We consider in this case the interest of the public, here represented by a major San Diego daily newspaper, in full disclosure of the records of a San Diego County Sheriff’s deputy’s administrative appeal of departmental discipline. We also consider the extent of the deputy’s right to keep his personnel matters private and out of the public eye. The majority correctly recognizes we must interpret the applicable statutory language in the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.), and its incorporation of the limitations on disclosure set forth in Penal Code section 832.7, with the goal of implementing the Legislature’s intent. Faithful adherence to the plain meaning of these statutory provisions will ensure that the ultimate result in this case is consistent with the balance struck by the Legislature regarding the relative importance of disclosing the secret inner workings of the government, on the one hand, and maintaining the individual privacy of the officer, on the other.
*1306Because the majority misconstrues the applicable statutes, it incorrectly holds that every aspect of the deputy’s administrative appeal should remain secret, including even the deputy’s name. By so doing, the majority overvalues the deputy’s interest in privacy, undervalues the public’s interest in disclosure, and ultimately fails to implement the Legislature’s careful balance of the competing concerns in this area. Accordingly, I dissent.
I
As the majority explains, The Copley Press, Inc. (Copley Press), publisher of the San Diego Union-Tribune newspaper, sought disclosure from the County of San Diego Civil Service Commission (the Commission) of certain documents related to the Commission’s hearing on a deputy sheriff’s appeal from his department’s proposed discipline of him. In seeking such disclosure, Copley Press relied on the CPRA, which “was enacted in 1968 to safeguard the accountability of government to the public, for secrecy is antithetical to a democratic system of ‘government of the people, by the people [and] for the people.’ The Act ‘was enacted against a “background of legislative impatience with secrecy in government . . . .” (53 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 136, 143 (1970).)’ ” (San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 771-772 [192 Cal.Rptr. 415].) As this court has explained: “Implicit in the democratic process is the notion that government should be accountable for its actions. In order to verify accountability, individuals must have access to government files. Such access permits checks against the arbitrary exercise of official power and secrecy in the political process. However, a narrower but no less important interest is the privacy of individuals whose personal affairs are recorded in government files.” (CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 651 [230 Cal.Rptr. 362, 725 P.2d 470], fus. omitted; see also Gov. Code, § 6250 [Legislature’s declaration in enacting the CPRA that access to government information “is a fundamental and necessary right”].)
Although the CPRA begins with the general rule of openness and disclosure of government information, it exempts from disclosure 29 categories of materials.1 (Gov. Code, § 6254.) “These exemptions are permissive, not mandatory. The [CPRA] endows the agency with discretionary authority to override the statutory exceptions when a dominating public interest favors disclosure.” (CBS, Inc. v. Block, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 652.) If an agency denies a request for disclosure under the CPRA, it must justify its denial by showing the CPRA expressly exempts the record in question from disclosure. (Gov. Code, § 6255, subd. (a).)
*1307In denying Copley Press’s claim for disclosure under the CPRA, the Commission cited two statutory provisions, but (like the majority) I need discuss only one, Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k) (section 6254(k)).2 That statute provides in relevant part: “[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to require disclosure of records that are any of the following: [IQ . . . [][] (k) Records, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law . . . .” This subdivision “is not an independent exemption” (CBS, Inc. v. Block, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 656), but incorporates other statutes that protect against disclosure. In this case, real parties in interest allege section 6254(k) incorporates Penal Code section 832.7, which renders confidential two types of law enforcement records, prohibiting their disclosure “in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code.”3 (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a).) The first type are “[p]eace officer or custodial officer personnel records” or information obtained from such records. (Ibid.) Such personnel records, in turn, are defined in Penal Code section 832.8 as “any file maintained under that individual’s name by his or her employing agency . . . .” (Italics added.) Thus, the first category of material made confidential by Penal Code section 832.7 is expressly limited to personnel records maintained by the officer’s employing agency or department.
