Petitioner was convicted of three murders and sentenced to death almost entirely on the trial testimony of two teenage girls, Darlene S. and Joanna N. Both of these crucial trial witnesses have since admitted under oath, at a habeas corpus reference hearing ordered by this court, that their trial testimony against petitioner was false. The majority acknowledges that Darlene’s trial testimony was false, and it agrees with the referee (a retired superior court judge) that petitioner has shown Joanna to be a chronic liar and manipulator. The majority nonetheless concludes that we should accept Joanna’s trial testimony as truthful and reject her later recantation as false. The majority reaches this conclusion by drawing a series of inferences from facts in the record.
I disagree. Because the punishment of death differs from all other criminal punishments both in its severity and in its finality, there is a special need that judgments in capital cases rest on evidence that is substantial, credible, and reliable. (See Ford v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 399, 411 [106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602-2603, 91 L.Ed.2d 335] (plur. opn.).) Darlene’s trial testimony did not provide credible evidence of petitioner’s guilt because, as the majority concedes, that testimony was false. Joanna’s trial testimony is highly suspect because, as the referee found, she is a chronic liar. Unlike the majority, as I will explain, I find nothing in the record before this court to provide the necessary reassurance that Joanna testified truthfully at petitioner’s trial. I would not send petitioner to his death on such flimsy evidence.
I
A. Background
During the summer of 1984, three teenage girls (Lynda Burrill and sisters Denise and Debbie Galston) disappeared from the town of Placerville in El Dorado County. Their decomposed remains were later discovered in the nearby El Dorado National Forest. Public suspicion focused on petitioner, a 27-year-old loner who lived in his car.
At the end of October 1984, when a deer hunter found the decomposed remains of the third victim, Debbie, the prosecution did not have enough evidence to charge petitioner with any of the three murders. No physical evidence tied him to any of the killings. And the circumstantial evidence implicating him was quite weak: All three victims frequented The Oz, a local video game arcade and teenage hangout, as did petitioner; petitioner had expressed his dislike of the Oz-crowd girls, making callous and threatening remarks about them; he was seen with victim Lynda the night she disappeared, and the next day he had a scratch on his forehead; he told contradictory stories about whether he knew Lynda; he kept knives, guns, and *1022handcuffs in his car; and he had camped and logged in the forested areas where the bodies were found.
1. Joanna N. ’s accusations
In late October 1984, Joanna N. talked to El Dorado County Sheriff’s deputies Detective Erol Hamage and Sergeant Bill Wilson. Joanna had been a friend of victims Denise and Debbie Galston, as they all lived in the same group foster home. Joanna told the sheriff’s deputies she knew “something” about the murders. Because she seemed unwilling to say more, the deputies had her meet with a psychologist, Dr. Frank Dougherty, Chief of the El Dorado County Mental Health Department, in the hope that she would feel more comfortable discussing what she knew about the murders with him.
Joanna saw Dr. Dougherty on November 1, 1984, and told him that petitioner had killed Denise. Eventually, she accompanied Dr. Dougherty and the sheriffs deputies on two trips to the forest where loggers had found Denise’s body. During the second trip to the murder scene, Joanna said she had seen petitioner kill Denise. The next day, November 7, Joanna described petitioner’s stabbing of Denise.
2. Darlene S. ’s accusations
During the summer of 1984, Darlene S., who was then petitioner’s girlfriend, lived in the group foster home with victims Denise and Debbie. On November 9, Detective Hamage and Sergeant Wilson brought Darlene to the sheriffs station for an interview. They asked Darlene if she knew anything about the murders. She insisted she did not, and she continued to do so in a series of interviews conducted throughout November. But on December 4, Darlene told the sheriffs deputies that a couple of days after Debbie’s disappearance, she had found a key chain belonging to Debbie in petitioner’s car, and that when Darlene showed the key chain to petitioner, he had admitted killing Debbie, Denise, and Lynda.
In May 1985, petitioner’s case went to trial on three counts of capital murder. Joanna and Darlene testified for the prosecution.
