dissenting:
The majority adopts a two-part test to determine the constitutionality of a Commission decision to split a county. First, the Commission must have been "sufficiently attentive to county boundaries to meet the requirements of section 47(2)." To comply with this first prong of the test, the majority explains that the Commission must begin by allotting districts to counties that have sufficient population to support one or more house or senate districts. Further, the Commission must "tak[el an overview" of the state as a whole in drawing districts and, thus, a "build-out" justification will no longer be acceptable under the majority's interpretation of the Colorado Constitution. Under the second prong of the majority's test, the Commission must, when it splits a county, advance "an adequate factual showing that less drastic alternatives could not have satisfied the equal population requirement of the Colorado Constitution."
Based on these newly created standards, the majority holds that splits of four specific counties (Boulder, Douglas, Jefferson, and Pueblo) in the Commission's proposed plan for senate districts ("Proposed Plan") are unconstitutional under the first prong of the test. The majority also finds that the Commission did not, under the second prong of the test, advance adequate explanations of the splits of three counties (Adams, Arapahoe, and Mesa) and two cities (Boulder and Pueblo). The majority approves the remainder of the Proposed Plan, including all of the house districts created by the Commission.
I respectfully dissent. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority's interpretation of the Colorado Constitution. The new constitutional tests fashioned by the majority effectively overrule the primary holdings of our 1982 and 1992 reapportionment cases without directly saying so. In my view, the majority takes an overly simplistic view of the reapportionment process-one which adopts an unnecessarily rigid approach to redistricting, while simultaneously and inconsistently creating a test that defies precedent and fails to provide guidance as to how it should be applied in the future.
The majority's opinion is problematic for several reasons. First, the majority, though purporting to apply the correct standard of review, fails to follow its own articulation of that standard. Second, the majority creates an unpredictable two-part test, never before used by this court, to determine the constitutionality of a county split. Third, the majority simultaneously announces a bright-line rule that is inconsistent with precedent because it strips the Commission of discretion and because it prohibits types of splits that we have previously approved as constitutional. Fourth, the majority's rule will often protect the integrity of more populous counties, especially those in the Denver metropolitan area, at the expense of less populous counties. Finally, applying the second prong of the majority's two-part test, I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority, that the Commission provided inadequate explanations for the splits of Adams, Arapahoe, and Mesa Counties and the Cities of Boulder and Pueblo.
Under the Commission's Plan, fifty-one of Colorado's sixty-three counties are not split. The alternative plans, upon which the majority places great weight, increase the number of undivided counties to only fifty-two. Although I readily admit that the Proposed Plan is not perfect, I cannot agree, on these facts, that it fails to comply with the constitutional standards that our previous cases have developed. I would approve the Proposed Plan because it substantially complies with the state constitutional requirements of equal population, avoidance of county and city *1256splits, compactness and contiguousness of districts, and preservation of communities of interest. In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 190 (Colo.1992) [hereinafter "In re Reapportionment 1992 "]; In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 193-94 (Colo.1982) [hereinafter "In re Reapportionment 1982 "1. Contrary to the approach taken by the majority in determining whether the Proposed Plan complies with the Colorado Constitution, our review should be limited in seope and deferential to the Commission's judgment. In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 189; In re Reapportion 1982, 647 P.2d at 194. Applying our constitutional precedent, the Proposed Plan meets constitutional muster.
I. The Majority Fails To Apply Its Own "Narrow" Standard of Review
No plan adopted by the Commission can go into effect absent approval by this court. Colo. Const. art. V, § 48(1)(e). Onee a plan is submitted to us, however, we have always required the seope of our review to be narrow. In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 194. We are not to redraw boundaries or choose what we view as a better plan from among alternative plans. If alternate plans all meet constitutional criteria, then the Commission, not this court, is vested with the discretion to adopt the plan of its choice. Id. ("The choice among alternative plans, cach consistent with constitutional requirements, is for the Commission and not the Court."). Our job is to examine the plan submitted by the Commission only to determine whether it comports with constitutional criteria. Id. ("Our role in this proceeding is ... to measure the present reapportionment plan against the constitutional standards.").
In reviewing a plan to determine whether it complies with the Colorado Constitution, we do not require absolute compliance. Instead, any plan that substantially complies with constitutional mandates must be approved. See In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 197 (approving county splits because "the Commission substantially complied with the constitutional requirements"); In re Interrogatories by the Gen. Assembly, 178 Colo. 311, 313, 497 P.2d 1024, 1025 (1972) ("[ determine that substantial compliance was achieved with the constitutional benchmarks noted above.").