The second type of law enforcement records made confidential by Penal Code section 832.7 (and thus protected from disclosure by Government Code section 6254(k)) are “records [or information obtained from such records] maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5” (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a), italics added), i.e., records relating to citizen complaints. Subdivision (a)(1) of Penal Code section 832.5 states that “[e]ach department or agency in this state that employs peace officers” must “establish a procedure to investigate complaints by members of the public” against their personnel. (Italics added.) Subdivision (b) requires that such complaints *1308and any related reports be retained for at least five years either in the officer’s “general personnel file or in a separate file designated by the department or agency,” provided that “prior to any official determination regarding promotion, transfer, or disciplinary action,” complaints described in subdivision (c) must be “removed from the officer’s general personnel file and placed in [a] separate file designated by the department or agency.” Subdivision (c) provides that complaints or any portion of a complaint the officer’s “employing agency” (italics added) finds to be “frivolous, . . . unfounded or exonerated” must not be maintained in the officer’s general personnel file. Finally, subdivision (d)(1) defines “ ‘[g]eneral personnel file’ ” as “the file maintained by the agency” containing the officer’s employment records.
Considering the subdivisions of Penal Code section 832.5 together, it is apparent the Legislature used the terms “agency” and “department” to refer to the public entity that employs the officer involved. Thus, files deemed confidential under Penal Code section 832.7’s second category of material, like its first, are limited to those maintained by the peace officer’s employing agency or department. This agency may be a city police department (employing a police officer), a county sheriff’s department (employing a deputy sheriff) or the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (employing a correctional officer).
The law applicable to this case is not unlike a set of nesting dolls, in which one law fits within another. We begin with the general rule of disclosure of government records (the CPRA), move to a possible exception to the general rule (Gov. Code, § 6254(k)), which in turn incorporates a law establishing the confidentiality of certain law enforcement records (Pen. Code, § 832.7), which specifically renders confidential only peace officer personnel records as defined by Penal Code section 832.8, and records maintained by any state or local agency as defined by Penal Code section 832.5, both of which are limited to files maintained by the officer’s employing agency. It is in these final definitions, located deep within this network of self-referential statutory provisions, that the majority purports to strike gold. Declaring that because the Commission has been designated to provide administrative appeals for employees of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, the majority opines “it is reasonable to conclude that for purposes of applying the relevant statutes in this case, the Commission is functioning as part of ‘the employing agency’ and that any file it maintains regarding a peace officer’s disciplinary appeal constitutes a file ‘maintained ... by [the officer’s] employing agency’ within the meaning of section 832.8.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1288, italics added.)
What the majority has found is fool’s gold. No amount of judicial juggling or legal legerdemain can convert a county’s civil service commission into the *1309agency that employs the county’s law enforcement officers. Certainly no evidence appears in the record—and the majority cites none—showing that the Commission has ever accepted a job application from this deputy; conducted a background check or hired him; issued a paycheck to him; contacted him about his medical, dental or retirement benefits; had the power to promote or demote him; or had any say over his day-to-day assignments. That the deputy was employed by the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, not the Commission, is plain.
Even accepting as accurate the majority’s characterization—dubious at best—of how the Commission is “functioning,” Penal Code section 832.7 does not sweep within its embrace all entities that merely function or act as part of the employing agency; it requires that the files be maintained by the entity that actually is the employing agency. (See Pen. Code, § 832.8 [file maintained “by his or her employing agency”]; id.., § 832.5, subd. (a)(1) [referring to “[e]ach department or agency in this state that employs peace officers”].) In concluding otherwise, the majority strays far from the plain meaning of the applicable statutory language.
