concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority correctly concludes that, under SCR 250, the imprecise language of the State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty fails to clearly explain how the facts alleged support the aggravating circumstance defined by NRS 200.033(6), i.e., that “[t]he murder was committed by a person, for himself or another, to receive money or any other thing of monetary value.” I further concur with the majority that the State should be allowed to amend the notice of intent to remedy this deficiency. However, I would hold that the crime of solicitation to commit murder necessarily involves the communication of a “threat of violence to the person of another.”11 do not read NRS 200.033(2)(b) to require that such a “threat of violence” must be perceived by the intended victim. Rather, I understand the aggravating circumstance to encompass a threat of violence that is communicated to another regardless of whether the threatened victim is aware of it. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the aggravating circumstances alleged against petitioner under NRS 200.033(2)(b) must be stricken.
NRS 200.033(2)(b).