dissenting: I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s interpretation of K.S.A. 83-219(a), which negates legislative intent, thereby preventing an effective inspection program by the Department of Agriculture.
In 1994, the legislature amended K.S.A. 83-201 to include the definition of a “point-of-sale.” At the same time, the legislature also amended K.S.A. 83-219(a) to include subsections (13) through (16), which address the misuse of point-of-sale systems. See L. 1994, ch. 83, secs. 1, 4. The majority concedes these amendments provided the Department of Agriculture with authority to inspect and regulate point-of-sale systems or electronic price scanning equipment such as used by Oshman.
Here’s the problem: In 1996, the legislature again amended K.S.A. 83-219(a) and changed the lead-in language from “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person” to “[i]t shall be unlawful for any owner of a commercial weighing or measuring device.” See L. 1996, ch. 146, sec. 24. There is no legislative history to explain the 1996 amendment. Very possibly, the term “person” may have been considered overly broad, subjecting mere grocery clerks to steep civil penalties. Importantly, I note that subsections (13) through (16), specifically added to K.S.A. 83-219(a) to regulate point-of-sale systems, were left undisturbed.
The majority notes a “measuring device” and a “point-of-sale system” are separately defined in K.S.A. 83-201(k) and (1), respectively. The majority then concludes: “We agree with Oshman that under the present ambiguities of the statutory scheme it is less than clear that a point-of-sale system comes within the definition of a measuring device.” This leads the majority to its holding that under the 1996 amendment to K.S.A. 83-219(a), a point-of-sale system is no longer included within the definition of “weights and measures” — a holding contrary to accepted canons of statutory interpretation.
*389First, as a general rule, statutes are construed to avoid unreasonable results. There is a presumption that the legislature did not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. KPERS v. Reimer & Roger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 635, 643, 941 P.2d 1321 (1997). In my opinion, it is not plausible that the legislature intended to negate the 1994 amendments necessary to inspect and regulate modem pricing computers by its enactment of the 1996 amendment to K.S.A. 83-219(a). My conclusion is reinforced since the legislature did not rescind 83-219(a) subsections (13) through (16).
Second,
“[ejffect must be given, if possible, to the entir.e act and every part thereof. To this end, it is the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. The court must give effect to the legislature’s intent even though words, phrases, or clauses at some place in the statute must be omitted or inserted.” State v. Engles, 270 Kan. 530, 533, 17 P.3d 355 (2001).
Third, “ ‘[i]n construing statutes and determining legislative intent, several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible.’ ” State v. Bolin, 266 Kan. 18, 24, 968 P.2d 1104 (1998) (quoting State v. Vega-Fuentes, 264 Kan. 10, 14, 955 P.2d 1235 [1998]).
In arriving at its holding, the majority disregards the unifying definition of “weights and measures” found in K.S.A. 83-201(a), which states: “ “Weights and measures’ means all commercial weights or measures of every kind, instruments and devices for weighing and measuring, and any appliance and accessories associated with any or all such instruments and devices and any point-of-sale system.” (Emphasis added.)
Based upon the above canons of construction and the definition of “weights and measures” in K.S.A. 83-201(a), I conclude K.S.A. 83-219(a) does apply to the Oshman point-of-sale system and would consider the remaining issues raised on appeal but not addressed by the majority.