The majority posits that if the Commission is not the employing agency, a citizen complaint the Commission finds frivolous or unfounded need not be removed but can remain in the deputy’s file, a result the majority finds unreasonable. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1288.) This concern is baseless. Where, as here, a county civil service commission is designated to hear appeals in peace officer disciplinary cases, the officer’s employing agency must abide by the commission’s decision. “ ‘The Commission’s decisions shall be final, and shall be followed by the County unless overturned by the courts on appeal.’ ” (Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 70, 77 [209 Cal.Rptr. 159].) Thus, for example, had the Commission here found the complaint against the deputy to be frivolous, the sheriff’s department, absent an appeal, presumably would in all respects adopt and abide by that decision. The contrary conclusion—that the department would retain the complaint in the deputy’s personnel file on the ground that it was the Commission, and not the department, that had found the complaint frivolous or unfounded—seems farfetched. Certainly nothing the majority says supports the speculation that a law enforcement agency would (or could) disregard the Commission’s decision on appeal.
Taking a somewhat different tack, the majority concludes that the Commission’s own records qualify as records “maintained . . . pursuant to Section 832.5” (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a)) and thus are confidential under the statutory scheme. The majority reasons that because Penal Code section 832.5, requiring the retention for at least five years of citizen complaints and any related reports or findings, does not specify the entity that must maintain *1310these records and “does expressly specify that ‘complaints retained pursuant to [the statute] may be maintained ... in a separate file designated by the department or agency’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1291), “it is reasonable to conclude that because the Commission has been designated to hear disciplinary appeals, its records qualify under section 832.7, subdivision (a), as ‘records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5’ ” (ibid.). But the absence of any evidence or suggestion in the record that the sheriff’s department has in fact designated the Commission to retain a file of complaints for five years, as required by section 832.5, subdivision (b), wholly undermines the majority’s analysis on this point.
The majority next argues its conclusion the Commission employs the deputy sheriff must be correct, because a contrary conclusion would render the scope of confidentiality available to peace officers dependent “on several fortuities: the entity hearing an appeal and the timing of the request.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1292.) Neither rationale is persuasive.
Because a law enforcement agency has discretion to decide the mechanism for administrative review of disciplinary matters (Gov. Code, § 3304.5), different agencies likely will choose different mechanisms. The majority erroneously assumes—with no support from legal authority or legislative history—that regardless of the review mechanism chosen (or, as here, imposed on the agency), the level of confidentiality attaching to the record of a peace officer’s appeal of proposed discipline must be the same. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1292-1293.) But no such “equality” principle is apparent in the statutory scheme, nor is the possibility of different levels of mandatory disclosure under the CPRA contrary thereto. By limiting the exception to the CPRA to personnel files maintained by the “employing agency,” the Legislature left open the possibility that law enforcement-related files maintained by other public agencies would be subject to disclosure under the CPRA.
A law enforcement agency may have any number of reasons to provide for independent commission—rather than in-house—review of police disciplinary matters, with its attendant greater public scrutiny. Community concerns about police brutality, oversight imposed by the city counsel or county board of supervisors, a charter mandate (as here), the size of the department (does it have several hundred officers or just two?), negotiated outcomes between a department and the union representing the rank-and-file, all these factors can no doubt play a part in the choice of an independent commission to provide administrative review. That an option exists to provide less disclosure to the public does not logically preclude an option providing for greater openness in government. The majority fails to explain why a law enforcement agency’s or local government’s choice to use an administrative review mechanism that involves more disclosure to the community is unreasonable.
*1311The majority also contends that if the Commission is not considered the deputy’s employing agency, the level of disclosure would turn arbitrarily on the timing of any request to disclose. Thus, according to the majority, if only the sheriff’s department is the deputy’s employer, only the sheriff’s department would be statutorily required to maintain the record of his disciplinary appeal. (Pen. Code, § 832.5, subd. (b).) In that case, disclosure could be had from the Commission under the CPRA; but if the Commission destroyed its records before the request, the copy of the record in the sheriff’s department’s possession would acquire confidentiality as a “personnel record” maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, precluding its disclosure. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1292-1293.)
