dissenting from the court's pronouncement.
T1 The court declares today that the initiative petition under consideration-which would prohibit (a) the use of non-English languages in state government meetings, documents, transactions proceedings and publications as well as (b) the expenditure of funds for translating into, as well as printing in, non-English languages-does not qualify for submission to a vote of the electorate because it offends several state constitutional norms.
2 I cannot join the court in so disposing of the controversy. I would declare this unchampioned measure unfit for submission because its prosecution for clearance stands abandoned. This case ceased to present a lively controversy when the proponents requested "leave to withdraw" their quest for the initiative's submission to a vote and found themselves in default for want of timely briefing. Today's pronouncement raises to new heights the aberrational enormity of this State's constitutional jurisprudence. It subjects to fundamental-law seru-tiny a people-proposed change in the law which no longer has a live champion and does not present a justiciable controversy for judicial resolution. In other words, judicial review is applied to a hopelessly lifeless initiative petition that could never reach submission stage because nobody advocates its passage for further processing as potential law. The judicial testing accorded today has earlier stood reserved for viable initiative petitions actively pressed for submission to a vote, not for a dead-end measure.1
T3 I would counsel the court to pronounce-as a rule of law to be applied prospectively-that when proponents in a pending cause refuse further to prosecute (and defend against a protest) an initiative that stands under a constitutional challenge, the court should give all interested persons due notice and afford, them the opportunity to pursue the quest sought to be withdrawn.
T4 There is another basic flaw in the process invoked today. Even if this were a lively controversy, appellate courts must not make constitutional pronouncements in advance of strict necessity. There is here no necessity for the rush to judgment upon this lifeless dispute. Lastly, because of my long-pressed opposition to the court's departure from Threadgill's2 teachings by allowing pre-submission testing of initiative measures for constitutional orthodoxy, I would refrain from giving this petition that kind of seruti-ny. There is simply no earthly need for making a ponderous pronouncement in a patently nonadversarial context. A declaration of mootness and abandonment, coupled with a default for want of timely briefing, should suffice.
I
PROPONENTS' PUBLIC-LAW CLAIM FOR SUBMISSION OF AN INITIATIVE MEASURE TO A VOTE CANNOT BE WITHDRAWN AFTER THE PETITIONS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
T5 I continue to espouse my earlier vote 3 against granting proponents leave to withdraw the initiative from judicial process that *132is pending upon their adversaries' protest. Before a petition is filed with the Secretary of State proponents have complete control over the measure. They may withdraw it at any time.4 In the post-filing stage, the proponents cannot be treated as a Hohfeldian plaintiff5 (dominus litis 6). At that point they become participants in the public-law process with no cognizable legal interest in the petition's prosecution.7 This measure clearly cannot be withdrawn on the proponents' withdrawal attempt alone.8
II
THE ABANDONED INITIATIVE MEASURE LOST ITS JUS-TICIABLE QUALITY
16 Judicial cognizance cannot be invoked by pressing for resolution a nonjusticiable controversy-one that presents nothing more than an academic, abstract, hypothetical or moot issue.9 Mootness is a state or condition which prevents the appellate court from *133rendering effective relief.10 This court may address only viable, lively disputes.11 Foisting a sentence of nullity upon a lifeless measure is but a judicial exercise in futility and supererogation.
T7 After its voluntary abandonment12 by the proponents' withdrawal request, the initiative in contest must be treated as no longer justiciable. While the proponents" claim for the measure's submission cannot be withdrawn at their request, there is here no legal barrier to (a) declaring the initiative mooted and abandoned because, during the twelvemonth period between the proponents' request to withdraw the petition and today's pronouncement, no one from the proponents' side of the controversy has come forth to prosecute the measure and (b) declaring the proponents to stand in default for want of timely briefing.
