(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
[24 I concur in the general statement of the law of res judicata and rule 11 sanctions as set out in the majority opinion but dissent from application thereof to the instant case. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that each of the three actions asserted sufficiently similar claims, see supra ¶ 18, and, that, therefore, the third action is barred by the claim preclusion branch of res judicata. The suits initiated in 1984 and 2001 were private claims, the first for a prescriptive easement or irrevocable license and the second for a declaration of rights under the easement agreement negotiated in the previous case. These private claims are different than and may be pursued separately from the public interest claim under Utah Code section 72-5-104 (the Dedication Statute) as initiated in the present suit. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2009).
{25 Although the public interest claim could have been presented in either the 1984 or 2001 suit, I do not believe that it should necessarily have been raised in the previous actions for several reasons. First, neither Mr. Gillmor in his 1984 action nor Mrs. Gill-mor in her 2001 action were obligated to bring a public claim-seceking a right for the members of the public to use the Richards property-in their pursuit of a determination of their own private right to use of the property. Indeed, the Gillmors' decision not to pursue a public claim under the Dedication Statute ought not preclude any member of the general public from initiating such a suit at a later time. The objective of claim preclusion is "that a controversy should be adjudicated only once," see Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, ¶ 29, 221 P.3d 194 (internal quotation marks omitted). This, however, is not feasible in the present case where members of the public may still pursue a public claim regardless of prior private right litigation.
T 26 Application of claim preclusion to this matter would lead to an illogical result. A literal application of claim preclusion in the present case would have the effect of preventing all members of the public from bringing a public claim based on the res judicata ruling barring the Gillmors from pursuing such a public claim. Even if claim preclusion were applied only to the Gillmors, the majority's decision today would be illogical in that it would prevent the Gillmors from pursuing a claim which any other member of the public might bring seeking the declaration of a public right in this piece of property. Instead of ending a dispute about the rights pertaining to a parcel, the majority decision simply delays the resolution for another day.
T 27 Second, the private claims asserted in the 1984 and 2001 actions are inherently different and require the presence of different factual determinations than the present public claim under the Dedication Statute.7 *750As such, I would reverse the district court's dismissal of Mrs. Gillmor's public claim on res judicata grounds.
{28 Because I would reach a different conclusion on the issue of res judicata than the majority, it follows that Mrs. Gillmor's claim was asserted with a good faith argument against res judicata, see Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (providing that rule 11 is violated when an attorney fails to make a reasonable inquiry to assure that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law"), is "objectively reasonable under all the cireumstances," Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1992), and should not result in rule 11(b) sanctions. Even if I am wrong and have erroneously applied the claim preclusion branch of res judicata, this is not enough to support a rule 11 violation. See id. ("[Tlhe mere fact that the attorney's view of the law was wrong cannot support a finding of a rule 11 violation."). Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's decision concerning the imposition of sanctions.
. The 1984 action asserted a claim for prescriptive easement. To establish a prescriptive easement, a claimant "must establish a use that is *750open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for at least twenty years." Edgell v. Canning, 1999 UT 21, ¶ 8, 976 P.2d 1193. The 2001 action sought a declaration of rights under the easement agreement negotiated in the previous case. Neither of these two causes of action require, as does the present claim, proof that the property has been continuously used by the public as a public thoroughfare. See Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, ¶ 10, 208 P.3d 1077, cert. denied, 215 P.3d 161 (Utah 2009). 'To satisfy the public thoroughfare element, must demonstrate proof of (i) passing or travel, (ii) by the public, and (iii) without permission." Id. ¶ 11.