B. Joanna’s Trial Testimony
At petitioner’s trial, Joanna told this story:
In the early evening of June 12, 1984, Joanna, Denise, and several other young people were at a “wandering party” in downtown Placerville. At some *1023point, the party moved to a place outside a car dealership. Joanna noticed petitioner drive by, and shortly thereafter saw Denise heading home. Denise walked toward the freeway underpass and then got into petitioner’s car. Petitioner then picked up Joanna, telling her they were going to “a party.”
After heading east on Highway 50, they stopped on a dirt road off Mormon Emigrant Trail. Joanna got out, walked uphill, and vomited. While washing her face in “a little trickle of water, a stream,” she heard Denise scream. From a distance of 55 to 60 feet in the moonlit night, Joanna saw Denise run from petitioner. Denise was naked and had her hands behind her back as if bound. Petitioner caught Denise, pushed her down, pulled a knife, and stabbed her. Joanna fled through the forest, making her way back to Mormon Emigrant Trail. There, she hid from an approaching car, fearing it might be petitioner. She then hailed the next car and got a ride back to Placerville from a young man named Joe, whom she had previously met at a local teen dance club. Back in Placerville, Joanna encountered Bruce Nesthus, who had been at the “wandering party” with her earlier. She spent the rest of the night at his house. Not until five months later, when she talked to Dr. Dougherty, Detective Hamage and Sergeant Wilson, did Joanna reveal to anyone her eyewitness account of Denise’s murder.
C. Darlene’s Trial Testimony
At petitioner’s trial, Darlene gave this account:
In the spring and summer of 1984, petitioner often referred to victims Denise and Debbie Galston as “sluts.” Once petitioner told Darlene, “[t]hree [will] be eliminated from the foster home” where the sisters lived “and three more.”
On June 12, 1984, the day of Denise’s disappearance, Darlene spent the early evening with petitioner. Around 10:00 p.m., petitioner took Darlene back to the group foster home. When she went outside to smoke, she saw petitioner’s car near the freeway; moments later, Denise entered petitioner’s car. A few days thereafter, Darlene told petitioner that Denise never came back to the foster home. He told her not to worry.
Denise’s sister Debbie was last seen on August 8, 1984. A day or two later, while cleaning petitioner’s car, Darlene found a unicorn key chain belonging to Debbie. After she confronted petitioner with the key chain, he admitted that he strangled and stabbed Denise, Debbie, and Lynda.
*1024II
A. Joanna’s Recantations
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus and later at the reference hearing this court ordered, petitioner presented evidence that Joanna had lied at his capital trial. Petitioner offered declarations by three people that Joanna had told them that her trial testimony was false. The declaration by Allen Dwyer, who had been married to Joanna between 1987 and 1989, stated that during the brief marriage, Joanna several times said that on the night Denise disappeared, Joanna was not with petitioner nor did she see him kill Denise, and that she had passed out drunk in a park in downtown Placerville. Declarations by Dwyer’s mother, Anita Hoosier5 and a friend, Laura Lawrence, asserted that Joanna had made similar comments to them.
In response, the Attorney General prepared a declaration, which Joanna signed on May 10, 1990, denying ever telling anyone that she had lied at trial.
On January 16, 1992, Joanna appeared with counsel at the El Dorado County District Attorney’s Office. The district attorney granted Joanna immunity from prosecution for any false testimony at petitioner’s preliminary hearing or trial or in her May 10, 1990 declaration. Then, in a tape-recorded deposition, Joanna recanted her trial testimony about Denise’s murder. Specifically, Joanna denied that the night of June 12, 1984, she saw Denise get into petitioner’s car, that moments later, petitioner picked her up, and that the three then drove to a remote area where petitioner stabbed Denise. Joanna acknowledged encountering Bruce Nesthus early the next morning and sleeping at his house, but she could not remember the exact time that she met him because she was drunk and under the influence of drugs. According to Joanna, she told the sheriff’s deputies that she witnessed Denise’s murder because she believed petitioner had killed Denise, as well as Lynda and Debbie.
Some two years later, at the reference hearing in February 1994, Joanna again recanted her trial testimony. She testified that she made up the story about witnessing petitioner kill Denise because of her own suspicions about petitioner and because of pressure put on her by Detective Hamage and Sergeant Wilson.