III
NOTICE OF PROPONENTS' FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AN INITIATIVE MEASURE IS THE SIGNATORIES DUE
8 Proponents, gua trustees of a petition's signatures, are under a duty to prosecute (and defend against the protests) an initiative measure 'on the signatories' behalf. Their role in the process is akin to that of a class representative who voluntarily assumes a fiduciary obligation toward the class. The latter may not be abandoned at will if prejudice to the class would likely follow.13 The court is charged with protecting the class members who, through their forensic absence, are unable to protect themselves.14 In the pursuit of an initiative measure the signatories' rights (qua legislators) 15 would clearly be prejudiced by (a) proponents' abandonment of their quest sans notice to the signatories *134and without the opportunity to pursue further their interest in the measure and (b) the court's judicial condemnation of the initiative as impermissible.
T9 I would counsel that in all future instances of a measure's mid-stream withdrawal by its proponents the court (a) give notice by publication (and by other mandatory means) to all persons known to be interested in the measure, (b) which would advise them that the proponents have withdrawn from the initiative's prosecution (or defense), and (c) would give the interested persons adequate opportunity to pursue the pending cause to its completion.16 If someone with a viable interest should come forth, the proceeding could then be reinstated as an active cause.17
IV
EVEN IF THIS CAUSE WERE A LIVELY CONTROVERSY, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARE NOT TO BE DECIDED IN ADVANCE OF STRICT NECESSITY
110 Today's pronouncement clearly violates the prudential bar of restraint which commands that constitutional issues not be resolved in advance of strict necessity.18 No necessity exists here for resolution of the constitutional content-based challenges to an abandoned and lifeless nitiative measure.
1 11 No lively controversy is present here in which antagonistic adversaries press for testing a legal norm's validity against the backdrop of facts that are forensically unfolded after the offending measure has come to be applied as law.19 Where there is no forensic scenario in the context of which challenged law is to be enforced, courts should not in vacuo 20 assess the attacked norm's *135constitutional soundness. I would not, as the court does today, reach for settlement the protestants' premature content-based constitutional challenges to a lifeless mea-gure.
V
THREADGILL v. CROSS21
[12 Nor would I today undertake to test the validity of this measure's content before its enactment as law by a vote of the people. My commitment to the undiluted force of Threadgill v. Cross22 continues with undiminished fervor.23 Threadgill teaches that conformity of a measure's content to the commands of the Constitution-state and federal-may not be judicially examined in advance of the initiative's adoption as law. Pre-enactment review of a measure's fundamental-law conformity should be confined to fatally vitiating infirmities in the initiative process itself. The electorate's effort at legislating directly must not be hindered by pre-submission attacks other than those which target the petition's lack of compliance with. some sine gua non prerequisite for judicial clearance in order to achieve the measure's submission to a vote of the people.24
VI
SUMMARY
{ 13 The initiative measure in judicial process here cannot be withdrawn on proponents' request. This cause is a public-law controversy over which proponents have no control after the petition's filing. No legal impediment is present here to this court's (a) declaring the measure mooted and voluntarily abandoned because, during the period between the proponents' request to withdraw the measure from submission and today's pronouncement, no one has come forth to prosecute (and defend against the protest) the petition and (b) declaring the proponents to stand in default for want of timely briefing.
T 14 The court's commitment to pre-enactment constitutional serutiny of initiative measures reaches a new level of aberrational excess. Today's pronouncement im-permissibly injects vitality into a lifeless, un-championed and utterly abandoned initiative petition with a zeal reminiscent of a roving commission rushing to judgment on abstract grievances.
115 I also press my counsel that in the future, when proponents refuse to prosecute a challenged initiative, the court give all interested persons adequate notice and opportunity to pursue the quest to its completion.
{16 Because of my continued and unswerving commitment to the teachings of Threadgill, 25 I must vigorously oppose subjecting any measure to constitutional testing in advance of its enactment into law. Aside from other flaws, today's pronouncement clearly violates the prudential bar of self-restraint from entertaining constitutional challenges in advance of strict necessity.
