concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority holds that when a school district fails to properly notify a probationary teacher that his or her teaching contract will not be renewed for the following year as required by the Teacher Employment, Compensation and Dismissal Act ("TECDA"), sections 22-68-101 to -408, C.R.S. (2007), the probationary teacher is entitled to compensation in the form of full back pay and benefits without any deduction for income earned in mitigation. The TECDA provides a specific remedy for such insufficient notice-namely, that a probationary teacher is "deemed to be reemployed for the succeeding academic year." We have long held that this remedy renews the probationary teacher's contract for the succeeding academic year by operation of law. In my view, that is all that the statute does. When that renewed contract is subsequently breached by the district, as occurred in this case, the probationary teacher is entitled to ordinary contract remedies. These include specific performance in the form of reinstatement (which the majority correctly concludes is not available in this case) and contract damages. Because mitigation is a longstanding principle of contract damages-a principle that the majority fails *234to employ in this case-I respectfully dissent from Part IL.C.2 of the opinion.
I.
Section 22-68-208(8), C.R.S. (2007), states that if a school district does not follow the proper procedures for notifying a probationary teacher that his or her employment contract will not be renewed for the following school year, the probationary teacher is "deemed to be reemployed for the succeeding academic year." As we have long held, this provision creates a new one-year employment contract by operation of law. Sch. Dist, RE-11J, Alamosa County v. Norwood, 644 P.2d 13, 14 (Colo.1982) (affirming district court's conclusion that where probationary teacher did not receive timely notice, her "contract for employment was automatically renewed for the [following] school year"); see also Julesburg Sch. Dist. No. RE-1 v. EKbke, 193 Colo. 40, 42, 562 P.2d 419, 421 (1977) (The statute "creates a contract by law between the school board and its teachers."); Marzec v. Fremont County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 142 Colo. 83, 86, 349 P.2d 699, 701 (1960) (The statute "makes a contract for the parties by operation of the law, where otherwise none would exist.") (citation omitted). Indeed, in his complaint, Barbour acknowledged his rights under the TECDA as contractual, alleging as a claim for relief a breach of contract created by law under the statute based on the Board's insufficient notice and its refusal to rehire him for the 2004-2005 school year.
Today, we affirm the court of appeals' ruling that Barbour received insufficient notice in this case, maj. op. at 228-81; the question then becomes one of remedy. Id. at 231. As noted above, the statute provides that the remedy for insufficient notice of non-renewal is the renewal of the probationary teacher's contract by operation of law for a new one-year period. At that point, the probationary teacher has a new one-year contract-but that is all he or she has. The statutory remedy is at its end. If the school district fails to honor that contract, as occurred in this case, the district has breached the contract and ordinary contract remedies apply. These include specific performance (that is, reinstatement to the probationary teacher's previous position) or contract damages in the form of back pay and benefits.
I agree with the majority that reinstatement is not an option in this case. Id. at 231. As the majority points out, the parties were engaged in litigation during the 2004-2005 year, thus ruling out reinstatement during that year, and the Board properly complied with the notice requirements to inform Barb our that he would not be reemployed during the succeeding academic years. Id. at 281-32. Because reinstatement is not an option, the majority correctly concludes that damages (in the form of back pay and benefits) are the only remaining remedy in this case. Id.
The majority's mistake, in my view, is to omit an important principle of common law contract damages from that remedy-that is, mitigation. Colorado law is clear that breach of employment contract damages are to be offset by earnings from alternative employment. See, eg., Fair v. Red Lion Inn, 948 P.2d 481, 489 (Colo.1997) (holding that injured employee has duty to mitigate damages flowing from breach of implied employment contract by accepting other employment); Dep't of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 250 (Colo.1984) (awarding back pay with offset for alternative earnings where probationary employee was discharged without following proper procedures under state personnel rule). Here, the majority awards a contract damages remedy that mistakenly ignores a longstanding component of the common law.
Robb v. School District No. RE 50(J) addresses a situation virtually identical to Barbour's. In that case, the plaintiff teacher brought an action against the school district for breach of an employment contract based on the district's alleged failure to properly notify him under the TECDA that his teaching contract was terminated. 28 Colo.App. 458, 455, 475 P.2d 830, 81 (1970). The school district had hired another teacher to fill the position, so reinstatement was not possible. As a result, damages in the form of lost earnings were awarded, but the plaintiffs earnings from his alternative employment were applied as an offset. Id. at 461, 475 P.2d at 3838. Likewise, as the majority ac*235knowledges, Barbour cannot be reinstated because any right to reinstatement was limited to the 2004-2005 school year. Thus, he is entitled to his lost earnings from that year, but as in Robb, those earnings are subject to offset by his substitute income.
IL.
The majority rejects the mitigation principle for three reasons, none of which is persuasive.
First, it takes the position that the statute itself requires full back pay and benefits without mitigation when there has been insufficient notice of nonrenewal. Maj. op. at 282. The statute, however, nowhere states that back pay without mitigation is required as a remedy for insufficient notice. Indeed, the only remedy specified by the statute for insufficient notice is the renewal of the teacher's contract by operation of law-that is, the probationary teacher "shall be deemed to be reemployed for the succeeding academic year." The statute simply does not address what happens onee the probationary teacher has been awarded a contract renewal by operation of law but the district refuses to honor it As noted above, the remedy for such a breach is supplied by the common law in the form of specific performance (in the form of reinstatement) or contract damages, including mitigation.
