concurring.
Judge Card's imposition of the 99-year term of imprisonment did not violate the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington
In Page v. State,1 we conducted a historical review of sentences for murder in the second degree. Based on this historical review, we concluded that a person convicted of second-degree murder should typically receive a sentence of 20 to 30 years of imprisonment.2 Relying on the Page guidelines, Grossman argues that 30 years of imprisonment was the maximum sentence that Judge Card could impose under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Blakely v. Washington without having a jury determine that aggravating factors authorized a greater sentence. In State v. Gibbs,3 we summarized the Blakely decision as follows:
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,[4] the United States Supreme Court held that, with the exception of a defendant's prior convictions, "any [disputed] fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."[5] In Blakely, the Supreme Court clarified that, for purposes of Apprendi, the "statutory maximum" is the maximum term of imprisonment that a judge may lawfully impose "solely on the basis of the facts reflected in a jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."[6]
Grossman argues that, under Blakely, the jury verdict only authorized Judge Card to impose a sentence of up to 80 years of imprisonment. He contends that Judge Card could not impose a sentence beyond the 80-year Page guideline unless he relied on aggravating cireumstances that had been proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The short answer to Grossman's argument is that Judge Card was authorized by Blakety to consider Grossman's prior record in deciding to impose a sentence over the guidelines. Grossman has an extensive prior criminal record. He has well over twenty prior convictions. Eleven of these prior conviec-tions are for assault; two of the prior convictions are felonies. Blakely does not preclude
*1090a sentencing court from considering a defendant's prior convictions.7 So even if we accepted Grossman's argument, Grossman's prior convictions alone would have authorized Judge Card to exceed the Page guidelines and impose the maximum sentence without violating Blakely.
The majority of the court, having resolved the issue, would stop at this point. I would go further. The Blakely decision has created a great deal of uncertainty about sentencing in criminal cases. I think we should resolve the issues created by Blakely in an attempt to reduce this confusion when the answer is clear.
The Page guidelines are merely a tool to aid sentencing judges in imposing sentences and to facilitate appellate court review of these sentences. If a sentencing judge follows these guidelines, the defendant, the public, and a reviewing court should have a better understanding of why the judge imposed a particular sentence. These are important sentencing goals.
The Alaska Statutes provide that a defendant convicted of murder in the second degree "shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of at least 10 years but not more than 99 years."8 That is the sentencing range that the jury's verdict authorized.
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court specifically stated that nothing in its opinion was meant to change the general rule allowing "judges to exercise discretion-taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in this country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the individual case."9 The sentence imposed by Judge Card was within this range. Furthermore, as this court has previously explained, the Page benchmark did "not create fixed sentencing boundaries ... [rather] ... it [was] designed to 'provide assistance and guidance'... by furnishing a numerical 'starting point ... for individualized [sentencing] analysis in each case.'"10
As we have pointed out, we developed the Page guidelines by conducting a historical review of previous sentences for second-degree murder.11 From this review we concluded that the typical sentence for second-degree murder fell within a range from 20 to 30 years.12 The Page guidelines therefore provide a starting point for a sentencing court in a second-degree murder case. The purpose of establishing this starting point was in part to comply with the legislature's directive to sentencing courts to consider "the seriousness of the defendant's present offense in relation to other offenses."13
But we have emphasized that "benchmarks are meant only to provide a framework for individualized analysis in each given case, based upon [traditional] sentencing criteria...."14 And we emphasized "that any sound reason may be relied on to differentiate one case from another."15
In Allen v. State,16 we pointed out that parties often framed their arguments in terms of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors.17 While we found this practice useful, we specifically noted that, in a sentencing for second-degree murder, a judge could rely on any sound reason to justify a sentence.18 We generally do not review *1091whether the sentencing court properly found aggravating or mitigating factors in imposing a sentence for murder in the second degree. This is because the aggravating factors and mitigating factors are not controlling in sentences for second-degree murder as they are when presumptive sentencing applies. A sentence for second-degree murder is governed by traditional sentencing criteria.19
We have therefore interpreted the Page guidelines as merely an aid to a sentencing judge to exercise typical sentencing discretion rather than as a limit on the sentencing judge's authority. I would therefore state what I think is the obvious conclusion. The Blakely decision does not restrict the discretion of the sentencing judge to impose a sentence in excess of the Page guidelines.
. 657 P.2d 850 (Alaska App.1983).
. Id. at 855.
. 105 P.3d 145, 147 (Alaska App.2005).
. 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).
. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63.
. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
. Edmonds v. State, 118 P.3d 17 (Alaska App.2005).
. AS 12.55.125(b).
. 530 U.S. at 481, 120 S.Ct. at 2358.
. Brown v. State, 973 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Alaska App.1999).
. Page, 657 P.2d at 855.
. Id.
. AS 12.55.005; Williams v. State, 809 P.2d 931, 935 (Alaska App.1991).
. Williams, 809 P.2d at 933 (referring to sentencing criteria set out in State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970) and AS 12.55.005).
. Id. at 934.
. 51 P.3d 949 (Alaska App.2002).
. Id. at 960.
. For an extensive discussion of the purpose of benchmark sentences, see Williams, 809 P.2d 931. For a discussion of the application of the Page guideline, see Brown, 973 P.2d 1158.
. Id.