. See, e.g., In re Initiative Petition No. 364, State Question No. 673, 1996 OK 129, 930 P.2d 186; In re Initiative Petition No. 362, State Question 669, 1995 OK 77, 899 P.2d 1145; In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 1992 OK 122, 838 P.2d 1; In re Initiative Petition No. 348, State Question No. 640, 1991 OK 110, 820 P.2d 772; In re Initiative Petition No. 347, State Question No. 639, 1991 OK 55, 813 P.2d 1019; In re Initiative Petition No. 341, State Question No. 627, 1990 OK. 53, 796 P.2d 267; In re Initiative Petition No. 332, 1989 OK 93, 776 P.2d 556; In re Initiative Petition No. 315, State Question No. 553, 1982 OK 15, 649 P.2d 545; In re Supreme Court Adjudication, Etc., 1975 OK 36, 534 P.2d 3.
. Threadgill v. Cross, 1910 OK 165, 109 P. 558.
. This court's 16 April 2001 order states in pertinent part:
ORDER
Upon the unexcused failure of the proponents to file an answer brief as directed by this Court's order of October 5, 2000, this matter is ordered standing submitted for adjudication on the protestants' briefs alone. The motion of proponent Carol Martin to withdraw the petition is denied. In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 1996 OK 129, 930 P.2d 186 .... [Opala, J., concurs in result].
. The pertinent terms of 34 O.S.Supp.1992 § 8 (A) are:
A. * * * The proponents of a referendum or an initiative petition, any time before the final submission of signatures, may withdraw the referendum or initiative petition upon written notification to the Secretary of State.
. A Hohfeldian plaintiff is a legal entity seeking a judicial determination that as a party litigant it has "a right, a privilege, an immunity or a power" vis-a-vis the opposite party in litigation. Macy v. Board of County Com'rs, 1999 OK 53, ¶ 12, 986 P.2d 1130, 1137-38; Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc. v. Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, 890 P.2d 906, 914 (Opala, J., concurring); Fowler v. Bailey, 1992 OK 160, 844 P.2d 141, 150 (Opala, C.J., concurring); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant In Public Actions: The non-Hobfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1033 (1968).
. Literally translated, dominus litis means master of the suit, i.e., one who by law is entitled to manage and control the litigation to the exclusion of others. Black's Law Dictionary 437 (5th ed.1979); Davis v. Davis, 1985 OK 85, 708 P.2d 1102, 1107 (one who is "placed in charge of prosecuting" the case is "dominus litis"); Ex parte Lewis, 85 Okl. Cr. 322, 188 P.2d 367, 380 (1947); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Bowers, 181 Va. 542, 25 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1943).
. The initiative petition's proponents stand in this court as non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs. One who stands in that status sues to secure judicial relief that would benefit other persons or the community as a whole. Toxic Waste, supra note 5 at 914 (Opala, J., concurring). There are many examples of non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs whose prosecution in behalf of others is authorized by the common law: (l) the gui tam plaintiff-one who sues primarily to benefit a public entity-is typically non-Hohfeldian; State ex rel. Trimble v. City of Moore, 1991 OK 97, 818 P.2d 889, 894; see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1963, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 645, 660-662 n.1 (1973); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U.Chi.L.Rev. 601, 604-607 (1968); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364-1365, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972); Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 675 (D.C.Cir.1977); (2) in a stockholder's derivative suit the plaintiff stands in the very same category as a gui tam plaintiff. Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 1987 OK 14, 741 P.2d 846, 847, 853; (3) in actions by bailee for recovery of damage to bailed personalty, the bail-ee may press a claim for conversion of, or injury to,; the chattel, though ownership of the damaged or lost chattel remains in the bailor; Hare v. Fuller, 7 Ala. 717 (1845); Montgomery Gas-Light Co. v. Montgomery E. Ry. Co., 86 Ala. 372, 5 So. 735 (1889); Associates Discount Corp. v. Gillineau, 322 Mass. 490, 78 N.E.2d 192, 193 (1948); Atkinson, The Real Party In Interest Rule: A Plea for Its Abolition, 32 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 926, 949 (1957); (4) actions for recovery in behalf of an underage child, Knowles v. Tripledee Drilling Co., Inc., 1989 OK 40, 771 P.2d 208.