Joanna mentioned telling Kenny Moulton, her boyfriend at the time of the trial, that she had lied at trial. She also said so to her ex-husband (Allen Dwyer), his mother, and Laura Lawrence, the three people who provided declarations in support of the petition.
*1025Joanna said that during the trial she became good friends with Sergeant Wilson and his wife Sherry. Sometime after the trial she told Wilson that her trial testimony about seeing petitioner stab Denise was untrue (she claimed to have only heard Denise’s screams), and that she did not ride back to Placerville with Joe (someone she had previously met at a teen dance club) but rather with petitioner.
Joanna said she delayed telling the district attorney that she had lied at trial because she was afraid that he would prosecute her for peijury and that ex-husband Dwyer would gain custody of their children. She eventually decided to reveal her false testimony because she wanted to clear her conscience and because of significant changes in her lifestyle, explaining that she no longer used drugs or alcohol, and that she had become a practicing Christian.
B. The Referee’s Findings Regarding Joanna’s Trial Testimony
This court asked the referee to determine whether Joanna’s trial testimony was false. He made these findings: Joanna was a chronic liar, who throughout her life had made up elaborate and creative falsehoods. The referee nonetheless concluded that Joanna had not lied about seeing petitioner kill Denise. But he disbelieved Joanna’s trial testimony that she fled through the forest and hitched a ride back to Placerville with someone named Joe. Based on his personal observation of the steep and rugged terrain, the referee concluded that it would have been impossible for Joanna to make her way from the murder site to the paved highway. Because petitioner’s jury at the trial had visited the murder scene, the referee considered it highly unlikely that the jurors would have believed Joanna’s testimony about how she got back to Placerville and thus would not have considered that testimony in finding petitioner guilty of Denise’s murder. For that reason, the referee concluded that the false part of Joanna’s trial testimony was not material.
In the referee’s view, there was no way for Joanna to have returned from the murder scene to Placerville other than riding back with petitioner. He posited that Joanna thought she could be prosecuted as an accessory to murder for having done so. That, the referee said, would explain Joanna’s initial reluctance to tell Detective Hamage and Sergeant Wilson about seeing petitioner stab Denise.
The referee believed Joanna’s reference hearing testimony that sometime after petitioner’s trial she told Sergeant Wilson that she had lied about seeing petitioner stab Denise (she had only heard screams) and about riding back to Placerville with Joe (she rode back with petitioner). But the referee disbelieved Joanna’s claim to Wilson that she had only heard but not seen the *1026murder. That, according to the referee, was just another posttrial attempt by Joanna to distance herself from the murder.
C. Darlene’s Recantation
After she was granted immunity for any peijury committed at petitioner’s preliminary hearing and capital trial, Darlene testified at the reference hearing that key aspects of her trial testimony were false. Specifically, she denied that petitioner ever told her he had killed any of the three girls; thus, her trial testimony attributing these admissions to petitioner was false. Also, contrary to her- trial testimony, she did not see Denise get into petitioner’s car on the night of June 12, 1984, when Denise disappeared. Petitioner never told her “[tjhree [will] be eliminated from the foster home and three more.” (See p. 1023, ante.) And contrary to her trial testimony, Darlene found Debbie’s unicorn key chain in petitioner’s car after petitioner and Darlene had given Debbie a ride, well before Debbie’s disappearance. Darlene immediately returned the item to Debbie.
Darlene explained at the reference hearing that although petitioner did refer to sisters Denise and Debbie Galston as “sluts,” he did so because they kept hanging around with Joanna, who reputedly was “going to bed with every guy” at The Oz video game arcade.
Darlene said that during her interrogations by Detective Hamage and Sergeant Wilson throughout November 1984, she repeatedly told them she knew nothing about the killings, but “they wouldn’t accept it.” The two sheriffs deputies accused Darlene of involvement in the murders, saying she was part of a “conspiracy” and could be sent to prison. Although her mother and stepfather were present at these sessions, Darlene testified that she was afraid of her stepfather, who hated petitioner and.had sexually abused Darlene since she was 10.
