{ 1 In this case, we are asked to determine whether Rodney Hans Holm was appropriately convicted for bigamy and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. Specifically, we are asked to determine whether Holm's be-bavior violated Utah's bigamy statute and whether that statute is constitutional. We are also asked to decide whether the trial court adequately established its criminal jurisdiction over the unlawful sexual conduct charges and whether the unlawful sexual conduct statute is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. We conclude that Holm's behavior falls squarely within the realm of behavior criminalized by our State's bigamy statute and that the protections enshrined in the federal constitution, as well as our state constitution, guaranteeing the free exercise of religion and conscience, due process, and freedom of association do not shield Holm's polygamous practices from state prosecution. We further conclude that the trial court appropriately exercised jurisdiction over Holm's unlawful sexual conduct charges and that the unlawful sexual conduct statute is constitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's conviction under Utah Code section 76-7-101 for bigamy and under Utah Code section 76-5-401.2 for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.
BACKGROUND
T2 Holm was legally married to Suzie Stubbs in 1986. Subsequent to this marriage, Holim, a member of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the "FLDS Church"),1 participated in a religious marriage ceremony with Wendy Holm. Then, when Rodney Holm was thirty-two, he participated in another religious marriage ceremony with then-sixteen-year-old Ruth Stubbs, Suzie Stubbs's sister. After the ceremony, Ruth moved into Holm's house, where her sister Suzie Stubbs, Wendy Holm, and their children also resided. By the time Ruth turned eighteen, she had conceived two children with Holm, the second of which was born approximately three months after her eighteenth birthday.
*731T3 Holm was subsequently arrested in Utah and charged with three counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old,2 in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-401.2 (2008),3 and one count of bigamy, in violation of Utah Code section 76-7-101 (2003)4-all third degree felonies. The trial court denied both Hoim's pretrial motion for a continuance to prepare a defense based on Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2008), which was issued a little over a month before trial, and Holm's motion to dismiss based on statutory grounds and the constitutional invalidity of the bigamy and unlawful sexual conduct statutes.
T4 At trial, Ruth Stubbs testified that although she knew that the marriage was not a legal civil marriage under the law, she believed that she was married. Stubbs's testimony included a description of the ceremony she had participated in with Holm. Stubbs testified that, at the ceremony, she had answered "I do" to the following question:
Do you, Sister [Stubbs], take Brother [Holm] by the right hand, and give yourself to him to be his lawful and wedded wife for time and all eternity, with a covenant and promise on your part, that you will fulfil all the laws, rites and ordinances pertaining to this holy bond of matrimony in the new and everlasting covenant, doing this in the presence of God, angels, and these witnesses, of your own free will and choice?
Stubbs testified that she had worn a white dress, which she considered a wedding dress; that she and Holm exchanged vows; that Warren Jeffs, a religious leader in the FLDS religion, conducted the ceremony; that other church members and members of Holm's family attended the ceremony; and that photographs were taken of Holm, Stubbs, and their guests who attended the ceremony.
1 5 Stubbs also testified about her relationship with Holm after the ceremony. She testified that she had moved in with Holm; that Holm had provided, at least in part, for Stubbs and their children; and that she and Holim had "regularly" engaged in sexual intercourse at the house in Hilldale, Utah. Evidence was also introduced at trial that Holm and Stubbs "regarded each other as husband and wife."
1 6 At the close of the State's case in chief, Holm moved for reconsideration of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the jury should not be allowed to consider whether he violated the bigamy statute by purporting to marry Stubbs. Specifically, he argued that the "purporting to marry" prong of the bigamy statute applied only to legally recognized marriages. The court again rejected his motion.
T7 During the course of the trial, the court denied Holm's request to present rebuttal evidence in the form of expert testimony concerning FLDS practice and beliefs. This evidence would have included Kenneth D. Driggs's testimony about the deeply held religious belief among FLDS adherents that this type of marriage is "necessary to their personal salvation," the history of polygamy, and the social health of polygamous communities.
T8 The jury returned a guilty verdiet on each of the charges, indicating on a special verdict form that Holm was guilty of bigamy both because he "purported to marry Ruth *732Stubbs" and because he had "cohabited with Ruth Stubbs." The trial court sentenced Holm to up to five years in state prison on each conviction, to be served concurrently, and imposed a $3,000 fine. Both the prison time and the fine were suspended in exchange for three years on probation, one year in the county jail with work release, and two hundred hours of community service.
T9 Holm appealed his conviction on all charges. The Utah Court of Appeals, sua sponte, certified the appeal for transfer to this court pursuant to rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code seetion 78-2-2(8)(b) (2002).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
110 On appeal, Holm raises several issues requiring us to engage in statutory and constitutional interpretation, to examine whether the trial court had jurisdiction, and to determine whether the trial court properly excluded expert testimony. Except for the exclusion of evidence issue, each of these issues involves questions of law, which we review for correctness. See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 42, 99 P.3d 820 (constitutional challenges to statutes); State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 8, 84 P.3d 1171 (statutory interpretation); State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Utah 1995) (trial court jurisdiction). As to the evidence issue, we review a trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ¶ 66, 44 P.3d 794.
ANALYSIS
{11 On appeal Holm raises arguments against both his conviction for bigamy and his conviction for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. We discuss Holm's arguments for reversing each of his convictions separately below.
I. WE AFFIRM HOLM'S CONVICTION FOR BIGAMY
112 Holm was convicted pursuant to Utah's bigamy statute, which provides that "[a] person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101 (2008). The jury weighing the case against Holm indicated on a special verdict form its conclusion that Holim had both "purported to marry another person" and "cohabited with another person" knowing that he already had a wife.
13 Due to the nature of the special verdict form, on appeal Holm must convinee this court that both prongs of Utah's bigamy statute have been inappropriately applied in his case. Holim raises essentially four arguments to support his contention that neither prong applies. First, Holm argues that his conviction under the "purports to marry" prong of the bigamy statute was improper as a matter of statutory interpretation. Specifically, Holm argues that he did not "purport to marry" Ruth Stubbs, as that phrase is used in the bigamy statute, because the word "marry" in subsection 76-7-101(1) refers only to legal marriage and neither Holm nor Stubbs contemplated that the religious ceremony solemnizing their relationship would entitle them to any of the legal benefits attendant to state-sanctioned matrimony. Second, Holm argues that his conviction under the bigamy statute was unconstitutional as applied in this case because it unduly infringes upon his right to practice his religion, as guaranteed by our state constitution. Third, Holm argues that his conviction under the bigamy statute was unconstitutional under the federal constitution. Fourth, Holm argues that the trial court improperly exelud-ed expert testimony that was offered to rebut the State's characterization of polygamous culture.
T14 We reject each of these arguments. The "purports to marry" language contained in the bigamy statute is not confined to legal marriage and is, in fact, broad enough to cover the type of religious solemnization engaged in by Holm and Stubbs. We further conclude that the ability to engage in polygamous behavior is expressly excepted from the religious protections afforded by our state constitution. We are also unpersuaded that the federal constitution mandates that the states of this union tolerate polygamous *733behavior in the name of substantive due process or freedom of association. Additionally, in the face of controlling United States Supreme Court authority, we are constrained to conclude that the federal constitution does not protect Holm from bigamy prosecution on religious freedom grounds. Finally, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Holm's proffered expert testimony because the testimony was not directly related to the questions before the jury and may have confused or distracted the jury.
1 15 We will first address whether Holm's behavior is within the reach of our State's bigamy statute. We will then address Holm's arguments attacking the validity of the bigamy statute on both state and federal constitutional grounds. Finally, we will address Holm's arguments regarding the trial court's exclusion of his proffered expert testimony.
A. The "Purports to Marry" Provision of Utah's Bigamy Statute Is Applicable to FHoim's Solemmization of His Relationship with Stubbs
116 To determine whether the "purports to marry" provision of Utah's bigamy statute is properly applicable to Holm, we must interpret that provision within its context in the Utah Code. "[OJur primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Foutz v. City of S. Jordan, 2004 UT 75, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). "We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 85, ¶ 9, 977 P.2d 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, "[wle read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2008 UT 12, ¶ 17, 66 P.3d 592. Only when we find that a statute is ambiguous do we look to other interpretive tools such as legislative history. See Adams v. Swensen, 2005 UT 8, ¶ 8, 108 P.3d 725.
17 The "purports to marry" provision of Utah's bigamy statute declares that "[a] person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101(1). Both parties to this appeal agree that "purport" means "Itlo profess or claim falsely; to seem to be." Black's Law Dictionary 1250 (Tth ed.1999).
T18 The definition of "marry," however, is disputed. The State argues that "marry" should not be construed as limited to legally recognized marriages. Holm argues that the word "marry" in subsection one refers only to a legally recognized marriage and that, therefore, there is no violation of the "purports to marry" provision unless an individual purports to enter into a legally valid marriage. We hold that the term "marry," as used in the bigamy statute, includes both legally recognized marriages and those that are not state-sanctioned because such a definition is supported by the plain meaning of the term, the language of the bigamy statute and the Utah Code, and the legislative history and purpose of the bigamy statute.