Further, the plan submitted to us by the Commission is presumed to be valid. In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P2d at 189 (recognizing "the presumption of good faith and validity we must accord to the Commission"); see also In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 197 ("Although we might make different choices were we in the Commission's place, we should not substitute our judgment for the Commission's unless we are convinced the Commission departed from [the] constitutional criteria.").
The majority purports to apply these standards, but fails to engage in a "narrow" review of the Proposed Plan. Its review instead creates new constitutional standards, which conflict with our precedent. The majority uses these new standards to support its conclusion that the Proposed Plan, in part, fails to comply with the Colorado Constitution. In the majority's view, the Commission's Proposed Plan is not entitled to a presumption of validity; nor is the Proposed Plan reviewed for substantial compliance with our state constitution.
Additionally, as demonstrated by the majority's use of a chart comparing the number of splits made under the various plans, the majority bolsters many of its conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the Proposed Plan by comparing it to other alternate plans.1 Maj. op. at 1250; see also maj. op. at 1251-1258. Comparisons such as these are of questionable value since more than one plan may comport with constitutional criteria2 In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 194.
*1257II. The Majority Creates an Unworkable Test
The majority adopts a new two-part test requiring that: (1) a plan must be "sufficient, ly attentive to county boundaries"; and (2) county splits must be accompanied by "an adequate factual showing that less drastic alternatives could not have satisfied the equal population requirement of the Colorado Constitution." Maj. op. at 1241, 1246, & 1249.
Our court has never before articulated this two-part test. We have never previously even used both of these two phrases in the same case. Additionally, neither phrase was central to the holding of the particular case from which it was taken. Thus, the majority combines two unrelated phrases, contained in two opinions spanning ten years, to create a test that lacks meaningful standards and will be difficult for future courts to apply.
The first prong of the majority's test is taken from In re Reapportionment 1982. In that case, in response to opponents' arguments that the senate redistricting plan did not comply with section 47(2) of our constitution, we noted our belief that "the Commission was sufficiently attentive to county boundaries." In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 195. This remark was made in the context of a discussion of why the Commission's 1982 plan, given all of the constitutional criteria, was approved. Id. at 195-97.
The second prong of the majority's test, that the Commission must advance an "adequate factual showing that less drastic alternatives could not have satisfied the equal population requirement," is taken from In re Reapportionment 1992. In that case, we rejected a split of Pitkin County as unconstitutional because: (1) both a city and a county were split; (2) the resulting district lacked compactness; (8) the split destroyed a community of interest; and (4) the Commission's explanation of the split was not detailed enough to "provide a basis for meaningful judicial review." In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 195-96. Hence, the remark that forms the basis for the second prong of the majority's new test was also made in the context of a discussion of the necessity of applying all of the constitutional criteria.
The majority's test has, thus, overemphasized isolated language from our previous cases in order to develop its two-part analysis. In doing so, it has created a test that lacks predictability and defined standards. For instance, it is unclear when the Commission will have been "sufficiently" attentive to boundaries, or when it will have provided an "adequate" explanation of its decisions. I conclude that the imprecision of the majority's test will make it impossible for this court to render any consistent review of the constitutionality of future Commission plans.
On one hand, the majority articulates its two-part test without defining when a Commission's plan will have been "sufficiently attentive to county boundaries." Thus, the Commission and future courts have little guidance as to when a plan will meet the first prong of the majority's test or when it will fall short of compliance. On the other hand, the majority's application of the rule demonstrates that there will be only one way for the Commission to satisfy the first prong of the majority's two-part test. The majority indicates that the first prong is met only when the Commission follows the bright-line rule that it must begin by allocating districts to the most populous counties. This bright-line rule is contrary to our precedent, as discussed below. In addition, the majority's rejection of the Commission's build-out justifications strips the Commission of the discretion historically afforded it to determine the order in which counties should be arranged into districts.
Based on the majority's application of its test to the Proposed Plan, I would assume that, any time that the bright-line rule is violated, the first prong of the two-part test will not have been satisfied and that the Proposed Plan is therefore unconstitutional. Thus, the articulation of the bright-line rule renders the first prong of the test unnecessary since the bright-line rule provides a complete answer to the question of whether *1258the Commission has been "sufficiently attentive to county boundaries."
To summarize, the majority has fashioned a two-part test that finds no support in precedent and that uses language that is vague and imprecise. -It then institutes an unprecedented bright-line rule to be implemented under the first part of the test. The second prong of the test, however, remains unexplained, with no standards provided to determine when an explanation will be "adequate."
