concurring: I agree with the well-reasoned majority opinion. I write separately only to clarify that, in my view, Judge Burgess should have simply dismissed Cooke’s motion for summary *759judgment as being beyond the district court’s authority upon remand.
As the majority notes, K.S.A. 60-2106(c) codifies the principle that an appellate court’s “mandate and opinion . . . shall be controlling in the conduct of any further proceedings necessary in the district court.” Slip op. at 12. Here, the Court of Appeals gave the district court clear and explicit directions when it stated: “This matter is reversed and remanded to the district court for the determination of an equitable division of the expenses of litigation and a distribution of the funds held by the clerk of the court.” Slip op. at 6, Cooke v. Gillespie, No. 91,078, unpublished opinion filed December 10, 2004. That directive did not authorize the district court to revisit the merits of the case by entertaining a motion for summary judgment and clearly precluded consideration of the statute of limitations upon remand.
Beier, J., joins in the foregoing concurring opinion.