The majority is incorrect. If the Commission’s record of the appeal is subject to disclosure under the CPRA, the sheriff’s department could not shield it from disclosure by placing it in the deputy’s personnel file. Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 882, 852 P.2d 377] is instructive. There we addressed the exception to CPRA disclosure set forth in Government Code section 6254, subdivision (f), concerning law enforcement investigatory files. The parties in Williams disputed whether the information in such files would remain confidential after the investigation ended. This court concluded the exception applied even after the investigation ended, but also stated that “the law does not provide . . . that a public agency may shield a record from public disclosure, regardless of its nature, simply by placing it in a file labelled ‘investigatory.’ ” (Williams v. Superior Court, at p. 355.) Similarly, the Court of Appeal in New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 97, 103 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 410], commenting on that possibility, opined: “The labels of ‘personnel records’ and ‘internal investigation’ are captivatingly expansive, and present an elasticity menacing to the principle of public scrutiny of government. A public servant may not avoid such scrutiny by placing into a personnel file what would otherwise be unrestricted information. A conclusion to the contrary would weaken and despoil the Public Records Act.” Because a law enforcement agency cannot avoid the mandate of the CPRA by placing a disclosable document into a peace officer’s personnel file, the level of confidentiality does not turn on the timing of the disclosure request.
Finally, the majority reasons that failure to adopt the fiction that the Commission is the deputy’s employing agency would “significantly impact a peace officer’s right of administrative appeal,” presenting deputies with a “[h]obson’s choice” of vindicating their rights on appeal or retaining the confidentiality of their personnel records. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1296.) A hobson’s choice is defined as either “an apparent freedom to take or reject something offered when in actual fact no such freedom exists” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 1076, col. 1) or “the necessity of accepting one of two equally objectionable things” (ibid,.). As to the first definition, a peace *1312officer facing disciplinary charges has a viable choice: he may appeal to the Commission, in which case the proceedings before the Commission (but not his actual personnel file) will be disclosable under the CPRA, or he can decline to appeal, accept his discipline and keep everything secret. The officer’s situation is no different than that of any civil litigant who, in order to vindicate legal rights in court, must submit to pretrial discovery and endure a public trial. That a choice may come freighted with some disadvantages does not render it illusory. As for the second definition, even if these choices as the majority suggests are “equally objectionable” to the officer, the majority does not explain why a peace officer facing discipline is entitled to pursue an administrative appeal free from uncomfortable choices. Guarding the confidentiality of the deputy’s actual personnel file, maintained by the sheriff’s department, but allowing for the disclosure of other information having an origin outside that file, hardly places a burden on a deputy’s administrative right to appeal so intolerable and objectionable that we may conclude the Legislature could not have intended that result. So far as we know, a peace officer may be desirous of having his appeal heard by an independent body, one drawn from outside his immediate chain of command. Although the majority states “[tjhere is no evidence the Legislature intended-to give local agencies discretion to force peace officers to make” a choice between appeal and disclosure (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1296), there likewise is no evidence the Legislature intended to preclude such discretion. Indeed, because Government Code section 3304.5 leaves the “precise details” of an officer’s right to administrative appeal4 to be determined by individual local law enforcement agencies (Coloca v. County of San Diego (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 433, 443 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 3]), equally likely is that the Legislature intended to give such agencies the discretion to require more disclosure on appeal, so long as the review procedures established, as here, do not violate any express provision of the statutory scheme set forth in Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, 832.8, or in the CPRA.