119 First, the common usage of "marriage" supports a broader definition of that term than that asserted by Holm. The dictionary defines "marry" as "to join in marriage according to law or custom," or "to unite in close and [usually] permanent relation." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 761 (lith ed.20083) (emphasis added). Holm argues that such a definition of "marriage" is unsupportable and asks us to read the term "legally" into the bigamy statute. To support his argument that "marry" should be construed narrowly in this fashion, Holm relies on Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "marriage" as "[tlhe legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife." Black's Low Dictionary 986. While Black's Law Dictionary does offer this as one definition of marriage, a review of the dictionary's various entries and editions5 makes clear *734that the dictionary itself does not confine its use of the term "marriage" to legally recognized unions. Indeed, the definitions Black's Low Dictionary provides for terms such as "plural marriage," "bigamy," and "polygamy" support a construction of the term "marry" that includes marriage not sanctioned by the state, as is true in common parlance. For example, "plural marriage" is defined as "(al marriage in which one spouse is already married to someone else; a bigamous or polygamous union," id. at 987 (emphasis added); "bigamy" is defined as "[the act of marrying one person while legally married to another," id. at 154 (emphasis added); and "polygamy" is "[the state of being simultaneously married to more than one spouse; multiple marriages," id. at 1180 (emphasis added). If we were to adopt Holm's construction of "marry," these definitions would be nonsensical, as one could not "marry" another while legally married.
{20 Furthermore, Black's Law Dictionary contains several definitions of different types of marriage that are, by definition, not legally recognized. For example, "putative marriage" is "marriage in which husband and wife believe in good faith that they are married, but for some technical reason are not formally married (as when the ceremonial official was not authorized to perform a marriage)"; "clandestine marriage" is "marriage that rests merely on the agreement of the parties" or "marriage entered into in a secret way, as one solemnized by an unauthorized person or without all required formalities"; and "void marriage" is "marriage that is invalid from its inception, that cannot be made valid, and that can be terminated by either party without obtaining a divorce or annulment." Id. at 986-87 (emphases added).
121 Moreover, the Black's Low Dictionary definition of the term "marriage," una dorned by modifiers, states that "(allthough the common law regarded marriage as a civil contract, it is more properly the civil status or relationship existing between a man and a woman who agree to and do live together as spouses." Id. at 986. Thus, the plain meaning of the term "marry," as it is used in the bigamy statute, supports our conclusion that it encompasses both marriages that are legally recognized and those that are not.
( 22 Second, when we look, as we must, at the term "marry" in the context of the bigamy statute, as well as statutes in the same chapter and related chapters of the Utah Code, it is clear that the Legislature intended "marry" to be construed to include marriages that are not state-sanctioned. Most significantly, the text of the bigamy statute supports a more expansive definition of "bigamy" than that asserted by Holm.6 Specifi*735cally, the bigamy statute does not require a party to enter into a second marriage (however defined) to run afoul of the statute; cohabitation alone would constitute bigamy pursuant to the statute's terms. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101(1) ("A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person ... with another person."). cohabits
1 23 Also, looking at related statutes in the Utah Code, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend to limit "marriage," as it is used throughout the Utah Code, to legally recognized marriages. By expressly recognizing unsolemnized marriages and allowing for a judicial determination to establish a legal marriage at some point prior to the request for a judicial decree, the Legislature has acknowledged that the attainment of a marriage license from the State is not determinative of whether a marriage exists. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp.2004); Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 798 (Utah 1994) ("[The judicial decree] merely recognizes that a woman and a man have by their prior consent and conduct entered into a marital relationship, although it was not theretofore formally solemnized or otherwise legally recognized."). In other words, the Utah Code contemplates that there will be "marital relationships" or "marriages" that are not legally recognized from inception, but which the State has the ability to legally recognize, even if the parties to that relationship do not desire such recognition. See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 141 8-59, 99 P.3d 820 (rejecting a convicted polygamist's argument that the State was foreclosed from establishing a legally recognized marriage pursuant to the unsolemnized marriage statute to support its bigamy prosecution). The Utah Code also recognizes that a marriage may be solemnized even though the marriage is illegal. Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-15 (1998) (penalizing anyone who "knowingly ... solemnizes a marriage ... prohibited by law" (emphasis added)).
$124 Holm contends that the term "marry" should be given the same breadth of meaning wherever it appears in the Utah Code. Accordingly, Holm argues that the term "marry" must be limited to legally recognized marriages because, if a broader definition is applied here, we would have to construe "marry" to encompass informal so-lemnizations in other sections of the bigamy statute specifically and the Utah Code generally. Holm bases this argument on subsection three of the bigamy statute, which essentially creates a mistake-of-fact defense for a bigamy defendant. Subsection three provides that "Tift shall be a defense to bigamy that the accused reasonably believed he and the other person were legally eligible to remarry." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101(8). Holm argues that the term "remarry" in subsection three clearly refers to a legal marriage and that the term "marry" in subsection one should carry the same meaning. See Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 74 Utah 108, 277 P. 206, 206-11 (1929) ("The same meaning will be given to a word or phrase used in different parts of a statute.").
1125 We are not persuaded that the term "remarry," as used in subsection three, is so clearly limited to legally recognized marriage. Consequently, we are not convinced that a broader interpretation of "marry" as used in subsection one is inconsistent with other uses of that term in the bigamy statute. Rather, in the absence of language limiting the definition of the term, it is appropriate to give the term chosen by the Legislature its full force, applying it to marriages recognized both by law and by custom. Conceived in this fashion, the defense offered by subsection three merely excuses bigamous marriages commenced with a reasonable belief that initiating the marital relationship would not run afoul of this State's bigamy law.
126 Third, although we need not look at other interpretive tools when the meaning of the statute is plain, our construction of "marry" is supported by the legislative history and purpose of the bigamy statute. As will be discussed more fully below, see infra 1T 40-48, the well-documented legislative history of this State's attempts to prevent the formation of polygamous unions supports our conclusion that the bigamy statute was intended to criminalize both attempts to gain *736legal recognition of duplicative marital relationships and attempts to form duplicative marital relationships that are not legally recognized. This court has previously recognized that the legislative purpose of the bigamy statute was to prevent "all the indicia of marriage repeated more than onee." (Green, 2004 UT 76, 147, 99 P.3d 820. In Green, we allowed an unsolemnized marriage to serve as a predicate marriage for purposes of a bigamy prosecution. See id. 18. If an unlicensed, unsolemnized union can serve as the predicate marriage for a bigamy prosecution, we are constrained to conclude that an unlicensed, solemnized marriage can serve as a subsequent marriage that violates the bigamy statute.
127 The dissent nevertheless adopts Holm's position that "purports to marry" means "purports to legally marry," "claims to enter a legally recognized marriage," or "claims benefits from the State based upon married status." In addition to the reasons proffered by Holm, the dissent seeks to support its reading of the statute by referring to our case law, which at times has used the term "purported marriage" to refer to a marriage that is presented as legally valid and recognized, when in reality the marriage enjoys no legal recognition. See infro 1138 n. 4 (citing cases). These cases do not, however, delineate the seope of the term "purports to marry" as the term is used in the bigamy statute, but instead involve situations in which the proper resolutions of various claims are dependent in some fashion on the existence, or absence, of a legally recognized marriage. It is true that, in assessing such claims, we have referred to the claim that a valid, legally recognized marriage exists as claim of a "purported marriage." It does not, however, necessarily follow that the phrase "purports to marry," as used in the bigamy statute, is similarly confined to claims that a legally valid and recognized marriage has been performed. Simply because one may also purport to enter into legally recognized marriage does not foreclose the possibility that one may purport to marry without claiming any legal recognition of the marital relationship.
128 In sum, we are not convinced that the plain language of the statute, which fails to adorn the term "marry" with any limiting modifiers, justifies the inference drawn by the dissent, and we decline to import such a substantive term into the language of the statute. See Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 2001 UT 29, ¶ 12, 24 P.3d 928 (stating that this court will not "infer substantive terms into the [statutory] text that are not already there" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we read the plain language of our bigamy statute as prohibiting an individual from claiming to marry a person when already married to another. Further, we conclude that the term "marry" is not confined to legally recognized marriages. In other words, one need not purport that a second marriage is entitled to legal recognition to run afoul of the "purports to marry" prong of the bigamy statute. Nowhere in subsection one is the word "marry" tied exclusively to state-sanctioned and recognized "legal" marriage.
