dissenting.
¶ 28 I respectfully dissent. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Carlos from calling F. as a witness because it had valid reasons for doing so. F. had made it abundantly clear during the first trial that not only would he be uncooperative and disrespectful, but he would also give no substantive, let alone potentially exculpatory, testimony. As noted in ¶ 3, the first trial ended in a mistrial. If the second trial had commenced three days or three weeks later, would the trial court have been required to call F. to the witness stand again, or even to summon him for a pretrial hearing, outside the jury’s presence, in order to discern his intentions and level of cooperation? I think not. And, if that is so, why should the fact that three months had elapsed since F. had appeared before the court necessarily lead to a different conclusion, in the absence of any suggestion, let alone showing, that F.’s attitude or intentions had changed?
¶ 29 Neither Carlos nor the majority cites any authority supporting the proposition that a trial court violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights or otherwise abuses its discretion by precluding a witness from “testifying” under the circumstances presented here. Without question, a defendant generally has a Sixth Amendment right “to present his own witnesses to establish a defense,” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 1023 (1967), including the right to subpoena the victim as a witness to testify at trial. State v. Sorenson, 152 Wis.2d 471, 449 N.W.2d 280, 287 (App.1989). Neither Washington nor Sorenson, however, involved a recalcitrant, uncooperative, and disrespectful witness who *281clearly demonstrated in a prior trial that he would offer no substantive testimony whatsoever.3
¶ 30 Similarly, the Fifth Amendment cases to which the majority analogizes are distinguishable on that same basis and do not support its result. See State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 665 P.2d 70 (1983); State v. Mills, 196 Ariz. 269, 995 P.2d 705 (App.1999); State v. Maldonado, 181 Ariz. 208, 889 P.2d 1 (App.1994). Those eases do not even suggest, let alone hold, that a trial court must re-interrogate an uncooperative witness or, worse yet, permit him to appear before the jury at a second trial when that witness unabashedly had refused to give any substantive testimony at the first trial a short time before. Moreover, in the Fifth Amendment context, a trial court may properly preclude a witness who “legitimately refuse[s] to answer essentially all relevant questions.” 4 McDaniel, 136 Ariz. at 194, 665 P.2d at 76. See also State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583, 588-89, 676 P.2d 615, 620-21 (1983). And, as this court has stated: “ ‘The Sixth Amendment right to call a witness must be considered in light of its purpose, namely to produce testimony for the defendant. Calling a witness who will refuse to testify does not fulfill the purpose....' "Mills, 196 Ariz. 269, ¶ 31, 995 P.2d 705, ¶ 31, quoting United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir .1974) (citations omitted in Mills).
¶ 31 In upholding the quashing of a subpoena in Mills on Fifth Amendment grounds, we essentially deferred to the trial court’s “reasonable speculation based on the court’s knowledge of the case.” 196 Ariz. 269, ¶ 34, 995 P.2d 705, ¶ 34. Similarly, the trial court’s preclusion order was based on its “reasonable speculation” that F. again would be uncooperative and offer no material testimony. Id. The record does not reflect, nor does Carlos suggest, that any intervening change in circumstances had occurred between the two trials or that F.’s attitude, intentions, lack of cooperation, or behavior would have been any different in September 1999 than in June. The Sixth Amendment affords no right to call a witness who in all likelihood will refuse to testify. Id. at ¶ 31, 995 P.2d at ¶ 31.
¶ 32 It is also worth noting that the trial court ruled on August 5, 1999, that Carlos could not call F. as a witness unless defense counsel could first establish that he would cooperate. The second trial did not commence until September 21. Although defense counsel stated at that time that F. had refused to meet with or be interviewed by her, counsel did not specify what steps she had taken, if any, between August 5 and September 21 to interview or depose F. For example, the record does not reflect that Carlos ever moved to depose F. pursuant to Rule 15.3(a)(2), Ariz.R.Crim.P., 16A A.R.S. See Stapleford v. Houghton, 185 Ariz. 560, 917 P.2d 703 (1996) (inmate/victim in custody has no right to refuse interview by defense). Although Carlos had sufficient time and opportunity to attempt to show that F. would cooperate and substantively testify, he failed to do so. In view of that failure, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Carlos from calling F.
1133 Nor did the trial court err in placing that burden on Carlos, as the majority concludes. See ¶¶ 12, 16, 17, 20. Although United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982), is factually distinguishable, its principles are now well settled and fully applicable here. In order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant “must at least make some plausible showing of how [a proffered witness’s] testimony would have been both *282material and favorable to his defense Id. at 867, 102 S.Ct. at 3442, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1202.5 And, courts have upheld that requirement in cases such as this, in which no illegal alien witnesses or countervailing governmental issues such as deportation are involved. See, e.g., Selam v. Warm Springs Tribal Correctional Facility, 134 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Mejia-Uribe, 75 F.3d 395, 399 (8th Cir.1996); Howard v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 132, 367 S.E.2d 527, 534-35 (1988).