.My April 16 vote (concurring in result, supra note 3) is entirely consistent with the position I take today. While I still concur in denying the proponents' motion to withdraw the petition and in effecting final disposition of this cause by adjudication, I do not favor a dismissal upon proponents' quest to withdraw their petition. The form of adjudication I press for is that of declaring the initiative petition abandoned and its proponents in default for want of a timely brief (see Part II infra). An "adjudication" is distinguishable from a judicial disposition that would effect the proceeding's termination by dismissal upon proponents' motion to withdraw the petition from submission to a vote.
. A dispute ceases to present a lively "case or controversy" when the tendered issues are abstract, academic, hypothetical or have become moot. Hughey v. Grand River Dam Authority, 1995 OK 56, 897 P.2d 1138, 1143; Northeast Okl. Elec. v. Corporation Comm'n, 1991 OK 28, 808 P.2d 680, 683; Westinghouse Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Grand River Dam Auth., 1986 OK 20, ¶ 21, 720 P.2d 713, 718; Rogers v. Excise Bd. of Greer County, 1984 OK 95, ¶ 15, 701 P.2d 754, 761; Lawrence v. Cleveland County Home Loan Auth., 1981 OK 28, 626 P.2d 314, 315; Edwards v. *133Hanna Lumber Co., 1966 OK 20, 415 P.2d 980, 981; Westgate Oil Co. v. Refiners Production Co., 1935 OK 548, 44 P.2d 993, 994; Payne v. Jones, 1944 OK 86, 146 P.2d 113, 116; Wallace v. McClendon, 1930 OK 305, ¶ 3, 289 P. 354. See also Application of Goodwin, 1979 OK 106, 597 P.2d 762, 765 n. 8.
. Morton v. Adair County Excise Bd., 1989 OK 174, 780 P.2d 707, 711; Rogers, supra note 9 at 761.
. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172, 97 S.Ct. 1739, 1740, 52 L.Ed.2d 219 (1977); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-317, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1705-1706, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974); Park View Hospital Trust Auth. v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Labor, 1996 OK 108, 925 P.2d 541, 544 (Opala, J., concurring in judgment).
. See in this connection Shelton v. Lambert, 1965 OK 28, ¶ 6, 399 P.2d 467, 469 ('The withdrawal or dismissal of a protest to an initiative measure is in effect its abandonment within the meaning of 34 O.S.1961 § 8. Upon such withdrawal the protest is treated as abandoned subject to the right of 'any other citizen' to revive it within five days from the abandonment."). Likewise, a proponent's attempt to withdraw an initiative measure should be treated as an abandonment of the petition.
. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1227, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) (a class representative is a fiduciary for absent class members); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig, 182 F.R.D. 42, 46 (S.D.N.Y.1998). A class action may not be voluntarily dismissed by the named plaintiffs without the court's approval and notice of the proposed dismissal to all members of the class in whatever manner the court directs. 12 O.S.2001 § 2023 (D) and (E); Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e); Blanchard v. EdgeMmark Financial Corp., 175 F.R.D. 293, 298-99 (N.D.Ill.1997); Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1305 (4th Cir.1978).
. In order to carry out its role as guardian of the absent class members' interests, the court has the power and the duty, as set forth in 12 O.S.2001 § 2023 (D) and (E), to ensure that the class representative and class counsel do nothing to compromise or otherwise prejudice the interests of those whom they have. undertaken to represent. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(d) and (e); Blanchard, supra note 13 at 298-99, citing Manual for Compex Litigation (Third) § 30 (1995).
. The proponents of an initiative measure and the petition's signatories act in the capacity of legislators. In re Initiative Petition No. 23, State Question No. 38, 1912 OK 611, 127 P. 862, 866, the court observes that "[pleople interested as the circulators of ... [initiative] petitions, and the others who sign them, are acting in the capacity of legislators. They are members of the largest legislative body in the state, and, where so acting, do so in a public or at least a quasi public capacity. ..." See also Brock v. The Honorable Donald D. Thompson, 1997 OK 127, ¶ 12, 948 P.2d 279, 286.