II
No doubt San Diego County chose the Commission to hear peace officer appeals for a specific reason. The Commission is “a ‘quasi-independent’ county agency. In contrast to most county agencies, which are directly supervised by the board of supervisors [citation], the Commission’s unique review function demands an independence which is specifically provided for in section 904.1 of the San Diego County Charter (as amended Dec. 17, *13131982): ‘The Commission is the administrative appeals body for the County in personnel matters authorized by this Charter. Upon appeal, the Commission may affirm, revoke or modify any disciplinary order, and may make any appropriate orders in connection with appeals under its jurisdiction. The Commission’s decisions shall be final, and shall be followed by the County unless overturned by the courts on appeal.’ ” (Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 77, italics omitted.)5
Because the Commission does not employ the deputy being disciplined in this case, its records are presumptively open under the CPRA. Only to the extent qualifying records maintained by the deputy’s employer—the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department—or information obtained from those records (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a)) are introduced in the appeal hearing would the Commission’s records remain confidential under Government Code section 6254(k) and Penal Code section 832.7. Even information presented to the Commission that is duplicated in the officer’s file would not necessarily be rendered confidential by section 6254(k) (incorporating Pen. Code, § 832.7) if it had a source independent from the personnel file itself. Only if the information is “obtained from” that file (Pen. Code, § 832.7), as would be the case if the file were read into evidence, would the exception to disclosure apply. For example, the name of an officer and the nature of his alleged misconduct may be derived from testimony before the Commission by the complaining witness herself or from other eyewitnesses to the alleged misconduct. As the Court of Appeal below observed: “Testimony of a percipient witness to events, or from documents not maintained in the personnel file, is not information subject to section 832.7 even though that information may be identical to or duplicative of information in the personnel file.” On the other hand, investigative information in the file that does not come out at the hearing remains confidential.
Contrary to the majority’s assertions, unlike In re Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 4, 110 P.3d 1218], cited by the majority (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1299, fn. 22), reference in the statutory scheme to the officer’s “employing agency” is not ambiguous. By ignoring the actual language of the CPRA and Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7 and 832.8, the majority unjustifiably enlarges the confidentiality of law enforcement personnel files and concomitantly reduces the amount of information disclosable to the public under the CPRA regarding how our law enforcement officers are performing their duties. Although the majority relies throughout on its view of what is *1314“reasonable,” I submit it is for the Legislature, and not this court, to make the policy decision concerning the appropriate balance between a peace officer’s right to confidentiality of his or her personnel records and the public’s right to accountability in government. In imposing its own view of what is reasonable, the majority departs from the clear statutory language that should be our only guide.
Because I disagree the Commission employs this deputy sheriff, I would find the Commission’s records are not privileged under Penal Code section 832.7 and thus should have been disclosed under the CPRA. Because the majority finds otherwise, I dissent.
As one court describes it: “The objectives of the Public Records Act thus include preservation of islands of privacy upon the broad seas of enforced disclosure.” (Black Panther Party v. Kehoe (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 645, 653 [117 Cal.Rptr. 106].)
The Commission relied also on Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c), which provides in pertinent part: “[NJothing in this chapter shall be construed to require disclosure of records that are any of the following: [][]... [|] (c) Personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The bulk of the Commission’s records, however, do not fall under the terms of this provision. With the exception of the deputy’s actual personnel file and information obtained from that file (see Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a)), the statutory exception from disclosure set forth in section 6254, subdivision (c) provides no basis on which to withhold the Commission’s records from Copley Press.
Although Copley Press also claims a constitutional right to disclosure of the Commission’s records, I would not reach the constitutional issue inasmuch as I would find disclosure is required under the CPRA. (See People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 534 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137] [courts should decline to reach constitutional questions if a statutory claim is dispositive].)
I agree with the majority that this language does not preclude application of Penal Code section 832.7 to administrative proceedings, as here. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1284-1286.)
Government Code section 3304, subdivision (b) provides: “No punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency against any public safety officer who has successfully completed the probationary period that may be required by his or her employing agency without providing the public safety officer with an opportunity for administrative appeal.”
That Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d 70, does not establish the Commission’s independence “for all purposes” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1289), as the majority opines, does not of course mean the Commission lacks independence for any purpose. Significantly, the majority identifies no reason San Diego County would designate the Commission to hear disciplinary appeals, other than the Commission’s independence.