concurring in result.
11 I concur in the result reached by the majority because the provisions of 47 O.S. 2001 § 2830.80 apply only to those motor carriers required to obtain a license from the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. It is undisputed that GD Transport was not required to obtain such a license because it was properly registered in another state under the single state registration provisions.
12 However, I reject the apparent conclusion by the majority that § 280.30 does not authorize a direct action against the insurer where the motor carrier has an Oklahoma license. The language relied upon by the majority for its conclusion, "after judgment against the carrier for any damage, the injured party may maintain an action upon the policy or bond to recover the same, and shall be a proper party to maintain the action," 47 0.$.2001 § 230.30(A), was a part of 47 O.S. 1991 § 169 prior to its amendment in 1995 to limit its application to motor carriers of household goods or used emigrant move-bles. While I would agree that the quoted language appears to support the argument that a judgment against the motor carrier must precede any action against the insurer, I do not believe we are free to so conclude.
13 No matter how persuasive this analysis may be, we are bound by Enders v. Longmire, 1937 OK 154, ¶ 14-15, 67 P.2d 12, 15, which rejected this identical argument concerning identical statutory language, as follows:
Had the Legislature intended that a judgment against the carrier must exist before suing the insurance or bonding company, it would have been very simple for the Legislature to have provided in the 1929 or the 1933 amendment, as follows:
"Only if, and after, judgment is secured against the carrier for any such damage, the injured party may maintain an action upon said policy or bond to recover the Judgment theretofore secured against the carrier."
No such amendment was adopted, nor anything like it in substance, and from the fact that neither the 1929 nor the 1983 Legislature substantially changed that part of said section upon which this court, in [Temple v. Dugger, 164 Okla. 84, 21 P.2d 482, and Jacobsen v. Howard, 164 Okla. 88, 23 P.2d 185,] held a joint action may originally be maintained against the carrier and its insurance company, we can only assume there was no legislative intent to prevent an original joint action against both the carrier and its surety.
1 4 Where the Legislature has reenacted a statute with the same or similar terms that have previously been construed by a court of last resort, we must presume the Legislature is familiar with the previous construction and intends to adopt that construction as a part of the statute, unless a contrary intent clearly appears. Special Indemnity Fund v. Bedford, 1993 OK 60, 852 P.2d 150.
T5 Until the Oklahoma Supreme Court holds otherwise, I am constrained to conclude that a direct action by the injured party is available against the insurer for a motor carrier required to obtain a license from the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. Therefore, I concur in the majority opinion only in its result.