I concur in the majority’s holdings that: (1) public school districts are not subject to lawsuits under the California False Claims Act; (2) the charter schools in this case and their operators are subject to lawsuits under the California False Claims Act and the unfair competition law; (3) plaintiffs’ claims, except for the allegation that defendant 0ne20ne Learning Foundation failed to provide the education it promised, are not barred as claims for “educational malfeasance”; and (4) plaintiffs are not required to present written claims under the Tort Claims Act before filing a qui tarn action under the California False Claims Act.
I dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that Education Code section 51747.31 applied to charter schools before its amendment in 1999, which became effective on January 1, 2000. That holding violates the rule that courts are to harmonize and maintain the integrity of statutes whenever possible, and it is contradicted by the legislative history of the 1999 amendment to section 51747.3.
Section 51747.3 was originally enacted in 1993. As here pertinent it (1) prohibited a local education agency from claiming state handing for students in independent study programs if the agency provided funds or other things of value beyond what it provided to students who attend regular classes; (2) prohibited school districts and county superintendents of schools, notwithstanding any other provision of law applicable to them, from claiming average daily attendance (for purposes of apportionment of funds) for students who were not residents of their county or a county immediately adjacent to their county; and (3) provided that its provisions could not be waived by the State Board of Education, by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, or “under any provision of Part 26.8 (commencing with Section 47600).” (Stats. 1993, ch. 66, § 32, p. 923, italics added.) Section 47600 is the first statute appearing in the Charter School Act. In 1999, the Legislature amended section 51747.3 to apply its provisions to charter schools. (Stats. 1999, ch. 162, § 1.)
Seizing on the language in the 1993 enactment of section 51747.3 prohibiting waiver of that statute’s provisions under the Charter School Act, the majority reasons that the waiver reference serves no purpose if section 51747.3 did not apply to charter schools. Perhaps so. But the majority’s construction cannot be reconciled with the plain language of other statutory provisions, as I explain.
Section 51747.3, when enacted in 1993, provided that school districts and county superintendents of schools could not claim students from outside the *1218county or adjacent counties in average daily attendance. Charter schools, however, were prohibited by subdivision (d) of former section 47605 (as added by Stats. 1992, ch. 781, § 1, pp. 3756, 3758) from excluding students on the basis of their residence even if they lived beyond those boundaries. And at that time the Charter School Act then also provided, in former section 47610 (as added by Stats. 1992, ch. 781, § 1, pp. 3756, 3760), that a charter school was exempt from all laws governing school districts except as specified in section 47611. Because section 51747.3, a law that governs school districts, was not then specified in section 47611, it had no applicability to charter schools. Thus, the majority’s construction of section 51747.3, as originally enacted in 1993, as applying to charter schools is flatly inconsistent with the language of former sections 47605, subdivision (d), 47610, and 47611. In my view, the relevant statutory provisions are best harmonized and given effect by construing section 51747.3, as originally enacted in 1993, as being inapplicable to charter schools. Such applicability occurred only on January 1, 2000, the date on which the Legislature’s 1999 amendment of section 51747.3 became effective.
The legislative history of section 51747.3 further underscores the error of the majority in construing the language of that statute’s 1993 amendment as applying to charter schools. The Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Senate Bill No. 434 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), which in 1999 proposed amending section 51747.3, specifically noted that the bill was adding charter schools to the statute: “(2) Existing law prohibits a local education agency from claiming state funding for the independent study of a pupil, whether characterized as home study or otherwise, if the agency has provided any funds or other thing of value to the pupil or his or her parent or guardian that the agency does not provide to pupils who attend regular classes or to their parents or guardians, [f] This bill would make this prohibition applicable to charter schools .... [][] (3) Existing law requires community school and independent study average daily attendance to be claimed by school districts and county superintendents of schools only for pupils who are residents of the county in which the apportionment claim is reported or pupils who are residents of the county in which the apportionment claim is reported or pupils who are residents of a county immediately adjacent to the county in which the apportionment claim is reported. [][] This bill would apply this provision also to charter schools.” (Leg. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 434 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), italics added; accord, Sen. Com. on Education, Analysis of Senate Bill No. 434 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) June 28, 1999 [“Distance learning most closely resembles independent study in other public schools, but charter schools are not specifically required to abide by the independent study requirements that apply to other public schools”].) Thus, as the Court of Appeal here concluded, the legislative history indicates that it was only in 1999 that the Legislature intended to add charter schools to section 51747.3.
*1219Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which in turn affirmed the trial court, insofar as it concluded that section 51747.3, as originally enacted in 1999, did not apply to charter schools, and that it was only when the statute’s 1999 amendment became effective on January 1, 2000, that charter schools came within the statute’s reach.
The petition of defendants and respondents for a rehearing was denied October 25, 2006, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Werdegar, J., did not participate therein.
All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise indicated.