Between an interview session with the prosecutor on November 15, 1984, when Darlene denied knowing anything about the murders, and her taped interview with Detective Hamage and Sergeant Wilson on December 4, when she said petitioner had told her he killed the three girls, the two questioned her “off the record” for five to six hours each day. Because Hamage and Wilson kept “harassing [her] and bothering [her],” Darlene said she finally changed her story to the one she gave at trial: That petitioner told her he had killed Denise, Debbie, and Lynda.
The transcript of the December 4, 1984, taped interview of Darlene by Detective Hamage and Sergeant Wilson, which was also introduced by *1027petitioner at the reference hearing, shows that the two sheriffs deputies went to Darlene’s house and threatened her with arrest for “withholding information.” In that interview, Darlene for the first time mentioned statements to her by petitioner admitting that he had killed the three girls.
D. Referee’s Findings About Darlene
In response to our question whether Darlene had given false testimony at petitioner’s capital trial, the referee found that Darlene lied when she testified at trial (1) that she saw Denise enter petitioner’s car the night Denise disappeared; (2) that she found Debbie’s unicorn key chain in petitioner’s car a day or two after Debbie disappeared; and (3) that petitioner told her he had killed Debbie, Denise, and Lynda.
The referee further found that “many manipulations of Darlene during the interrogation process” by Detective Hamage and Sergeant Wilson, culminating in their threat “to arrest her for ‘withholding information’ ” led her to lie at petitioner’s capital trial. The referee concluded, however, that Darlene’s false testimony was not material because she was a poor witness who could not keep her story straight, and who was thoroughly impeached by defense counsel.
Ill
A. Pertinent Legal Standards
California law provides for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus if “[f]alse evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against [the petitioner] at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration. . . .” (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1).)
The petitioner has the burden of establishing entitlement to relief and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 546 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527].) Thus, to successfully mount a collateral attack, the petitioner must overcome the presumptions favoring the “ ‘truth, accuracy, and fairness of the conviction and sentence.’ ” (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 886 P.2d 1252].)
When this court orders a reference hearing, it is not bound by the referee’s factual findings, although they are generally accorded great weight when supported by substantial evidence. (In re Johnson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 447, 461 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 957 P.2d 299].) “Deference to the referee is called for on factual questions, especially those requiring resolution of testimonial *1028conflicts and assessment of witnesses’ credibility . . . (Ibid.) This deference “ ‘ “derives from the fact that the referee had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their manner of testifying.” ’ ” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 710 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017].)
This court independently reviews the referee’s resolution of legal issues and mixed questions of fact and law. (In re Johnson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 461; In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 180-181 [249 Cal.Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370].) Whether false evidence “is substantially material or probative” (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)) calls for independent review because materiality presents a mixed question of fact and law. “Mixed questions are those in which 1 “the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” ’ ” (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243]; People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 984 [232 Cal.Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180].)
B. Materially False Testimony by Joanna
On petitioner’s claim that Joanna gave materially false testimony at his capital trial, the majority adopts the referee’s findings and conclusions that Joanna lied only about how she got back to Placerville (see p. 1025, ante) and that her false testimony was not material. Thus, according to the majority, Joanna testified truthfully at petitioner’s capital trial that on the night of June 12, 1984, she saw Denise enter petitioner’s car; that petitioner turned around and picked up Joanna, telling her they were going to a “party”; that the three traveled to a forested area, where Joanna left the car and vomited; that shortly thereafter, she saw a naked Denise running with her hands behind her back as if tied, and petitioner chasing and ultimately stabbing Denise with a knife.
In reaching that conclusion, the majority highlights certain findings by the referee. We usually defer to a referee’s factual findings when they are based on the referee’s observation of witness demeanor at the reference hearing. (In re Avena, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 710.) Here, however, the referee’s findings are based not so much on witness demeanor at the reference hearing but rather on a series of inferences drawn from the evidence presented at trial and at the reference hearing. These inferences do not warrant deference, as this court is in as good a position as a referee to draw logical inferences from evidence.