III, Requiring the Commission to Proceed in a Particular Manner and Rejecting Build-Out Justifications Violates Our Precedent
The majority posits a bright-line rule that the Commission must first allocate districts to those counties that have a population greater than an ideal house or senate district. Maj. op. at 1249. If the county population will support, for instance, 2.5 districts, then the Commission is only permitted to allocate that county's population among three districts-two districts contained entirely within county borders and one district which combines part of the population of the relevant county with neighboring counties. A Commission decision that creates, for example, one whole district within county borders and two partial districts, or two whole districts within county borders and two partial districts, will almost always be considered, under the majority's analysis, unconstitutional.
The majority's approach demands that districts be drawn in a specific way, as detailed above, because anything less would purportedly fail to comply with the constitution. The majority asserts, in essence, that the Colorado Constitution sets forth a rigid hierarchy of apportionment criteria, under which the constitutionality of a redistricting plan can be judged predominantly, if not solely, by counting the number of divisions for the most populous counties.
Based on this new rule, the majority rejects the Commission's divisions of Boulder, Douglas, Pueblo, and Jefferson Counties because these populous counties did not receive the number of entire senate districts for which they "qualify."3 Maj. op. at 1241 & 1246.
The result reached by the majority is mandated neither by the language of the Colorado Constitution nor by our precedent. The constitution does not state that the redistricting authority must begin by drawing immovable lines that protect the more populous counties to the detriment of the less populous counties. Nor have previous cases decided by this court ever made such a suggestion, despite numerous opportunities to do so. Our precedent reveals just the opposite.
There are numerous state constitutional considerations that weigh upon the redistricting process. These include that: (1) each district should have equal populations, Colo. Const. art. V, § 46; (2) counties should not be divided or combined with other counties "Lelxcept when necessary to meet the equal population requirements of section 46," Colo. Const. art. V, § 47(2), and if counties must be split, the number of cities and towns within those split counties should be "as small as possible," Colo. Const. art. V., § 47); (8) each district should be "as compact in area as possible" and should "consist of contiguous whole general election precinets," Colo. Const. art. V, $ 47(1); and (4) "communities of interest ... shall be preserved within a single district whenever possible," Colo. Const. art. V, § 47(8). In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 190.
This court has, however, cautioned against a formulaic, inflexible application of these criteria 4 In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 *1259P.2d at 194 ("[T}he criteria of sections 46 and 47 are to be viewed as a whole, as a set of firm but general guidelines which allow the Commission some discretion in application.").
We have never held that there is only one acceptable approach to the drawing of general assembly districts. Im re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 196 (recognizing that a county's population may be "dense enough to allow the lines to be drawn in a number of ways without offending section 47(2)"). Nor have we ever imposed strict instructions on how to formulate a redistricting plan. In fact, we have historically afforded the Commission a degree of discretion as to how it proceeds when it draws district boundaries. In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 197 (approving the Commission's decision to draw districts for regions of the state in a predetermined order chosen by the Commission).
We afforded the Commission such discretion in 1982. The 1982 senate redistricting plan split eight counties (Arapahoe, Boulder, Delta, El Paso, Jefferson, Larimer, Pueblo, and Weld). In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 195-96. Seven of the split counties (all but Delta) were "large" counties with populations sufficient to support more than one senate district. Id. at 196.
Contrary to the majority's assertion, we approved the 1982 plan5 In doing so, we deferred to the Commission's choice of which counties to divide and, importantly, where and how to divide them:
[Slubstantial equality of population and avoidance of splitting counties cannot always be met simultaneously. When they cannot, the avoidance of split counties must yield. The area of the state in which these conflicts occur is subject to adjustment, and the Commission must have the discretion to choose where the necessary and constitutionally permissible compromises are made.
In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 197; see also In re Interrogatories by the Gen. Assembly, 178 Colo. at 318, 497 P.2d at 1025 ("While the addition to or deletion from a particular district might be said to be ill-advised by some, the decision is ... one to be upheld provided a constitutional violation is not shown.").
Notably, we did not state that the Commission is required to begin its mapping attentive to the needs of the populous counties, while only secondarily moving to the consideration of less populous counties. Nor did we ever hint that there is only one constitutionally acceptable order in which the Commission must proceed.
To the contrary, we specifically recognized that the Commission was not required to draw lines in the way the majority now suggests. The 1980 census revealed that El Paso County's population was large enough that three districts could have been drawn entirely within county boundaries and a fourth partial district could have been created with neighboring counties In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 196. Under the plan submitted, however, only one district was drawn entirely within county borders and three other partial districts, *1260containing portions of El Paso County and portions of neighboring counties, were also created. Id.
