dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion regarding the admissibility of the defendant’s prior conviction for indecent liberties with a child. I agree with the trial court’s admission of this conviction under the plan exception of K.S.A. 60-455. I would, therefore, affirm the defendant’s convictions in this case.
There can be no doubt that the evidence of prior sexual misconduct in this case related to the plan exception under K.S.A. 60-455. Although the defendant denied having any sexual contact with his minor stepdaughter or minor natural daughter, the victims, including the prior crime victim, testified that he had. The question presented is whether the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of the defendant’s prior conviction. While the majority briefly mentions this as being the appropriate standard of review, the majority opinion did not fully articulate the following standard, nor in my opinion did the majority apply this standard:
“The admission of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation omitted.] An appellate court’s standard of review regarding trial court’s admission of evidence, subject to exclusionary rules, is abuse of discretion. Judicial discretion is abused when judicial is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. One who asserts that the trial court abused its discretion bears the burden showing such abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Jenkins, 272 Kan. 1366, 1378, 39 P.3d 47 (2002).
The majority opinion cites to a number of our past decisions including State v. Damewood, 245 Kan. 676, 682, 783 P.2d 1249 (1989), which describes the rationales for admitting evidence of prior unrelated acts to show plan under K.S.A. 60-455. One such rationale advanced by Damewood is as follows: “Admission of evidence under 60-455 to show plan has been upheld under at least *426two theories. In one the evidence, though unrelated to the crimes charged, is admitted to show the modus operandi or general method used by a defendant to perpetrate similar but totally unrelated crimes.” (Emphasis added.) 245 Kan. at 681-82.
The majority in this case concludes that the facts failed to meet a standard of similarity and that “there simply was insufficient evidence presented to show a distinct method of operation that can be considered ‘signature’ or ‘strikingly similar’ or even ‘similar enough’ for K.S.A. 60-455 purposes. Consequently, the district court erred in admitting the prior conviction evidence under the plan exception contained in that statute.” This conclusion in my opinion appears to be a legal conclusion without any consideration of our actual standard of review as set forth above. While acknowledging similarities between the defendant’s past conviction and the present crimes, the majority focuses on the dissimilarities in its legal conclusion that the evidence demonstrates trial error.
The similarities between the defendant’s past conviction and his charged crimes bear repeating. First and foremost, the modus operandi of the defendant in both the past crime and the present crimes is to befriend a woman who has a minor daughter from a previous marriage. The friendship with the mother of the minor daughter results in marriage, and the defendant becomes a member of the family and the stepfather of the minor daughter. He gains the trust of the minor child and proceeds to sexually abuse the minor child. The evidence discloses the following additional similarities. The circumstances of the makeup of the defendant’s family in both the past offense involving L.D. and the present offense involving M.W. are especially similar. In both cases, close in time to when the defendant’s then wife would have another child, the defendant would begin sexually abusing the stepdaughter. Both minor stepdaughters were close in age when the abuse began. Further, the girls’ genital regions were molested; in addition, there were acts of penetration which were attempted in L.D.’s case but accomplished against M.W. As with L.D., the defendant would tell the girls he loved them after the acts were completed. In both cases, the defendant stressed to his victims the need for secrecy *427about his conduct. And in both cases, the girls were violated in various rooms throughout the house.
Thus, the facts herein establish a pattern of escalating criminal sexual activities between the defendant and young girls living in his home. The facts in the prior conviction (L.D.) involved the defendant marrying a woman with an 8-to 9-year-old daughter. The defendant fondled L.D. on many occasions in the home, out of the presence of anyone else. Sexual intercourse did not occur. As to M.W., the defendant moved in with 9-year-old M.W. and her mother, as his common-law wife. He had sexual intercourse with M.W. in many areas of the home while he and M.W. were alone. After this had been going on for several years, the defendant went to court to secure custody of his natural daughter, S.J., age 16, whom he had not seen for 6 years. Shortly after the defendant moved his daughter into his home, his activities escalated into group sex involving himself, both girls, and the common-law wife.