129 Applying the definition of "marry" outlined above to the facts presented in this case, there can be no doubt that Holm purported to marry Stubbs. The undisputed facts establish that Holm stood before an official of the FLDS Church, Warren Jeffs (son of then-FLDS prophet Rulon Jeffs), with Stubbs at his side and responded affirmatively to a vow asking the following question:
Do you Brother [Holm], take Sister [Stubbs] by the right hand, and receive her unto yourself to be your lawful and wedded wife, and you to be her lawful and wedded husband, for time and all eternity, with a covenant and promise, on your part that you will fulfil all the laws, rites and ordinances pertaining to this holy bond of matrimony in the new and everlasting covenant, doing this in the presence of God, angels, and these witnesses, of your own free will and choice?
T 30 At the ceremony, Stubbs wore a white dress, which she considered a wedding dress. Throughout her testimony at the trial court, Stubbs referred to the ceremony as a marriage. As mentioned, the ceremony was officiated by a religious leader and involved *737vows typical of a traditional marriage ceremony. See Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-6(1) (Supp.2004) (stating that religious officials who are older than eighteen and "in regular communion with any religious society" are empowered to solemnize a marriage). In short, the ceremony in which Holm and Stubbs participated appeared, in every material respect, indistinguishable from a marriage ceremony to which this State grants legal recognition on a daily basis.
1 31 At trial, Stubbs testified that following the ceremony she considered herself married. The facts show that Stubbs lived in a house with Holm, that Holm and Stubbs considered themselves husband and wife, and that Holm and Stubbs regularly engaged in sexual intercourse. Although no one of these factors is itself indicative of marriage, looking at the cumulative effect of the factors present in this case it is clear that the relationship formed by Holm and Stubbs was a marriage, as that term is used in the bigamy statute.
132 In rejecting the notion that Holm violated the "purports to marry" provision of the bigamy statute, the dissent assigns central importance, in fact almost exclusive importance, to the lack of a marriage license recognizing the marital commitments made by Holm and Stubbs. But while a marriage license represents a contract between the State and the individuals entering into matrimony, the license itself is typically of secondary importance to the participants in a wedding ceremony. The crux of marriage in our society, perhaps especially a religious marriage, is not so much the license as the solemnization, viewed in its broadest terms as the steps, whether ritualistic or not, by which two individuals commit themselves to undertake a marital relationship. Certainly Holm, as a result of his ceremony with Stubbs, would not be entitled to any legal benefits attendant to a state-sanctioned marriage, but there is no language in the bigamy statute that implies that the presence of or desire for such benefits should be determinative of whether bigamy has been committed. Holm, by responding in the affirmative to the question placed to him by his religious leader, committed himself to undertake all the obligations of a marital relationship. The fact that the State of Utah was not invited to register or record that commitment does not change the reality that Holm and Stubbs formed a marital bond and commenced a marital relationship. The presence or absence of a state license does not alter that bond or the gravity of the commitments made by Holm and Stubbs.
1 83 Accordingly, we hold that Holm's behavior is within the ambit of our bigamy statute's "purports to marry" prong.7 Having so concluded, we now turn to Holm's arguments attacking the constitutional legitimacy of his bigamy conviction. Because this court has endorsed the primacy approach to constitutional challenges, whereby we first attempt to resolve constitutional challenges by appealing to our state constitution before turning to the federal constitution, we first analyze whether Holm's conduct is protected pursuant to the Utah Constitution. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1006 (Utah 1994) (outlining the rationale for adopting the primacy model). After addressing Holm's state constitutional claims, we will turn to Holm's contention that the bigamy statute offends the federal constitution.
B. The Utah Constitution Does Not Shield FHoim's Polygamous Behavior from State Prosecution
11 34 It is ironic indeed that Holm comes before this court arguing that the Utah Constitution, despite its express prohibition of polygamous marriage, actually provides greater protection to polygamous behavior than the federal constitution, which contains no such express prohibition. In making this argument, Holm relies on various provisions of our state constitution that protect the *738freedom of conscience and the exercise of religion, as well as provisions securing liberty interests for the people of this State. While our state constitution may well provide greater protection for the free exercise of religion in some respects than the federal constitution,8 we disagree that it does so as to polygamy.
$35 This court has "never determined whether the free exercise clause of article I, section 4 [and related clauses] of the Utah Constitution provide[ ] protection over and above that provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1249 (Utah 1998).
136 As in Jeffs, we need not address that question here because the Utah Constitution offers no protection to polygamous behavior and, in fact, shows antipathy towards it by expressly prohibiting such behavior. Specifically, article III, section 1, entitled "Religious toleration-Polygamy forbidden," states as follows: "First-Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited." Utah Const. art. III, § 1. This language, known commonly as the "irrevocable ordinance," unambiguously removes polygamy from the realm of protected free exercise of religion. In fact, we concluded as much in In re Black, 8 Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887, 905 (1955). In that case, the State was attempting to remove children from the custody and care of polygamous parents. Id. at 888. The parents argued that the judgment removing their children violated the constitutional guarantees contained in the Utah Constitution. Id. at 900. We responded that
Article III of our Constitution is a complete answer to [the parents'] contention. The specific prohibition against polygamous or plural marriage therein contained may not be impliedly annulled by any interpretation of Sections 1, 4 and 15 of Article I inconsistent therewith. The prohibition following as it does the guarantee of religious toleration prevents any conclusion that the framers of our Constitution did not intend to put a specified limitation on the language contained in Section 4, Article I of the State Constitution.
The prohibition against polygamous or plural marriages following the guarantee of religious tolerance is double emphasis that the framers of our Constitution wished to make clear that polygamy was not included within an approved mode of religious worship.
Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
T 37 The dissent dismisses In re Black as a plurality opinion, dicta, and incorrect. Infra T151 n. 12. We do not believe that In re Black can be so easily dismissed. It appears that at least three of the four justices participating in that case agreed with the analysis of the effect of article III. We confirm that analysis today.
138 In arguing that the irrevocable ordinance does not provide a constitutional basis for criminalizing polygamous marriages, Holim again argues that the term "marriage" is confined to legally recognized marriages. In analyzing the effect of the irrevocable ordinance, Holm once again makes an inferential leap that colors its interpretation. Just as Holm argues that the "purports to marry" prong of our bigamy statute limits its operation to a purported legally recognized marriage, so Holm argues that the irrevocable ordinance is merely an acknowledgment that the State of Utah is foreclosed from giving formal legal recognition to polygamous marriages.
139 The dissent agrees with Holm and further supports the argument that the irrevocable ordinance was intended to prohibit only legal recognition of polygamous marriages by contending that article I, section 29 of the Utah Constitution and its statutory counterpart, Utah Code section 30-1-4.1(1)(a), limit the definition of marriage to *739"legal unions." Article I, section 29 of the Utah Constitution provides that this State "recognize[s] as marriage only the legal union of a man and a woman." By its plain language, this section of the Utah Constitution is not a definition of marriage, but instead is a limit to the types of marriages that can be legally recognized in Utah.
$40 A review of the history of the irrevocable ordinance makes clear that its drafters did not intend so narrow a sphere of operation (merely prohibiting legal recognition of polygamous marriages) as that advanced by Holm and the dissent. In 1894, the United States Congress passed the Utah Enabling Act, granting the Territory of Utah the ability to convene a constitutional convention and to take steps toward obtaining statehood. Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107 (1894). Included within the Enabling Act was a requirement that the Utah Constitution ultimately contain an irrevocable ordinance providing, "First: That perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and that no inhabitant of said State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; Provided, That polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited." Id. § 3 (emphasis added).9 A review of the constitutional debates surrounding the adoption of the language contained in the irrevocable ordinance reveals that delegates were primarily concerned with fully complying with the requirements contained in the Utah Enabling Act. See, eg., 1 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt Lake City on the Fourth Day of March, 1895, to Adopt a Constitution for the State of Utah 806 [hereinafter Proceedings ] (comment of Mr. Eichnor) ("This is compliance with the Enabling Act, and, gentlemen, if you want our Constitution to go in the waste basket, just tamper with the requirements the Enabling Act lays down for the compact. Do not tamper with it. That is my advice.").
141 Given the framers' express intent to comply, and, indeed, their assessment of the necessity of complying with the terms of the Utah Enabling Act, their discussion at Utah's constitutional convention centered on Congress's intent in requiring Utah to include such an ordinance in its constitution. Further, the ensuing debate plainly illustrates the framers' recognition that such a requirement was aimed at accomplishing more than simply preventing the possibility of a theocratic state and that Utah was obligated to comply with the spirit, as well as the letter, of the Enabling Act. See 2 Proceedings at 1748 (comment of Mr. Varian) ("I want to remind you all that in the construction of law, civil law as well as the law of God, and religious law, that it is the letter that killeth, and the spirit giveth life.").