Thus, El Paso County presented the precise situation to which the majority now objects, and which would be unconstitutional under the majority's approach. Nevertheless, we approved the Commission's 1982 plan because it had been "drawn to achieve equal population" and did not constitute a "clear constitutional violation." Id.
Similarly, we sanctioned splits in the cities of Boulder and Grand Junction, even though each city was populous enough to support its own district. Id. at 197. This numerical fact did not convince us that constitutional standards had not been satisfied.
In In re Reapportionment 1992, we reiterated many of these points when we rejected several section 47(2) challenges to the proposed house plan.6 In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 193-98. The plan submitted reflected the Commission's decision to begin drawing districts in particular areas of the state and then proceed to other areas of the state. Id. at 196-97.
When we considered the 1992 plan, in In re Reapportionment 1992, we did not simply conclude that, as a matter of arithmetic, there was a right or wrong number of split counties. Nor did we begin our analysis by focusing only on the most populous counties. Instead, we considered all the criteria of section 47, including avoidance of split counties, compactness, and preservation of communities of interest. In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 196 (analyzing a split of Pitkin County). Ultimately, we approved splits of Arapahoe, Baca, and Montezuma Counties. In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 196 & 197-98.
Further, and inconsistently with the majority's bright-line rule, we concluded that the division of the City of Westminster into seven house districts did not violate the constitution, despite the fact that it could have been contained in far fewer districts. Id. at 196-97. We reasoned that "since Westminster's population exceeds that of an ideal house district, at least one split was required." Id.
We explained the remainder of the splits as being due, in large part, to the order in which the Commission had drawn its districts: "[T)he Commission initially fixed the boundaries of two districts in the eastern part of Adams County and worked west. Simultaneously, the Commission was moving east out of the mountains in creating District 62." Id. at 197. In light of the practical reality that the drafting of a redistricting plan must begin somewhere, and that some areas of the state will be subject to multiple splits in order to minimize splits in other areas of the state, we held that these numerous splits were "not per se unconstitutional." Id. We recognized that the Commission's decision about the order in which lines were drawn meant that there would be more splits to areas considered last:
Because of the Commission's choices of where to begin drawing house districts, and in order to bring "closure" to the Final Plan and preserve equality of population, Westminster was split into more parts than if the Commission had proceeded differently.
Id. Nevertheless, we approved the seven splits reflected in the reapportionment plan.
*1261Ignoring our earlier holdings, the majority now finds that it was improper for the Commission to proceed in the manner that it did in this case. Specifically, the majority states:
It ... appears from the Commission's rationale that it considered itself at liberty to start the cartography of reapportionment at any point of Colorado geography it might choose. . . . [TJhe constitutional criteria instead contemplate the Commission taking an overview of Colorado's population by county, then generating a map that respects the state's legal preference for county integrity, then applying minimization of city divisions, compactness, contiguity, and community of interest criteria to add portions of counties to other counties in forming districts, when necessary.
Maj. op. at 1251-1252, The majority thus eliminates the discretion that this court has historically afforded the Commission and announces a rule that requires the Commission to "take] an overview" of the state in an attempt to minimize overall county splits.
Based on this new "overview" rule, in combination with its other new rule, that the Commission must begin the reapportionment process by allocating districts to the most populous counties, the majority concludes that splits of Boulder, Douglas, Pueblo, and Jefferson Counties are unconstitutional.7
The rules announced by the majority represent an extraordinary departure from precedent and upset decades of settled expectations about the application of constitutional criteria. In my view, the majority's approach is both unwarranted and ill-advised.
IV. The Majority's Bright-Line Rule Protects More Populous Counties at the Expense of Less Populous Counties
All parties concede that some sparsely populated counties must be combined with other counties, or parts of other counties, in order to create senate districts of constitutionally permissible population. Similarly, other, more populous counties must be divided into smaller segments in order to create districts of the right number of people. Such is the natural result of Colorado's population distribution and the constitutional mandate that districts must be of equal population. The question that the parties now debate is where and how various divisions and combinations should oceur.
The majority resolves this question by concluding that preference must be given to more populous counties, at the expense of less populous counties. I cannot agree with this result for I believe that it unfairly and unnecessarily disadvantages the members of less populous communities in the redistricting process.
To take a simple example, assume three same-sized, square-shaped counties in a contiguous conformation. County B (the middle county) has sufficient population to support 1.5 districts. County A (the westernmost county) has sufficient population to support 0.25 districts. County C (the easternmost county) also has sufficient population to support 0.25 districts. Under the majority's analysis, the Commission must first create one district entirely contained within County B's boundaries. Then, the Commission must create a separate district using the remaining population (0.5 district) from County B and combining it with population from neighboring counties.
