concurring.
I concur because I agree with the majority that appellant suffers from a mental disorder and is dangerous to others. In fact, appellant is extremely dangerous to women. As explained below, I write separately due to my concern regarding the use of the civil commitment statutes for purposes of preventive detention. However, before I discuss my concern, I want to emphasize that the majority’s holding is not a license to throw people back in confinement on the day of their release from prison.
Appellant’s challenge to his civil commitment is that the state did not sufficiently prove the nexus between his par-aphilia and his dangerousness to the public and that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate he lacked volitional control. Appellant has had overwhelming urges to rape women since he was 19 years old. He has been incarcerated twice for sexually assaulting women. Regarding the last incident, appellant woke up in the morning with an urge to rape somebody and proceeded to act on that urge. At the civil commitment hearing, the experts agreed that appellant suffers from paraphilia and that it is only a matter of time before he *222again acts out on his sexually violent impulses. Thus, there was sufficient evidence of the nexus between appellant’s dangerousness and his mental disorder and sufficient evidence that appellant had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The only disagreements among the experts were whether appellant’s paraphilia was classified as a mental disorder or a personality disorder and when exactly appellant would next sexually assault someone. Appellant has not challenged his commitment on either of those grounds on appeal.
Appellant falls within a narrow overlap of criminal and civil law where persons may be subject both to criminal liability and civil commitment. In Kansas v. Crane, 534 US 407, 122 S Ct 867, 151 L Ed 2d 856 (2002), and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 US 346, 117 S Ct 2072, 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997), the United States Supreme Court limited when sexually dangerous offenders may be civilly committed and underscored the constitutional importance of distinguishing dangerous sexual offenders subject to civil commitment from other dangerous but typical recidivists who are more properly dealt with through criminal proceedings. To be constitutionally permissible, the civil commitment must take place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards and there must be a finding of dangerousness to self or others coupled with a serious mental disorder. Crane, 534 US at 409-10. Further, “there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” Id. at 413.
Those requirements have been satisfied in this case. Because those requirements were satisfied this case is not a case of preventive detention. Appellant is not “confined in any prison, jail or other enclosure where those charged with a crime * * * are incarcerated.” ORS 426.140(1). Rather, appellant is committed to the custody of the Department of Human Services, which will assign him to a treatment facility. ORS 426.140(2).
In a recent movie, Minority Report, Washington, D.C., residents could be convicted for precrimes they were about to commit. Convicting a person for a crime before the crime is committed is preventive detention. In the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it was reported that dissidents were hospitalized in mental institutions because *223their incorrect political beliefs meant that they had a mental disorder. Imprisoning political dissidents for their political beliefs is preventive detention.
As a society that values freedom, we must avoid preventive detention and avoid imprisoning individuals for their beliefs. However, in this case, appellant is not being preven-tively detained or imprisoned for his beliefs. Rather, he is committed because he meets the statutory requirements for mental commitment.