142 We concede that Holm puts forward one plausible interpretation of the irrevocable ordinance; namely, that the ordinance prohibits Utah's state government from legally sanctioning or recognizing polygamous marriages. We further concede that such an interpretation comports with the reality that the federal government harbored serious concerns about the possibility that the State of Utah could be ruled de facto by the LDS Church. See generally Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question 206-08 (2002) (describing a federal attempt to disrupt the influence of the LDS Church in the Territory of Utah). Though such an interpretation is plausible when one looks to the text of the *740ordinance alone, the notion that the ordinance only limits legal recognition of polygamous marriages collapses when the language is looked at in the context of the constitutional convention and in conjunction with the delegates' decision to look beyond the text to the spirit of the Utah Enabling Act. At the convention, the delegates took affirmative steps to prevent an interpretation like that advanced by the dissent from gaining traction. Specifically, the framers of our state constitution made it clear they understood that the Utah Enabling Act did not merely prevent legal recognition of polygamy but required its prohibition.
{43 The framers did this by expressly pronouncing in the Utah Constitution itself the continuing vitality of a territorial law passed in 1892, entitled "An Act to punish polygamy and other kindred offenses," insofar as that act defined and punished polygamy. Utah Const. art. XXIV, § 2. The framers thereby raised the status of the territorial law to that of a constitutional provision. The constitutional debates reveal that proponents of expressly declaring the territorial act criminalizing polygamy to be operational after statehood were primarily motivated by two concerns: (1) that revivification of the territorial law criminalizing polygamy was necessary because it was void at the time of its passage due to the fact that Congress had already "occupied the field" in relation to the criminalization of polygamy and (2) that compliance with the spirit of the Utah Enabling Act required the State to evidence its willingness and ability to curtail polygamous behavior.
1 44 As to the first concern, the delegates thought it necessary to specifically mention the law criminalizing polygamy in order to revivify that law should questions about its validity be raised. Questions about the law's validity were focused on issues of federal preemption. See 2 Proceedings at 1736 {comment of Mr. Varian) ("There was passed in 1892 by the Legislature of the Territory [an] act [that] defines and provides penalties for ... polygamy.... Now, that law I apprehend is not in force in Utah today, and the reason is that Congress entered upon that field ... and covered the whole subject matter."). Given concerns about the validity of the 1892 act, the delegates expressed the opinion that the wisest course of action would be to reanimate the law by expressly declaring its continuing effectiveness in the state constitution. See id. at 1736-37 (expressing the opinion that, to comply with the Enabling Act, the state constitution must give "the force of law" to criminal prohibitions against polygamy).
T 45 As to the second concern, the proposal to declare in the constitution that the territorial law criminalizing polygamy remained in effect was also viewed as necessary to comply with the spirit of the Utah Enabling Act. The sponsor of the proposal explained his intention in the following manner:
[While [the ordinance] is strictly in accord with the letter of the [Utah Enabling Act], it is not in accord fully with the spirit of that act, because .. . it was the intention of the people of the United States assembled in Congress that a prohibition in fact, as well as by words, should be evidenced by the organic law of this State.
2 Proceedings at 1736 (comment of Mr. Var-ian). One delegate, declaring his support for retaining the territorial law eriminalizing polygamy, argued that by retaining the territorial law, Utah could fully comply with the Enabling Act and refute the notion that the ordinance amounted to nothing more than an empty promise that the State would not grant legal recognition to or otherwise sancetion polygamous behavior. According to that delegate,
The moral effect of the whole State by its representatives in Convention, declaring that a certain thing shall be forever prohibited, of course has great weight, but there is a view that may be taken of that, which is this, that at most it is merely an inhibition upon the Legislature ever sanctioning an establishment of that kind, but it is not a law against it with penalties. In other words, it is without effect.
Id. at 1742-48 (comment of Mr. Thurman). The possibility that the ordinance might be interpreted only as a limitation preventing the State from sanctioning or legally recognizing polygamous marriages prompted the delegate to support a more affirmative ap*741proach to prohibiting polygamy. See id. at 1748 ("For the reason suggested, and by way of showing a more determined disposition upon our part to comply, not only in the letter, but in the spirit, with the demands of the Enabling Act, I shall support it.").
146 The framers of our state constitution viewed the reaffirmation of the 1892 territorial law criminalizing bigamy as directly related to the irrevocable ordinance. The relation between the two provisions is acknowledged throughout the debates on the issue, perhaps never as saliently as in the following statement:
If you are in good faith, as you say you are, it will be asked, why do you object to placing upon this statute book, the organic law of your commonwealth, the fact you do intend to prevent the crime of polygamy? What does "prohibit" mean? Does it not mean prevent? I ask my friend from Salt Lake, and colleague, more learned in philological lore than myself, whether it is one of the synonyms of prevent, and if the interpretation must not be put upon the use of that language in the act of Congress, that it means to prevent the practice of polygamy and plural marriage? How are you going to prevent it, unless you put some penal enactment into force that the courts and executive officers under your State government may be able to administer your law well in that behalf?
Id. at 1747-48 (comment of Mr. Varian). The inclusion of the provision passed by a margin of seventy-two to sixteen. Id. at 1749.
47 Although the definition of polygamy contained in the 1892 territorial act varies slightly from that articulated by the "purports to marry" prong of our contemporary bigamy statute, it is clear that our state constitution is not offended by the criminal punishment of Holm's behavior. To the contrary, the framers of our state constitution understood the irrevocable ordinance to mandate the prevention of polygamy and not to merely prohibit government recognition of polygamy.
€48 Given the above, we conclude that Holm is foreclosed by the language of the state constitution from making any attempt to appeal to that document-whether pursuant to the provisions pertaining to the freedom of conscience, individual liberty, or free exercise-to protect behavior that the constitution is specifically aimed at preventing. Having so concluded, we next take up Holm's contention that his polygamy conviction violates the federal constitution.
C. Hoim's Conviction Does Not Offend the Federal Constitution
1 49 Holm claims his conviction runs afoul of the federal constitution in several ways. Specifically, he argues (1) that his conviction was obtained in violation of the federal constitution's guarantee of the free exercise of religion; (2) that his conviction violates his liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) that his conviction raises equal protection concerns because the State targets only religiously motivated polygamists with prosecution; (4) that the bigamy statute is facially overbroad because it unduly infringes upon his right of association; and (5) that the term "marry," as used in the bigamy statute and the unlawful sexual conduct with a minor statute, is unconstitutionally vague. We address each of Holm's contentions in turn.
1. The Bigamy Statute Does Not Impermis-sibly Infringe Holm's Federal Free Exercise Right
150 Although the United States Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879), upheld the criminal prosecution of a religiously motivated polygamist as nonviolative of the Free Exercise Clause, Holm contends on appeal that his federal free exercise right is unduly infringed upon by his comyiction in this case. Holm argues that Reyna]; s is "nothing more than a hollow relic of bygone days of fear, prejudice, and Victorian morality," and that modern free exercise juris’prudence dictates that no criminal penalty can be imposed for engaging in religiously motivated polygamy. This court recently rejected an identical 'argument in State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶¶ 18-19, 99 P.3d 820.
*742[ 51 As we pointed out in Green, Reynolds, despite its age, has never been overruled by the United States Supreme Court and, in fact, has been cited by the Court with approval in several modern free exercise cases, signaling its continuing vitality. See Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 19, 99 P.3d 820 (refusing to depart from the Reynolds holding and citing cases indicating the continuing vitality of Reynolds as precedent). Moreover, even if Holm's assertion that Reynolds is antiquated beyond usefulness is accurate, our opinion in Green conducted a thorough analysis, using the most recent standards announced by the United States Supreme Court, of the claim that religiously motivated polygamy is immune from criminal sanction. Id. % 20-41. As we noted in Green, the United States Supreme Court held in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), partially superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1998, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, - U.S. --, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 168 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006), and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 804, as recognized in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 125 S.Ct. 2118, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005), that a state may, even without furthering a compelling state interest, burden an individual's right to free exercise so long as the burden is imposed by a neutral law of general applicability. Id. at 878-80, 110 S.Ct. 1595. The Court has since clarified that a law is not neutral if the intent of that law "is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation." Church of the Lulkumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 583, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1998). In Green, we concluded that Utah's bigamy statute is a neutral law of general applicability and that any infringement upon the free exercise of religion occasioned by that law's application is constitutionally permissible. 2004 UT 76, T 83, 99 P.3d 820.
[ 52 Regardless of the wisdom of the United States Supreme Court's current federal free exercise analysis, that analysis is controlling, and this court does not enjoy the freedom to tamper with or modify pronouncements by that Court. In light of those pronouncements and our own case law rejecting the notion that religiously motivated polygamy is protected by the federal Free Exercise Clause, we conclude that Holm cannot avail himself of that clause in his attempt to escape conviction. Having so concluded, we turn to Holm's claim that his conviction violates his individual liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Holm's Conviction Does Not Offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
$53 Holm argues that the State of Utah is foreclosed from criminalizing polygamous behavior because the freedom to engage in such behavior is a fundamental liberty interest that can be infringed only for compelling reasons and that the State has failed to identify a sufficiently compelling justification for its criminalization of polygamy. We disagree and conclude that there is no fundamental liberty interest to engage in the type of polygamous behavior at issue in this case.
