set forth a request for any injunctive relief. Indeed, even if the trial court had granted all forms of relief requested by Plaintiffs in the complaint, no injunction would have ensued. Because this case did not involve an actual claim for injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals’ analysis of whether injunctions constitute an interest in land was advisory, and it is hereby overruled. Although we disagree with the reasoning employed in the Court of Appeals’ decision, the result that it reached was correct. Because the sole object of this suit is damages, Section 38-3-1 (D)(1) does not apply to this action. Jemez Land Co. 15 N.M. at 321, 107 P. at 685. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that “Plaintiffs were not required by Section 38-3-l(D)(l) to file their action in Lea County.” Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶ 26, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68.
{10} The dissent suggests that Plaintiffs’ complaint made reference to a continuing nuisance and therefore adequately invoked injunctive relief. Dissent ¶ 37. With regard to the continuing nuisance claim, Plaintiffs’ complaint only “seek[s] a recovery of the reasonable and necessary costs associated with restoring those portions of the Ranch that remain contaminated by the Defendants’ operation, to their condition prior to that contamination occurring.” Even though the complaint makes reference to a continuing nuisance, Plaintiffs’ request for relief is clearly for monetary, not injunctive, relief. The dissent also argues that the trial court may impose injunctive relief for a continuing nuisance and therefore, for purposes of venue, Plaintiffs’ continuing nuisance claim should not be restricted to a claim for monetary relief and should be “construed as implicating equitable relief in the form of abatement or injunction.” Dissent ¶ 40. However, even if the trial court, in its discretion, decided to award injunctive relief sua sponte, this does not change “the object of [the] suit.” Consequently, “the object of [the] suit” continues to be one for damages and therefore venue in the present case is not determined by Section 38-3-l(D)(l).
C. Whether the county in which a foreign corporation’s non-resident statutory agent maintains an office for receiving service of process provides proper venue under Section 38-3-1(F).
{11} Under Section 38-3-1, when subsection (D) does not apply, proper venue depends on whether the defendant is a resident of New Mexico. Section 38-3-l(F) allows a plaintiff to sue a foreign corporation defendant who is admitted to do business and who maintains a statutory agent in the county where the statutory agent resides. In this case, Plaintiffs are suing both resident and foreign Defendants. Because Plaintiffs filed suit in Santa Fe County pursuant to their interpretation of the venue rules pertaining to foreign corporations, we begin by addressing venue as it relates to these foreign corporations. The statutory agents serving the foreign corporation Defendants, namely CT Corporation System (“CT”) and Prentice Hall Corporation System (“Prentice Hall”), are located in Santa Fe and are themselves foreign corporations. We now address whether the presence of these statutory agents in Santa Fe is sufficient to make Santa Fe the proper venue.
1. The Court of Appeals’ Opinion
{12} In addressing this issue, the Court of Appeals relied on Aetna Finance Co. v. Gutierrez, 96 N.M. 538, 540-41, 632 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (1981), which held that “foreign corporations are considered nonresidents of this state for the purpose of venue.” Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶29, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68. Based on this understanding of residence, the Court interpreted the Legislature’s failure to “contemplate the appointment of a foreign corporation as a statutory agent when it enacted Section 38-3-1(F)” as intending to preclude non-residents from serving as statutory agents for venue purposes. Id. Accordingly, the Court held that “a foreign corporation must appoint a domestic corporation or an individual actually residing in New Mexico in order to receive the benefit of the special venue provisions of Section 38-3-l(F).” Id. ¶31. We disagree.
{13} The Court of Appeals failed to properly weigh NMSA 1978, § 53-17-9 (1967), which was enacted after Section 38-3-1, and which explicitly authorizes the appointment of a non-resident statutory agent. We presume that when the Legislature decided to unconditionally allow non-residents to serve as statutory agents, it was aware of existing law. See State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep’t (In re Kira M.), 118 N.M. 563, 569, 883 P.2d 149, 155 (1994). Consequently, in light of the enactment of Section 53-17-9, foreign corporations that have appointed a foreign corporation as their statutory agent, may “receive the benefit of the special venue provisions of Section 38-3-l(F).” Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶ 31, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68.
2. Whether CT and Prentice Hall “reside” in Santa Fe County for purposes of venue
{14} Section 38-3-l(F) provides that:
suits against foreign corporations admitted to do business and which designate and maintain a statutory agent in this state upon whom senice of process may be had shall only be brought [(1)] in the county where the plaintiff, or any one of them in case there is more than one, resides or [(2)] in the county where the contract sued on was made or is to be performed or [(3)] where the cause of action originated or indebtedness sued on was incurred or [ (4) ] in the county where the statutory agent designated by the foreign corporation resides.
(Emphasis added.) In the present case, the parties do not dispute that the Defendants in question are foreign corporations admitted to do business in New Mexico. The issue at bar- is whether Plaintiffs may place venue in Santa Fe County where the statutory agents designated by the foreign corporations reside, when the statutory agents themselves are non-residents.