. I do not counsel for additional notice-giving in this case but rather wish to foreshadow a needed procedural change in processing initiative petitions after the proponents' withdrawal or abandonment. Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum, 1986 OK 16, 732 P.2d 438, 447-448 n. 46 (notice can 'be mandated by a pronouncement that is given prospective effect).
. The adoption of my proposed procedure would be consistent with those statutory requirements that call for this court to adopt rules governing challenges during the initiative (or referendum) process. 34 O.S.Supp.1992 § 8 (E). If the applicable procedure is not set forth in either § 8 or Rule 1.194, Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules, 12 O.S.Supp.1997, App. 1, this court may utilize any "procedure that conforms to federal and state constitutional due process requirements." In re Initiative Petition No. 365, State Question No. 687, 2000 OK 85, ¶ 2, 14 P.3d 545, 546.
The terms of 34 O.S.Supp.1992 § 8 (E) are:
E. Upon the filing of an objection to the count, the Supreme Court shall resolve the objection with dispatch. The Supreme Court shall adopt rules to govern proceedings to apply to the challenge of a measure on the grounds that the proponents failed to gather sufficient signatures.
The terms of Rule 1.194 are:
Proceedings in the Supreme Court to determine protests or objections to initiative and referendum petitions shall be commenced and proceed in accordance with the procedures set out in 34 O.S.Supp.1992 § 8.
The proceeding shall be treated as an original action and the parties shall be afforded a trial de novo, In re Initiative Petition 281, State Ques. No. 441, Okl.,[1967 OK 230] 434 P.2d 941. If factual issues are raised, the Court may assign the matter to a referee.
The Court may issue directions when the procedure is not set out in 34 O.S.Supp.1992 § 8, in this Rule, or in Part VI of these Rules.
. The prudential rule of necessity, adhered to by all state and federal courts, holds that constitutional issues must not be resolved in advance of strict necessity. In re Initiative Petition No. 363, State Question No. 672, 1996 OK 122, 927 P.2d 558, 565; In re Initiative Petition No. 347, supra note 1 at 1037 (Opala, C.J., concurring); Smith v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1987 OK 3, 732 P.2d 466, 467 n. 3; I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Schwartz v. Diehl, 1997 OK 115, 568 P.2d 280, 283; Dablemont v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 1975 OK 162, 543 P.2d 563, 564.
. The pertinent provisions of Art. 5, § 3, Okl. Const., are:
* * * Petitions and orders for the initiative and for the referendum shall be filed with the Secretary of State and addressed to the Governor of the state, who shall submit the same to the people. The Legislature shall make suitable provisions for carrying into effect the provisions of this article.
. Smith, supra note 18, at 467.
. Supra note 2.
. Id.
. My unswerving commitment to Threadgill, supra note 2, is documented in several reported decisions. See In re Initiative Petition No. 349, supra note 1 at 18 (Opala, C.J., dissenting); In re Initiative Petition No. 348, supra note 1 at 781 (Opala, C.J., concurring in result); In re Initiative Petition No. 347, supra note 1, at 1037 (Opala, C.J., concurring); In re Initiative Petition No. 341, supra note 1 at 275 (Opala, V.C.J., concurring in result); In re Initiative Petition No. 317, State Question No. 556, 1982 OK 78, 648 P.2d 1207, 1222 (Opala, J., concurring in the judgment); In re Initiative Petition No. 315, supra note 1 at 554-555 (Opala, J., concurring in result); In re Initiative Petition No. 349 (No. 76,-437, February 20, 1991) (Opala, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (unpublished opinion).
. For an initiative to pass the threshold test it must (a) be in substantial compliance with the sine qua non procedural requirements for submission, (b) address but a single subject (In re Initiative Petition No. 344, State Question No. 630, 1990 OK 75, 797 P.2d 326, 330; In re Initiative Petition No. 342, State Question 628, 1990 OK 76, 797 P.2d 331, 333) and (c) embrace content appropriate for lawmaking by the people (In re Supreme Court Adjudication, Etc., supra note 1); see also in this connection In re Initiative Petition No. 347, supra note 1 (Opala, C.J., concurring).
. Supra note 2.