54 In arguing that his behavior is constitutionally protected as a fundamental liberty interest, Holm relies primarily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2008). In that case, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy, concluding that private, consensual sexual behavior is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 578, 128 S.Ct. 2472. Holm argues that the liberty interest discussed in Lawrence is sufficiently broad to shield the type of behavior that he engages in from the intruding hand of the state. Holm misconstrues the breadth of the Lawrence opinion.
I 55 Despite its use of seemingly sweeping language, the holding in Lawrence is actually quite narrow.10 Specifically, the Court takes *743pains to limit the opinion's reach to decriminalizing private and intimate acts engaged in by consenting adult gays and lesbians. In fact, the Court went out of its way to exclude from protection conduct that causes "injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects." Id. at 567, 128 S.Ct. 2472. Further, after announcing its holding, the Court noted the following: "The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct...." Id. at 578, 128 8.0t. 2472.
156 In marked contrast to the situation presented to the Court in Lawrence, this case implicates the public institution of marriage, an institution the law protects, and also involves a minor. In other words, this case presents the exact conduct identified by the Supreme Court in Lawrence as outside the seope of its holding.
157 First, the behavior at issue in this case is not confined to personal decisions made about sexual activity, but rather raises important questions about the State's ability to regulate marital relationships and prevent the formation and propagation of marital forms that the citizens of the State deem harmfal.
Sexual intercourse ... is the most intimate behavior in which the citizenry engages. [Lawrence] spoke to this discreet, personal activity. Marriage, on the other hand, includes both public and private conduct. Within the privacy of the home, marriage means essentially whatever the married individuals wish it to mean. Nonetheless, marriage extends beyond the confines of the home to our society.
Joseph Bozzuti, Note, The Constitutionality of Polygamy Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a Punchline or a Prophet?, 48 Catholic Law. 409, 485 (Fall 2004).
T58 The very "concept of marriage possesses "undisputed social value.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 72, 99 P.3d 820 (Durrant, J., concurring) (quoting In re Marriage of Mehren & Dargam, 118 Cal.App.4th 1167, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 522, 528 (2004)). Utah's own constitution enshrines a commitment to prevent polygamous behavior. See Utah Const. art. III, § 1; id. art. XXIV, § 2. That commitment has undergirded this State's establishment of "a vast and convoluted network of laws ... based exclusively upon the practice of monogamy as opposed to plural marriage." Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir.1985). Our State's commitment to monogamous unions is a recognition that decisions made by individuals as to how to structure even the most personal of relationships are capable of dramatically affecting public life.
159 The dissent states quite categorically that the State of Utah has no interest in the commencement 'of an intimate personal relationship so long as the participants do not present their relationship as being state-sanctioned. On the contrary, the formation of relationships that are marital in nature is of great interest to this State, no matter what the participants in or the observers of that relationship venture to name the union. We agree with the dissent's statement that any two people may make private pledges to each other and that these relationships do not receive legal recognition unless a legal adjudication of marriage is sought.11 See infre 1145. That does not, however, prevent the legislature from having a substantial interest in criminalizing such behavior when there is an existing marriage.
*744160 As the dissent recognizes, a marriage license significantly alters the bond between two people because the State becomes a third party to the marital contract. Infra 11145. It is precisely that third-party contractual relationship that gives the State a substantial interest in prohibiting unlicensed marriages when there is an existing marriage. Without this contractual relationship, the State would be unable to enforce important marital rights and obligations. See infra 1102. In situations where there is no existing marriage, the Legislature has developed a mechanism for legally determining that a marriage did in fact exist, even where the couple did not seek legal recognition of that marriage, so that the State may enforce marital obligations such as spousal support or prevent welfare abuse. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp.2005).12 There is no such mechanism for protecting the State's interest in situations where there is an existing marriage because, under any interpretation of the bigamy statute, a party cannot seek a legal adjudication of a second marriage. Thus, the State has a substantial interest in criminalizing such an unlicensed second marriage.
161 Moreover, marital relationships serve as the building blocks of our society. The State must be able to assert some level of control over those relationships to ensure the smooth operation of laws and further the proliferation of social unions our society deems beneficial while discouraging those deemed harmful. The people of this State have declared monogamy a beneficial marital form and have also declared polygamous relationships harmful. As the Tenth Circuit stated in Potter, Utah "is justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship." 760 F.2d at 1070 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 72, 99 P.3d 820 (Durrant, J., concurring) ("[Utah] has a compelling interest in prohibiting conduct, such as the practice of polygamy, which threatens [monogamous marriage].").
T62 Further, this case features another critical distinction from Lawrence namely, the involvement of a minor. Stubbs was sixteen years old at the time of her betrothal, and evidence adduced at trial indicated that she and Holm regularly engaged in sexual activity. Further, it is not unreasonable to conclude that this case involves behavior that warrants inquiry into the possible existence of injury and the validity of consent. Seq eg., Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 40, 99 P.3d 820 ("The practice of polygamy ... often coincides with crimes targeting women and children. Crimes not unusually attendant to the practice of polygamy include incest, sexual assault, statutory rape, and failure to pay child support.") (citing Richard A. Vazquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Pub-lie Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U.J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 225, 289-45 (2001).
T63 Given the above, we conclude that Lawrence does not prevent our Legislature from prohibiting polygamous behavior. The distinction between private, intimate sexual conduct between consenting adults and the public nature of polygamists' attempts to ext-ralegally redefine the acceptable parameters of a fundamental social institution like marriage is plain. The contrast between the present case and Lawrence is even more *745dramatic when the minority status of Stubbs is considered. Given the critical differences between the two cases, and the fact that the United States Supreme Court has not extended its jurisprudence to such a degree as to protect the formation of polygamous marital arrangements, we conclude that the erimi-nalization of the behavior engaged in by Holm does not run afoul of the personal liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Having so concluded, we now address Holm's contention that our State's bigamy statute violates equal protection guarantees.
3. No Equal Protection Concerns Are Implicated by Utah's Bigamy Statute
{64 Holm claims that his conviction for bigamy is unconstitutional because the bigamy statute unfairly discriminates against individuals who are religiously compelled to practice polygamy. We disagree.
165 Generally speaking, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that similarly situated individuals be treated in the same manner. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 478 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). In Green, we held that Utah's bigamy statute is facially neutral as to religion; in other words, it delineates no distinction between classes of individuals. 2004 UT 76, 125, 99 P.3d 820. "The statute does not ... mention polygamists or their religion." Id. One could engage in polygamy out of animus for religion and still be considered in violation of the statute. Quite simply, the statute is designed to punish behavior regardless of the motivations giving rise to that behavior.
T 66 Furthermore, in Green, we concluded that the facially neutral text of the bigamy statute is not merely a smokesereen meant to disguise a discriminatory intent to prosecute only religiously motivated polygamy. Id. 128. As we noted in Green, the last reported decision concerning a bigamy prosecution prior to Green involved a man engaging in non-religiously motivated polygamy. Id. Ironically, the defendant in that case argued that the State of Utah selectively prosecutes "'only those bigamists who practice bigamy for other than religious reasons." Id. " 28 n. 10 (quoting State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct.App.1988)). Although Holm asserts that discriminatory prosecution of bigamy occurs, the record before us is devoid of any meaningful evidence supporting that assertion. In light of our holding in Green that the bigamy statute is facially neutral and that its enactment was not intended to provide a vehicle for discriminatory actions, and in the absence of evidence giving credence to Holm's assertion of unequal treatment, we decline to find Holm's conviction violative of equal protection guarantees.
T 67 Having so concluded, we now turn to Holm's assertion that the bigamy statute is unconstitutional because it unduly infringes upon his right of association.
4. Criminalization of Polygamy Does Not Unduly Infringe upon the Right of Association
$68 Holm claims that the State of Utah, by criminalizing polygamous behavior, has unjustifiably restricted his ability to teach his family the principle of plural marriage by way of example. According to Holm, such a restriction violates his right of association protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. We conclude that Holm's right of association is not so broad as to render him immune from criminal sanction for polygamous behavior.
69 As an initial matter, we point out that the freedom of association protected by the federal constitution has been conceived of as covering two separate but related rights. As the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984), there are "two distinct senses" of the freedom of association, commonly referred to as intrinsic and instrumental association.
T70 Holm argues that Utah's criminalization of polygamous behavior infringes upon his right of association in both senses. We disagree and conclude that Holm's rights to intrinsic and instrumental association have not been unduly restricted.