To satisfy the majority's test, this leftover 0.5 district could be used in one of two ways. First, the leftover population of County B could be cobbled together with both Counties A and C. Under this scenario, Counties A and C would be connected by a narrow land bridge through County B, resulting in a dumbbell-shaped district that ignores the compactness requirements of the state constitution. Alternatively, the leftover 0.5 district could be joined with County A (or C) plus all or part of a more distant county or *1262counties,8 in a sacrifice meant to provide the larger county, County B, with the maximum number of whole districts that could simultaneously exist within its boundaries.
A more logical choice for the Commission might be to split County B into two, with half of its population being coupled with County A and half with County C. Thus, one district would consist of all of County A and half of County B, and the second district would consist of all of County C and half of County B. Under the terms of the majority's analysis such a logical result would not ordinarily be constitutional because County B would be split into two partial districts instead of one whole district and one partial district.
Note that, under the logical approach described above, the constitution's provision regarding compactness is effectuated and neither County A nor County C needs to turn to additional neighboring counties in order to complete a district. Further, the logical approach involves only one split county (County B), while the majority approach demands a split of County B plus potential splits of additional neighboring counties and/or sacrifices of compactness of districts.
While this basic example obviously cannot capture all of the mathematical nuances involved in the redistricting process, its teachings are equally applicable to the more complicated fact pattern presented by our state county boundaries. I take this opportunity to acknowledge the sheer difficulty and enormity of the task that the Commission undertakes.
The political geography and population distribution of our state, as well as the competing concerns defined by our federal and state constitutions, mean that there are literally thousands of variables affecting the drawing of legislative districts. At the time of the 2000 census, Colorado had sixty-three counties that ranged in size from 150 square miles (Gilpin County) to 4,778 square miles (Las Animas County). Though some of these counties are shaped as almost perfect squares (e.g., Morgan County), others are irregularly shaped (e.g., Denver County), rendering the Commission's task even more complex. Population densities vary among the counties, with some having fewer than one person per square mile and others having thousands of people per square mile. Additionally, to comply with constitutional criteria not at issue here, the Commission was required to take into account the distribution and voting patterns of minority groups.
To all of these complications is added the further challenge that Colorado's varied topography means that residents of the state may live in rural agricultural areas, in urban centers, in small mountain resort cities, in planned suburban developments, or a plethora of other types of areas. Residents of these different communities may have significantly different attitudes towards issues such as water usage, growth, transportation, and the environment.
The Commission, before arriving at its Proposed Plan, held dozens of meetings across the state, where it heard testimony from people representing all sorts of different interests and communities. It publicized a Preliminary Plan, which it then revised in response to suggestions and criticism. In creating its Proposed Plan, the Commission considered literally hundreds of maps involving different permutations of senate districts.
The majority's formulaic approach fails to recognize the mathematical nuances involved in creating districts that maximize compliance with the relevant constitutional criteria. The complexity of the geography of our state, the diverse types of communities, the different and sometimes competing federal and state constitutional requirements, and the almost infinite number of district permutations that can be generated all combine to require this court to defer to the discretion of the Commission, provided that the Proposed *1263Plan was drawn on the basis of the appropriate constitutional criteria. Instead of taking this approach, the majority's new rule favors the most populous counties, using the populations of less populous counties largely as fillers that round out the leftover populations from more populous counties.
The result of the majority rule is that less populous counties will be fractured or combined so as to cater to the populations found in more populous counties. Further, depending on population distribution, the majority's technique will oftentimes lead to sprawling districts that present compactness concerns.
The majority rejects the divisions of Boulder, Douglas, Pueblo, and Jefferson Counties in the Proposed Plan because the Commission did not begin by first allocating districts to the most populous counties. Because I believe that the first prong of the majority's test is ill-advised and unsupported by precedent, I disagree with the majority's conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the divisions of those four counties.
V. The Commission's Explanations for Splits of Adams, Arapahoe, and Mesa Counties and the Cities of Boulder and Pueblo Are Persuasive
Even if I was to agree with the two-prong test that the majority adopts, I do not believe that the majority correctly applied the second prong in this case. Specifically, the majority suggests that the explanations advanced to justify the splits of Adams, Arapahoe, and Mesa Counties, and the Cities of Boulder and Pueblo, are inadequate. I disagree because I would accept the Commission's explanations as satisfying the substantial compliance standard that applies when we evaluate whether the Commission's work comports with constitutional criteria. I would hold that the Commission's decision to draw districts in a predetermined order and the Commission's explanations for county splits are entitled to deference. See In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 197; In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 197.