I thus agree with the majority that the TECDA does not mention mitigation, maj. op. at 283, but to me that fact is irrelevant. The statute only creates a new one-year contract by operation of law; it does not provide any remedy for breach of that contract. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, id., there would be no reason for the General Assembly to add a mitigation requirement to a contract damages remedy when the statute does not speak of that remedy in the first place. If common law contract damages apply to a breach of the renewed contract, we need to look at the rules of common law contract damages in their entirety, including mitigation.
Second, the majority relies on our decision in Norwood. In that ease, the school district sought to terminate the employment of Nor-wood, a probationary teacher, pursuant to the prior version of the TECDA. However, the written notice of termination did not reach Norwood until after the statutory deadline. 644 P.2d at 14, 16-17. Norwood commenced an action seeking a declaration that "she was automatically reemployed as a teacher for the [subsequent] school year and for a mandatory injunction reinstating her to her teaching position with full fringe benefits, back pay, and all statutory entitlements." Id. at 14. The court upheld the trial court's finding that the termination notice was improper under the TECDA and further upheld the award of reinstatement with back pay and fringe benefits. Id. at 18.
The vast majority of the court's opinion discusses the timeliness of the district's notice. Its mention of a remedy is limited to two paragraphs at the end of the opinion, which state:
Finally, the school district asserts that the district court ordered an award of back pay and fringe benefits without any evidence to sustain the order. It predicates this assertion on its misconception that Norwood's action was for a wrongful dismissal and that, therefore, the proper measure of damages is the difference between the teacher's salary and her earnings in mitigation during the period of wrongful discharge.
Petitioner misstates the nature of this declaratory action, which is not one for damages, but rather is grounded on the automatic reemployment statute relating to non-tenured teachers and which sought a mandatory injunction reinstating her to the teaching position she held, as provided by the statute. The award of back pay and fringe benefits follows by operation of law upon her reinstatement. We find petitioner's argument to be without merit.
Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
Thus, in Norwood, we stated that mitigation in that case was not an issue due to the nature of Norwood's particular declaratory action, "which [was] not one for damages" but rather sought a reinstatement to the teaching position she held. Id. at 18. Nor-wood actually was reinstated to her teaching position, and her award of back pay and *236fringe benefits-presumably for that portion of the year that she had missed-simply "follow[ed] by operation of law upon her reinstatement." Id. The Norwood court therefore did not-and could not, given the circumstances of the case-reach the question posed here, which is whether mitigation is applicable when reinstatement is not an option and common law contract damages supply the remedy for breach of the renewed contract. Although we rejected the district's characterization of Norwood's claim as one for damages, we did not reject the district's argument that, had Norwood's action been one for damages, mitigation would be appropriate. In other words, we rejected the district's description of Norwood's claim (as one for damages), but not its statement of the law that mitigation would have applied had its description of Norwood's claim been correct. In sum, there is no need to "overrule" Norwood on this point, as the majority posits, maj. op. at 282; Norwood is simply inapplicable.
Importantly, the majority limits Norwood to its facts (that is, to situations in which reinstatement is possible in the year following the notice violation) when it addresses the reinstatement issue in this case. Maj. op. at 282. As noted above, in Norwood, we awarded both reinstatement and full back pay. Here, Barbour contends that he is entitled to just that-back pay for the school year following improper notice, 2004-2005, as well as reinstatement in a subsequent year. The majority properly rejects this view by noting that Norwood "did not specifically address" whether reinstatement is required in every case. Id. at 282. Ultimately, it holds that Barbour cannot receive both reinstatement and back pay because, unlike in Norwood, reinstatement for the year following the notice violation is impossible. Id. at 282. In my view, if Norwood is to be limited to its facts regarding reinstatement and back pay, it should be so limited in the context of mitigation as well.
The majority rejects mitigation on a third ground: public policy. It concludes that mitigation would allow school districts to give insufficient notice "without repercussion" and leave probationary teachers not "appropriately compensated." Id. at 288. In my view, mitigation would lead to neither of these results. The goal of contract damages is to place the plaintiff in the same position he or she would have been in had the breach not occurred-not one that is better or worse. Donahue, 690 P.2d at 250; Lanes v. O'Brien, 746 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Colo.App.1987). As applied to this case, Barbour got paid more in his alternative employment than what he would have made at Hanover Junior-Senior High School, but "the change of employment meant an increase in Barbour's daily commute of seventy-seven miles and his loss of three federal and private grants." Maj. op. at 226. The appropriate damages remedy for the breach of Barbour's renewed contract would be the difference between what Barbour would have made had he worked at Hanover for a year (including his grant money), and what he did in fact make at his alternative employment (less his increased travel costs). This is "appropriate" compensation for Barbour under longstanding common law contract damages. See Robb, 28 Colo.App. at 461, 475 P.2d at 38. It also means that, contrary to the majority's concern, the school district's insufficient notice will have a "repercussion" in the form of a damage award it must pay.
IIL
The statutory remedy for the district's improper notification of Barbour is a one-year contract renewal by operation of law. When the district refused to honor that renewed contract, Barbour's remedy was common law contract damages. Because the majority determines that mitigation-a longstanding principle of contract damages-is inapplicable to this case, I respectfully dissent with respect to Part II.C.2 of its opinion.
I am authorized to state that Justice RICE joins in this concurrence and dissent.