concurring.
Shortly before his death, Kent Leppink sent a letter to his parents. The letter contained a sealed envelope. Leppink directed his parents to not open the sealed envelope unless something "fishy" happened to him.
After Leppink died, his parents opened the envelope. In a note contained in the envelope, Leppink stated that if he died under suspicious cireumstances that "Mechele, John [Carlin] or Scott [Hilke] were the people, or persons that probably killed me. Make sure they get burned." He instructed his parents to "[ulse the information enclosed to take Mechele down. Make sure she is prosecuted." Leppink's accusations that were con*151tained in the note are the key evidence in question in this appeal.
All of the authority of which we are aware holds that these "accusations from the grave" are extremely prejudicial, As Judge Mann-heimer states in his majority opinion:
Many courts have noted the extremely prejudicial and inflammatory nature of a victim's accusatory statements "from the grave". See, e.g., People v. Coleman, [38 Cal.3d 69,] 211 Cal.Rptr. 102, 111, 695 P.2d 189, 198 (Cal.1985); State v. Prudden, [212 N.J.Super. 608,] 515 A.2d 1260 (N.J.App.1986); State v. Downey, [206 N.J.Super. 382,] 502 A.2d 1171 (N.J.App.1986). Even in cases where the victim's accusatory statement was found to be properly admitted to prove or explain the victim's ensuing actions, appellate courts have acknowledged that this type of evidence is fraught with inherent dangers, and that it requires rigid limitations on its admission and its use by the jury. See United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 766 (D.C.Cir.1973).
(In addition, in State v. Sanchez,1 the court found that admission of this kind of aceusation to support the inference that the victim feared the accused or that the accused was the perpetrator violates the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. The court held that because "the intended audience [of the note] reasonably included law enforcement and the circumstances surrounding the note indicate that an objective declarant reasonably should have anticipated that the State would make use of the statements at trial ... [the] note was testimonial ...")2
Decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court are consistent with these holdings. In Wyatt v. State,3 the court stated that the fact that a murder victim feared the accused is inadmissible "if its probative value depends on the impermissible inference that, because the victim feared the accused, the accused likely did something or planned to do something to justify the fear." 4
The State does not dispute this authority. The State concedes that Leppink's accusations that "Mechele, John or Seott were the people, or persons that probably killed me" would be inadmissible hearsay if it was offered "to prove the truth of Leppink's prediction that Linchan would kill him." The State argues that the note was admissible "to explain Leppink's actions shortly before the murder-actions which could only be understood when viewed in relation to the confusion reflected in Leppink's letter ...".
As Judge Mannheimer points out in the opinion of the court, there was, however, no dispute concerning Leppink's deep infatuation with Linchan and his confused feelings about her, nor was there any dispute concerning Leppink's actions. The easiest way to demonstrate this is to discuss the "Hope note." This was the note that Linehan participated in writing that lured Leppink to Hope, where he was murdered.
Linehan conceded that in April of 1996, she had arranged to take a trip to Sacramento and Lake Tahoe so that she could be with Scott Hilke, who was then living in California. Linchan was gone between April 25 and May 2. Before she left, she and Carlin wrote a note that they placed where Leppink would find it. The note, purportedly from Carlin, mentioned a cabin which he had worked on for Linehan in Hope. The letter implied that Linehan would be at the cabin "this weekend" with another man. At the bottom of the note was a handwritten message from Linehan indicating "please don't let anyone know where we are at."
It is uncontested that the note was a fabrication and that there was no cabin in Hope. On the weekend of April 27, Leppink traveled to Hope looking for Linchan. It was during this time that Leppink changed the beneficiaries on his life insurance three times, tore up the will that named Linehan as the beneficiary, and wrote the letter to his parents. The parties do not dispute that Leppink contacted Carlin to help him find *152Linehan in Hope, and that Carlin killed Lep-pink there.
This evidence, which was uncontested, clearly demonstrates Leppink's relationship with Linehan. He was infatuated with her, didn't trust her and had very confused feelings about her, and would likely respond to the Hope note by trying to find her. Line-han knew this and wrote the Hope note. Linehan contended that she wrote the note to divert Leppink so that she could have her romantic encounter with Hilke. The State contended that Linchan wrote the Hope note to lure Leppink to Hope so Carlin could kill him. But the relationship between Leppink and Linchan was clear-he had strong and conflicted feelings about her and she could easily manipulate him. In short, there was no reason to admit the accusations that Lep-pink made in his letter to his parents to explain that relationship or show his "actions shortly before the murder." It is undisputed what Leppink did, why he did it, and how he felt. The question was Linehan's intent when she wrote the Hope note.
The State also argues that the accusations that Leppink made in the note were admissible to explain Linehan's cooperation with the state troopers during her May 5 interview. The State contends that the defense argued that Linehan's conduct during the investigation was consistent with her innocence-that Linehan had cooperated by volunteering knowledge about the Desert Eagle gun, had acknowledged her relationship with Leppink, admitted her involvement in drafting the Hope note, and did not make a claim to the insurance proceeds or under Leppink's will. The State argued that it needed to explain Linehan's cooperation by showing that, before she talked to the troopers, she had been informed about Leppink's letter.
There are several problems with the State's claim that it needed to introduce the accusation in the letter. First, it is undisputed that, on May 4, a day before Linehan's interview with the troopers, she talked to Lane Leppink, Kent Leppink's brother, who told her that "she should be careful because {his] parents would blame her." So Linchan had already been informed that she was a suspect before she talked to the troopers. Second, as Judge Mannheimer points out in the opinion of the court, it is unclear when Linehan was actually informed about the letter-it could well have been after she talked to the troopers on May 5. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that Leppink's letter was only admissible to show Leppink's state of mind and was not admissible for any other purpose.
In conclusion, courts appear to universally conclude that admission of "accusations from the grave" similar to the kind admitted in this case are highly prejudicial. The reasons which the State has advanced for admitting this evidence do not stand up to analysis. The State's case against Linehan was cireum-stantial, and the evidence was subject to different interpretations and was hardly overwhelming. We accordingly conclude that Linehan's conviction must be reversed.
. 341 Mont. 240, 177 P.3d 444, 451-53 (2008).
. Id. at 453.
. 981 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1999).
. Id. at 113, quoting Linton v. State, 880 P.2d 123, 130 (Alaska App.1994), aff'd on reh'g 901 P.2d 439 (Alaska App.1995).