Various Commission explanations of splits have been approved by this court in the past. As discussed above, build-out justifications were explicitly deemed acceptable in In re Reapportionment 1992.9 Additionally, in In re Reapportionment 1998-II, after initially remanding the case so that the Commission could reconsider its split of Pitkin County, we accepted as sufficient the Commission's explanation for why that county split was retained. In re Reapportionment 1992-II, 828 P.2d at 216. The Commission described the various alternatives it considered and explained how constitutional criteria applied to each alternative. Based on its reasoning that retaining the Pitkin County split would help effectuate all of the constitutional criteria, including the preservation of communities of interest, we approved it. Id. In this case, the Commission should be held to the same standard. In explaining why counties and cities are split, either when the Proposed Plan is originally submitted or upon resub-mittal, the Commission should not be required to make a more strenuous showing than was required ten years ago.
The Commission's Proposed Plan splits Adams County into two whole districts (Districts 24 and 26) and two partial districts (Districts 28 and 25). When the Commission drew districts in the southwestern metropolitan area, it completed three whole districts in Jefferson County. It then used some of Jefferson County's leftover population to create a district containing a portion of Jefferson County and a portion of Adams County. This accounts for one of the partial districts. The Commission then created the two whole districts in Adams County. Because the population in the remaining part of Adams County was less than necessary to form its own district, it was combined with the Arapahoe County portion of the City of Aurora.10 This was a logical combination since the City of Aurora spans more than one county.
Under the rationale of In re Reapportionment 1992, I do not believe that this build-out justification is inadequate. Additionally, *1264I note that the plans to which the majority compares the Commission's Proposed Plan for Adams County do not, in fact offer any significant advantage over the Proposed Plan. Specifically, both the Rodriguez 5 Plan and the Wells 37 Plan create two whole districts and two partial districts in Adams County, just like the Commission's Proposed Plan.
Similar build-out justifications drove the creation of three, instead of four, whole senate districts within Arapahoe County. The initial decision to split Arapahoe County was made because Denver County's population could accommodate four whole senate districts and one partial district (District 32). The Commission elected to complete District 32 by combining the remaining Denver County population with population from similar communities to the south of Denver in Arapahoe County. Notably, the choice to push south out of Denver into Arapahoe County was a decision the Commission made early in the process and one that minority commissioners repeatedly embraced in subsequent plans. While the Proposed Plan may have more partial districts in Arapahoe County than other plans, this alone does not render it unconstitutional. Substantial compliance, not perfection, is the standard to which the Proposed Plan should be held. In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 197.
Mesa County has sufficient population to support 0.95 senate districts, Thus, its population is slightly less than the ideal popula- - tion for one whole senate district. Therefore, it requires additional population to form a district. Unfortunately, as the Commission explains, every adjacent county has a population that, when added to Mesa County's population, is too large for an ideal district. This means that either Mesa County must be split and joined with other counties, or that some other county (such as Delta County) must be split and joined with Mesa County. Either way, a county must be split. In my view, our state constitution does not require the splitting of a smaller county merely because its size is less than that of an ideal senate district. Therefore, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the Commission has not advanced an adequate explanation to justify the splitting of Mesa County.
The Commission has explained that it split the City of Boulder in order to preserve the integrity of the City and County of Broom-field.11 Broomfield's population was insufficient to complete a district, so the Commission had to cross into some other county. One possible source was the area of Boulder County north of Broomfield, including Long-mont, Louisville, Erie, and Lafayette. However, the Commission determined, based on almost uniform public comment, to keep those similar communities together in their own district (District 17), contained wholly within Boulder County. The option of going south into Jefferson County was foreclosed because that area had already been used to complete District 28.
As the Commission described in its argument to this court, that left them with two options: (1) pushing into Adams County to the east; or (2) pushing to the northwest into the City of Boulder. The Commission, based on the perceived community of interest existing between Broomfield and Boulder along the Highway 86 transportation corridor, decided to combine part of the City of Boulder with Broomfield to create District 18. The population then remaining in Boulder County was insufficient to comprise an entire district, The remainder of Boulder's population was, therefore, placed in District 19. While these are not necessarily the best choices that the Commission could have made, I believe that they are constitutionally permissible choices.