¶ 34 The majority’s statement that Carlos was only required to show that F.’s testimony, theoretically, would have been relevant and material to the defense begs the question. ¶ 16. In order to obtain reversal under the circumstances presented here, a defendant must show that a proffered witness actually can and will give such testimony. Because Carlos made no such showing, the abstract, hypothetical notion that F.’s testimony, if forthcoming, would be relevant and material is of no moment.
¶ 35 The majority’s effort to avoid the Valenzuela-Bernal requirement by distinguishing victims from other proffered witnesses also is unavailing.6 ¶ 14. Indeed, absent Fifth Amendment considerations or plea bargain arrangements, an accomplice or other alleged perpetrator of the charged offense would be more likely than a victim to give testimony that is favorable and material to the defense. In any event, the showing required by Valenzuela-Bernal and its progeny applies to those parties who seek to have victims as well as other witnesses testify at trial. See State v. Salazar, 289 N.W.2d 753, 754 (Minn.1980) (state’s failure to locate and call victim as witness did not deprive defendant of fair trial, in part, because there was “no reason to believe that the victim’s testimony would have been favorable to defendant”); State v. LaTender, 86 Wis.2d 410, 273 N.W.2d 260, 271 (1979) (failure of one victim to appear and testify at trial, despite having been subpoenaed, did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights); cf. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 509 (9th Cir.1994) (no Sixth Amendment or due process violation resulted from defendant’s inability to interview victim/witness before trial, when defendant failed to show that “additional material and favorable evidence was available or even sought” from victim); People v. Habersham, 162 A.D.2d 370, 557 N.Y.S.2d 36, 36 (1990) (trial court’s refusal to allow defendant to call victim at pretrial hearing did not violate Sixth Amendment rights when defendant failed to show victim’s testimony would have supported his claim that identification procedures were unduly suggestive).
¶ 36 Carlos’s underlying motivation behind this claim of error is obvious. He wants to call F. as a witness not because of any testimony he may give, but rather because Carlos understandably, and probably accurately, expects F. to act out again on the witness stand, prejudicing the jury and enhancing his chances of a mistrial or acquittal. Indeed, Carlos expressly argues that if F. had “persisted in not wanting to testify then the jurors would have known this first hand and could have deliberated with this information.” In addition, Carlos’s pretrial motion to which the majority refers, ¶ 4, clearly revealed that he primarily sought to impeach F. with his prior felony convictions and expressly noted that F. would be “a hostile witness.” Those are not valid grounds for calling a witness, victim or otherwise, and do not justify a reversal and new trial here. See United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 713 (7th Cir.1982); cf. Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 722 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1999); State v. Jackson, 30 Or.App. 843, 568 P.2d 697, 698 (1977).
*283¶ 37 For all of these reasons, I would affirm. Alternatively, however, the most this court should do is remand for a hearing to determine whether F., in fact, would now cooperate and offer some material testimony. If so, I would agree that a new trial is in order. But if not, Carlos’s convictions should stand. The majority’s rationale for rejecting that procedure is questionable. ¶27. If in fact F.’s motivation for not cooperating or testifying is to assure Carlos’s continued imprisonment (rather than the more likely explanation of not wanting to be a prison “snitch”), F. presumably would inculpate, not exculpate, Carlos if F. were to actually testify
¶38 Finally, although the majority concludes that reversal and a new trial are required here, the scope of its holding should not be misconstrued. On remand, the trial court should determine in a hearing outside the presence of the jury whether F. will cooperate and offer any substantive, material testimony. If so, obviously Carlos is entitled to present that testimony to the jury in the new trial. But if F.’s attitude and lack of cooperation are unchanged, as everybody suspects will be the case, then the trial court should preclude F.’s appearance before the jury and would safely do so without violating any of Carlos’s rights. See Henry; McDaniel; Mills. Although the majority implicitly approves of this procedure, see ¶¶ 10, 21, 22, 27, it should expressly do so in order to avoid any confusion on remand.
. Uncontroverted evidence at trial established that F. had refused to give an interview or otherwise cooperate with prison officials who had investigated the subject incident. According to one investigator, inmate victims generally refuse to provide information for fear of being labeled a prison "snitch.”
. F.’s refusal to testify was not based on the Fifth Amendment privilege or any other valid ground. Nonetheless, as the state correctly points out and as the trial court noted, the power to hold F. in contempt "would prove fruitless, given the fact that [he] was serving life imprisonment.” See State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583, 589 n. 5, 676 P.2d 615, 621 n. 5 (1983) (threatening contempt against witness who refused to testify "was a dubious hope at best, considering the fact that the witness had already been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment”).
. Arizona courts have recognized and applied that principle in the Fifth Amendment context. See State v. Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 581, 863 P.2d 861, 873 (1993) (upholding trial court’s denial of defendant’s request to call alleged perpetrator of crime as witness, because witness would have invoked Fifth Amendment privilege, when no material and favorable evidence was lost); McDaniel, 136 Ariz. at 194-95, 665 P.2d at 76-77 (to same effect); Mills, 196 Ariz. 269, V31, 995 P.2d 705, ¶ 31 (defendant has right to compel attendance of witnesses whose testimony is both material and favorable to defense).
. "There is no constitutional requirement that the victim of any crime testify.” State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 265, 394 P.2d 196, 200 (1964).