*746T71 First, the concept of intrinsic association encompasses certain intimate associations. Id. Under this type of association, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the freedom to form certain intimate associations is constitutionally protected, stating that "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme." Id. In this sense, the "freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty." Id. at 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244. When considering claims that a certain governmental action violates the right to intimate association, the United States Supreme Court has essentially conducted a fundamental liberty analysis to determine whether the type of behavior allegedly infringed upon is protected. See id. at 618-19, 104 S.Ct. 8244 (citing fundamental rights cases when identifying the characteristics of relationships possibly entitled to asso-clational protection}.
T72 Holm's right to intrinsic association has not been unduly infringed upon because, as discussed above, supra TY 53-68, the right to engage in polygamous behavior is not encompassed within the ambit of the individual liberty protections contained in our federal constitution. Consequently, Holm cannot argue that his associational rights prevent the State from interfering with his ability to engage in properly criminalized behavior, as the right of intimate association protects only those associations that further or otherwise support fundamental liberty interests.
173 Second, instrumental associations include those associations "indispensable" to the "preserv[ation] [of] other individual liberties" including "those activities protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244. "An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed." Id. at 622, 104 S.Ct. 8244.
T74 Holm's right to instrumental association has not been infringed. We have already concluded that Utah's prohibition on polygamous behavior does not run afoul of constitutional guarantees protecting the free exercise of religion. Further, we see nothing contained within the language of the bigamy statute that prevents Holm from associating with a group advocating the social and spiritual desirability of a polygamous lifestyle. Although it is true that the bigamy statute prevents Holm from expressing his opinions regarding polygamy by engaging in polygamous behavior, we are not convinced that the State is constrained to tolerate constitutionally prohibited behavior in order to allow individuals to express their dissatisfaction with the eriminal status of that behavior.
T 75 Accordingly, we conclude that Utah's prohibition against polygamous behavior does not violate Holm's First Amendment right to freedom of association.13 We now turn to Holm's final federal constitutional argument, that the term "marry" is unconstitutionally vague.
5. The Term "Marry" Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague
T 76 Holm argues that if the term "marry," as used in the Utah Code, is not confined to legally recognized marriage, and therefore is broad enough to encompass his behavior, then the "purports to marry" prong of the bigamy statute must be struck down as im-permissibly vague because the language of the statute fails to adequately define the type of activity that is being criminalized. Further, Holm argues that, if the term "marry" is not confined to legally recognized marriages, then he cannot be prosecuted for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor because the Utah Code immunizes "married" people from being subject to prosecution pursuant to that statute. We conclude that the lan*747guage of the bigamy statute sufficiently put Holm on notice that his plural marriage to Stubbs would run afoul of this State's erimi-nal law and that Holm cannot rely on the marriage defense in combating the charges of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.
177 To survive a void-for-vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must (1) "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement," and (2) "establish minimal guidelines" that sufficiently instruct law enforcement as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 857-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Holm has raised both facial and as-applied vagueness challenges to the bigamy statute. As we concluded in Green, however, "a court should 'examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law' when a challenged statute "implicates no constitutionally protected conduct."" 2004 UT 76, 144, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting Vill of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982)); see also Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186 ("A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed [by statute] cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."). As we have concluded that no constitutionally protected conduct has been restricted by Holm's conviction, it is inappropriate to consider Holm's facial vagueness challenge. As a result, we now consider whether, under the two-part test presented above, the bigamy statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Holm.
a The Bigamy Statute Adequately Notified Holm That His Conduct Was Illegal
T78 We first consider whether the language of our bigamy statute is so vague as to have provided inadequate notice to Holm that his marriage to Stubbs would violate our State's bigamy statute.
T79 Holm argues that he was not put on notice that his marriage to Stubbs would violate the "purports to marry" prong of the bigamy statute because an ordinary person would consider that prong to criminalize only attempts to enter into a second legally recognized marriage or assertions that a second legally recognized marriage has occurred. We disagree.
1 80 Holm onee again relies on the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "marriage" to argue that the terms "marry," "husband," and "wife" refer to situations in which an intimate union has been legally recognized. See Black's Law Dictionary 986 (7th ed.1999) (defining "marriage" as "[the legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife"); id. at 746 (defining "husband" as "a man who has a lawful wife living"). As discussed extensively above, however, Black's Law Dictionary itself bears out the broader implications of the term, supra 1119-21, and the term "marry" or "marriage" cannot be so neatly cabined to refer only to legally recognized relationships.
81 Looking only to the plain language of our bigamy statute, we are at a loss to comprehend how Holm can plausibly argue that he did not purport to marry Stubbs when he participated in a marriage ceremony with her and subsequently engaged in a relationship that mirrored that of a traditional marriage. By its terms, the bigamy statute is designed to prevent individuals from engaging in two marital relationships simultaneously. See Green, 2004 UT 76, 147, 99 P.3d 820 ("Indeed, Green's conduct produced precisely the situation that bigamy statutes aim to prevent-all the indicia of marriage repeated more than once."). We conclude that Holm was provided adequate notice by the "purports to marry" prong of our bigamy statute that his marriage to Stubbs would be considered criminal behavior. See id. 149 ("Words are symbols of communication and as such are not invested with the quality of a scientific formula. It is enough that they can be construed with reasonable certainty.").
T82 Holm argues, however, that if the "purports to marry" prong of the bigamy statute is not unconstitutionally vague, then *748the term "married," as used in section 76-5-407(1) of the Utah Code, which provides that sexual conduct with a minor is not unlawful if the participants in the conduct are "married to each other," Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-407(1) (2008), must protect him from prosecution for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.14 Essentially, Holm argues that he received inadequate notice that his purported marriage to Stubbs would not immunize him from prosecution for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor for engaging in sexual activity with Stubbs. We disagree and conclude that Holm was on notice that his marriage to Stubbs would not serve as a defense to a subsequent prosecution for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor.
{83 If Holm's understanding of section 76-5-407 is correct, the statute would not be applicable to sexual conduct occurring in unlicensed marital unions. In other words, the intent of the parties engaging in the sexual conduct could determine, without state input or control, whether their sexual conduct amounts to a criminal offense. A criminal prohibition like that established by the unlawful sexual conduct statute cannot be so easily subverted. Considering that the Utah Code prohibits and criminalizes the existence of a marriage when one marriage already exists, it is absurd to conclude that the existence of the second, prohibited marriage insulates Holm from prosecution under the unlawful sexual conduct statute. Quite simply, a person of ordinary intelligence is on notice, as a matter of common sense as much as a matter of statutory language, that criminal conduct cannot provide a defense for criminal conduct.
T 84 We therefore reject Holm's assertion that he had insufficient notice that his illegal marriage to Stubbs would not insulate him from prosecution pursuant to the unlawful sexual conduct statute.
b. The Bigamy Statute Was Not Enforced Against Holm in an Arbitrary or Discriminatory Manner
185 We next consider whether "the [bigamy statute] is sufficiently definite ... as to discourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 50, 99 P.3d 820. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, criminal statutes must "establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement" to avoid the risk of leaving the task of "lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 360, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 908 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). When confronted with an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of a criminal statute, "it is the application of the [challenged statute] to defendant[ ] by law enforcement officials we review." United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1007 (10th Cir.2001).
[ 86 Just as we determined in Green "that law enforcement officials encountering Green's cireumstances would not be left to pursue their own personal predilections in determining the applicability of Utah's bigamy statute," 2004 UT 76, 152, 99 P.3d 820, we conclude that no reasonable law enforcement official acquainted with Holm's behav-for could conclude other than that Holim had violated Utah law. As discussed above, su-pro 1129-31, the facts clearly establish that Holm purported to marry Stubbs while already having a wife.
187 Having concluded that Holm's prosecution does not run afoul of the federal constitution, we now turn to Holm's contention that the trial court erred by not allowing *749expert testimony addressing the social history and health of polygamous communities.
D. The Trial Court Properly Excluded Hoim's Proffered Expert Testimony
188 Holm contends that the trial court erred by not allowing him to put into evidence expert testimony addressing the social history and health of polygamous communities. Specifically, Holm argues that such testimony was necessary to rebut the notion that polygamous communities are rife with abuse and victimize children. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not admitting the testimony in question.
189 Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows an expert to testify to "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," if that testimony "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." A decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be reversed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 85, ¶ 66, 44 P.3d 794.
190 In this case, the trial court concluded that expert testimony relating to the history of polygamy in Utah and the social health of polygamous communities would not aid the trier of fact in determining the factual questions before it. Historical context and evidence as to the social health of polygamous communities have no bearing on the factual predicate for a bigamy or unlawful sexual conduct prosecution. 'The questions put to the jury were, in fact, only tangentially related to the broader concerns of history and social health The jury was charged with the task of determining whether Holm purported to marry or cohabited with Stubbs while knowing he already had a wife, whether Holm engaged in sexual activity with Stubbs when she was sixteen or seventeen, and whether Holm is ten years her senior. Holm's proffered testimony as to the history and social health of polygamous communities, which spans nearly thirty pages of transcript, would not have aided the jury in determining the questions before it and would more likely have distracted and confused the jury. As a result, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert testimony.