The majority relies on the referee’s finding that at the 1994 reference hearing Joanna could give no details of her whereabouts on June 12, 1984 *1029(the night Denise disappeared), between 9:30 p.m. and 3:00 or 3:30 the next morning (the approximate time Joanna encountered Bruce Nesthus with whom she spent the night). (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1000.) I see nothing unusual about Joanna’s inability to recall at the reference hearing details of events that took place 10 years earlier. Bruce Nesthus’s October 4, 1984, telephone interview with Detective Hamage is instructive on this point because it took place only four months after Denise disappeared. (Nesthus moved to another state before Denise’s body was found and thus did not know she had been murdered.) Asked by Detective Hamage about “the twelfth of June” and “the drinking party [that] wound up down at [the auto dealership],” Nesthus replied, “I can’t remember. It doesn’t click in my mind.”
In concluding that Joanna’s trial testimony was essentially trae, the majority points to her having directed the sheriffs deputies in November 1984 to the approximate location off Ferrari Mill Road where Denise’s body had been found earlier. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1001-1002.) But as Joanna explained at the reference hearing in 1994, she had previously lived on Sly Park Road off Highway 50 (near Ferrari Mill Road) and she knew from news reports the approximate location where loggers had found Denise’s body one-half mile west of Ferrari Mill Road.
The majority also makes much of Joanna’s ability on June 22, 1985 (her third trip to the scene of Denise’s murder), to lead Sergeant Wilson to “within 75 yards” of the spot where loggers 11 months earlier had found Denise’s body. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1003.) I am not persuaded. The circumstances of that trip are highly suspect.
Sergeant Wilson arranged the trip just days before the guilt phase of petitioner’s capital case was to be submitted to the jury and right after the prosecution learned that a “critical piece” of evidence linking petitioner to Denise’s murder—a man’s reversible black-and-orange jacket found with Denise’s clothes on April 30, 1985—belonged not to petitioner but to Bruce Nesthus. The prosecutor had already introduced evidence suggesting that petitioner owned the jacket when Nesthus (who by then had left California) returned to Placerville to testify. Nesthus inquired about a jacket he had lent to Denise at the “wandering party” on the night she disappeared. Shown the jacket found with Denise’s clothes, Nesthus identified it as his and thereafter testified about lending Denise his jacket. When the prosecutor learned that the jacket was not petitioner’s, he began “bouncing off the walls,” as Sergeant Wilson testified at the reference hearing, for fear of losing the case. It was then that Sergeant Wilson took Joanna on one more trip to the scene of Denise’s murder in the wilderness area outside Placerville in an effort to bolster the case against petitioner.
*1030It is undisputed that on that June 22, 1985, trip, Sergeant Wilson drove straight to the intersection on Ferrari Mill Road, where he told Joanna to direct him to the place where she saw petitioner stab Denise. It is also undisputed that it was only on her third try that Joanna picked the road where Denise’s body had been found. As Joanna explained at the reference hearing, “body language” hints by Sergeant Wilson helped her to pick the right location. The referee rejected Joanna’s account, however, instead believing Sergeant Wilson’s reference hearing testimony denying any intent to give Joanna hints about the location. Even so, in a last-ditch effort to make the case against petitioner, Wilson may have unwittingly used body language to hint to Joanna which road to take to the murder scene.
Moreover, Sergeant Wilson’s credibility is in question. As the referee found, Wilson and his partner, Detective Hamage, had coerced the false testimony that Darlene gave against petitioner at his capital trial. (See p. 1027, ante) Furthermore, although Wilson denied at the reference hearing that Joanna had ever mentioned to him after the trial that she lied at petitioner’s trial, the referee accepted Joanna’s testimony at the reference hearing that she told Wilson she heard Denise scream but did not see petitioner stab Denise, and that thereafter she rode back to town with petitioner rather than hitchhiking a ride from Joe as she had testified at trial. Implicit in the referee’s finding is his conclusion that Wilson’s reference hearing testimony on this point was false.