All three victims were young girls who became available to the defendant in his residence by his having entered into marriage relationships with the girls’ mothers or his acquisition of legal custody of his natural daughter. The escalation in the level of sexual activity with each new victim as the defendant became increasingly emboldened does not diminish the factual basis supporting the finding of a plan under K.S.A. 60-455; in fact, it supports the finding. Through his plan, the defendant was able to satisfy his increasing sexual desire for young girls involved in a familial relationship with him.
Some of the dissimilarities referenced in the majority opinion primarily between L.D. and M.W. could be described as “accidental” or irrelevant to the similarities in the sexual abuse. The fact that the defendant attempted but never accomplished intercourse with L.D., but actually achieved intercourse with M.W. and S.J., was not so much a dissimilar act as it was a failed attempt to complete a similar act. The crucial point is that the defendant wanted to have sexual intercourse with his stepdaughters and daughter and attempted to satisfy those desires.
Furthermore, the fact that the defendant may have engaged in group sex with M.W., S.J., and his common-law wife but did not *428participate in group sex with L.D. and her mother, who had no knowledge of the sexual abuse, is seemingly irrelevant to whether the defendant did in fact sexually abuse both of his stepdaughters while he was isolated with them. His decision to add new variations of sexual acts and family members to his plan or method of operation does not discount the similarities between the defendant’s tried and true methods when he was alone with his daughter or stepdaughters. The focus on these dissimilarities, rather than the true similarities between the crimes, is where I believe the majority is wrong.
In its focus upon the dissimilarities, the majority relies in part upon State v. Davidson, 31 Kan. App. 2d 372, 383-84, 65 P.3d 1078, rev. denied 276 Kan. 971 (2003), in which Judge (now Justice) Beier discussed the Damewood, 245 Kan. 676; State v. Rucker, 267 Kan. 816, 987 P.2d 1080 (1999); and State v. Tiffany, 267 Kan. 495, 986 P.2d 1064 (1999), cases regarding the plan exception under K.S.A. 60-455. Davidson held that it was reversible error to admit the 60-455 evidence under various bases, including plan. However, in comparing Davidson’s prior conduct and the charged crime, the court found some similarities and, in addition, several dissimilarities as “[m]ost of the charged acts do not match the behavior engaged in with the girls, and the victims were different genders.” 31 Kan. App. 2d at 384. However, in this case the defendant’s behavior was quite similar, and the victims were related and the same gender.
An example of focusing upon similarities instead of dissimilarities is illustrated in Tiffany, where the defendant was charged with forcing the 7-year-old granddaughter of a friend to masturbate him until he ejaculated. The district court admitted evidence of prior uncharged sex crimes that the defendant had masturbated in front of his 5- or 6-year-old daughter and made her rub his penis until ejaculation, that his 8- or 9-year-old daughter had rubbed his penis at his request, and that he had exposed his penis and masturbated in front of a 13- or 14-year-old boy that he was hving with at the time.
On appeal, this court noted that the evidence admitted was limited to a “strikingly similar” method of operation, as similar acts *429were used to entice the victims into performing the requested acts, the victims were all about the same age, and the criminal conduct was performed in the same manner. The court concluded that Damewood and State v. Clements, 252 Kan. 86, 843 P.2d 679 (1992), controlled the case, as “ ‘[t]he general method used . . . is similar enough to show a common approach that is tantamount to a plan.’ ” Tiffany, 267 Kan. at 502 (quoting Clements, 252 Kan. at 90).
Unlike the majority in this case, the Tiffany court focused on the similarities between the acts rather than the dissimilarities between the prior acts and the charged crime. The court could have just as well said that the prior acts were dissimilar because they involved a victim related to the defendant, involved a victim of a different gender, involved a situation where the victim did not actually masturbate the defendant, and involved victims ranging in age from 5 to 14. As such, the similarities between the acts, rather than the dissimilarities, should be the main focus of the analysis.
