I agree with the majority that defendant’s conviction for using a false compartment is not supported by substantial evidence. As the majority explains, a false compartment within the meaning of *185Health and Safety Code section 11366.8 (section 11366.8) is a compartment that is “constructed in a manner to intentionally deceive an untrained observer by concealing its existence,” analogous to a suitcase with a false bottom. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 179.) In this case, the compartment defendant used was the space under the steering column and behind the dashboard. Although this area is not ordinarily used for storing personal property, its existence is apparent to anyone. This compartment is no more false than the crevices between the seats of a vehicle, the area between the floormats and floor of a vehicle, or the glove box. Any of these compartments might be used to conceal drugs, but the fact that these compartments existed would be apparent to a reasonable observer. They are akin to a separate zippered shoe compartment at the bottom of a suitcase, which similarly could be used to conceal drugs but which in no way could be characterized as false. Because the evidence did not support a finding that defendant possessed or used a false compartment within the meaning of section 11366.8, the conviction must be reversed.
The analysis above is sufficient to dispose of this case, inasmuch as defendant may not be retried on this count. (Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 18 [57 L.Ed.2d 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141].) But the majority goes on to hold that a compartment that is false within the meaning given above—i.e., that is constructed in a manner to intentionally deceive an untrained observer by concealing its existence—is nonetheless not false within the meaning of the statute if the compartment is part of the vehicle’s original factory equipment. In other words, the majority holds that a false compartment does not qualify as a false compartment within the meaning of the statute unless the compartment is a product of aftermarket changes to original factory equipment. The distinction the majority purports to draw between a defendant’s intent to conceal drugs in a vehicle’s false compartment that is installed or created aftermarket (which is a felony) and a defendant’s same intent to use the same false compartment when that compartment is part of the vehicle’s original factory equipment (and, hence, innocent conduct) is unnecessary to the decision in this case, is not supported by the statutory language, and leads to absurd results. I write separately to distance myself from that analysis.
Section 11366.8, subdivision (d), provides: “The term ‘false compartment’ means any box, container, space, or enclosure that is intended for use or designed for use to conceal, hide, or otherwise prevent discovery of any controlled substance within or attached to a vehicle, including, but not limited to, any of the following: [][] (1) False, altered, or modified fuel tanks. [][] (2) Original factory equipment of a vehicle that is modified, altered, or changed, [f] (3) Compartment, space, or box that is added to, or fabricated, made, or created from, existing compartments, spaces, or boxes within a *186vehicle.” Plainly, the main clause of this sentence does not require a false compartment to be a modification, alteration, or change to the original factory equipment. Indeed, subdivision (d) prefaces its definition with the word “any,” which means “without limit and no matter what kind.” (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798 [268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934].)
In reasoning that section 11366.8, subdivision (d) included any aftermarket false compartment but excluded the same false compartment if offered as part of the vehicle’s original factory equipment, the majority begins by echoing the Court of Appeal’s contention that “ ‘a definition of “false compartment” that required no modification of original factory equipment would be so consequential that [it] is difficult to think the Legislature would not have provided such an example if that was indeed its intention.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 179.) The apparent consequence of such a construction, according to the Court of Appeal, is that “the statute would provide the basis for a separate felony offense in the majority of the many cases in which drugs not in plain view are found in a vehicle,” such as when drugs are hidden in “[t]he space between the cushions of the back seat of a Chevrolet.” However, the Court of Appeal (and, by extension, the majority here) was mistaken since, as discussed above, the crevices between the seats do not constitute false compartments, nor would the mere fact that drugs were hidden in a vehicle necessarily mean that the compartment in which they were found was false. The test is, as the majority elsewhere acknowledges, “whether the compartment itself was constructed in a manner to intentionally deceive an untrained observer by concealing its existence.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 179.) Who constructed it and when in the chain of distribution it was created are simply not relevant to that determination.
The majority’s other rationale for excluding false compartments that are part of the vehicle’s original factory equipment rests on a strained interpretation of the examples provided in section 11366.8, subdivision (d), and the inappropriate invocation of the ejusdem generis canon of construction. The majority fails to recognize that “canons of statutory construction are merely aids to ascertaining probable legislative intent” (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 521, fn. 10 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809]) and should not be applied to defeat the underlying legislative intent (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1391 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323]). Our ultimate task is to select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and to avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences. (People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 246 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224].) The canons identified by the majority are often helpful to that determination, but *187they are neither “magical incantation[s]” nor “immutable rule[s].” (Estate of Banerjee (1978) 21 Cal.3d 527, 539 [147 Cal.Rptr. 157, 580 P.2d 657].) These canons do not apply in particular where, as here, “no manifest reason exists why other persons or things than those enumerated should not be included and thus exclusion would result in injustice,” nor should the canons apply “to a statute the language of which may fairly comprehend many different objects, some of which are mentioned merely by way of example, without excluding others of similar nature.” {Id. at p. 539, fn. 10.)
