(dissenting):
¶ 23 I dissent. I agree that the Act requires that a notice of claim “shall set forth ... (i) a brief statement of the facts; (ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-ll(3)(a)(i) — (iii) (Supp.2003). The notice of claim provision, as well as other provisions under the Act, requires strict compliance by claimants. See Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16,¶ 13, 40 P.3d 632 (“[T]he ... Act demands strict compliance with its requirements to allow suit against governmental entities. The notice of claim provision, particularly, neither contemplates nor allows for anything less.”). If a complaint does not strictly comply with the requirements of the Act, plaintiffs cannot bring suit “against the [S]tate or its subdivisions.” Id. at ¶ 11.
¶ 24 While a notice of claim is required to “provide[ ] the entity being sued with the factual details of the incident that led to the plaintiffs claim,” Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,¶20, 977 P.2d 1201, the Act does not further define what constitutes a sufficient “brief statement of the facts.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-ll(3)(a)(i). However, Utah caselaw has established two purposes of the notice of claim. “[T]he purpose[s] of such notice of claim [are] to provide the governmental entity an opportunity to[ (1) ] correct the condition that caused the injury,[and (2) ] evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of litigation.” Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998).1 “In deciding how to file a notice of claim upon [the State] to satisfy the Act, a claimant has no other choice but to rely upon the statutes and upon the purpose of the notice statute .... ” Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
¶ 25 Based upon the plain language of the Act, see Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n., 2004 UT 11,¶ 17, 84 P.3d 1197 (“ ‘When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute’s meaning by first looking to the statute’s plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.’ ” (citation omitted)); Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130,¶ 21, 63 P.3d 705 (same), Plaintiffs notice of claim constituted a “brief statement of the facts.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-ll(3)(a)(i). Plaintiffs notice of claim read, in relevant part,
On December 5, 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front of a Utah State Liquor Store on ice, which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorly designed rain gutter that drains onto the top of the sidewalk, rather than underneath it.
Whether the brief statement of the facts in a notice of claim addresses the purposes underlying the notice requirement is, however, fact dependent-a point conceded by the State in its brief as follows:
The phrase “a brief statement of facts” is not statutorily defined. That is because section 63-30-11, by definition, applies to any claim asserted against the State and so it must be general enough to apply to all manner of claims — slip[-]and[-]fall claims such as this case, as well as cases that arise out of very different circumstances. Thus, section 63-30-ll(3)(a) must be generally worded in order to fulfill the purposes of the Act in any case.[2]
Relying on Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17,¶ 10, 42 P.3d 379, and Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,¶ 20, 977 P.2d 1201, however, the trial court ruled as a matter of law that, in effect, the notice document must contain both the notice requirements in the Act and the purposes of the notice statute. This notwithstanding, the State was well aware of which Utah State Liquor Store was the subject of Plaintiffs claim and thereby in a position to (1) “correct the condition that caused the injury,” and (2) “evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of litigation.” *261Larson, 955 P.2d at 345-46.3 Neither of the cases relied upon by the trial court, nor any of the other so-called actual notice cases, address what constitutes a “brief statement of the facts.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-ll(3)(a)(i); see Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 25,¶ 5, 69 P.3d 1287 (concluding that actual notice by a municipality of a potential claim does not lower the strict compliance standard for filing a notice of claim, but not addressing whether the notice complied with the brief statement of the facts requirement). Although the focus of Larson is upon the determination of what constitutes the “governing body” for the purpose of filing a notice of claim, Larson is nonetheless instructive. Larson, 955 P.2d at 345 (quotations and citation omitted). The Larson court, having reiterated the purposes set out in Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980), and having declared that “a claimant has no other choice but to rely upon the statutes and upon the purpose of the notice statute,” engaged in a purpose-based, fact-intensive analysis to determine which government official is “reasonably and logically” the proper person to receive the filing.4 Larson, 955 P.2d at 346 (emphasis added).
¶ 26 Whether the purposes of the notice of claim are addressed in any given case is contextual and requires a fact inquiry. “Purpose” is defined as “[a]n objective, goal or end,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1250 (7th ed.1999), “something set up as an object or end to be attained,” or “an action in course of execution.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 957 (9th ed.1986). Thus, the concept of “purpose” is inherently prospective in nature. A notice of claim that must be relied upon for the recipient to appropriately and prospectively respond would have to contain sufficient information to guide the response. It is absurd, however, having complied with the plain language of the statute, to require a notice of claim to contain information already obtained to accomplish the purpose of providing an opportunity to correct, evaluate, and perhaps settle-a purpose that has already been accomplished and, therefore, is no longer a purpose.
¶ 27 Therefore, I conclude that when determining whether a notice of claim contains a sufficient “brief statement of the facts,” Utah Code Ann. § 63 — 30—11(3)(a)(i), a trial court must, when necessary, make a fact inquiry to determine if the purposes of (1) correcting the condition that caused the injury, and (2) evaluating a claim, and possibly settling the claim without litigation have been satisfied.5 See Larson, 955 P.2d at 345-46. Since the State has refused to concede satisfaction of the purpose requirements in this case, it should have an opportunity to address the issue before the trial court.
¶ 28 Accordingly, I also would reverse the trial court’s dismissal, but remand for the purpose of conducting a fact inquiry to determine whether the aforementioned purposes have been satisfied. See id.
. Notwithstanding the lead opinion's assertion to the contrary, onr supreme court has already “improved'' the Act. See Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998).
. At oral argument, counsel for the State agreed that respecting certain claims, such as defamation, location would be irrelevant. It is undisputed, however, that location is relevant to the purposes of correcting the condition and evaluating the claim in this case.
. I fail to see the point of the lead opinion's analysis of irrelevant strict compliance cases and observation that "[t]he strict compliance standard favors the State.”
. A point counsel for the State refused to concede at oral argument, asserting that some critical person at the State may not have had actual knowledge of the location and needed to rely solely on the notice.
.Cf. Johnson v. City of Bountiful, 996 F.Supp. 1100, 1103 (D.Utah 1998) (ruling that "Utah requires strict compliance with the notice of claim provision. Nonetheless, 'defects in the form or content of notices of claim do not always act to bar a claim.’ By including the police report and informing Bountiful that Plaintiff was injured, the letter may satisfy the first required element of a notice of claim.” (citation and emphasis omitted)).