The circumstance of Bmce Nesthus’s reversible jacket lends additional support to my conclusion that petitioner has, by a preponderance of evidence, proven the falsity of Joanna’s trial testimony about witnessing petitioner kill Denise. Nesthus testified at trial that he lent the jacket to Denise at the wandering party (see p. 1029, ante) after she complained about being cold. The jacket was found together with the clothes Denise was wearing on the night she was killed. Thus, Denise must have worn the jacket when she left the party. Joanna testified at trial that when Denise left the party, she walked toward the freeway underpass and then got into petitioner’s car. Curiously, in Joanna’s many sessions with Detective Hamage and Sergeant Wilson in November 1984, when she described what Denise was wearing on the night of her death, Joanna made no mention of Denise wearing a man’s black-and-orange jacket.
The referee had no persuasive explanation for Joanna’s obvious reluctance at Darlene’s initial interview by Hamage and Wilson on November 9, 1985, to tell Darlene about seeing petitioner kill Denise. (The two sheriffs deputies repeatedly asked Joanna to describe her crime scene observations to Darlene, but Joanna would not do so. Ultimately, the sheriffs deputies *1031revealed to Darlene what Joanna had told them about petitioner’s killing of Denise.) The referee concluded that Joanna was reluctant to tell Darlene what she had seen because she was ashamed of not helping Denise escape from petitioner. It is more likely that, as Joanna testified at the reference hearing, she thought that Darlene, who had been petitioner’s girlfriend, knew what had happened to Denise and would catch Joanna in a lie.
In my view, petitioner, has amply satisfied his burden of proving that Joanna’s trial testimony that she witnessed petitioner kill Denise was a lie. Joanna repeatedly told others, including her ex-husband, his mother, a friend, and ultimately Sergeant Wilson, that she had lied at trial. And she twice under oath recanted her trial testimony, first at a recorded deposition by the El Dorado County District Attorney and later at the reference hearing.
Other than Darlene’s testimony at trial that petitioner told her about killing the three girls (see p. 1023, ante), only Joanna’s testimony put petitioner at the scene of any of the three murders. If believed by the jury, that testimony must have had a devastating effect on petitioner’s defense. Accordingly, the evidence was “ ‘of such significance’ ” that with “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” (In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 546), it affected the outcome on guilt and on penalty at petitioner’s trial. Therefore, based on materially false testimony by Joanna, I would grant petitioner the relief he is seeking.
Even if I were to agree with the majority in rejecting Joanna’s recantations of her trial testimony, petitioner would still be entitled to relief based on the materially false testimony of Darlene, as discussed below.
C. Materially False Testimony by Darlene
The referee found that Darlene, petitioner’s former girlfriend, had lied at petitioner’s trial on three points: (1) that on the night of Denise’s disappearance, Darlene saw Denise get into petitioner’s car; (2) that a day or two after the disappearance of Denise’s sister, Debbie, Darlene found Debbie’s unicorn key chain in petitioner’s car; and (3) that, when Darlene confronted petitioner with the key chain, he told her he had killed not only Debbie but also Denise and Lynda.
Was Darlene’s false testimony “substantially material or probative” (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)) on the question of petitioner’s guilt of killing the three girls? As stated earlier, false evidence is substantially material or *1032probative if it is “ ‘of such significance that it may have affected the outcome,’ in the sense that ‘with reasonable probability it could have affected the outcome . . . [Citation.]” (In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 546.) As I explain, this test is met here.
Of Darlene’s three lies, the most damaging to petitioner’s defense was her testimony that petitioner told her about killing the three girls. This court has held that the erroneous admission of a confession is not reversible per se. (People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 509 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037].) But as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, evidence of a confession has such a “profound impact on the jury” that appellate courts “ ‘may justifiably doubt [the jury’s] ability to put [a confession] out of mind even if told to do so.’” (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296 [111 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 113 L.Ed.2d 302].) To put it succinctly, a confession is “a kind of evidentiary bombshell.” (People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 731 [44 Cal.Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665], overruled on other grounds in People v. Cahill, supra, at pp. 509-510, fn. 17.)
The majority concludes that Darlene’s false testimony that petitioner told her he had killed the three girls was not substantially material because “overwhelming evidence at trial, separate and apart from [Darlene’s false evidence] amply supported the jury’s verdict.” (Maj. opn, ante, at p. 1011.) In support, the majority relies first and foremost on Joanna’s trial testimony that she “witnessed petitioner murder Denise.” (Id. at p. 1012.)