The majority relies on ejusdem generis, the general principle that when a particular class of things modifies general words, those general words are construed as applying only to things of the same nature or class as those enumerated. The majority reasons that this canon of statutory construction does not allow us “to broaden the meaning of false compartment with regard to original factory equipment beyond the restrictions set forth in the Legislature’s second example” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 180), which refers to original factory equipment “that is modified, altered, or changed” (§ 11366.8, subd. (d)). However, out of all the cases cited by the majority, only one applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis where, as here, the statute prefaced its fist of examples with the words “including, but not limited to” (Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 999 P.2d 718] (Kraus))—and even Kraus provides no support for the majority.
Kraus considered whether a landlord’s charge for prelease administrative services was an unrefundable security fee prohibited by Civil Code former section 1950.5. At the time, section 1950.5, subdivision (b), read as follows: “ ‘As used in this section, “security” means any payment, fee, deposit or charge, including, but not limited to, an advance payment of rent, used or to be used for any purpose, including, but not limited to, any of the following: [f] (1) The compensation of a landlord for a tenant’s default in the payment of rent, [f] (2) The repair of damages to the premises, exclusive of ordinary wear and tear, caused by the tenant or by a guest or licensee of the tenant, [f] (3) The cleaning of the premises upon termination of the tenancy, [f] (4) To remedy future defaults by the tenant in any obligation under the rental agreement to restore, replace, or return personal property or appurtenances, exclusive of ordinary wear and tear, if the security deposit is authorized to be applied thereto by the rental agreement.’ ” (Kraus, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 139.) We observed that “[a]ll of the examples of a security set forth in subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1950.5 are charges intended to secure the landlord against future tenant defaults” and that the section therefore excluded “[a] fee imposed at the outset of the tenancy to reimburse the landlord for expenses incurred for such purposes as providing application *188forms, listing, interviewing, screening the applicant, checking credit references, and similar purposes.” (Kraus, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 141, italics added.) The latter fees served to recoup the immediate prelease costs incurred by the landlord and therefore were outside the plain meaning of a security as “ ‘something given, deposited, or pledged to make certain the fulfillment of an obligation.’ ” (Id. at p. 140.) Here, by contrast, a compartment comes within the ordinary meaning of a false compartment regardless of whether the compartment is part of the vehicle’s original factory equipment or is added at a later stage of the marketing process. The majority’s construction thus fails to accord the proper significance to the proviso “including, but not limited to,” which “suggests that a broad construction was intended” (In re Forfeiture of $5,264 (1989) 432 Mich. 242 [439 N.W.2d 246, 251, fn. 7]) and “connotes an illustrative listing, one purposefully capable of enlargement.” (Id., 439 N.W.2d at p. 252; accord, Turtle Island Restoration v. National Marine (9th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3d 969, 975 [“Congress used the phrase ‘including but not limited to’ and in so doing, contemplated that the list of potential obligations that the United States had under the Agreement was not exhausted by those listed in the subsection.”]; Cooper Distributing Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. (3d Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 262, 280 [“since the phrase ‘including, but not limited to’ plainly expresses a contrary intent, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is inapplicable”]; State ex rel. Stenehjem v. Philip Morris Inc. (2007) 2007 ND 90 [732 N.W.2d 720, 729] [“Use of the words, ‘including, without limitation,’ reflects a contrary intention that an enumeration is not exhaustive, rendering the doctrine of ejusdem generis inapplicable.”].)
Instead of Kraus, I find instructive People v. Clark-van Brunt (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8 [205 Cal.Rptr. 144], which is cited in In re Forfeiture of $5,264, supra, 439 N.W.2d at page 255. Clark-van Brunt construed Health and Safety Code section 11014.5, subdivision (a), which defines “drug paraphernalia.” That subdivision provides that drug paraphernalia means “all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are designed for use or marketed for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, . . . ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this division” and then provides a list of such items, preceded by the proviso that drug paraphernalia “includes, but is not limited to [the following].” The appellate department concluded that “[t]he clear import of the phrase ‘but is not limited to’ signifies that the Legislature intended the definition of ‘drug paraphernalia’ to be expansive and flexible. Thus, the expressly enumerated items are simply exemplary of those items which may constitute ‘drug paraphernalia’ rather than delineating the parameters of the subject.” (People v. Clark-van Brunt, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at pp. Supp. 17-18.) Here, where a statute uses similar words concerning a similar topic, I would similarly construe the phrase “but not limited to” to be expansive and flexible and the items *189following to be exemplary but not exclusive of the items covered by the statute. (See Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1760 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 4, 1993, p. 2 [bill prohibiting false compartments “is similar to the law prohibiting the possession of drug paraphernalia”].)1
Moreover, the majority offers no reason why the Legislature would have wanted to make the possession, use, or control of false compartments with the intent to conceal drugs therein a felony, unless the compartment is part of the vehicle’s original factory equipment, in which case the possession of the compartment with the requisite intent is no crime at all under this section. The harm occasioned by the concealment of drugs in a false compartment that is part of the vehicle’s original factory equipment is identical to the harm occasioned by the concealment of drugs in the same compartment that was installed as an aftermarket modification. (See People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 660-661 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 170 P.3d 623]; accord, Zurich American v. ABM Industries (2d Cir. 2005) 397 F.3d 158, 165 [applying ejusdem generis “would require us to ignore the phrase ‘but not limited to’ ” in the insurance policy].)
