Specially Concurring.
I write separately to emphasize the restrictive nature of the court’s holding herein, limited to the particular fact-driven scenario of this case. Here Spencer, a convicted felon previously subject to the same probationary search provision, voluntarily moved into the home of his sister knowing the residence was subject to search, knowing that he was not permitted to reside with her, failing to advise the probation department and seek special permission before moving in, and residing there at the sufferance of his sister.1 Any other result would permit the probationer and/or drug user to find sanctuary in a residence subject to probation search through the simple expedient of placing a lock on some door and running for cover once the knock of an inquisitive probation officer is first heard.
By moving into the house under this set of circumstances, Spencer has, in effect, given his defacto consent to be subject to the same probationary home search conditions that apply to his sister. Thus, this ease is an except tion to the general rule that when a probationer is sharing living quarters with another who is not subject to similar conditions, the probation officer may only search those parts of the premises that the probationer has common authority to use. See Milton v. State, 879 P.2d 1031 (Alaska App.1994), and cases cited therein; see also State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 40 P.3d 86 (2002); State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 76 P.3d 990 (Ct.App.2003).
Accordingly, a person who lives with a probationer generally retains a limited expectation of privacy in his person, possessions and place of residence. In the case of a shared residence, the probation search may extend to all areas of the residence over which the probationer has control, even if that control is not exclusive, and includes all common areas of the residence. However, the co-resident still retains the right to object to a search that exceeds the scope of these dimensions and seek suppression of evidence found as a result thereof. Milton, 879 P.2d at 1035-36. Nothing herein, on the other hand, would preclude the probation department from attempting to obtain a separate consent to search from the co-tenant, or alternatively requiring the probationer to live separate and apart from the co-tenant as a condition of probation.
. It does not appear that Spencer even enjoyed the relationship of tenantdandlord with Conklin. See and compare State v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 983 P.2d 225 (Ct.App.1999).