II. WE AFFIRM HOLM'S CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH A MINOR
91 Holm was convicted on two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor under Utah Code section 76-5-401.2 (2003), which makes it unlawful for individuals to engage in sexual conduct, as defined by that statute, with partners who are at least ten years their junior and who are sixteen or seventeen years old. Holm argues that his conviction under this statute must be overturned because (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction over these charges and (2) the statute as applied to Holm violates the Equal Protection Clause. We address each of these claims below.
A. The Trial Court Had Criminal Juris diction over Hoim's Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor Charge
192 Holm asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the charges of unlawful sexual conduct levied against him under section 76-5-401.2 because the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sexual conduct in question occurred in Utah. We reject this claim for the reasons discussed below.
193 The Utah Criminal Code provides that, in the absence of facts establishing attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy, a Utah trial court has criminal jurisdiction over an individual's prosecution "for an offense which he commits ... by his own conduct" only if "the offense [itself] is committed either wholly or partly within the state." - Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1)(a) (2008) (amended 2004).15 The jurisdiction determination is a matter for the trial court, not the jury, and *750the court itself must resolve any associated factual disputes by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. §§ 76-1-201(5), -501(8); State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Utah 1995). While Holm asserts that the magistrate should have made such a finding at the probable cause hearing, we again clarify that the trial court's obligation to make this determination arises after the bindover order is issued and the information is transferred to the trial court. See State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465-67 & nn. 2, 5 (Utah 1991) (explaining that the role of the magistrate in the probable cause hearing differs from that of a trial judge even where the individual playing the role of magistrate holds judicial office). The trial court may order charges dismissed "either on its own initiative or upon application of either party" if it determines that the court "is without jurisdiction." Utah R.Crim. P. 25(b)(4); see Payne, 892 P.2d at 1088.
{94 Here, Holm was bound over for trial on two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old. Holm argues that he was bound over "only on the two specific instances leading to conception" of his first two children with Ruth Stubbs. He therefore asserts that the trial court's jurisdiction depended on the State proving by a preponderance of the evidence that these "two specific instances" of sexual intercourse occurred in Utah.
T 95 In fact, however, the information specified that the two counts of unlawful sexual conduct referred respectively to conduct that had occurred "[slometime between December 13, 1998 and April, 1999," and to conduct that had occurred "[slometime between January 1, 2000 and June 1, 2000, in Washington County, ... Utah." Neither the information nor the bindover order included the conceptions of the two children as part of the charged crime. Thus, the State was not obligated to prove where the conceptions occurred-a nearly impossible task, as the trial court noted-but only that it was more likely than not that Holm had engaged in some instance of sexual conduct with Stubbs in Utah during the charged periods.
€96 The trial court appears to have understood Holm's objection on this issue as a sufficiency of the evidence argument rather than a jurisdictional argument. It denied Holm's motion to dismiss on these grounds because it could not conclude "that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty on the evidence presented." The State argues that Holm failed to clarify that he was asking the trial court to determine jurisdiction and that Holm therefore waived any jurisdictional claim. Even assuming Holm failed to raise the jurisdictional issue, however, we would not consider it waived. Criminal jurisdiction is a form of subject matter jurisdiction. See State v. Amoroso, 1999 UT App 60, ¶¶ 16-18, 975 P.2d 505; see also State v. Alagao, 77 Hawai'i 260, 888 P.2d 682, 688 (App.1994) (referring to "[JJurisdiction of the offense charged" as "subject matter jurisdiction"). Thus, a trial court or an appellate court may dismiss a criminal charge for lack of criminal jurisdiction at any time, regardless of whether the defendant raised the issue before or during trial. See Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 16, 94 P.3d 211; Payne, 892 P.2d at 1033.
T97 In this case, given our clarification above of the charges at issue, we think it clear that the trial court did have jurisdiction. Stubbs testified at trial that she lived together with Holm at their Hildale residence during the charged periods and that it was "common for [her] to have sexual intercourse [with him] at the house in Hildale, Utah." This undisputed testimony-together with the undisputed facts that Holm and Stubbs had entered into a religious union, that they considered themselves married, and that Stubbs conceived two children during the charged periods-readily leads to the conclusion that the trial court's jurisdiction was established by a preponderance of the evidence. The fact that Holm and Stubbs also traveled out of state during these periods, "sometimes as often as twice a month," according to Holm, does not change our assessment.
B. Hoim's Conviction for Unlawful Sexual Conduct Does Not Violate His Constitutional Right to Equal Protection
198 Holm's final argument regarding his unlawful sexual conduct convictions is *751that section 74-5-401.2 violates his federal right to equal protection under the law because it impermissibly distinguishes between married and unmarried individuals. We disagree for the reasons set forth below.
199 The federal Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. "Thus, state laws must treat similarly situated people alike unless a reasonable basis exists for treating them differently." State v. Lofferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 70, 20 P.3d 342 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where no suspect classification or violation of a fundamental right is involved, a difference in treatment "need be only rationally related to a valid public purpose" to withstand equal protection serutiny. Id. 171. Here, Holm does not argue that we should apply anything other than such rational basis serutiny. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 81 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (applying rational basis serutiny to a statute that treated individuals differently based on their marital status).
1 100 We accept Holm's claim that individuals who engage in sexual conduct with partners who are at least ten years their junior and who are sixteen or seventeen years old are "similarly situated" for purposes of equal protection analysis regardless of the marital relationship between those involved. In the context of a defendant convicted under a criminal law, we have determined whether individuals are "similarly situated" by referring to the conduct for which the defendant was convicted. See State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, ¶ 21, 57 P.3d 977 (holding that those convicted of felony murder were not similarly situated to those convicted of aggravated murder because the elements of the crimes were different); State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 508 (Utah 1989) (holding that all individuals who deal drugs within 1,000 feet of a school were similarly situated with regard to a statute providing enhanced penalties for those engaged in such conduct); State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 146, 147 (1969) (indicating that those found in possession of LSD were similarly situated with regard to two statutes providing different penalties for the same conduct). Utah Code section 76-5-401.2 defines the crime of unlawful sexual conduct with a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old. Section 76-5-407 exempts a married individual from operation of the unlawful sexual conduct statute where the individual engages in the proscribed conduct with his or her spouse. Id. § 76-5-407(1). Thus, a distinction based on marital relationship is made among those who engage in the conduct proscribed by section 76-5-401.2.16 We therefore proceed to the question of whether this distinction is rationally related to the purpose of section 76-5-401.2.
1101 Holm argues that the State has no rational justification for endorsing consensual sexual conduct between a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old girl and a man ten years her elder where the two have entered a legal marriage with the consent of one of the girl's parents, under Utah Code section 30-1-9 (Supp.2005), while criminalizing such conduct where the two are not legally married. He points out that if the distinction is based solely on the minor's inability to give valid consent, such a concern would not apply in this case because Stubbs's father consented to her religious union with Holm. Contrary to Holm's suggestion, we agree with the State that its interest in the distinction goes be-youd any concern with obtaining parental consent. The state-determined framework *752within which the legal status of marriage exists provides a minor with certain protections under the law that are absent where the union is not a legal marriage and thus falls outside this framework.
{102 The protections afforded persons who are married in the eyes of the law include rights, vis-a-vis their spouses, to support and maintenance, Utah Code Ann. § 30-4-1 (1998), to the fulfillment of certain procedural requirements before the union can be dissolved, id. $ 380-3-1, to a fair distribution of property and debt obligations in the event such a dissolution occurs, id. § 80-8-5 (Supp.2005), and to inherit all or a portion of the spouses' estates in the event of their death, id. §§ 75-2-102, -202 (Supp.2005). These examples represent only a few of the instances in which marital status is legally relevant. It is true that the distribution of assets within or following a marriage may to a certain extent be determined by a premarital agreement between the parties, id. § 30-8-4 (1998), and that unmarried partners may make arrangements for property distribution by private contract or will We do not believe, however, that such private arrangements significantly alter, in the former case, or are in any sense equivalent to, in the latter case, the protection provided by the network of laws surrounding the legal institution of marriage. Marriage is unique because it is buttressed by this network of laws, which in many instances overrides any attempt by a married individual to cireum-vent their requirements. Having provided such a framework of support, the State may rationally distinguish between minors who are within its protection and those who are not.
{103 While the State's power to interfere with the private relationships of consenting adults is limited, it is well established that the same is not true where one of the individuals involved in the relationship is a minor. See State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 7274, 732 (Utah 1984) (accepting the proposition "that young people should be protected from sexual exploitation by older, more experienced persons until they reach the legal age of consent and can more maturely comprehend and appreciate the consequences of their sexual acts"). We believe the State has a legitimate interest in criminalizing the conduct at issue and that the Legislature's decision to criminalize the conduct only where the parties involved are not married to each other does not render the statute invalid under equal protection principles. We therefore uphold the constitutionality of Holm's convictions under section 76-5-401.2.