I agree that Joanna’s trial testimony, if accepted by the jury, together with the circumstantial evidence supporting petitioner’s guilt, would amply support the determination that petitioner killed Denise, Debbie, and Lynda. But without Joanna’s trial testimony, the circumstantial evidence was very weak.1 Moreover, the record of petitioner’s capital trial reveals substantial problems with Joanna’s testimony that she saw petitioner kill Denise, thus calling into question whether the jury ever seriously considered that testimony in determining petitioner’s guilt.
At the guilt phase of petitioner’s capital trial, the jury heard that Joanna had lied to the police and others throughout the summer and fall of 1984 about the disappearance of Denise; defense counsel elicited from Joanna that *1033in her interviews with the sheriff’s deputies and with Dr. Frank Dougherty of the El Dorado County Mental Health Department she had “made up stories, lies, and other scenarios that never happened,” repeatedly asking all three if she had given enough information to “get [petitioner] arrested”; and he established on cross-examination that shortly before Joanna told Detective Hamage and Sergeant Wilson she knew something about the murders, an $8,500 reward was offered for information leading to the conviction of the killer, and that after telling the sheriffs deputies she saw petitioner kill Denise, Joanna had applied for the reward.
Defense counsel also played for the jury a tape recording of Dr. Dougherty’s initial interview with Joanna, whose account of her June 12, 1984 trip to the woods outside Placerville with murder victim Denise and petitioner differed greatly from her trial testimony describing that same event. Thus, at the close of the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, the prosecution must have realized there was a serious problem with the credibility of its star witness, Joanna. This is apparent from the prosecutor’s argument to the jury describing “the credibility of Joanna” as a “major issue,” and suggesting that the jury could “hypothetically take Joanna” out of the case and evaluate the evidence as if Joanna “never appeared before this jury and . . . ha[d] nothing whatsoever to do” with the prosecution’s case. The prosecutor then discussed other evidence as supporting petitioner’s guilt, stressing that none of that evidence had “one iota to do with Joanna.” He added that if Joanna “never came here and never said one word, between the testimony of Darlene and the other witnesses there is a fabric, there is a thread that goes through the case, and it weaves together with an absolute and compelling certainty,” a point the prosecutor twice reiterated in closing argument.
The prosecutor’s argument to the jury underscores the materiality of Darlene’s false testimony, as the Attorney General essentially conceded at the reference hearing. The Attorney General’s brief filed with the referee on August 28, 1995, states: “If this Court finds that Darlene neither witnessed any of the murders nor heard a confession of those murders by petitioner and that her trial testimony in that regard (and, likewise, all the pre-offense incriminating statements Darlene also attributed to petitioner) was false, then respondent concedes that since there is no physical evidence linking [petitioner] to any of the three murders, no evidence linking him to Debbie’s murder, and only circumstantial evidence linking him to Lynda’s murder, this false evidence was both material and probative as to guilt and to punishment as to Counts II (Lynda) and III (Debbie). It is also arguable [Darlene’s false evidence] is material and probative as to Count I (Denise), since in his argument [Deputy District Attorney] Tepper told the jury that they *1034[.sic] could reject Joanna’s testimony in its entirety and still find sufficient evidence to convict on all three counts.” (Italics added.)
In addition to Darlene’s false testimony that petitioner told her he had killed Denise, Debbie, and Lynda, she also lied about seeing Denise get into petitioner’s car the night Denise disappeared and finding Debbie’s key chain in petitioner’s car a day or two after Debbie disappeared.
Darlene’s false testimony that on June 12, 1984 (the night Denise disappeared), she saw Denise get into petitioner’s car corroborated Joanna’s trial testimony that petitioner that night had picked up Denise and then Joanna near the freeway underpass in Placerville. (Compare Joanna’s trial testimony on this point (p. 1024, ante) with Darlene’s (p. 1023, ante).) Because Darlene’s false testimony tended to support Joanna’s testimony by placing Denise in a car with petitioner on the night of her murder, that false testimony by Darlene was particularly damaging to petitioner. Jurors skeptical of Joanna’s credibility, which the prosecutor acknowledged was a “major issue” in the case, may have been persuaded of the essential truth of Joanna’s testimony because of the corroborating evidence provided by Darlene. Darlene’s false testimony about finding Debbie’s key chain in petitioner’s car shortly after Debbie disappeared, as the deputy attorney general highlighted in the portion of the brief quoted above, was the only evidence presented by the prosecution at trial to tie petitioner to Debbie’s murder. Thus, it too was highly damaging.