? Resolution of this issue requires us to define “resides” as it applies to statutory agents who are foreign corporations under Section 38-3-l(F). Using our definition of “non-resident” from Aetna Finance Co., Defendants claim that the statutory agents in the present case do not reside in New Mexico and that venue cannot, therefore, be placed where the statutory agent resides. Defendants argue that venue is proper only in Lea County where Plaintiffs reside and where the cause of action originated. Even though Aetna Finance Co. contains language in support of Defendants’ position, it is distinguishable from the present ease. In that case, the foreign corporation was suing a domestic defendant. The plaintiff corporation had offices in Albuquerque and sought venue in Bernalillo County under Section 38-3-l(A). This Court looked to subsection (F) to determine whether Aetna “reside[d]” in Bernalillo County for venue purposes. We ultimately held that it did not. In so holding, this Court employed broad language that we today limit. In the present dispute, the foreign corporations are defendants and we therefore look not to subsection (A), but rather to subsection (F), to determine what venue is proper. To the extent that Aetna Finance Co. can be read to hold that foreign corporations can never “reside” in New Mexico for venue purposes under subsection (F), it is overruled.
{16} We next look to the language of Section 38-3-KF) to determine if CT and Prentice Hall “reside” in Santa Fe for purposes of venue. The meaning of language used in a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995). We give such language its ordinary and plain meaning unless the legislature indicates a different interpretation is necessary. Draper v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 116 N.M. 775, 777, 867 P.2d 1157, 1159 (1994). According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “[r]esidence usu[ally] just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place [and a] person thus may have more than one residence at a time----” Black’s Law Dictionary 1310 (7th ed.1999). Under this plain meaning of residence, CT and Prentice Hall “reside” in New Mexico by virtue of the offices they maintain in Santa Fe.
{17} We believe that the plain meaning of the term “resides” best effectuates the Legislature’s intent in enacting Section 38-3-1. When the Legislature determined in 1955 that “suits against foreign corporations admitted to do business and which designate and maintain a statutory agent in this state upon whom service of process may be had shall only be brought ... in the county where the statutory agent designated by the foreign corporation resides,” only resident New Mexicans could serve as statutory agents. Section 38-3-l(F); Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶ 29, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68. Because all statutory agents resided in New Mexico, the term “resides” could have only been intended to locate the statutory agent and not to distinguish between resident statutory agents and non-resident statutory agents.
{18} Our rules of venue represent the Legislature’s intent to ensure that the location of a trial is convenient for both parties to a lawsuit:
Venue relates to the convenience of litigants, and reflect[s] equity or expediency in resolving disparate interests of parties to a lawsuit in the place of trial[J In transitory actions the venue rules reflect an attempt to balance the common-law right of a defendant to be sued in his [or her] most convenient forum (usually the county of his [or her] residence) with the right of the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to sue.
Team Bank, 118 N.M. at 150, 879 P.2d at 782 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, when a defendant resides in New Mexico, the plaintiffs right to choose the forum in which to sue is limited by Section 38-3-l(A) to those forums that the Legislature has determined will not unduly inconvenience the defendant. When the defendant does not reside in New Mexico and does not maintain a statutory agent in the state, however, Section 38-3-l(F) allows the plaintiff to place venue in any New Mexico county, presumably because all New Mexico counties will be inconvenient to a non-resident. We believe the Legislature passed Section 38-3-l(F) in order to “give foreign corporations that are admitted to do business and that have designated and maintained a statutory agent in this state the same ‘weight’ in the venue balance as resident defendants.” Team Bank, 118 N.M. at 150, 879 P.2d at 782. We believe this intent is unaffected by the residence of a statutory agent.
{19} In the context of a statutory agent, we hold that the term “resides” has a plain meaning which we believe the Legislature intended. A statutory agent who maintains an office in New Mexico for the purpose of receiving service of process “resides” in New Mexico regardless of whether it is a foreign corporation or a New Mexico resident. Accordingly, in the present case, venue was proper in Santa Fe County for the Defendants who maintained CT and Prentice Hall as their statutory agents in Santa Fe County.1
{20} Section 38-3-l(F) is silent on the issue of whether a properly joined defendant is subject to venue in the same county in which another defendant is subject to venue by virtue of the residence of a statutory agent. However, with regard to transitory actions, Section 38-3-l(A) demands that venue be brought, among other alternatives, “in the county where either the plaintiff or defendant, or any one of them in case there is more than one of either, resides.” See Teaver v. Miller, 53 N.M. 345, 349, 208 P.2d 156, 160 (1949) (“[T]he residence of one of the defendants determines the venue of the action against all.”). We can discern no basis for applying a separate rule to multiple defendants when venue is based on the residence of a statutory agent. The Court of Appeals’ opinion determined that Teaver was inapplicable “because under these facts no party resides in Santa Fe County.” Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶ 33, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68. Because we conclude that when a foreign corporation appoints a foreign corporation statutory agent the residency requirement in Section 38-3-l(F) is met, Teaver is applicable. We therefore hold that venue in Santa Fe County is proper with regard to all Defendants still involved in the present case.2
III. CONCLUSION
{21} The Court of Appeals’ determination that the object of this lawsuit is not land or an interest in lands is affirmed. We also affirm, but for different reasons, the Court of Appeals’ holding that venue in Santa Fe County was proper against Amerada Hess Corp.; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.; Dynegy Corp.; Concho Resources, Inc.; Arch Petroleum, Inc.; and Rice Engineering, Inc. We hold that venue is proper in Santa Fe County for all Defendants still involved in this lawsuit.
{22} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: PAMELA B. MINZNER and PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justices. PATRICIO M. SERNA, Chief Justice (dissenting) JOSEPH F. BACA, Justice (dissenting). This does not prevent a foreign corporation from appointing a statutory agent in any other county in this state and making venue proper in that county.
. Because the trial court dismissed all Defendants from the case for improper venue and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Rhombus Energy Co.; Rhombus Operating Co., Ltd.; and Primero Operating Co., Ltd., these Defendants remain dismissed from the case since Plaintiffs did not appeal this issue.