Finally, the majority finds inadequate the explanation of the Commission's decision to split the City of Pueblo. Pueblo County, which contains the City of Pueblo, has population sufficient to support 1.15 districts. Thus, the county must be split somewhere. The Commission justified its decision to split the City of Pueblo by noting that this was the only place that the split could happen such that Pueblo County could be com*1265bined with eastern plains counties. I again note that when counties must be split, the Commission is afforded the discretion to determine where to make difficult, though constitutionally permissible, splits. I do not believe that the splitting of the City of Pueblo offends constitutional principles.
VI. The Proposed Plan Substantially Complies with the Appropriate Constitutional Standards
As explained in Section I, above, our role in reviewing the Proposed Plan is supposed to be narrow. In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 194. We are not to choose among alternative plans and we are to afford the Proposed Plan a presumption of validity. Id. Our task is to examine the Proposed Plan only to determine whether it substantially complies with constitutional criteria. Id.
No party alleges that federal law has been violated with respect to the Proposed Plan, nor does my independent examination reveal any federal constitutional problems. Therefore, I turn to the mandates of the Colorado Constitution. The paramount requirement of the Colorado Constitution is that each district be of equal population. Colo, Const. art. V, § 46. No serious objection is raised that the districts in this case do not comply with the equal population requirement.
The next three requirements, avoidance of city and county splits, compactness and contiguity of districts, and preservations of communities of interest, are the subject of much debate among the parties to this case.
We have previously held that the Commission has the discretion to draw districts in the order that it chooses, even if this means that there are more splits to the resulting plan than might otherwise exist, In re Reapportionment 1998, 828 P.2d at 197; see also In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 196 (recognizing that there are situations where districts can be "drawn in a number of ways without offending section 47(2)"). Further, we have stated that the constitutional criteria are to be "viewed as a whole, as a set of firm but general guidelines which allow the Commission some discretion in application." Id. at 194; see also In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 195-96 (considering all the criteria in determining the constitutionality of a county split). In applying these standards, we have acknowledged that multiple plans can simultaneously comply with constitutional criteria. In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 194. These principles form the backdrop for my analysis of the Commission's Proposed Plan.
As mentioned above, the Commission's Proposed Plan preserves intact fifty-one out of our sixty-three counties.12 The focus of the majority's opinion, this dissent, and the arguments of the parties has thus been upon the few counties in which splits do occur.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to accommodate everyone. Such is the dilemma faced by the Commission. If the Commission satisfies the desires of one county, city or community of interest to remain whole and undivided, it often must necessarily split another county, city, or community of interest. Put simply, one of the county lines must yield.
The Commission has explained that some of the divisions of Boulder, Douglas, Pueblo, and Jefferson Counties resulted from its decision to begin drawing districts in a particular region of the state before proceeding to draw districts in other regions.13 The Commission engaged in numerous discussions and votes regarding the order in which they should work. These decisions are entitled to deference from this court.
The splits resulting from the order in which the Commission proceeded could have been avoided, in small part, if the Commission had drawn the districts differently. Nevertheless, as our precedent discloses, this reality does not mean that the Commission has failed to substantially comply with constitutional standards. In re Reapportionment 1992, 647 P.2d at 197. In my opinion, constitutional standards have been satisfied.
*1266The alternate plans presented by the objectors in this case may well be acceptable under the Colorado Constitution. However, the presentation of an alternate, constitutionally acceptable plan does not render the Commission's Proposed Plan unconstitutional, even if many people believe that the alternate plan is better. See, eg., In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 197 ("[The Commission must have the discretion to choose where the necessary and constitutionally permissible compromises are made.").
Ultimately, the reality is that, because of the political nature of the redistricting process,14 there will also be some people who are dissatisfied with decisions about which counties should be split. This alone does not render a particular plan unconstitutional.15
When the Commission's Proposed Plan is accorded the deference that it is due and when the proper constitutional standards are applied, it becomes apparent that this court should approve the Commission's Proposed Plan.
VIL. Conclusion
Were we, the court, in the Commission's shoes, we might not make the same choices that it has made. Nevertheless, our job is not to second-guess the result, but to test its constitutionality. I believe that the Commission's Proposed Plan for both the house and the senate complies with the standards of constitutionality set forth in our precedent and, therefore, should be approved.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice MULLARKEY and Justice MARTINEZ join in this dissent.
. I find the majority's chart to be objectionable because it repeats the same bias in favor of more populous counties found throughout the majority's opinion. See infra, section IV.
. The majority states, "Alternative plans illustrate how ... counties can be divided in a constitutionally preferred manner." Maj. op. at 1252. The question that this court is supposed to answer, however, is only whether the Commission's plan complies with constitutional criteria, not *1257whether there is another constitutionally preferred plan. In re Reapportionment 1982, 647 P.2d at 194.