CONCLUSION
[ 104 We conclude that Holm was properly convicted of both bigamy and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. As to the bigamy conviction, we conclude that Holm's behavior falls squarely within the terms of the "purports to marry" prong of the bigamy statute, that his conviction pursuant to that prong did not run afoul of any state or federal constitutional right, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony relating to the social history and health of polygamous communities.
As to the sexual-conduct-with-a-minor conviction, we conclude that Holm was properly convicted because the trial court had jurisdiction over him and because such conviction did not violate his constitutional right to equal protection. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[106 Associate Chief Justice WILKINS and Justice PARRISH concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion.. The FLDS Church is one of a number of small religious communities in Utah that continue to interpret the early doctrine of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the "LDS Church" or "Mormon Church") as supporting the practice of "plural marriage," or polygamy. Though often referred to as "fundamentalist Mormons," these groups have no connection to the LDS Church, which renounced the practice of polygamy in 1890.
. The three unlawful sexual conduct with a minor charges were based on the fact that Ruth Stubbs had conceived two children with Holm before she turned eighteen and on the allegation that sexual conduct occurred between Ruth Stubbs and Holm the night after the religious marriage ceremony. At a preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the third unlawful sexual conduct charge because there was insufficient evidence to find that any sexual conduct occurred the night after the marriage ceremony.
. Utah Code section 76-5-401.2 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A person commits unlawful sexual conduct with a minor if, under circumstances not amounting to [other, more serious sexual offenses], the actor who is ten or more years older than the minor at the time of the sexual conduct ... has sexual intercourse with a minor....
. Utah Code section 76-7-101 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person.
. We note that there are discrepancies between the definitions provided for "marriage" and "po*734lygamy" in the seventh and eighth editions of Black's Law Dictionary. In the seventh edition "marriage" is defined as "[the legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife," whereas in the eighth edition it is defined as "[the legal union of a couple as husband and wife." Compare Black's Law Dictionary 986 (7th ed.1999), with Black's Law Dictionary 986 (8th ed.2004). Also, included within the definition of "marriage" contained in the seventh edition is the statement that "(allthough the common law regarded marriage as a civil contract, it is more properly the civil status or relationship existing between a man and a woman who agree to and do live together as spouses." Such a statement is absent from the eighth edition. See Black's Law Dictionary 992 (8th ed.2004). "Polygamy" is defined in the seventh edition as "[the state of being simultaneously married to more than one spouse; multiple marriages" and in the eighth edition as "[the state or practice of having more than one spouse simultaneously, multiple marriages." Compare Black's Law Dictionary 1180 (7th ed.1999) with Black's Law Dictionary 1197 (8th ed.2004). For purposes of this opinion, all references to Black's Law Dictionary are io the seventh edition unless otherwise noted.
. The dictionary definition of "bigamy" implies that at least one legally recognized marriage exists. See Black's Law Dictionary 154 (7th ed.1999) (defining "bigamy" as "[t]he act of marrying one person while legally married to another"). As discussed above, however, this definition itself illustrates that the general conception of the term "marriage" is not confined to legally recognized marriage. Beyond dictionary definitions, it is evident that when the Territory of Tiah enacted a law criminalizing polygamy, the term "marry" was not confined to legally recognized marriage. See 1892 Utah Laws, ch. VI, § 1, at 5-6 ("Every person who has a husband or wife living, who, hereafter marries another ... is guilty of polygamy." (emphasis added)). As with the definition of bigamy found in Black's Law Dictionary, the territorial law criminalizing polygamy would be nonsensical if the term "marry" is considered limited to legally recognized marriage.
. Because we conclude that Holm's behavior violates the "purports to marry" prong of the bigamy statute, we need not reach Holm's arguments relating to the validity of the cohabitation prong. As indicated above, the jury convicted Holm under both prongs of the bigamy statute, and if, as we conclude, Holm was properly convicted pursuant to the "purports to marry" prong of the bigamy statute, it is of no consequence whether the cohabitation prong was properly applied to him.
. At least two justices on this court have expressed the view that, pursuant to the guarantees contained in our state constitution, religiously motivated conduct should not be burdened by the State unless that burden furthers a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See Green, 2004 UT 76, 170 & n. 1, 99 P.3d 820. (Durrant, J., concurring).
. Holm argues that Congress, by requiring the inclusion of the irrevocable ordinance, violated the "equal footing doctrine," which essentially mandates that all states be admitted into the Union on equal terms with other states. See generally Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565, 31 S.Ct. 688, 55 L.Ed. 853 (1911); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir.1985). In Potter, the Tenth Circuit heard and rejected an identical claim. 760 F.2d at 1068. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
"Hf the original ban on polygamy and plural marriage was invalid, the State's power to incorporate such provisions in its Constitution and its laws remained. If there was an unlawful coercion in the Enabling Act, the Supreme Court of Utah observed some time ago that there has been no attempt to change the State's laws, 'nor is such attempt likely.' "
Id. (quoting State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647, 654 (1944)). We find no fault in the reasoning of the Potter decision, and Holm has made no attempt to attack its rationale. Therefore, we conclude that Holm's equal footing claim is without merit.
. In fact, numerous litigants have relied upon the Lawrence decision to attempt to expand the sphere of behavior protected by the federal constitution. Given the quite limited nature of that *743case's holding, however, it should come as no surprise that the Lawrence opinion has been distinguished more than forty times since it was issued. See, eg., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir.2005) ("Lawrence ... did not announce ... a [constitutionally protected] fundamental right ... to engage in all manner of consensual sexual conduct, specifically in this case, incest."); United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 628-29 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that Lawrence did not protect an adult from criminal sanction for taking pornographic photos of a sixteen-year-old).
. Utah Code section 30-1-4.5 (Supp.2005) allows a court to order that an unsolemnized marriage is a legal and valid marriage so long as the relationship is between a man and a woman who are capable of giving consent and marrying, have cohabitated, have mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and obligations, and have held themselves out as husband and wife.
. See, eg., Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538 (seeking legal adjudication of marriage and a divorce to receive division of the marital assets); Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994) (seeking legal adjudication of marriage to receive automobile insurance benefits); Kelley v. Kelley, 2003 UT App 317, 79 P.3d 428 (extending alimony rights to include time of unsolemnized marriage); Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (seeking legal adjudication of marriage to receive property distribution and portion of retirement benefits); Floor Debate, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 17, 1987) (Senate recording tape no. 75) (statement of Sen. Stephen Rees) (stating that the purpose of the unsolemnized marriage statute is to "close some loopholes in welfare abuse"); id. (statement of Norman Angus, Director of State Social Services Administration) ("[A] woman with children ... may ... be living with an individual who could and in all probability does provide a substantial amount of support to that household and still we cannot consider any of the income or the resources of that individual available and therefore the woman can in {act qualify for a full public assistance grant. ...").
. Holm claims that the bigamy statute is facially unconstitutional because it is overbroad and implicates freedom of association concerns. Because we conclude that such concerns are not implicated and that Holm's conviction does not unduly infringe upon constitutional rights, we decline to address his overbreadth claim.
. In both the table of contents and the heading of his opening brief, Holm asserted that section 76-5-401.2 is "void for vagueness." But the discussion in the body of his brief regarding the vagueness of the term "marry" does not refer to section 76-5-401.2, and indeed the word "marry" does not appear in section 76-5-401.2. It is evident that Holm's vagueness discussion was meant to apply not to section 76-5-401.2 but to section 76-5-407, which indicates that the provisions in part 4 of chapter 5 of Title 76, including section 76-5-401.2, "do not apply to consensual conduct between persons married to each other." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-407(1) (2003) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we construe Holm's argument as a claim that he had insufficient notice that his conduct violated section 76-5-401.2 because the term "married" in section 76-5-407(1) is vague. See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 1 43, 99 P.3d 820 (recognizing that "[vlagueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
. We note that Utah Code section 76-1-201 was amended in 2004. The current version of the statute appears to require the defendant to file a pretrial motion in order to challenge jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(5)(b) (Supp. 2004). Unless otherwise indicated, our refer*750ences in this opinion are to the version of section 76-1-201 in effect at the time of Holm's trial.
. We note that our equal protection analysis would be no different, in practical terms, if we construed section 76-5-401.2 in combination with section 76-5-407(1) as including the lack of a marital relationship between the parties as an element of the crime rather than viewing section 76-5-407(1) as exempting those within a marital relationship from operation of section 76-5-401.2; we would still be required to assess whether the resulting definition of the class, including the lack of a marital relationship, was rationally related to the purpose of the statute. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964) ('The courts rust reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose...."); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-2, at 1439-40 (2d ed.1988) (noting that an analysis in which "persons or activities treated differently by government could for that very reason be deemed not 'the same'" would "afford[ ] virtually no scope for review").