Whether under the rationale of “strikingly similar” or “similar enough,” a wide degree of latitude is granted to the trial court to make a decision as to whether such evidence is similar enough to allow it into evidence under K.S.A. 60-455 to show plan. As indicated above, the majority seems to state our standard of review but resolves this case as a matter of law that the evidence is simply not similar enough. The ultimate question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the defendant’s prior indecent liberties with a child conviction. In my opinion, the decision of the trial court was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable and, at the very least, reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court.
The Pattern Instructions for Kansas (PIK) Comments relating to proof of other crimes note that this court has taken a more “liberal view” of admitting K.S.A. 60-455 evidence in sexual misconduct cases. See PIK Crim. 3d 52.06, Comment II. E, p. 64. Our prior decisions set forth in this dissent and the majority decision supports the PIK Comments. This liberal view stems, in my opinion, from the basic similarities that exist in these lands of cases and the modus operandi which frequently occur. The sexual acts *430are visited upon minors and occur because of the relationship of trust cultivated by the defendant in a familial setting. It is this basic similarity that triggers the inquiry as to whether the past conduct of the defendant when compared with the crimes charged is admissible to show modus operandi. See Damewood, 245 Kan. at 681-82.
Further support for this liberal view in sexual misconduct cases is found in federal statutes and case law. Federal Rule of Evidence 413(a) provides: “In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” Likewise, Federal Rule of Evidence 414 extends that rule to admit prior child molestation offenses in prosecutions for child molestation for its bearing on any relevant matter. Fed. R. Evid. 413 and 414.
In upholding the constitutionality of these statutes, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that plausible reasons existed for the enactment of Rule 414, including the legitimate interest of Congress’ objective of enhancing effective prosecution of sexual assaults and the government’s “particular need for corroborating evidence in cases of sexual abuse of a child because of the highly secretive nature of these sex crimes and because often the only available proof is the child’s testimony. [Citation omitted.]” United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998). While K.S.A. 60-455 is certainly not as permissive in admitting prior crimes evidence in sexual misconduct cases, the reasoning in enacting the federal statutes is persuasive and supports the more liberal construction that this court has applied in those types of cases in the past.
I conclude, consistent with our past decisions, that the facts and circumstances concerning the defendant’s conduct in the prior conviction was similar enough to his conduct in some of the instant charges, especially as it pertains to M.W., to warrant admission of the defendant’s prior conviction for indecent liberties with a child. I particularly note that given the similarities, it is difficult to con-*431elude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior conviction evidence.
While K.S.A. 60-455 does not include “unfair prejudice” language, this court read “unfair prejudice” into K.S.A. 60-455 in State v. Davis, 213 Kan. 54, 57, 515 P.2d 802 (1973), and when we held: “Evidence which is more prejudicial than probative is inadmissable pursuant to K.S.A. 60-455.” Ratterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, Syl. ¶ 3, 707 P.2d 1063 (1985).
Relying upon what may be considered a rule of necessity arising out of the above decision, the defendant claims the prior crime evidence was unfairly prejudicial. However, all evidence that is derogatory to a defendant is by its nature prejudicial to the defendant’s claim of innocence. Evidence that actually or probably brings about the wrong result under the circumstances of the case is “unduly prejudicial.” State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 477, 931 P.2d 664 (1997).
In my opinion, there was litde chance, if any, that the prior conviction evidence in this case brought about the wrong result. Moreover, prejudice can be minimized in K.S.A. 60-455(b) cases by a limiting instruction, especially if given prior to the testimony concerning the prior conviction and before deliberations. See, e.g., State v. Lane, 262 Kan. 373, 391, 940 P.2d 422 (1997); see also Clements, 252 Kan. at 89 (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting prior sex offense conviction through victim where jury was instructed prior to testimony and by written instructions before deliberations). This is exactly the procedure that was followed in the case now being considered. Under these circumstances, in my opinion, the prior crime evidence was not unfairly prejudicial.
For all of the above reasons, I conclude that the prior crime evidence in this case was admissible and that the trial court, based upon the similarities existing between the prior crime and the crime charged, did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
McFarland, C.J., joins in the foregoing dissent.