Finally, the majority’s interpretation of the statute runs afoul of the canon of statutory construction that directs us to interpret legislative enactments to avoid absurd results. (See People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 604 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 695, 918 P.2d 999].) In seeming recognition of the implausibility of its construction of the statute, the majority seeks refuge in the rule of lenity, under which an ambiguous penal statute is construed, in very limited circumstances, in favor of the defendant. The rule, of course, does not apply every time there are two or more reasonable interpretations of a penal statute. (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 986 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 261, 135 P.3d 669].) Rather, the rule applies “ ‘only if the court can do no more than guess what the legislative body intended; there must be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty to justify invoking the rule.’ ” (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1], italics added.) No such uncertainty exists here. Under the majority’s approach, section 11366.8 would not apply *190to a defendant who buys a new car with a factory-installed false compartment and uses the compartment to conceal drugs, but would apply to a defendant who asked the dealer to install the same compartment in the prior year’s model of that vehicle. At the same time, drug dealers will be motivated to conceal their goods in the false bottom and walls of a trailer, as long as the trailer was built with those compartments originally. This would be flatly inconsistent with the Legislature’s expressed concern that, “under current law, an auto shop which builds and installs false compartments for the transportation of controlled substances may openly admit their purpose to law enforcement officers and feel secure in the fact that they have violated no law and can not be prosecuted unless they actually possess an illegal controlled substance.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1760 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 4, 1993, p. 2 (Senate Committee Analysis).)
Indeed, the majority’s interpretation rips a substantial hole in the coverage of the statute. An illegitimate boat or trailer manufacturer that includes a false compartment for drug smuggling in the vehicle will be immune from liability under this statute, as will the individuals who actually possess or use the false compartment to store or conceal drugs. And if a legitimate vehicle manufacturer creates a false compartment for a lawful purpose—say, to safeguard jewelry—drug dealers once again will be immune from using those compartments to smuggle drugs. It is difficult to reconcile this cribbed construction of the statute with the Legislature’s expectation that this law “would provide a necessary tool for law enforcement efforts to combat increasing use of false compartments in the drug trade.” (Sen. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 2.)
The majority’s unduly narrow construction of the statute also will shift the inquiry at trial from whether a compartment is false to whether a false compartment has been “modified, altered, or changed in any way.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 174.) Is it sufficient if the defendant has unscrewed a panel of an original compartment that would otherwise qualify as false and reattached it, but in doing so has screwed it in less tightly than before, resulting in a slightly larger interior space? Has the original factory equipment been “changed in any way” if the defendant does no more than remove a panel of such a compartment and reattach it? What if the defendant changes the panel’s color or places a sticker on it? Does equipment installed by the dealer, such as a spoiler or upgraded audio equipment containing false compartments, qualify as original factory equipment? I find no evidence that the Legislature was concerned with these questions or believed that public safety turned on the answers to them. (Cf. Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1387-1388 [punitive *191damages “are neither equitable nor corrective” and thus are not included within the administrative remedies under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.)].) The line the majority draws is unnecessary to resolve the case and may well have unintended adverse consequences.
For the foregoing reasons, I join only in the judgment that there was insufficient evidence of a false compartment under section 11366.8.
The majority’s construction of section 11366.8, subdivision (d) is also internally inconsistent. The majority theorizes that “had the Legislature intended for original factory equipment of a vehicle to be included within the term ‘false compartment’ whether or not the equipment had been modified, altered, or changed, it would not have included, as a second example of a false compartment, ‘Original factory equipment of a vehicle that is modified, altered, or changed,’ ” in subdivision (d)(2) of section 11366.8. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 179.) Yet, in subdivision (d)(1), the Legislature included an example of a “fuel tank” that was either itself “[f]alse” or “altered, or modified”—thus encompassing original factory equipment (a fuel tank) that is false. The majority correctly observes that the word “false” with respect to a fuel tank “means ‘not genuine’ or ‘not real,’ ” but that indicates only that the fuel tank is “an extra, nonusable fuel tank” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 181-182, fn. 2)—not that it was an addition, alteration, or modification of the vehicle’s original factory equipment.