In determining the materiality of Darlene’s false testimony—that she saw Denise get into petitioner’s car the night Denise disappeared, that she found Debbie’s key chain in petitioner’s car a day or two after Debbie disappeared, and that petitioner admitted to her that he had killed Denise, Debbie, and Lynda—this court must view it “objectively,” in light of all “relevant circumstances” to decide whether there is a “reasonable probability” that the false testimony affected the outcome of the trial. (In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 546.) Thus, we must consider the potential effect of Darlene’s false testimony on the jury in light of the other evidence favoring the prosecution at trial. Putting aside the testimony of Joanna that defense counsel had effectively impeached, leading the prosecutor to suggest to the jury that Joanna’s testimony was unnecessary to the jury’s determination of petitioner’s guilt, the prosecution’s case consisted of this scant circumstantial evidence: Petitioner disliked the Oz-crowd girls, which included murder victims Denise, Debbie, and Lynda, and he had made callous and threatening remarks about them; he was seen with Lynda the night she disappeared, and the next day he had a scratch on his forehead; he told contradictory stories *1035about whether he knew Lynda; he kept knives, guns, and handcuffs in his car; and he was known to have frequented the forested areas where the girls’ bodies were found. Considering the totality of circumstances in this case, I conclude that Darlene’s false testimony that she saw Denise get into petitioner’s car the night Denise disappeared, that she found Debbie’s key chain in petitioner’s car shortly after Debbie disappeared, and that petitioner told her he killed Denise, Debbie and Lynda was “substantially material or probative” (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)) on the question of petitioner’s guilt.
In concluding that Darlene’s false testimony was not material, the majority adopts the referee’s finding that defense counsel’s cross-examination had “‘tom to pieces’” Darlene’s story of petitioner’s confession. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1009.) The referee noted that when defense counsel questioned Darlene about the details of what she claimed petitioner had told her about the killings, she “could not remember the lies she had stated on direct [examination], so [she] either denied them or made [up] new and more obvious lies.” From this the majority concludes that the confession’s believability was “ ‘open to question’ ” and would not have been accepted by the jury. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1010-1011.)
I agree that under intense questioning by defense counsel about certain details of the three killings, Darlene’s confusion was evident. But in my view her uncertainty did not completely undercut the basic thrust of her testimony—that petitioner, her then boyfriend and near-constant companion, had told her of killing Denise, Lynda, and Debbie. Moreover, as explained on page 1027, ante, whether false evidence is material, that is, whether it could have affected the outcome of the trial (see In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 546), presents a mixed question of law and fact that this court reviews independently (see In re Johnson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 461; In re Cordero, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 180-181). Thus, I do not here defer to the referee’s findings on the materiality of the false testimony. The false evidence included testimony attributing to petitioner a confession to killing the three teenage victims, which likely would have made a strong impact on the jury. In light of defense counsel’s effective impeachment of Joanna (who testified that she saw petitioner kill Denise), the prosecutor’s invitation for the jury to find petitioner guilty without considering Joanna’s testimony, and the prosecution’s otherwise relatively weak circumstantial case against petitioner, there is at least a “reasonable probability” that Darlene’s false evidence “could have affected” the jury’s determination of petitioner’s guilt. (See In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 546.) Accordingly, based on the false testimony of Darlene, petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1).)
*1036Conclusion
For the reasons given above, I would grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
At oral argument, the Attorney General stressed that the prosecution’s trial evidence included the testimony of more than 70 witnesses in addition to Darlene and Joanna. Having reviewed the testimony of those other witnesses, I find it to be only peripherally relevant. None testified to having witnessed any of the three murders or to have heard petitioner confess to those murders.