. As discussed in greater detail below, the majority also rests its rejection of the splits of these four counties on its new rule that the Commission must "tak[e) an overview" of the state when drawing districts, and cannot rely on a build-out justification. See infra; maj. op. at 1252.
. We have recognized that the concerns listed at the top of the above list are more "important" than those at the bottom of the list. In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 190. We have even gone so far as to describe them as a "hierarchy" of concerns. Id. This does not mean, however, that the criteria at the bottom will never be reached or that they are ordinarily irrelevant to the Commission's decisions on how 10 draw district lines. Apart from the paramount equal population concern, we have never held, as the majority now does, that concerns at the bot*1259tom of the list can never outweigh concerns higher up on the list. See maj. op. at 1247 ('The Commission may not apply the lesser criteria over the greater criteria."). To the contrary, we have specifically held that, in certain circumstances, concerns lower in the hierarchy must trump concerns higher in the hierarchy. In re Interrogatory of the House of Representatives, 177 Colo. 215, 217-18, 493 P.2d 346, 347-48 (1972).
. The majority states that we found "a significant deficiency in the Commission's action that required remand for plan modification." Maj. op. at 1246. This is incorrect. In fact, we determined that the redistricting map complied with constitutional criteria and remanded only for revision of the sequencing of election districts. In re Reapportionment 1982, 6447 P.2d at 192-93.
The majority then cites In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1982) [hereinafter "In re Reapportionment 1982 II "1, to support the proposition that this court may reject a resubmitted plan that is "less consistent" with constitutional criteria than a previously submitted plan. Maj. op. at 1245. The majority's statement is correct, but incomplete. In In re Reapportionment 1982 II, we outlined a special standard of review applicable only in the particular circumstances of that case. Specifically, we held that, it is only when the resubmitted plan is less consistent with constitutional criteria than the previously submitted plan that "deference to Commission expertise is inappropriate." In re Reapportionment 1982 IT, 647 P.2d at 211.
. Again, the majority misstates the outcome of this case. We did not remand the plan because of a "significant deficiency." Maj. op. at 1246. In fact, we found fault with only minor aspects of the submitted plan. First, we corrected the inadvertent division of the town of Perry Park. Second, we objected to the division of Pitkin County (and the City of Aspen within Pitkin County) and remanded the case so that the Commission could reconsider it. With those exceptions, we approved the plan. In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 189.
The Commission submitted a revised plan that retained the split of Pitkin County, though it eliminated the split of the City of Aspen. In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 213, 216 (Colo.1992) [hereinafter "In re Reapportionment 1992-II "]. The Commission explained that it considered, but ultimately rejected, other plans because they would entail splitting additional counties or cities, fail to achieve a "net improvement in preservation of communities of interest" or split communities of interest entirely, or be unable to remedy concerns of limited access between Pitkin County and the rest of District 61. Id. We considered that explanation adequate and approved the revised plan. Id.
. I note that the majority's "overview" approach and its bright-line rule that the Commission must begin by apportioning districts to the most populous counties are arguably inconsistent. It is certainly possible to envision a scenario where an overview of the state would, in actuality, reveal that more splits exist in a plan created by a Commission that followed the bright-line rule than might exist in an alternate plan.
. For instance, assume that County X, located to the northwest of County A, has a population sufficient to support 0.6 district. The leftover 0.5 district from County B could be combined with the 0.25 district from County A. To complete the district, the Coramission could take the final 0.25 district from County X. As part of the resulting chain reaction, County X would then have to seek out other neighboring counties with which it could merge its remaining 0.35 district to create a whole district.
. The majority rejected build-out justifications as unacceptable under the first prong of its test. Presumably, such justifications are therefore also impermissible under the second prong.
. Adams County residents dominate the resulting district.
. Broomfield became a county in November of 2001. Thus, its population was not tabulated as a separate county in the 2000 census. Nevertheless, the Commission chose to preserve its city and county borders.
. Other plans advanced by the opponents of the Commission's plan increase the number of undivided counties to only fifty-two.
. I have already addressed the divisions of Adams, Arapahoe, and Mesa Counties, as well as the divisions of the Cities of Boulder and Pueblo, in Section V, supra.
. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., The Practice of Redistricting, 72 U. Colo. L.Rev. 1029 (2001).
. It is not inappropriate for the Commission to take political considerations into account, so long as it does not elevate these considerations to the level of constitutional concerns. In re Reapportionment 1992, 828 P.2d at 199 ("It is only when partisan factors are allowed an importance equal to or greater than the proper constitutional criteria that a plan is defective.")